Why We Need Interdependence Theory

The exceptional sociability of human life colors nearly every phenomenon in the social and behavioral sciences. However, most psychological theories continue to adopt a within‐person perspective, analyzing human behavior by reference to individual‐level biological processes, personal dispositions, or cognitive experiences. Interdependence theory is an important antidote to this actor‐focused bias. Interdependence theory identifies the most important characteristics of interpersonal situations via a comprehensive analysis of situation structure and describes the implications of structure for understanding intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. Situation structure matters because it is the interpersonal reality within which motives are activated, toward which cognition is oriented and around which interaction unfolds. This paper describes key principles of interdependence structure and processes, and illustrates the utility of an interdependence theoretic analysis via a review of four phenomena – regulatory fit, persistence in the face of dissatisfaction, tit‐for‐tat versus generosity, and the origins and consequences of trust.     

Why We Need Qualitative Research in Suicidology

Using the differentiation between explanations and understanding from philosophy of science as the point of departure, a critical look at the current mainstream suicidological research was launched. An almost exclusive use of quantitative methodology focusing on explanations is demonstrated. This bias in scope and methodology has to a large extent taken the suicidological field into a dead‐end of repetitious research. It is argued that an increased focus on understanding and thus extended use of qualitative methodology is essential in bringing the suicidological field forward.     

Beyond Income: Why We Want to Keep on Working Even if We Don’t Need the Money

Applied Research in Quality of Life - This research focuses upon non-financial work motivation against the background of the debate about the introduction of a basic income. We focus on work...     

Privacy and the Computer: Why We Need Privacy in the Information Society

For more than thirty years an extensive and significant philosophical debate about the notion of privacy has been going on. Therefore it seems puzzling that most current authors on information technology and privacy assume that all individuals intuitively know why privacy is important. This assumption allows privacy to be seen as a liberal "nice to have" value: something that can easily be discarded in the face of other really important matters like national security, the doing of justice and the effective administration of the state and the corporation. In this paper I want to argue that there is something fundamental in the notion of privacy and that due to the profoundness of the notion it merits extraordinary measures of protection and overt support. I will also argue that the notion of transparency (as advocated by Wasserstrom) is a useless concept without privacy and that accountability and transparency can only be meaningful if encapsulated in the context of privacy. From philosophical and legal literature I will discuss and argue the value of privacy as the essential context and foundation of human autonomy in social relationships. In the conclusion of the paper I will discuss implications of this notion of privacy for the information society in general, and for the discipline of information systems in particular.     

为何信赖科学(论纲)

本文是英国布里斯托尔大学退休物理学教授齐曼提交给清华大学、北京师范大学和中国自然辩证法研究会于 2 0 0 2年 11月共同举办的“科学技术”中的哲学问题学术研讨会”的报告 ,原文“BelivinginScience”。该报告以纲要的形式论述了其科学哲学的框架 ,涉及科学哲学的诸多理论问题该报告在大会宣读颇受好评 ,现征得作者同意 ,翻译发表 ,以飨读者。     

Knowledge to Wisdom: We Need a Revolution

Introduction The following document is a very brief summary of a thesis and argument that I have devoted the last 30 years of my life to trying to get across to my fellow human beings. It was first spelled out in What’s Wrong With Science? (Bran’s Head Books, 1976) and subsequently in From Knowledge to Wisdom (Blackwell, 1984), Is Science Neurotic? (Imperial College Press, 2004) and numerous articles, references to which can be found on . Three years ago an international group was formed, called Friends of Wisdom, which seeks to get across to academics and the public the compelling arguments and urgent need to transform academic inquiry so that its basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom. The document below is taken from the website of Friends of Wisdom, the URL of which is . It is the mission statement of Friends of Wisdom. You are invited to join.     

Ferenczi and Winnicott: Why We Need Their Radical Edge: Commentary on Paper by Michael Parsons

Parsons's paper, “An Independent Theory of Clinical Technique,” is discussed. Agreement is expressed with many of the theoretical points made by Parsons, and the creative and freeing historical role of the British Independent tradition (recently attacked by Kleinian authors such as Segal) is praised. However, the author sees some of the clinical examples in the paper as expressing a traditionalist conception of psychoanalytic practice, with a strong one-sided emphasis on the analyst as a knowledgeable expert offering deep interpretations. Parsons does not question the nature of the actual intersubjective relationship in each dyad, with its fluctuations and its subtle nuances, which can go far beyond the proclaimed roles of the two partners, at times even reversing them. More radical points of view can be found in the work of Ferenczi and Winnicott, two authors who are significant both for Parsons and for the author; for example, Ferenczi's emphasis on the patient's capacity to interpret the analyst's countertransference, and the experiments with the setting both made in their search for an adaptation to the unique ‘analysand's needs. In conclusion, the paper calls for continued departure from standard techniques of any kind, critically deconstructing all traditional assumptions regarding the analytic process.     

Why We Need Skepticism in Argument: Skeptical Engagement as a Requirement for Epistemic Justice

The Argumentative Adversariality debate is over the question of whether argument must be adversarial. A particular locus of this debate is on skeptical challenges in critical dialogue. The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) in argument is a practical manifestation of argumentative adversariality. Views about the on-the-ground value of the DSS vary. On one hand, in “The Social & Political Limitations of Philosophy” (2012), Phyllis Rooney argues that the DSS leads to epistemic injustice. On the other, Allan Hazlett in his recent piece “Critical Injustice” (2020) argues for the virtues of the skeptical stance in terms of epistemic justice. Both Rooney and Hazlett are concerned with the role skeptical engagement plays in argument, but they assign opposite values to it. In this essay, I review Rooney and Hazlett’s examples and (i) show that the epistemic dysfunction in the two scholar’s going cases is one and the same, and (ii) argue that the cause of both is a lack of proper skeptical engagement. Skeptical engagement is a requirement for epistemic justice. Together (i) and (ii) constitute an initial defense of the Adversarialist position against objections regarding the social epistemic risk of the skeptical stance.

     

Resource Cost Analysis: We Really Need to Know

Analysis of costs in delivering special services is seen within the context of increasing demands by various consituencies for cost accountability and containment. The problem of analyzing such cost is considered and approaches to cost analysis are delineated. The Resource Cost Model is suggested as a useful cost analysis method and discussed in terms of potential advantages and limitations at local school levels.     

Psychotherapy With African American Men: What We Know and What We Need to Know

African American men are at an increasingly high risk of experiencing psychological disturbances. Strategies for establishing effective therapeutic relationships with these clients are provided in the literature. Notably absent are empirical data pertaining to the effectiveness of psychotherapy with African American men. This article reviews the literature on psychotherapy and proposes an agenda for the next decade of research with African American male clients.     

Vertical and Horizontal Transcendence

Transcendence is explored from two perspectives: the traditional concept wherein the origination of the sacred is "out there," and the alternate concept wherein the sacred originates "here." Each is evaluated from the perspectives of aesthetics and hierarchy. Both forms of transcendence are viewed as essential to the full religious life.     

Millennials at Work: What We Know and What We Need to Do (If Anything)

There are a lot of opinions about who Millennials are, what they think and value, and how they will behave as they grow older and gain more experience in the workforce. The relatively sparse empirical research published on Millennials is confusing at best and contradictory at worst. As noted in this article and others in this special issue, however, there are a few topics including work attitudes, long-term health outcomes, and personality factors on which we have reasonably solid data to inform us about current and likely future behavior of Millennials. We address the importance of context for understanding behavior of people in different generations, a subject often missing from the discussion of generational similarities and differences. There are implications for practitioners of what we know and for how context affects behavior. We make suggestions for how practitioners can use the data available to inform decisions they make about working with Millennials. Finally, we discuss the importance of new directions of research on generational differences to help both practitioners and the research community better understand the realities of generational similarities and differences and rely less on urban myths or stereotypes.     

Rethinking Procreation: Why it Matters Why We Have Children

Attempts to explain the intuitive wrongfulness in alleged ‘wrongful life’ cases commonly do so by attributing harmful wrongdoing to the procreators in question. Such an approach identifies the resulting child as having been, in some sense, culpably harmed by their coming into existence. By contrast, and enlarging on work elsewhere, this paper explores the relevance of procreative motivation, rather than harm, for determining the morality of procreative conduct. I begin by reviewing the main objection to the harm‐based approach, which arises out of Derek Parfit's analysis of the non‐identity problem and its implications for preconception cases. Most attempts to avoid the non‐identity objection adopt either an impersonal harm approach or draw on some version of a metaphysical modal counterpart theory to defend a person‐affecting harm account. But here I develop an alternative view. The proposed account construes the wrongness in the considered cases as ‘evil’ rather than harm, and the type of evil in question as being of a non‐grievance, welfare‐connected, collective kind. Understanding the wrongness in this way offers a basis for the view that it matters morally why we procreate, and not just whether or how we do so.