论作为基本人权的公民诉讼权

公民诉讼权 ,是指当公民认为自己的合法权益受到侵害或与他人发生争议时 ,所享有的要求国家司法机关以审判的方式作出公正裁决的权利 ,属于公民的程序性人权。作为公民的基本人权 ,诉讼权不仅得到了世界上众多法治发达国家的宪法确认和保障 ,而且得到了国际人权保障最重要的文件《世界人权宣言》以及《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》的确认和保障。为了进一步加快我国法治化的进程 ,切实保护我国公民的基本权利 ,必须加强对公民诉讼权的法律保护     

人权视野下的个人健康权与选择权

从人权的角度看,个人健康权也是一种个人选择权,因为健康本来就是属于个人的。个人健康选择权在属性上,属于一种消极性、否定性和自由性的权利。个人健康选择权主要包括健康生活方式、治疗方式、保健方式、健康状态（水平）、健康隐私以及医疗保障组织选择。农村新型合作医疗是带有合作组织的性质的一种组织,它的推行,应当充分尊重农民自愿参加的选择权,不宜按照某个计划目标推行。     

Being Right,and Being in the Right

This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral reasoning and judgment on the one hand, and moral goodness on the other. I argue that moral reasoning is inescapably vulnerable to moral, as opposed to merely theoretical, failure. This, I argue, means that there is something deeply misleading in the way that Kant's moral theory, and some of its main rivals, have invited us to conceive of their subject matter.     

The Right to Strike and the Right to Work

ABSTRACT L. J. MacFarlane has contended that the right to strike is a keystone of democratic society. The right to strike is a right to free expression, association, assembly and power. And the right to strike is dependent upon the right to employment. MacFarlane denies that the right to employment is a universal right. I argue that unless the right to work is indeed universal MacFarlane's main contention is false. Forced unemployment is, amongst other things, the denial of full citizen status, for the range of liberties that constitutes the right to strike is essential to full participation in democracy. It is only when the traditional liberty-rights of free expression and striking are seen as being based upon such recipient rights as rights to media space and time and upon the right to work, that they can play their proper democratic role. This conception of those rights is missing from the work of Rawls and Nozick as well as from MacFarlane.     

进展期胃癌术后生存质量影响因素探讨

胃癌是我国发病率和病死率较高的恶性肿瘤,且住院病例90％以上为中晚期。因此预后不佳。近年来在进展期胃癌诊断和治疗方面有较大进展,尤其是人们对术后生存质量的重视。本文初步探讨了进展期胃癌术后生存质量的影响因素：如患者一般状况、手术方式、术后辅助放化疗和中医药治疗等。     

知情权 选择权 责任与义务

讨论患者的知情权、选择权与医生的责任义务很有现实意义。病人一旦就医,安全和早日康复是第一位的,当医生面对患者时,救死扶伤不惜一切地去挽救患者的生命是医生的天职,患者一旦推动生命,其他权力都是空话。     

The Right Stuff

This paper argues for including stuff in one's ontology. The distinction between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different ontologies of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure stuff ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. (The paper defends the latter.) Eleven different reasons for including stuff (in addition to things) in one's ontology are given (seven of which the author endorses and four of which would be sensible reasons for philosophers with certain metaphysical positions that the author does not happen to hold). Then five objections to positing stuff are considered and rejected.     

市场经济、道德权利与产权伦理

产权伦理是现代市场经济的一个根本性的精神基础,是建立有效的产权制度及其运行机制的重要条件;同时,它是人类道德体系的核心价值理念之一,是基于权利,义务与道德的内在逻辑构建起来的。产权伦理的研究具有重要的理论价值和现实意义,可以构成一门具有特殊的学科特质,研究方法和理论内容的伦理学学科。     

Against Right Reason

I argue against ‘right reason’ style accounts of how we should manage our beliefs in the face of higher‐order evidence. I start from the observation that such views seem to have bad practical consequences when we imagine someone acting on them. I then catalogs ways that Williamson, Weatherson, and Lasonen‐Aarnio have tried to block objections based on these consequences; I argue all fail. I then move on to offer my own theoretical picture of a rational ‘should believe,’ and show that, if such a picture is right, it can neatly explain why right reason isn't. I close by arguing that the extent to which anti‐luminosity arguments motivate right reason has been overstated; the positive picture developed here, despite rejecting right reason, is nonetheless consistent with luminosity failures.     

The Right Wrong-Makers

Right- and wrong-making features (“moral grounds”) are widely believed to play important normative roles, e.g. in morally apt or virtuous motivation. This paper argues that moral grounds have been systematically misidentified. Canonical statements of our moral theories tend to summarize, rather than directly state, the full range of moral grounds posited by the theory. Further work is required to “unpack” a theory’s criterion of rightness and identify the features that are of ground-level moral significance. As a result, it is not actually true that maximizing value is the fundamental right-making feature even for maximizing consequentialists. Focusing on the simple example of utilitarianism, I show how careful attention to the ground level can drastically influence how we think about our moral theories.     

Getting it Right

In addition to noting significant differences of interpretation between me and Kristopher Norris on understanding classic just war thought and judging its importance, this Comment flags errors of fact and faulty logic in the Norris essay.     

Hobbesian Right to Healthcare

Over the last few years we have had a debate regarding the role of government in providing healthcare. There has been a question as to whether or not the state's proper role requires protection of its subjects from the calamities associated with a lack of healthcare. In this article, I will argue that straightforward Hobbesian principles require the state to provide healthcare. It might seem odd (or, at the very least, anachronistic) that such a positive right can be justified by a philosopher who famously conceives of individuals as motivated by self‐interest. Nonetheless, Hobbes's political theory provides the framework for such a right.     

一般人格权探析

一般人格权不仅是相对于具体人格权的概念,也是相对于人格权的概念;把一般人格权解释为具体人格权的抽象,那就必然等同于人格权,这将无法把握其真正的含义.从一般人格权产生的过程来看,一般人格权是作为具体人格权的补充而提出的.一般人格权的内容不是人格独立、人格自由、人格尊严和人格平等,而是权利主体对法律规定的具体人格权客体以外的人身要素和人格要素的支配,其具有不确定性.     

Motive and Right Action

Some philosophers believe that a change in motive alone is sometimes sufficient to bring about a change in the deontic status (rightness or wrongness) of an action. I refer to this position as ‘weak motivism’, and distinguish it from ‘strong’ and ‘partial motivism’. I examine a number of cases where our intuitive judgements appear to support the weak motivist’s thesis, and argue that in each case an alternative explanation can be given for why a change in motive brings about (or, in some cases, appears to bring about) a change in deontic status.