Complicity and Criminal Liability in Rwanda: A Situationist Critique

In Complicity and the Rwandan Genocide (2010b), Larry May argues that complicity can be the basis for criminal liability if two conditions are met: First, the person’s actions or inactions must contribute to the harm in question, and secondly, the person must know that his actions or inactions risk contributing to this harm. May also states that the threshold for guilt for criminal liability is higher than for moral responsibility. I agree with this latter claim, but I think that it casts doubt on May’s account of criminal liability, particular in so-called performance cases in which low-level participants merely fail to help. This is because it is far from clear that passive non-helpers are morally responsible for their participation in widespread harms. Situationism purports to show that passive bystanders typically are not morally responsible for their role in such harms, because they were behaving reasonably subject to the constraints they faced. In this paper, I assess this claim, and defend it on the basis of O. W. Holmes’ standard of the reasonable person as a guide to judging criminal complicity. Finally, I provide a situationist account of the Rwandan genocide, which focuses on the systemic causes and primary perpetrators of the genocide, rather than low-level participants.     

Delinquenzverläufe jugendlicher Sexualmörder

Sexual homicides by juvenile offenders are statistically rare and until now only a few studies explored this phenomenon. Studies on forensic psychiatric court reports and follow-up data from federal criminal records were used to investigate the delinquency of a sample of 19 juvenile sexual homicide perpetrators from their childhood up to the mean age of 45 years of age. More than the half (58%) committed or attempted sexual assaults prior to the sexual homicide. Seven from 13 who were released from custody (54%) committed sexual or violent reoffences. In a long-time analysis as much favourable as unfavourable developments were found. The results suggest that most of the persons who commit sexual homicides as juveniles already committed sexual offences before and have a high risk of sexual and violent reoffending even a long time after the homicide.     

Responsibility and Reciprocity

Discussions of responsibility typically focus on the person who is held responsible: what are the conditions or criteria of responsibility; what can be done to or demanded of a person who is responsible? This paper shifts focus onto those who hold, rather than those who are held, responsible: what do we owe to those whom we hold responsible? After distinguishing responsibility as answerability from responsibility as liability, it attends mainly to the former, and points out the ways in which it is multiply relational: I am responsible for something to someone who has the standing to call me to account for it, under the norms of some particular practice. Responsibility as thus understood is also reciprocal: if you are to be answerable to me, I must treat you with a certain respect, attend seriously to your answer, and be ready to answer to you myself. The paper explores some of the implications of this point both for our moral dealings with each other, and for criminal law and the criminal trial.     

Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate

In this article, I urge that mainstream discussions of abortion are dissatisfying in large part because they proceed in polite abstraction from the distinctive circumstances and meanings of gestation. Such discussions, in fact, apply to abortion conceptual tools that were designed on the premiss that people are physically demarcated, even as gestation is marked by a thorough-going intertwinement. We cannot fully appreciate what is normatively at stake with legally forcing continued gestation, or again how to discuss moral responsibilities to continue gestating, until we appreciate in their own terms the goods and evils distinctive of gestational connection. To underscore the need to explore further the meanings of gestation, I provide two examples of the difference it might make to legal and moral discussions of abortion if we appreciate more fully that gestation is an intimacy.     

Offender-Victim Relationships in Criminal Homicide Followed by Offender's Suicide,North Carolina, 1972–1977

ABSTRACT: An analysis of 90 cases of criminal homicide followed by suicide in North Carolina, 1972 to 1977. Homicidal victim-offender relationships were investigated in regard to age, sex, race and whether victim and offender were member of the same family, friends, acquaintances, or strangers. These results were compared with victim-offender relationships in 994 criminal homicide cases in North Carolina in which offenders did not commit suicide. Married white males over 30 years were much more involved in homicide-suicide than they were in homicide alone. In these homicide-suicide cases, the victim was usually the spouse. Except for marital status, characteristics of homicide offenders who killed themselves resembled those of suicide-only individuals much more than those of homicide-only offenders. In the homicide-suicide cases, the killing of someone in close relationship to the offender, often a wife, appeared to be part of the evolving process of suicide. This clearly has implications for intervention into marital strife and also for immediate treatment of homicide offenders who kill spouses and other family members.     

Fetal Homicide

Summary

Under common law, a crime resulting in the death of a fetus that was viable but not “born alive” was viewed as a transgression less serious than murder. Accordingly, courts did not allow parents to bring wrongful death suits for the death of a fetus. In the past decade, however, several states have amended their criminal or civil statutes to include the specific crime of “feticide” or “fetal homicide,” and the Federal government is considering similar legislation. This paper examines the history and current status of criminal and civil law regarding the third-party killing of a fetus.     

Fairness,Care, and Abortion

Only women can bear the burdens of gestating fetuses. That fact, I suggest, bears on the morality of abortion. To illustrate and explain this point, I frame my discussion around Judith Jarvis Thomson's classic defense of abortion and Gina Schouten's recent feminist challenge to Thomson's defense. Thomson argued that, even assuming that fetuses are morally equivalent to persons, abortions are typically morally permissible. According to Schouten's feminist challenge to Thomson, however, if fetuses are morally equivalent to persons, then abortions are typically morally impermissible because there is a collective moral obligation to care for the vulnerable. The consideration that is my topic, however, poses a problem for that feminist challenge to Thomson. There is reason to believe, I argue, that it is unfair that only women can bear the burdens of gestating fetuses. And, if that is unfair, it would undermine that feminist challenge to Thomson. I show, in other words, that there is a plausible and well-motivated basis for believing that, even if fetuses are morally equivalent to persons and there is a collective obligation to care for the vulnerable, then abortions are nevertheless typically morally permissible. That is how fairness bears on the morality of abortion.     

Just How Unlawful is “Euthanasia”?

Those who campaign for law reform to permit "euthanasia" may seek different things and at least some of what they seek may already be permissible under the criminal law of England and Wales. In this paper I examine one means whereby the criminal law delivers outcomes acceptable to the euthanasia lobby, that is the curious notion of "causation" deployed by the law, which adds a value override to the more usual notion of factual causation such that, for example, if medical treatment falls within the acceptable range as normal and proper, the pre–existing injury or illness is treated as exclusively the cause of death and the doctor escapes criminal liability, even where the medical treatment will shorten life to the certain knowledge, possibly even the wish, of the doctor. Thus the law may already be delivering a range of outcomes — euthanasia in a weak sense — acceptable to the euthanasia lobby. If so, it achieves this by stealth. That is inappropriate to the doctor–patient relationship, which is one of trust. So there is a strong case for greater transparency. Moreover, there are limits to the acceptable outcomes which an unreformed criminal law can deliver and in a range of cases the criminal law condemns the doctor to impotence and the patient to a prolonged, miserable and undignified death. So there is also a case for going beyond the current law and legalising euthanasia in a strong sense.     

The Idea of Moral Progress

This paper shows that moral progress is a substantive and plausible idea. Moral progress in belief involves deepening our grasp of existing moral concepts, while moral progress in practices involves realizing deepened moral understandings in behavior or social institutions. Moral insights could not be assimilated or widely disseminated if they involved devising and applying totally new moral concepts. Thus, it is argued, moral failures of past societies cannot be explained by appeal to ignorance of new moral ideas, but must be understood as resulting from refusals to subject social practices to critical scrutiny. Moral philosophy is not the main vehicle for disseminating morally progressive insights, though it has an important role in processes that lead to moral progress. Yet we have grounds for cautious optimism, since progressive moral insights can be disseminated and can, sometimes, have constructive social effects.     

La responsabilité pénale du psychiatre du fait de son patient

If the criminal liability remains personal, recent case law has tended to broaden the hypotheses for the doctor's criminal liability in the case of unintentional offenses. The question particularly concerns the psychiatrist, because of acts committed by his patient, on the basis of articles 221-6 or 222-19 of the French penal code. However, judicial assessment of the fault and its causal link with the damage does not impose on the psychiatrist an obligation of result, insofar as only serious professional misconduct, manifestly not in accordance with the rules of medical art, are sanctioned.     

Family Survivors of Homicide: I. Symptoms,Syndromes, and Reaction Patterns

As more and more mental health clinicians become involved in the criminal justice system, family therapists will see increasing numbers of crime victims in their caseloads, and some of these families will have lost loved ones to murder. Part I of this two-part article describes the common and atypical symptoms, syndromes, and reaction patterns shown by families who have experienced the murder of a loved one. Part II will present a practical model for treating family survivors of homicide that incorporates cognitive-behavioral, psychodynamic, family systems, and existential components. Throughout, the emphasis is on therapists being equipped with a sufficiently broad range of clinical tools to treat these survivors flexibly, effectively, competently, and compassionately.     

Shame,Stigma, and Disgust in the Decent Society

Would a just society or government absolutely refrain from shaming or humiliating any of its members? “No,” says this essay. It describes morally acceptable uses of shame, stigma and disgust as tools of social control in a decent (just) society. These uses involve criminal law, tort law, and informal social norms. The standard of moral acceptability proposed for determining the line is a version of perfectionistic prioritarian consequenstialism. From this standpoint, criticism is developed against Martha Nussbaum’s view that to respect the dignity of each person, society absolutely must refrain from certain ways of shaming and humiliating its members and rendering them objects of communal disgust.     

Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?

Abstract: The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of the moral law from actual acts of willing on behalf of those bound by that law (an independence that is upheld). The resulting position, which is called not ‘all the way down’ constructivism, is attributed to Kant.     

Moral knowledge: some reflections on moral controversies, incompatible moral epistemologies, and the culture wars.

An authentic Christian bioethical account of abortion must take into consideration the conflicting epistemologies that separate Christian moral theology from secular moral philosophy. Moral epistemologies directed to the issue of abortion that fail to appreciate the orientation of morality to God will also fail adequately to appreciate the moral issues at stake. Christian accounts of the bioethics of abortion that reduce moral-theological considerations to moral-philosophical considerations will not only fail to appreciate fully the offense of abortion, but morally mislead. This article locates the bioethics of abortion within the theology of the Church of the first millennium, emphasizing that abortion was prohibited, whether or not one considered the embryo or fetus to be ensouled.     

论保密义务与诚信原则

尊重患者隐私,保守执业秘密,是医师的道德义务,也是法律义务,保密义务的理论基础在于诚实信用原则.为此,医疗活动中应引入体现伦理道德要求的诚信理念,从道德和法律两方面规范医师的行为,并且建立以法律规范为主的规制模式.     

Conscientious objection and person-centered care

Person-centered care offers a promising way to manage clinicians’ conscientious objection to providing services they consider morally wrong. Health care centered on persons, rather than patients, recognizes clinicians and patients on the same stratum. The moral interests of clinicians, as persons, thus warrant as much consideration as those of other persons, including patients. Interconnected moral interests of clinicians, patients, and society construct the clinician as a socially embedded and integrated self, transcending the simplistic duality of private conscience versus public role expectations. In this milieu of blurred boundaries, person-centered care offers a constructive way to accommodate conscientious objection by clinicians. The constitutionally social nature of clinicians commits and enables them, through care mechanisms such as self-care, to optimize the quality of health care and protect the welfare of patients. To advance these conditions, it is recommended that the medical profession develop a person-centered culture of care, along with clinician virtues and skills for person-centered communication.     

Serial murder and the case of Aileen Wuornos: attachment theory, psychopathy, and predatory aggression

The extant research on female homicide has yet to offer any systematic assessment of why women murder serially. Part of the explanation is attributed to existing literature focusing on justifiable and excusable homicide, or women who kill their abusive partners because they have been battered, fear that their lives are in danger, or are otherwise victimized. Thus, predatory homicide perpetrated by women has not received extensive attention in the relevant literature. This article aims to address this deficiency by providing a detailed case study analysis of Aileen Wuornos, a convicted serial murderer executed at Broward Correctional Institution in Pembroke Pines, FL, on October 9, 2002. By linking the literature on attachment theory with the research on psychopathy and predatory aggression, this article argues that Aileen Wuornos was a cold blooded and calculated killer: a serial offender responsible for her delinquent and criminal behavior. Generalizing from the case of Aileen Wuornos, several tentative recommendations are proposed as linked to clinical and forensic prevention, diagnosis, and treatment, as well as future research on women, psychopathy, and predatory serial homicide.     

Reasoning in the personal and moral domains: Adolescent and young adult women's decision-making regarding abortion

The present investigation of adolescent and young adult women's reasoning, and decision-making about abortion was conducted to determine whether reasoning about abortion could be described by moral, social-conventional, and personal concepts and to examine relationships between domain of reasoning and action choices. Seventy single women, ranging in age from 13 to 31 and divided between 25 women having abortions, 23 women continuing their pregnancies, and 22 never-pregnant women, were administered a semi-structured clinical interview about abortion and two hypothetical moral judgement dilemmas. A classification task was developed to provide an additional measure of reasoning in different domains. Another 29 single, first-pregnant women provided a comparison of the effects of these procedures on decision-making. Content analysis of the protocols revealed that responses to the abortion interview could be reliably distinguished between concepts of morality and personal issues and their coordination or lack of coordination. Subjects treating abortion as a moral issue were more likely to continue their pregnancies while subjects treating abortion as a personal issue were more likely to obtain an abortion. Differences in reasoning between pregnant and nonpregnant subjects were not observed. Moral responses to the abortion interview were found to be highly related to hypothetical moral judgments.     

The moral limits of Feinberg's liberalism

This essay explores Joel Feinberg's conception of liberalism and the moral limits of the criminal law. Feinberg identifies liberty with the absence of law. He defends a strong liberal presumption against law, except where it is necessary to prevent wrongful harm or offense to others. Drawing on Rawlsian, Marxian, and feminist standpoints, I argue that there are injuries to individual liberty rooted not in law, but in civil society. Against Feinberg, I defend a richer account of liberalism and liberty, linking them to human dignity, and a more positive role for law. Feinberg justifies liberty as an instrumental welfare‐interest, valuable in virtue of the way it serves the individual's ulterior goals. Drawing on the example of racism and civil rights, I argue that the value of equal liberty stems from its social role in constituting persons’ sense of their own worth and dignity. Against Feinberg, I claim that liberty's value is grounded in a shared historical ideal of personhood, not in the individual's goals or desires. Feinberg also links liberalism with an extreme anti‐paternalist position, on which individuals should be at liberty to alienate their very own right of personal autonomy. Drawing on the examples of slavery and drug addiction, I argue against this liberty, and the conception of liberalism and paternalism in Feinberg which leads to it. A liberalism founded upon an ideal of human dignity allows, even requires, a use of law to prevent persons from destroying the very conditions of their own autonomy and dignity.     

Abortion, embryonic stem cell research, and waste

Can one consistently deny the permissibility of abortion while endorsing the killing of human embryos for the sake of stem cell research? The question is not trivial; for even if one accepts that abortion is prima facie wrong in all cases, there are significant differences with many of the embryos used for stem cell research from those involved in abortion—most prominently, many have been abandoned in vitro, and appear to have no reasonably likely meaningful future. On these grounds one might think to maintain a strong position against abortion but endorse killing human embryos for the sake of stem cell research and its promising benefits. I will argue, however, that these differences are not decisive. Thus, one who accepts a strong view against abortion is committed to the moral impermissibility of killing human embryos for the sake of stem cell research. I do not argue for the moral standing of either abortion or the killing of embryos for stem cell research; I only argue for the relation between the two. Thus the conclusion is relevant to those with a strong view in favor of the permissibility of killing embryos for the sake of research as much as for those who may strongly oppose abortion; neither can consider their position in isolation from the other.