科学家的道德责任

科学家的道德责任分为由他们的专业特点所决定的角色责任和作为普通人所共同具有的普遍责任.一种传统的观点认为,科学家追求真理和知识的自主性是不受任何限制的,因此他们的角色责任远胜过他们的普遍责任,他们不需要考虑他们的工作超出科学范围之外的后果是怎样的,因此应当免除他们考虑这一后果的普遍责任.     

Joseph Rotblat and the Moral Responsibilities of the Scientist

Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat was one of the most distinguished scientists and peace campaigners of the post second world war period. He made significant contributions to nuclear physics and worked on the development of the atomic bomb. He then became one of the world’s leading researchers into the biological effects of radiation. His life from the early 1950s until his death in August 2005 was devoted to the abolition of nuclear weapons and peace. For this he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, together with Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (that he helped found) in 1995. His work in this area ranked with that of Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell and this article is an attempt to summarise his life, achievements, but in particular outline his views on the moral responsibilities of the scientist. He is a towering intellectual figure and his contributions to mankind should be better known and more widely understood.

企业社会责任的道德考察

企业作为影响社会财富的创造积累、社会利益的分配格局和社会需求的有效供给的基本经济细胞,需要擢升其企业公民意识、关怀利益相关者以及尊重社会及其成员道德尊严的企业社会责任的履行能力,以向社会传递一种荻取企业自我价值实现的社会道德认同境界.     

论市场经济主体的道德责任

改革开放30多年,我国逐步实现了从计划经济体制向市场经济体制的转型,但这种转型还不完善,其重要表现之一是个人、企业、政府等市场经济主体的道德责任感还没有普遍确立起来。道德责任是市场经济主体的应然之责。如果市场经济主体缺乏应有的道德责任感,以不合乎道德的方式参与市场经济活动,那么市场经济内在具有的道德维度无法得到张扬,市场经济体制的运行必然要与人本身的根本利益需要和价值诉求撞车,市场经济体制的道德合理性也会遭到质疑。我国经济伦理学应以激发和强化市场经济主体的道德责任感为使命。     

企业生态道德责任浅析

本文分析了企业生态道德责任提出的原因,指出了企业承担生态道德责任是建设社会主义生态文明的内在要求,也是企业迎接国际挑战、增强企业核心竞争力的保证,更是企业自身建设伦理文化的需要.企业要具有生态道德责任,则必须从企业确立生态道德责任的价值目标、培养员工生态道德素质、建立企业生态道德责任的系统工程这几个方面入手.只有这样,我们的企业才能将经济活动、生态智慧和伦理关怀融为一体,最终才有可能实现与社会经济相协调发展.     

The Debate on the Moral Responsibilities of Online Service Providers

Online service providers (OSPs)—such as AOL, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter—significantly shape the informational environment (infosphere) and influence users’ experiences and interactions within it. There is a general agreement on the centrality of OSPs in information societies, but little consensus about what principles should shape their moral responsibilities and practices. In this article, we analyse the main contributions to the debate on the moral responsibilities of OSPs. By endorsing the method of the levels of abstract (LoAs), we first analyse the moral responsibilities of OSPs in the web (LoA_IN). These concern the management of online information, which includes information filtering, Internet censorship, the circulation of harmful content, and the implementation and fostering of human rights (including privacy). We then consider the moral responsibilities ascribed to OSPs on the web (LoA_ON) and focus on the existing legal regulation of access to users’ data. The overall analysis provides an overview of the current state of the debate and highlights two main results. First, topics related to OSPs’ public role—especially their gatekeeping function, their corporate social responsibilities, and their role in implementing and fostering human rights—have acquired increasing relevance in the specialised literature. Second, there is a lack of an ethical framework that can (a) define OSPs’ responsibilities, and (b) provide the fundamental sharable principles necessary to guide OSPs’ conduct within the multicultural and international context in which they operate. This article contributes to the ethical framework necessary to deal with (a) and (b) by endorsing a LoA enabling the definition of the responsibilities of OSPs with respect to the well-being of the infosphere and of the entities inhabiting it (LoA_For).     

公共卫生实践中诸主体的道德责任

公共卫生伦理的实质是维护公共健康的道德责任,明确其实践诸主体的具体道德责任,即政府应当尽力提供与公正分配公共卫生资源,公众应当追求公共善基础上的合法权利,卫生职业者应当献身职业,进而为维护和促进公共健康利益、减少和预防疾病、降低和最小化风险与伤害提供伦理支撑,也将为公共卫生实践主体提供正确的价值引导.     

论企业道德责任的依据、表现与内化

企业道德责任的含义大体有广义和狭义两个方面,从较为广泛和普遍的意义上,我们认为企业的道德责任是体现在企业的经济责任、法律责任和精神文化责任之中的,同时又是同企业伦理建设密切相关的诸种责任的有机统一。而从狭义的视角来看,企业的道德责任是企业所肩负的对自己、对同道和对社会的道德义务的自觉承担和精神担纲,它在其精神实质上可以用“敬业求精、贵和乐群”来概括。企业道德责任的内化即为企业良心。企业良心就是企业道德责任的自我意识和自我评价。它由企业爱心、企业诚心和企业义心或公正之心所构成。     

医务人员在医疗活动中的利益边界与道德责任分析

当今是一个以利益为轴心的时代,利益伦理是医学伦理学不可忽视的课题。欲望是无穷的,利益是有限的,任何利益都有其边界和限度,我们必须设置利益的道德界限。医患双方未能遵守利益限度和利益边界原则,使矛盾转化为冲突。利益冲突不仅影响医生的专业判断,而且影响了其医疗决定。医生既是医疗职业者,也是社会的一员,社会公众利益最大化是医疗服务的基本目标,为病人最大利益着想是医护专业最根本的道德规范与责任。     

Abortion,Killing, and Maternal Moral Authority

A threat to women is obscured when we treat “abortion‐as‐evacuation'’ as equivalent to “abortion‐as‐killing.'’ This holds only if evacuating a fetus kills it. As technology advances, the equivalence will fail. Any feminist account of abortion that relies on the equivalence leaves moral room for women to be required to give up their fetuses to others when it fails. So an account of the justification of abortion‐as‐killing is needed that does not depend on the equivalence.     

中国社区道德状况分析及对策

和谐社区是和谐社会建设的,在和谐社区建设中,不仅要形成一个社会福利服务、社区互助服务与市场有偿服务相结合的多类型多层次覆盖的社区服务网络,而且要形成一个社区道德文明建设网络,使社区成员之间形成互动与互助、邻里亲善、守望相助、疾病扶持的良好人际关系,构建温馨、祥和的社区氛围。     

Responsibility Ethics,Shared Understandings,and Moral Communities

Margaret Walker's Moral Understandings offers an “expressive‐collaborative,” culturally situated, practice—based picture of morality, critical of a “theoretical‐juridical” picture in most prefeminist moral philosophy since Henry Sidgwick. This essay compares her approach to ethics with that of John Rawls, another exemplar of the “theoretical‐juridical” model, and asks how Walker's approach would apply to several ethical issues, including interaction with (other) animals, social reform and revolution, and basic human rights.     

Indigenous Psychotherapies and Religion: Moral Vision and Embodied Communities

Over the past century, the dominant model for addressing mental illness has been the treatment of individuals, largely by individual therapists who assume the availability of individual psychological resources. That form of therapy is a scarce commodity in capitalist societies, and social models of healing have been largely marginalized and forgotten. From the point of view of an indigenous psychology of religion, this essay (1) reports on local cultural and community models of healing that honor the common good, draw on local, communal narratives, and involve a given community in the process of healing. However, because it is not simply community in itself that is therapeutic, the authors argue (2) that healing cultures have communities that are guided by their moral vision and are committed to justice, moral integrity, and the sharing of resources. They draw on intergenerational studies that detail the effects in Inuit communities where a moral vision and a sense of community was present but then was eroded. Therapists whose interventions draw on the moral resources of the community may facilitate healing, as demonstrated by the use of allocentric imaging in more communal traditions. Finally, it is not simply communities with moral ideals that are therapeutic but (3) indigenous communities whose structures and whose role models embody their ethic that is critical for healing. The authors examine ecological communities in China committed to Confucian values and protection of the earth. The L’Arche communities begun in France by Jean Vanier and Alcoholics Anonymous groups around the world serve as examples of embodied moral communities.     

But for the Grace of God: Abortion and Cognitive Disability,Luck and Moral Status

Many theories of moral status that are intended to ground pro-choice views on abortion tie full moral status to advanced cognitive capabilities. Extant accounts of this kind are inconsistent with the intuition that the profoundly cognitively disabled have full moral status. This paper improves upon these extant accounts by combining an anti-luck condition with Steinbock’s stratification of moral status into two levels. On the resulting view, a being has full moral status if and only if (1) she has moral status and (2) (a) has had advanced cognitive capacities, (b) has the potential to develop such capacities, or (c) would have had such capacities were it not for luck. I argue that modal accounts of luck provide a non-speciesist basis for attributing the lack of advanced cognitive capacities in humans to luck without doing the same for non-human animals.     

Moral Treatment in Asylums and General Hospitals in 19th-Century America

Moral treatment, a therapeutic approach that emphasized character and spiritual development, and called for kindness on the part of all who came in contact with the patient, flourished in American mental hospitals during the first half of the 19th century. Many of its essential features also existed then in the treatment of physical illness in American general hospitals. Changing social and welfare services and advances in scientific medicine contributed to a subsequent decline in moral treatment and to a divergence between the therapeutic approaches of the two kinds of hospitals. In recent years, there has been a gradual convergence in their treatment modes. Contemporary social and welfare services are contrasted with traditional moral treatment.     

Moral Luck as Moral Lack of Control

When Thomas Nagel originally coined the expression “moral luck,” he used the term “luck” to mean lack of control. This use was a matter of stipulation, as Nagel’s target had little to do with luck itself, but the question of how control is related to moral responsibility. Since then, we have seen several analyses of the concept of luck itself, and recent contributors to the moral luck literature have often assumed that any serious contribution to the moral luck debate must begin with a robust concept of luck simpliciter. I argue here that this assumption is a mistake, on the basis of three reasons: the issue was originally conceived as an issue about responsibility and control, analyses of luck tend to distort and needlessly complicate what is at issue when shoehorned into the moral luck debate, and these analyses have very little (if anything) to contribute to the discussion.     

Moral Communities in Anti-Doping Policy: A Response to Bowers and Paternoster

This article argues that Bowers and Paternoster’s emphasis on a moral community marks an important step towards a more ethical and effective approach to anti-doping. However, it also argues that the authors’ proposed strategies undermine their stated goal of effectively engaging athletes as partners in anti-doping efforts and raise ethical concerns. Their proposed emphasis on exploiting shaming as a punishment and their general view of athletes as adversaries fosters mistrust between athletes and those who enforce the anti-doping rules. Instead, this article describes a model for empowering athletes as stakeholders in anti-doping policy as a means to provide anti-doping rules with increased moral legitimacy among athletes.