Horney,Zen, and the Real Self

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

John Macmurray,Spirituality, Community and Real Schools

This paper suggests that the work of the Scottish philosopher John Macmurray provides a valuable contribution to debates on spirituality, education, and schools as communities. In particular by recognizing the nature of the spiritual in everyday activities of people in communities, by focusing on the overall aims of schooling, and by rejecting dualism, idealism and materialism, Macmurray was able to describe how schools might properly be organized. The paper aims to investigate some of Macmurray's insights, to see how they might help transform one's vision of schooling.     

Dunn's Relevant Predication, Real Properties and Identity

We critically investigate and refine Dunn's relevant predication, his formalisation of the notion of a real property. We argue that Dunn's original dialectical moves presuppose some interpretation of relevant identity, though none is given. We then re-motivate the proposal in a broader context, considering the prospects for a classical formalisation of real properties, particularly of Geach's implicit distinction between real and 'Cambridge' properties. After arguing against these prospects, we turn to relevance logic, re-motivating relevant predication with Geach's distinction in mind. Finally we draw out some consequences of Dunn's proposal for the theory of identity in relevance logic.     

Horney,Zen, and the Real Self: Theoretical and Historical Connections

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Real Donors, Real Consent: Testing the Theory of Reasoned Action on Organ Donor Consent

In an attempt to apply the theory of reasoned action (TRA) to the process underlying organ donor consent, participants completed questionnaires concerning their affective responses to organ donation, as well as their intentions to donate. Participants were given the opportunity to sign an organ donor card. Those who chose to sign the card had more positive attitudes about donation, perceived donation as something that their reference group would encourage, and had stronger intentions to consent to signing a card. The current investigation extends the organ donor literature by using a true behavioral outcome measure indicating consent. Moreover, the pattern of results between attitudes, norms, intention, and behavior illustrates the usefulness of applying the TRA to yet another health-related behavior.     

Hilda Oakeley on Idealism,History and the Real Past

In the early twentieth century, Hilda Diana Oakeley (1867–1950) set out a new kind of British idealism. Oakeley is an idealist in the sense that she holds mind to actively contribute to the features of experience, but she also accepts that there is a world independent of mind. One of her central contributions to the idealist tradition is her thesis that minds construct our experiences using memory. This paper explores the theses underlying her idealism, and shows how they are intricately connected to the wider debates of her period. I go on to explain how the parts of Oakeley's idealism are connected to further areas of her thought – specifically, her views on history and her growing block theory of time – to provide a sense of Oakeley's philosophy as a system. As there is no existing literature on Oakeley, this paper aims to open a path for further scholarship.     

Post‐Secularism,Secular Theology,and the Names of the Real

This article disputes the common view of religious and secular as oppositional terms. Our contemporary world is post‐secularist, because secularism is a modern ideology that imagines a strict separation of the religious and the political, where religion becomes a purely private affair. This situation is compromised by the “return” of religion in political terms. Constructively, following Jacques Lacan, we can say that secular theology concerns the Real; and with François Laruelle, we can think about a non‐theology that complements what he calls non‐philosophy. Finally, I speculate on three names of the Real: energy, capital, and nomos.     

Real knowledge

Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief and justification conditions are not accidentally conjoined. Two of those requirements have received considerable attention in recent literature by the defeasibility theorists and the causal theorists. I argue that a third requirement is needed to block the merely coincidental cosatisfaction of the belief and justification conditions and to capture our intuitions about the epistemic agent who possesses real knowledge. That condition ascribes a disposition to the real knower to believe all and only justified propositions in virtue of his/her belief that the propositions are justified. Two consequences of that requirement are discussed: (1) if S really knows that p, then S knows simpliciter that S knows simpliciter that p and (2) the iterative feature of real knowledge mentioned in (1) provides a basis for the rejection of a particularly pernicious form of scepticism.     

Real Definitions

I offer and defend an account of real definitions. I put forward two versions of the account, one formulated in terms of the notion of generalised identity and of a suitable notion of grounding (RD1), and the other one formulated in terms of the former notion and of a suitable notion of comparative joint‐carvingness (RD2). Given a plausible assumption, (RD1) and (RD2) turn out to be equivalent. I give a sketch of a unified account of the three notions involved in (RD1) and (RD2) from which the assumption can be derived.