Why we Believe

The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions. This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I shall reject the view that belief formation must in every instance be a truth-directed affair. Unlike the pragmatists, however, I shall conclude that the enterprise of belief formation is not directed exclusively, or even primarily, at attaining knowledge. In other words, pursuit of that which it profits to believe, on the one hand, and pursuit of knowledge on the other, are distinct enterprises, which overlap (when they do) only accidentally. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Why we walk the way we do

By using inverse dynamics and forceplate recordings, this study established the principle of oscillating systems and the influence of gravity and body parameters on the programming of the gait parameters, step frequency and length. Calculation of the ratio of the amplitude of the center of mass (CM) and the center of foot pressure (CP) oscillations yielded an equation and established a biomechanical constant, the natural body frequency (NBF). NBF appears to be an absolute invariant parameter, specific to human standing posture and gait in terrestrial gravity, which influences the relative positions of CM and CP and whose value separates the frequency bands of standing posture from those for gait. This equation was tested by using the experimental paradigm of stepping in place and then used in calculating the magnitude of CM oscillations during gait. The biomechanical analysis of the experimental observations allows one to establish the relationships between body parameters and gravity and the central programming of locomotor parameters.     

Why more can be less: An inference-based explanation for hyper-subadditivity in bundle valuation

We conceptualize, develop, and test a multiple-item bundle valuation model through which decision makers are able to make inferences about the value of uncertain items based on the value of certain items. Results of four experiments indicate that bundling a low-value certain item with a high-value uncertain item, which are not substitutes, results in a bundle valuation lower than the value of the uncertain item alone. We refer to this highly unexpected and previously unexplained phenomenon as “hyper-subadditivity.” In addition we find that bundling a high-value certain item with a low-value uncertain item leads to superadditivity, even though the items are not complements. Hence, we find that when two objects are bundled together, and one has a more certain value, decision makers use the value of the certain item to infer the value of the less certain item. They might infer that the other (less certain) object must be worth an amount similar to the item with which they are paired. We further demonstrate that reducing uncertainty eliminates these effects, and that direct value inferencing (not simple numeric priming, nor inferences about quality) is the most likely mechanism driving these effects.     

Why we must leave our organs to others

Organ procurement presents several ethical concerns (from what constitutes acceptable criteria for death to issues involved in specifically designating to whom an organ can be given), but none is more central than the concern for what are appropriate means for acquiring organs. The following discussion attempts a different perspective on the issue of organ procurement by arguing that, rather than appealing to our charitable consciences or our pocketbooks, relinquishing our organs after death in this day and age is, in fact, obligatory for most people. Each of us is pressed by the growing demand for our organs should we die "rightly," and that desperate need has risen to such a level that not to release our organs for transplantation would constitute a serious moral wrong.     

Why we view the brain as a computer

The view that the brain is a sort of computer has functioned as a theoretical guideline both in cognitive science and, more recently, in neuroscience. But since we can view every physical system as a computer, it has been less than clear what this view amounts to. By considering in some detail a seminal study in computational neuroscience, I first suggest that neuroscientists invoke the computational outlook to explain regularities that are formulated in terms of the information content of electrical signals. I then indicate why computational theories have explanatory force with respect to these regularities:in a nutshell, they underscore correspondence relations between formal/mathematical properties of the electrical signals and formal/mathematical properties of the represented objects. I finally link my proposal to the philosophical thesis that content plays an essential role in computational taxonomy.     

Why we need a relevant theory of conditionals

This paper presents ConR (Conditional R), a logic of conditionals based on Anderson and Belnap's system R. A Routley-Meyer-style semantics for ConR is given for the system (the completeness of ConR over this semantics is proved in E. Mares and A. Fuhrmann, A Relevant Theory of Conditionals (unpublished MS)). Moreover, it is argued that adopting a relevant theory of conditionals will improve certain theories that utilize conditionals, i.e. Lewis' theory of causation, Lewis' dyadic deontic logic, and Chellas' dyadic deontic logic.I am of course deeply indebted to André Fuhrmann, who co-wrote the paper on which the present effort is based. Perhaps I should also thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada because the original research for this project was funded by them in the form of a post-doctoral fellowship.     

Why we can't get along

The author examines various arguments to explain the internal conflicts and schisms that have afflicted depth psychology since its beginnings. These arguments include the inevitable splits that occur in the course of institutional development, the inheritance of family schisms within the profession, historical, geographical and political influences, Freud's notion of the 'narcissism of minor differences' along with Gordon's idea of the need for enemies in establishing identity, and the impact of market forces. The author refutes these arguments and postulates instead that the profession attracts narcissistically disturbed members who have not been or cannot be sufficiently analysed. The profession needs to address this endemic narcissism in order to prevent further splitting and to establish a more ecumenical framework.     

Why Adults have to be Children First

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Why we still need a mark of the cognitive

What makes a process a cognitive process? I’m not just asking for a list of cognitive processes, but for what makes an item on that list a cognitive process. Why should it be on the list? This is a question that has been ignored far too long in the domain of research calling itself cognitive science. It is time to give an answer and that is what I propose in this paper. I contrast my answer with others that have been given and defend the need against some claims in the literature that a mark of the cognitive is not needed.     

Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist

According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that at least some mental state types consist not merely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states, but also in nonrelational properties that play a role in explaining functional relations. Consequently, a scientific realist of the sort I describe must reject functionalism.     

Why we need to write openly about our clinical cases

To learn more about what is and is not effective in the psychoanalytic situation, analysts need to develop a library of detailed analytic case material. Open case writing, by not overconstraining readers, allows them enough access to the analytic couple's affective experience to persuade them of the authenticity and validity of the analyst-author's views. They are then free to rethink the material creatively on their own, to use it as they need to, and to learn from others, in order to enhance their analytic skills. Closed case writing hinders readers' creative freedom to understand and interpret, and hence to learn. To encourage analyst-authors to share their affective experiences in the analytic situation more openly, analysts need to establish a constructively collaborative attitude toward playing with clinical material. They need to take for granted that new readers, even authors themselves newly rereading their work, will discover something new. A dialectical process can then be established in which clinical authors and readers contribute to each other in an ongoing imaginative interchange.     

Why we are fairer than others

Subjects wrote lists of either fair or unfair things that they or others did. A pervasive tendency was found for subjects to associate themselves with fair behaviors and others with unfair behaviors. When different subjects rated samples of the written behaviors for fairness and frequency we found that fair behaviors were rated as more frequent than unfair behaviors and self-ascribed behaviors were rated as fairer than behaviors ascribed to others. These findings and others are shown to result from a tendency for subjects to perceive a stronger link between the fairness and frequency of their own behavior than between the fairness and frequency of the behavior of other people. A final analysis showed that the subcategories of unfair behavior that subjects associated with others were different from those associated with themselves.     

Why we simulate negated information: a dynamic pragmatic account

A well-established finding in the simulation literature is that participants simulate the positive argument of negation soon after reading a negative sentence, prior to simulating a scene consistent with the negated sentence (Kaup, Ludtke, & Zwaan, 2006; Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Ludtke, 2007). One interpretation of this finding is that negation requires two steps to process: first represent what is being negated then "reject" that in favour of a representation of a negation-consistent state of affairs (Kaup et al., 2007). In this paper we argue that this finding with negative sentences could be a by-product of the dynamic way that language is interpreted relative to a common ground and not the way that negation is represented. We present a study based on Kaup et al. (2007) that tests the competing accounts. Our results suggest that some negative sentences are not processed in two steps, but provide support for the alternative, dynamic account.     

Why there might be a moral faculty: A reply to Johnson

Is there a cognitive faculty dedicated to the moral domain? Mark Johnson has developed a number of arguments against the existence of such a faculty. I claim that these arguments are not persuasive and that there may be a moral faculty.