Mood, memory, and social judgments in children

The influence of positive and negative moods on children's recall and recognition memory and impression-formation judgments was investigated in a two-list experimental design. A total of 161 schoolchildren, 8 to 10 years old, were presented with audiovisual information containing positive and negative details about 2 target children. Each presentation was preceded by happy or sad mood manipulations. One day later, the children were again placed in a happy or sad mood, and their recall and recognition memory and impression-formation judgments were assessed. Results showed that memory was better when (a) the children felt happy during encoding, retrieval, or both; (b) the material was incongruent with learning mood; (c) the 2 target characters were encountered in contrasting rather than in matching mood states; and (d) recall mood matched encoding mood. A happy mood increased the extremity of both positive and negative impression-formation judgments. Results are contrasted with experimental data obtained with normal or depressed adults, and implications are considered for contemporary theories of mood effects on cognition and for social-developmental research.     

Mood and prospective memory

This study considered the relationship between mood states, prospective memory, and retrospective memory among a non-clinical sample of undergraduate students. Multiple regression analyses with simultaneous entry of variables were undertaken to examine the unique contributions of the alternate memory test and the emotional states to memory test performance. As expected, retrospective free recall performance and anxiety made unique and significant contributions to performance on the prospective memory task. However, only prospective memory performance emerged as a significant predictor of retrospective free recall. It is suggested that none of the mood measures emerged as a significant predictor of retrospective memory performance because they do not account for unique variance. In contrast, the relationship between anxiety and prospective memory appears to be due to factors uniquely associated with anxiety, and unrelated to depression.     

Implicit memory for negative and positive social information in individuals with and without social anxiety

Studies of memory bias for threat-relevant information in individuals with social anxiety have produced mixed results. These discrepancies may be because investigators have studied different memory processes or have used different memory tasks. We employed a video clarity judgement task to investigate implicit (capacity-free, automatic, unconscious) memory and a recognition task to investigate explicit (effortful, strategic, conscious) memory for threat in socially anxious individuals and nonanxious controls. Implicit memory for "old" (i.e., seen before) videos was defined as rating "old" videos as more clear than "new" (i.e., never seen before) videos. We created brief video clips that involved an actor or actress approaching the camera and commenting on some aspect of the viewer's actions, physical appearance, or belongings. Twenty-four videos were positive (e.g., "I really like your shoes"), and 24 were negative (e.g., "That is a horrible haircut"). Results revealed that the video clarity test was an effective measure of implicit memory. Furthermore, socially anxious individuals showed a larger implicit memory index for negative videos than did nonanxious and dysphoric controls. No group differences emerged for implicit memory for positive videos. Similarly, groups did not differ in recognition of, or false alarms for, positive and negative videos. These results demonstrate the role of implicit memory in social anxiety implying that information about threat may be automatically primed in these individuals.     

Mood and the perception of unusual people: Affective asymmetry in memory and social judgments

Does good and bad mood have a different influence on our perceptions of typical and atypical people? In this experiment, people in happy, sad or neutral moods recalled, and formed impressions of high- or low-prototypical characters. We expected an asymmetric mood effect on memory, with better recall of typical targets that require simplified, schematic processing in positive mood, but greater negative mood effects on atypical targets that require more detailed and inferential processing. Subjects (N = 66) an audio-visual mood induction in an allegedly separate experiment, before recalling, and forming impressions about people who were consistent or inconsistent with familiar prototypes within their social milieu. We found the predicted mood-congruent bias in judgments, that was significantly greater for non-typical than for typical people. We also found evidence for positive-negative mood asymmetry in memory, with better recall of typical people in positive mood, and atypical people in negative mood. The findings are discussed in terms of contemporary multi-process models of affect and cognition (Forgas, 1992), and the implications for everyday affective influences on social judgments and stereotyping are considered.     

Implicit memory bias for threat-relevant information in individuals with generalized social phobia

The authors used a noise judgment task to investigate implicit memory bias for threat in individuals with generalized social phobia (GSP). Participants first heard neutral sentences (e.g., "The manual tells you how to set up the tent.") and social-threat sentences (e.g., "The classmate asks you to go for drinks."). Implicit memory for these sentences was then tested by asking participants to rate the volume of noise accompanying the presentation of these "old" sentences intermixed with "new" sentences that had not been previously presented. Implicit memory for old sentences is revealed when participants rate the noise accompanying old sentences as less loud than the noise accompanying new sentences. Those with GSP demonstrated an implicit memory bias for social-threat sentences, whereas controls did not. This differential priming effect suggests that information about threat may be automatically accessed in GSP.     

Pseudocontingencies derived from categorically organized memory representations

Pseudocontingencies (PCs) allow for inferences about the contingency between two variables X and Y when the conditions for genuine contingency assessment are not met. Even when joint observations X _i and Y _i about the same reference objects i are not available or are detached in time or space, the correlation r(X _i ,Y _i ) is readily inferred from base rates. Inferred correlations are positive (negative) if X and Y base rates are skewed in the same (different) directions. Such PC inferences afford useful proxies for actually existing contingencies. While previous studies have focused on PCs due to environmental base rates, the present research highlights memory organization as a natural source of PC effects. When information about two attributes X and Y is represented in a hierarchically organized categorical memory code, as category-wise base rates p(X) and p(Y), the reconstruction of item-level information from category base rates will naturally produce PC effects. Three experiments support this contention. When the yes base rates of two respondents in four questionnaire subscales (categories) were correlated, recalled and predicted item-level responses were correlated in the same direction, even when the original responses to specific items within categories were correlated in the opposite direction.     

Mood congruence in childhood and recent autobiographical memory

To improve upon previous methodology, participants in musically induced happy, sad, or neutral moods were asked to recall childhood and recent autobiographical memories in response to pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral word cues. Symmetrical mood-congruent memory effects were observed when events were rated from the perspective of when they actually occurred (i.e., then), because memories rated as being unpleasant then tended to be rated as more pleasant now. Finally, pleasant and unpleasant cue words facilitated retrieval of childhood memories more than did neutral cues. These findings suggest that symmetrical mood congruence can be observed when accounting for such factors as the valence of retrieval cues and the perspective from which experiences are rated, given that memories appear to undergo change in affective labelling.     

Mood acknowledgment and correction for the mood-congruency bias in social judgment

Past research has revealed a mood-congruency bias wherein people evaluate other individuals more positively when they are experiencing good moods than when they are experiencing bad moods. At times, however, people may attempt to prevent their transient mood states from biasing their evaluations of other people. It was proposed that the capacity to attend openly to one’s moods is an important precursor to such mood correction efforts. Two studies supported this hypothesis. People who were encouraged to attend to their feelings (Study 1), as well as people who are naturally inclined to acknowledge their feelings (Study 2), were more likely than their counterparts to prevent their positive and negative moods from biasing their judgments of a target person.     

Infant memory for place information

The present studies were designed to examine the role of place cues in memory retrieval during early infancy. Three-month-old infants were trained to move a mobile by kicking. Two weeks later, memory retrieval was disrupted if they were reminded in a location or place different from where they had been trained, but not if they were reminded in the same place (Experiment 1A). The same result was obtained even though highly salient cues in their immediate visual surround remained unchanged during reminding (Experiments 1B and 1C). No disruption was seen, however, when retrieval was cued in a different place after only 1 day (Experiment 2). These findings unequivocally demonstrate that infants as young as 3 months encode incidental information about the place where an event occurs and suggest that early memories are buffered against retrieval in potentially inappropriate contexts over the long term.     

Recognition memory for deducible information

Recent research in language comprehension indicates a constructive encoding process in which the linguistic input is transformed into some more general semantic structure which is stored. In attempting to characterize the nature of such structures, some conflicting findings have been observed for paragraphs which describe similar set-theoretic relations, linear orderings and set inclusions. While the linear ordering research supports the constructivist theory, the set inclusion work does not. The set inclusion studies, however, employed true-false tests and not the usual recognition tests. The present study investigated the processing of set inclusion paragraphs in a self-paced study/recognition test paradigm. Results supported the constructivist theory and were contrary to predictions based upon the previous set inclusion research. Subjects were unable to differentiate between presented information and unpresented deducible information. These results were discussed in terms of accuracy constraints of different tasks on memorial performance and a possible interaction of Type of Test by Universal Quantification.     

Attribution difficulty and memory for attribution-relevant information

This research compared the processing and retrieval of attribution-relevant information when the attributional inference is easy or difficult to make. Subjects attributed behavioral events to the person or to the situation, based on several items of context information. Each context sentence implied either the person or the entity as causal agent. When the attributional inference was difficult to make (an equal number of context sentences implied actor and entity as the causal agent), subjects recalled more of the behavioral events, recalled more context sentences, and were less confident in their attributions than when the attributional inference was easy to make (most context sentences implied the same causal agent). Subjects also recalled context information that was implicationally incongruent with the majority of the other context sentences with a higher probability than when that same information was implicationally congruent.     

Processing load and memory for stereotype-based information

The present research considered the effects of stereotypes on judgmental and memorial processes. In particular, we investigated the heuristic utility of stereotype application in difficult or demanding information-processing contexts. Our results supported the prediction that stereotypical effects on memory are contingent upon the characteristics of the task environment. Whereas perceivers displayed preferential recall for stereotype-inconsistent information under low processing loads, this switched to a preference for consistent information as task demands increased. Likewise, target-based judgments were most stereotypic under high processing loads. Judgment-recall correlations supported the contention that, under high-loads, these inferences are related to the relative memorability of stereotypic information. We consider these findings in the wider context of stereotype-based effects on social cognition.     

Interference in memory for pictorial information

Subjects studied either faces composed from visual features or verbal facts composed from concepts. Recognition times were increased for both faces and facts when they were composed of elements that occurred in multiple study items. In Experiment 1 the interfering effect of other study items was much larger for verbal facts than for faces. This difference was largely eliminated in Experiment 2 where care was taken to control the features by which the faces were encoded. Experiment 2 also showed that verbal information could interfere with pictorial information and vice versa. However, this cross-modality interference was much weaker than within-modality interference. The data are consistent with the ACT theory in which pictorial material and verbal material are stored together in an abstract propositional network. The subnode model (Anderson, Language, memory, and thought, Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1976) can account for the greater within- than cross-modality interference.     

Framing social information and generalized social phobia

Patients with generalized social phobia (GSP, N=33) and matched community controls (N=31) engaged in a social interaction that was constructed to go well, and then received feedback that framed social cues reflecting either the absence of negative outcomes or the presence of positive outcomes. Following feedback that framed positive social cues, the GSP group predicted they would experience more anxiety in a subsequent interaction than did non-phobic controls. In contrast, following feedback framing the absence of negative outcomes, the GSP group did not differ from controls in their anxiety predictions. The results demonstrated that framing paradigms and methods can be usefully applied to the study of cognitive processes in social phobia and indicated that research to examine how GSP patients process specific types of social information is needed.     

Selective memory biases in individuals' memory for health-related information and behavior recommendations

Behavior change is central to both prevention and treatment of many chronic diseases. Frequently, however, individuals do not initiate the behavior change recommendations suggested by health professionals. One explanation for low rates of compliance with such recommendations may be selective memory biases in favor of information supporting the idea that one is healthy. Two studies examined whether memory for health information would be biased by preexisting health beliefs. In the first study (N?=?113), individuals' attitudes about the value of alcohol consumption influenced their memory for pro- versus anti-alcohol information. Participants showed better memory for information supporting their attitudes. In Study 2 (N?=?50), memory for behavioral recommendations depended on participants' behavioral practices. Participants displayed better memory for behavioral recommendations consistent with the idea that they were healthy than for recommendations which challenged those beliefs. These findings illustrate an additional manner in which selective processing can affect health promotion efforts, suggest that a motivation to maintain existing health beliefs may underlie the memory differences, and demonstrate that there may be value in developing efforts to ensure that people remember potentially threatening health recommendations.     

Mood and memory: Mood-congruity effects in absence of mood

Themood-congruity effect refers to facilitated processing of information when the affective valence of this information is congruent with the subject’s mood. In this paper we argue that mood may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition to produce the mood-congruity effect of selective learning. Two experiments are presented in which subjects learned lists of words with neutral, positive, and negative affective valences. In the learning task the subjects were instructed to behave as if they were depressed or happy. The mood-congruity effect was indeed obtained. The effect was stronger with subjects who “predicted” the relationship between mood and affective word valence than with subjects who were unaware of this relationship. The results are not simply attributed to task demands, but are interpreted in terms of a model of cognitive processes and people’s knowledge about mood states.     

Simple mechanisms for gathering social information

Social contexts are notoriously complex, yet decisions are nevertheless made by using simple strategies. We argue that the concept of fast and frugal heuristics provides a promising framework for understanding how we gather social information to make decisions in social environments. That is, we assume that under limitations of time, energy, and computational resources people use cognitively based shortcuts that rely on information from social environments to solve different types of real problems. We review three successful applications of heuristics to the social arena. We first introduce some commonly faced social inference problems (e.g., selecting a mate or deciding whether to cooperate with someone) and then discuss how individuals can use simple strategies to solve such problems. For each problem, we consider how social environments are structured, and how we take advantage of this structure when using heuristics to make inferences and decisions.