Mood, memory, and social judgments in children

The influence of positive and negative moods on children's recall and recognition memory and impression-formation judgments was investigated in a two-list experimental design. A total of 161 schoolchildren, 8 to 10 years old, were presented with audiovisual information containing positive and negative details about 2 target children. Each presentation was preceded by happy or sad mood manipulations. One day later, the children were again placed in a happy or sad mood, and their recall and recognition memory and impression-formation judgments were assessed. Results showed that memory was better when (a) the children felt happy during encoding, retrieval, or both; (b) the material was incongruent with learning mood; (c) the 2 target characters were encountered in contrasting rather than in matching mood states; and (d) recall mood matched encoding mood. A happy mood increased the extremity of both positive and negative impression-formation judgments. Results are contrasted with experimental data obtained with normal or depressed adults, and implications are considered for contemporary theories of mood effects on cognition and for social-developmental research.     

Person memory and person judgments based on categorically organized information

Free recall, cued recall, and rating-like judgments — conceived as alternative modes of expressing memorized information — were assessed in a person memory task. The target person had been described with respect to the presence or absence of 48 different interests (e.g., Mozart, sonatas, tennis, boxing) in 12 interest categories (e.g., music, sports). The number of interests (vs non-interests) per category was manipulated as well as the order of the three sub-tasks. The pattern of results can be explained within a categorical coding framework which suggests two functionally independent stages of recall: (a) access to a higher-order memory code on the category level, and (b0 reconstruction of specific items within categories. In particular, judgments of the degree of interest in the abstract categories were only related to selective free recall on the categorical level but not specific level free recall. Cued recall of the degree of interest in specific items was only related to free recall on the specific level. Making the category judgments before the free recall task, rather than afterwards, increased the availability of categories but not specific items. And inconsistent patterns of interests impaired the cued recall of specific patterns within categories but did not affect the categorical level. A strong positivity effect (i.e., more interests recalled than non-interests) was also found, resembling the often noted advantage of positive information in other domains of cognitive psychology.     

Mood and prospective memory

This study considered the relationship between mood states, prospective memory, and retrospective memory among a non-clinical sample of undergraduate students. Multiple regression analyses with simultaneous entry of variables were undertaken to examine the unique contributions of the alternate memory test and the emotional states to memory test performance. As expected, retrospective free recall performance and anxiety made unique and significant contributions to performance on the prospective memory task. However, only prospective memory performance emerged as a significant predictor of retrospective free recall. It is suggested that none of the mood measures emerged as a significant predictor of retrospective memory performance because they do not account for unique variance. In contrast, the relationship between anxiety and prospective memory appears to be due to factors uniquely associated with anxiety, and unrelated to depression.     

Implicit memory for negative and positive social information in individuals with and without social anxiety

Studies of memory bias for threat-relevant information in individuals with social anxiety have produced mixed results. These discrepancies may be because investigators have studied different memory processes or have used different memory tasks. We employed a video clarity judgement task to investigate implicit (capacity-free, automatic, unconscious) memory and a recognition task to investigate explicit (effortful, strategic, conscious) memory for threat in socially anxious individuals and nonanxious controls. Implicit memory for "old" (i.e., seen before) videos was defined as rating "old" videos as more clear than "new" (i.e., never seen before) videos. We created brief video clips that involved an actor or actress approaching the camera and commenting on some aspect of the viewer's actions, physical appearance, or belongings. Twenty-four videos were positive (e.g., "I really like your shoes"), and 24 were negative (e.g., "That is a horrible haircut"). Results revealed that the video clarity test was an effective measure of implicit memory. Furthermore, socially anxious individuals showed a larger implicit memory index for negative videos than did nonanxious and dysphoric controls. No group differences emerged for implicit memory for positive videos. Similarly, groups did not differ in recognition of, or false alarms for, positive and negative videos. These results demonstrate the role of implicit memory in social anxiety implying that information about threat may be automatically primed in these individuals.     

Mood and the perception of unusual people: Affective asymmetry in memory and social judgments

Does good and bad mood have a different influence on our perceptions of typical and atypical people? In this experiment, people in happy, sad or neutral moods recalled, and formed impressions of high- or low-prototypical characters. We expected an asymmetric mood effect on memory, with better recall of typical targets that require simplified, schematic processing in positive mood, but greater negative mood effects on atypical targets that require more detailed and inferential processing. Subjects (N = 66) an audio-visual mood induction in an allegedly separate experiment, before recalling, and forming impressions about people who were consistent or inconsistent with familiar prototypes within their social milieu. We found the predicted mood-congruent bias in judgments, that was significantly greater for non-typical than for typical people. We also found evidence for positive-negative mood asymmetry in memory, with better recall of typical people in positive mood, and atypical people in negative mood. The findings are discussed in terms of contemporary multi-process models of affect and cognition (Forgas, 1992), and the implications for everyday affective influences on social judgments and stereotyping are considered.     

Implicit memory bias for threat-relevant information in individuals with generalized social phobia

The authors used a noise judgment task to investigate implicit memory bias for threat in individuals with generalized social phobia (GSP). Participants first heard neutral sentences (e.g., "The manual tells you how to set up the tent.") and social-threat sentences (e.g., "The classmate asks you to go for drinks."). Implicit memory for these sentences was then tested by asking participants to rate the volume of noise accompanying the presentation of these "old" sentences intermixed with "new" sentences that had not been previously presented. Implicit memory for old sentences is revealed when participants rate the noise accompanying old sentences as less loud than the noise accompanying new sentences. Those with GSP demonstrated an implicit memory bias for social-threat sentences, whereas controls did not. This differential priming effect suggests that information about threat may be automatically accessed in GSP.     

Mood state-dependent memory: A meta-analysis

Abstract

Published research (from 1975 to 1985) on mood state-dependent memory is examined with meta-analytical techniques. Research on mood-congruent memory is also examined when relevant to a mood state-dependent hypothesis. Effect sizes are shown to vary systematically as a function of several variables. Mood state-dependent memory is more often observed with positive rather then negative moods. Also, the strongest effects were found in studies that: (a) used real-life events as the material to be retrieved; (b) selected contrasting moods, i.e. positive vs. negative rather than simply positive or negative vs. neutral moods; (c) used mood states that were specific to the items; (d) lasted longer; (e) had smaller sample size; (f) selected subjects according to direct mood criteria; (g) paid subjects for their participation in the experiment; and (h) used adults rather than students or children. Present findings are consistent with other reviews and with common theories of mood state-dependent memory. However, the findings also highlight the importance of methodological variables, more particularly variables related to the degree of commitment of subjects to the experiment, and variables related to the nature and complexity of the experimental environment. Two dimensions, realism of the experiment and demand sensitivity, compete to account for the methodological results and for some of the theoretical results.     

Mood and positive testing in social interaction

Why, how and when does mood influence positive testing, that is, the selection of matching questions, when people actively search for information about others they meet? In four experiments, we demonstrated that happy mood increased positive testing compared to sad mood. Experiment 1 showed that happy participants were more strongly motivated to get along and smooth the interaction to come than sad ones. In addition, evidence was provided by a mediation analysis that happy mood increased the preference for positive testing because of such an improved motivation to get along. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed that happy participants' preference for positive testing vanished when cognitive resources were limited. The preference for positive testing appeared under happy mood only when the context made salient the goal to get along (Experiments 3 and 4). Together, these results suggest that positive testing in a social‐hypothesis testing paradigm may have social values. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pseudocontingencies derived from categorically organized memory representations

Pseudocontingencies (PCs) allow for inferences about the contingency between two variables X and Y when the conditions for genuine contingency assessment are not met. Even when joint observations X _i and Y _i about the same reference objects i are not available or are detached in time or space, the correlation r(X _i ,Y _i ) is readily inferred from base rates. Inferred correlations are positive (negative) if X and Y base rates are skewed in the same (different) directions. Such PC inferences afford useful proxies for actually existing contingencies. While previous studies have focused on PCs due to environmental base rates, the present research highlights memory organization as a natural source of PC effects. When information about two attributes X and Y is represented in a hierarchically organized categorical memory code, as category-wise base rates p(X) and p(Y), the reconstruction of item-level information from category base rates will naturally produce PC effects. Three experiments support this contention. When the yes base rates of two respondents in four questionnaire subscales (categories) were correlated, recalled and predicted item-level responses were correlated in the same direction, even when the original responses to specific items within categories were correlated in the opposite direction.     

Mood congruence in childhood and recent autobiographical memory

To improve upon previous methodology, participants in musically induced happy, sad, or neutral moods were asked to recall childhood and recent autobiographical memories in response to pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral word cues. Symmetrical mood-congruent memory effects were observed when events were rated from the perspective of when they actually occurred (i.e., then), because memories rated as being unpleasant then tended to be rated as more pleasant now. Finally, pleasant and unpleasant cue words facilitated retrieval of childhood memories more than did neutral cues. These findings suggest that symmetrical mood congruence can be observed when accounting for such factors as the valence of retrieval cues and the perspective from which experiences are rated, given that memories appear to undergo change in affective labelling.     

Mood acknowledgment and correction for the mood-congruency bias in social judgment

Past research has revealed a mood-congruency bias wherein people evaluate other individuals more positively when they are experiencing good moods than when they are experiencing bad moods. At times, however, people may attempt to prevent their transient mood states from biasing their evaluations of other people. It was proposed that the capacity to attend openly to one’s moods is an important precursor to such mood correction efforts. Two studies supported this hypothesis. People who were encouraged to attend to their feelings (Study 1), as well as people who are naturally inclined to acknowledge their feelings (Study 2), were more likely than their counterparts to prevent their positive and negative moods from biasing their judgments of a target person.     

Infant memory for place information

The present studies were designed to examine the role of place cues in memory retrieval during early infancy. Three-month-old infants were trained to move a mobile by kicking. Two weeks later, memory retrieval was disrupted if they were reminded in a location or place different from where they had been trained, but not if they were reminded in the same place (Experiment 1A). The same result was obtained even though highly salient cues in their immediate visual surround remained unchanged during reminding (Experiments 1B and 1C). No disruption was seen, however, when retrieval was cued in a different place after only 1 day (Experiment 2). These findings unequivocally demonstrate that infants as young as 3 months encode incidental information about the place where an event occurs and suggest that early memories are buffered against retrieval in potentially inappropriate contexts over the long term.     

Recognition memory for deducible information

Recent research in language comprehension indicates a constructive encoding process in which the linguistic input is transformed into some more general semantic structure which is stored. In attempting to characterize the nature of such structures, some conflicting findings have been observed for paragraphs which describe similar set-theoretic relations, linear orderings and set inclusions. While the linear ordering research supports the constructivist theory, the set inclusion work does not. The set inclusion studies, however, employed true-false tests and not the usual recognition tests. The present study investigated the processing of set inclusion paragraphs in a self-paced study/recognition test paradigm. Results supported the constructivist theory and were contrary to predictions based upon the previous set inclusion research. Subjects were unable to differentiate between presented information and unpresented deducible information. These results were discussed in terms of accuracy constraints of different tasks on memorial performance and a possible interaction of Type of Test by Universal Quantification.     

Chronicles and social memory

This written version of the 2016 Mowinckel Lecture draws attention to and characterizes in broad strokes a particular approach that is strongly influenced by Social Memory studies and then, through a number of examples, demonstrates its potential use for addressing questions about Chronicles, as read among the literati of the late Persian or Early Hellenistic Yehud/Judah, and especially about the contribution that Chronicles made to the social memory of this group.     

Short-term memory for spatial and temporal information

Two experiments examined the probed recall of visually presented letter sequences in which the items appeared at different spatial locations. Three types of probe were compared: (1) spatial position; (2) temporal association; and (3) combined position and association. In the first experiment, in which the spatial locations of the items were correlated with their temporal order, spatial probes were more effective than temporal association probes. In the second experiment spatial location was uncorrelated with temporal order, and spatial probes were less effective than temporal association probes. Regardless of the probe, errors tended to be items presented close in time to correct responses: spatial proximity was far less important. The results are discussed in terms of a storage system in which items and their spatial locations are organized within a temporal format. Both experiments showed superior combined probe performance, demonstrating that short-term retrieval is not limited to the use of one type of cue at a time. Secondary aspects of the results showed additionally that subjects can “edit” their responses to avoid making obvious mistakes, and that spatial location can be partially forgotten rather than being completely lost.     

Attribution difficulty and memory for attribution-relevant information

This research compared the processing and retrieval of attribution-relevant information when the attributional inference is easy or difficult to make. Subjects attributed behavioral events to the person or to the situation, based on several items of context information. Each context sentence implied either the person or the entity as causal agent. When the attributional inference was difficult to make (an equal number of context sentences implied actor and entity as the causal agent), subjects recalled more of the behavioral events, recalled more context sentences, and were less confident in their attributions than when the attributional inference was easy to make (most context sentences implied the same causal agent). Subjects also recalled context information that was implicationally incongruent with the majority of the other context sentences with a higher probability than when that same information was implicationally congruent.     

Processing load and memory for stereotype-based information

The present research considered the effects of stereotypes on judgmental and memorial processes. In particular, we investigated the heuristic utility of stereotype application in difficult or demanding information-processing contexts. Our results supported the prediction that stereotypical effects on memory are contingent upon the characteristics of the task environment. Whereas perceivers displayed preferential recall for stereotype-inconsistent information under low processing loads, this switched to a preference for consistent information as task demands increased. Likewise, target-based judgments were most stereotypic under high processing loads. Judgment-recall correlations supported the contention that, under high-loads, these inferences are related to the relative memorability of stereotypic information. We consider these findings in the wider context of stereotype-based effects on social cognition.