Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments about moral dilemmas

We report the results of two experiments that show that participants rely on both emotion and reason in moral judgments. Experiment 1 showed that when participants were primed to communicate feelings, they provided emotive justifications not only for personal dilemmas, e.g., pushing a man from a bridge that will result in his death but save the lives of five others, but also for impersonal dilemmas, e.g., hitting a switch on a runaway train that will result in the death of one man but save the lives of five others; when they were primed to communicate thoughts, they provided non-emotive justifications for both personal and impersonal dilemmas. Experiment 2 showed that participants read about a protagonist's emotions more quickly when the protagonist was faced with a personal dilemma than an impersonal one, but they read about the protagonist's decision to act or not act equally quickly for personal and impersonal dilemmas.     

Perceptions of Children's Credibility in Sexual Assault Cases1

Children's testimony often plays a central role in prosecutions of child sexual abuse. Nevertheless, research on jurors' perceptions of the credibility of child sexual assault victims remains limited. In three experiments, we examined mock jurors' reactions to children's testimony about sexual abuse. Participant jurors were exposed to videotaped or written scenarios of child sexual abuse trials and then rated victim credibility and defendant guilt. Analyses indicated that: (a) victim age was either inversely related or unrelated to perceptions of victim credibility, (b) women were more likely than men to find child victims credible, (c) corroborating testimony from a child victim increased the credibility of another child victim, and (d) exposure of participants to past criminal acts and other negative defendant character evidence heightened perceived victim credibility and defendant guilt. Implications for understanding jurors' reactions to child witnesses are discussed.     

What's in a Name? Persuasion Perhaps

Four studies demonstrate the potential influence of name similarity on perceptions of similarity to oneself in general, liking, and compliance. Some participants received a scenario in which the protagonist's name was similar to their own. These participants indicated that the character was more similar to themselves, reported greater liking for the person, and expressed more willingness to comply with a request for help than control participants did. In addition, the persuasive influence of name similarity on questionnaire return rates indicated that both undergraduates and college professors completed and returned questionnaires more frequently if the name on the cover letter was similar to their own. The influence of name similarity was independent of name familiarity. The importance of name similarity in eliciting overt behavioral action is discussed.     

“You don't expect me to believe that,do you?” Expectations influence recall and belief of alibi information

Presumptions of guilt could bias criminal investigators' interviews of suspects, reducing recall of exculpatory alibi information, and the label “alibi” could be enough to create a presumption of guilt. Participants (n = 285) viewed a videotaped narrative account; some participants knew prior to viewing that the account was an alibi whereas others discovered this after viewing. Also, some participants were given an expectation that the alibi provider was guilty or innocent. Results indicated participants with a presumption of guilt before viewing the alibi recalled less alibi‐relevant information, found the alibi less believable, and viewed the alibi provider more negatively than did participants without such an expectation, and that a label of “alibi” was not enough to create a presumption of guilt.     

The threat of those who “understand”: ways in which out‐groups induce guilt

Two types of out‐groups are hypothesized to make people feel guilty about their in‐group's misdeeds. Given its expertise and legitimacy, a disapproving victimized out‐group should raise guilt. However, when a morally tainted perpetrator out‐group is the evaluator, a need to differentiate the self from this out‐group should characterize the guilt responses. This out‐group's disapproval should therefore diminish guilt, whereas some understanding toward the in‐group's position may paradoxically increase guilt. Moreover, these patterns are likely to be accentuated as in‐group identification increases. Predictions were supported among Dutch participants (N = 145) who read how either the current Jewish Dutch (victimized out‐group) or Germans (perpetrator out‐group) evaluated the Dutch collaboration with the Nazis. Results indicated that compassion for the victimized partially mediated the guilt responses. Implications for how perpetrator groups are persuaded to acknowledge their misdeeds are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Harm Focus Leads to Greater Collective Guilt: The Case of the U.S.‐Iraq Conflict

Collective guilt from harm one's group has caused an out‐group is often undermined because people minimize or legitimize the harm done (i.e., they generate exonerating cognitions). When a group action has harmed both the in‐group and an out‐group, focusing people on “self‐harm”—ways in which the in‐group has harmed itself—may elicit more collective guilt because self‐harm is less likely to be exonerated. In Study 1, American participants who focused on how the invasion of Iraq had harmed the United States expressed greater collective guilt over harm inflicted on the people of Iraq than those who focused on Iraqi suffering. Study 2 showed that this effect is due to reductions in exonerating cognitions among people focused on self‐harm. We consider the implications of these findings for intergroup reconciliation, particularly in situations where two groups have been involved in open conflict.     

Will jurors correct for evidence interdependence in their verdicts? It depends

Throughout an investigation, pieces of evidence are likely to contaminate one another, yet at trial jurors are expected to treat pieces of evidence as if they are independent. Are jurors able to understand potential evidence contamination? The present study showed mock jurors a videotaped trial simulation. Participants were randomly assigned to hear testimony regarding one piece of evidence, two pieces of independent evidence, or two pieces of interdependent evidence. The study tested the hypothesis that jurors who hear evidence that is interdependent will be just as likely to find the defendant guilty as jurors who hear about two pieces of independent evidence. When an eyewitness's identification was the uncontaminated piece of evidence, our hypothesis was supported. However, when the confession was the uncontaminated piece of evidence, jurors seemed to understand that one piece of evidence had been influenced by another and adjusted their beliefs about the defendant's guilt accordingly. This study supports the conclusion that jurors can sometimes identify and correct for evidence contamination in their perceptions of a defendant's guilt. Implications for reform support are discussed.     

The desirability of beliefs: preschoolers' appreciation of fact beliefs and subsequent emotions

In this study, we investigated the extent to which preschool children's own knowledge about reality biases their understanding that others' beliefs about reality govern others' emotions and not reality itself. Therefore, an increasing tension was created between the beliefs of the protagonist and the participant, by providing varying degrees of evidence about the validity of the protagonist's belief. Children of between 4 and 5 years of age were asked to predict the protagonist's emotion, given the protagonist's desire and the protagonist's belief. The results show that, to a certain extent, preschool children take others' beliefs into account when predicting others' emotions. When the outcome is clear, children probably feel tied to reality, and in the case of false beliefs, their knowledge about reality biases their emotion predictions, as was also evident in ‘false belief’ research (Wimmer H, Perner I. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition 13: 103–128). However, when it is uncertain what the actual outcome will be, then it is not the likelihood of others' beliefs but the desirability of the outcome that biases children's predictions of others' emotions. In other words, when the actual outcome is yet unclear, 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds show a tendency for wishful thinking in their predictions of others' emotions. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

大学生心理控制源与内疚感和羞耻感对反事实思维的影响

研究以128名大学生为研究对象,采用2 (心理控制源: 外控型、内控型)×2 (自我道德感: 内疚感、羞耻感) 两因素被试间实验设计,考察了外控和内控大学生在内疚感和羞耻感两种不同的自我道德情感下反事实思维内容的差异。结果表明:(1) 心理控制源对大学生反事实思维不同内容的诱发具有重要的影响:外控者更倾向于产生行为和情境导向的反事实思维,而内控者更倾向于产生自我导向的反事实思维。内疚感和羞耻感对大学生反事实思维内容的产生没有直接的影响;(2) 反事实思维内容的产生受到了心理控制源与内疚感和羞耻感两种自我道德情感的交互影响:外控者在羞耻感的启动条件下比在内疚感的启动条件下表现出了更多的行为和情境导向的反事实思维,而内控者在内疚感的启动条件下比在羞耻感的条件下表现出了更多的自我导向的反事实思维。研究结果有助于解释以中西方不同被试而得出的内疚感和羞耻感与反事实思维关系的矛盾结论。     

Toddlers’ social evaluations of agents who act on false beliefs

Mature social evaluations privilege agents’ intentions over the outcomes of their actions, but young children often privilege outcomes over intentions in verbal tasks probing their social evaluations. In three experiments (N = 118), we probed the development of intention-based social evaluation and mental state reasoning using nonverbal methods with 15-month-old toddlers. Toddlers viewed scenarios depicting a protagonist who sought to obtain one of two toys, each inside a different box, as two other agents observed. Then, the boxes’ contents were switched in the absence of the protagonist and either in the presence or the absence of the other agents. When the protagonist returned, one agent opened the box containing the protagonist's desired toy (a positive outcome), and the other opened the other box (a neutral outcome). When both agents had observed the toys move to their current locations, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box containing the desired toy. In contrast, when the agents had not seen the toys move and therefore should have expected the desired toy's location to be unchanged, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box that no longer contained the desired toy. Thus, the toddlers preferred the agent who intended to make the protagonist's desired toy accessible, even when its action, guided by a false belief concerning that toy's location, did not produce a positive outcome. Well before children connect beliefs to social behavior in verbal tasks, toddlers engage in intention-based evaluations of social agents with false beliefs.     

Response to Requests for Abortion: The Influence of Guilt and Knowledge1

Participants who varied in their levels of sex guilt and sexual knowledge indicated the extent of their approval for abortion in response to 10 case histories of abortion applicants. The case histories were varied in terms of the circumstances under which conception had occurred. Sex guilt was significantly related to abortion decisions while sexual knowledge registered little effect. Low sex guilt students were more favorable toward abortion requests than were high sex guilt students, but both groups were more favorable toward abortion when conception was the result of failure of a contraceptive method than when it was due to the applicant's inconsistent use of the method. In addition, high sex guilt students' abortion decisions were significantly influenced by the relationship of the applicant to her coital partner. When the relationship was “steady,” they approved the request, whereas abortion was denied to the applicant who conceived with a casual partner. The results were discussed within the context of the debate over the morality of abortion and the problem of unwanted adolescent pregnancy. It was suggested that sex guilt may play a larger role in these issues than has been previously recognized, and that presenting the “facts” (sexual knowledge) may have little impact in abortion related decisions.     

Group-based guilt and shame in the context of intergroup conflict: The role of beliefs and meta-beliefs about group malleability

Group-based guilt and shame are part of a wide range of moral emotions in intergroup conflicts. These emotions can potentially motivate group members to make compromises in order to promote conflict resolution, and increase support for reparations and apologies following moral transgressions committed by the in-group. Thus, it is important to understand how to induce these emotions and the mechanisms for their effects. In the present paper, we examined the mechanisms underlying group-based guilt and shame in four studies. Across the first three studies, conducted in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we found that group-based guilt was mostly predicted by individuals’ implicit theories about groups (ITG). Specifically, we found that the more participants believed that groups are malleable, the more they experienced group-based guilt. Group-based shame, however, was found to be dependent upon individuals’ perception of other people’s perceptions about the malleability of groups (i.e., meta-ITG), as the perceived damage to one’s in-group image is a major component in experiencing shame. In Study 4, conducted in the context of gender relations, we differentiated between the two components of shame, that is, moral and image shame. As predicted, while group-based guilt and moral shame showed similar patterns of results, meta-ITG had a moderating effect on the association between ITG and group-based image shame. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed in relation to promoting intergroup conflict resolution and reconciliation.     

Children's and Adults’ Ability to Build Online Emotional Inferences During Comprehension of Audiovisual and Auditory Texts

Two studies examined inferences drawn about the protagonist's emotional state in movies (Study 1) or audiobooks (Study 2). Children aged 5, 8, and 10 years old and adults took part. Participants saw or heard 20 movie scenes or sections of audiobooks taken or adapted from the TV show Lassie. An online measure of emotional inference was designed that assessed the ability of the participants to understand the main protagonist's emotional state. The participants’ emotional knowledge and media literacy were assessed as further variables. The results of the studies provide evidence that children from the age of 5 build emotional inferences when both watching movies and listening to audiobooks. A developmental trend exists with regard to the precision of the emotional inferences. Media literacy and emotional knowledge differed in terms of their influence on the ability to generate inferences, which was dependent on the age of the participant and the presentation mode.     

Children's Emotional Reactivity to Interadult Nonverbal Conflict Expressions

The authors investigated children's responses to nonverbal expressions of conflict. Reactions of 3 groups of children (ranging in age from 6 to 16 years) to multiple forms of nonverbal conflict behaviors expressed in videotaped simulations of interadult disputes were examined. Results indicated that children make few discriminations between different forms of nonverbal conflict behaviors and that their reactions to nonverbal conflict are similar to their reactions to verbal conflict. Adults' expressions of fear elicited the most negative emotional responses from children, suggesting that children react to the meaning of conflict expressions and that expressions of fear may represent the greatest emotional security risks to children. Implications of these results for a theoretical model of the effects of forms of marital conflict on children are discussed (P. T. Davies & E. M. Cummings, 1994).     

Repeating the Errors of Our Parents? Family‐of‐Origin Spouse Violence and Observed Conflict Management in Engaged Couples*

Based on a developmental social learning analysis, it was hypothesized that observing parental violence predisposes partners to difficulties in managing couple conflict. Seventy-one engaged couples were assessed on their observation of parental violence in their family of origin. All couples were videotaped discussing two areas of current relationship conflict, and their cognitions during the interactions were assessed using a video-mediated recall procedure. Couples in which the male partner reported observing parental violence (male-exposed couples) showed more negative affect and communication during conflict discussions than couples in which neither partner reported observing parental violence (unexposed couples). Couples in which only the female partner reported observing parental violence (female-exposed couples) did not differ from unexposed couples in their affect or behavior. Female-exposed couples reported more negative cognitions than unexposed couples, but male-exposed couples did not differ from unexposed couples in their reported cognitions.     

Sociomoral reasoning in children and adolescents from two collectivistic cultures

This study compared the sociomoral reasoning of 7-, 9-, 12-, and 15-year-old children and adolescents of two collectivistic cultures in the 1990s: Spain (horizontal collectivism; N = 208) and Russia (vertical collectivism; N = 247). Participants reasoned about choices and moral justifications of a protagonist in a sociomoral dilemma where participants can focus on different moral and non-moral concerns (e.g., going with their best friend, going with a new classmate or trying to do something with both). Results support previous research in western societies: participants tend to choose the option “visiting the best friend”, and self-interest tends to decrease with age whereas altruism tends to increase. Moreover, Spanish participants tended to consider all parties involved in the dilemma (i.e., old friend and new classmate), whereas Russian participants did not. These results are discussed in light of their differences as horizontal and vertical collectivistic societies. Overall, the results open an avenue for new studies when comparing the effects of culture on children's and adolescents' development.