法律正义和正义美德

正义是一个复杂而重要的伦理学主题,当代伦理学家罗尔斯把正义当成是一种法律制度,而古代亚里士多德却更为正确地指出,法律正义还不是一种完全的正义,正义毋宁更是一种美德,它是一切美德的总汇。     

康德的正义与康德主义的正义

作者认为当代康德主义的正义理论旨在改进康德正义理论,克服其在康德正义理论中看到的问题。然而,康德主义者对康德的批评恰恰是康德主义正义理论所遭受的批评。本文考察这些批评是否同等地适用于康德主义理论和康德的理论,并指出两种理论所依赖前提之不同。同时,本文将论证康德主义理论使用了大量的理想化预设,这意味着它们无法被充分证成,当代康德主义者改进康德正义理论的努力是不成功的,而回到康德却能够提供一条出路。     

法律正义与道德正义

进入文明时代以来,社会正义一直是人们追求的基本价值目标.社会正义实质上是对人类社会关系(包括个人之间、群体及组织之间、个人与群体及组织之间的相互关系)的公平性、正当性的确认和捍卫,社会正义通常采取法律形式和道德形式来表达.法律正义是以国家意志的形式来表达的社会关系的规定性,它通过制度规范方式来确认和捍卫公民的合法权益和守法义务.道德正义是以德性和良心的形式来表现的社会关系的规定性,它通过伦理规范的方式来确认和维护公民的伦理权利和道德义务.法律正义是道德正义的基础和保障,因而也是社会正义的底线和起点;道德正义是法律正义的前提和灵魂,因而也是社会正义的理想和目标.构建法律正义与道德正义的良性互动关系.是实现社会正义的有效保证.     

分配公正、程序公正、互动公正影响效果的差异

以大学生奖学金评比为例,探讨了组织公正各维度影响效果的差异。以661名大学生为被试,采用2×2×2的完全随机设计,以情境故事法（scenarios）呈现刺激,研究了奖学金评比中分配公正、程序公正、互动公正对大学生学习投入、班级荣誉感、班级归属感、与辅导员的关系的影响。结果表明,组织公正三个维度与效果变量之间存在清晰的对应影响关系：分配公正主要影响具体、以个人为参照的效果变量;程序公正主要影响与组织有关的效果变量;互动公正主要影响与上司有关的效果变量。     

Merciful Justice

I offer a solution to an old puzzle about how God can be both just and merciful at the same time—a feat which seems required of God, but at the same time seems impossible since showing mercy involves being more lenient than justice demands. Inspired by two of Jesus’ parables and work by Feinberg, Johnson and Smart, I suggest that following a “principle of merciful justice”—that persons ought to receive what they deserve or better—delivers mercy and justice simultaneously, certainly in cases of distributions of goods, and even in cases of distribution of harms as well, if we can accept some qualifications.     

论公正

公正的基准是权利。权利在本质上是一种获得性的社会性资格。公正就是这样的原则 :以权利为本位而义务与权利相对等、对称和对应。公正作为美德就是尊重他人的权利和尊重公共规则。公正作为制度伦理首先就是以权利为本位 ,其次是普遍和平等 ,再次是公开、明确和有既定程序。     

全球正义——日益扩展的行动范围

各种正义概念 在《理想国》的十卷著作中,苏格拉底的问题"什么是正义?"导致了人们分别在个体和社会那里对正义的本性进行研究.     

Interspecific Justice

This essay supposes that the question of what treatment of animals is morally acceptable cannot be decided in any straightforward way by appeals to ‘equal consideration of interests’ or to animal rights. Instead it seeks to survey a variety of proposals as to how we ought to adjudicate interspecific conflicts of interests ‐ proposals that are both ‘speciesist’ and ‘non‐speciesist’ in nature. In the end one proposal is defended as the most reasonable one, and is claimed to provide a partial basis for developing an adequate theory of interspecific justice. In the course of this argument the challenge posed by radical critics of current treatment of animals (e.g. Tom Regan and Peter Singer) is considered. The schema of a theory developed here partly supports and partly conflicts with positions they have defended. Regarding the latter point it proposes a non‐anthropocentric basis for discounting the interests of sentient animals.