Origins of Self-Perception in Infancy

Most accounts of the origins of the self-concept in humans rely on the mirror self-recognition (rouge removal) task whereby the infant is credited with self-awareness at about 15 months, once it is able to use the mirror reflection to locate a dab of rouge on the nose. But mirror self- recognition may require relatively advanced cognitive abilities and may reveal relatively little about the ontogenetic origins of self-knowledge. The aim of this article is to consider the antecedents of self-knowledge in processes of sensory perception during infancy. J. J. Gibson' s ecological approach to sensory perception asserts that there is information for the distinction between self and nonself inherent in perception. Evidence from human infants who are too young to recognize themselves in mirrors is reviewed for a sensory perceptual basis for the existential self (the I) and for the categorical self (the me) in William James' s terminology. Studies of the visual proprioceptive control of posture in babies may be interpreted to support an inherent distinction between self and nonself in infantperception, rather than the traditional account of an "adualistic confusion." Similarly, various aspects of bodily self-awareness manifested even by fetuses demonstrate some basis for a categorical self as an original aspect of experience. Self-specification in perception is also indicated in recent research on imitation in very young infants, a possible mechanism for the essentially social component of self-concept development. Although a case for early self-specification in perception can readily be made, it is much more difficult to explain how self-perception gives rise to self-conception. One possibility briefly discussed is that a process of representation and re-representation of information originally obtained through interaction with physical and social objects gives rise to reflective self- awareness and the particularly autobiographical knowledge of self which we take to be species- typical of humans.     

Contextualizing personality psychology

The issue of how to contextualize personality psychology constructively has been a longstanding dilemma. This special issue brings together personality, social, self, clinical, and cultural psychologists who have attempted to contextualize the self, personality, attachment, and cultural constructs in an integrative fashion, with a focus on broader situations, such as social roles. In this introductory essay, I describe the potential advantages of integrating traditional concepts in personality psychology with social roles and provide an overview of the contributions made to the special issue.     

Psychopathology and the self: Human actors,agents, and authors

The articles included within this special issue of the Journal of Personality all conceptualize psychopathology as the result of problems in human selfhood. As such, they implicate a wide assortment of self-related constructs, from self-objectification to self-esteem, in the etiology and maintenance of psychopathology, and they point to interventions designed to alter these self-processes in order to alleviate suffering. In this commentary, I reinterpret and reorganize many of the ideas presented in the articles from the standpoint of a tripartite perspective on the reflexive human self. The self is first and foremost an inherent duality of I and Me. Psychologically speaking, the I/Me dynamic plays out in three different guises—the self as (1) social actor, (2) motivated agent, and (3) autobiographical author. Problems in human selfhood as they pertain to psychopathology may be profitably reconceived in terms of the corresponding performative styles expressed by social actors, the motivational agendas of values and goals that energize human striving and determine self-esteem, and the internalized life stories that human beings, as authors of the self, fashion and narrate to make sense of the reconstructed past and imagined future.     

‘Bildung’ and Intercultural Understanding: A Dialogical Approach

In this introduction to the special issue on Bildung and dialogical self theory (DST), I explain why the notion of Bildung warrants elaboration in a special issue of the Journal of Constructivist Psychology. The concept of Bildung—for some, too apolitical and individualistic—gains significance by relating it to intercultural understanding as a prime challenge for plural societies in which cultural and religious diversity easily leads to confrontation and even violent conflict. The special issue offers an interdisciplinary discussion of the relevance of DST for this topic, of Bildung and humanism, and of the practice of intercultural adult education. In three articles, arguments for dialogical self as a prerequisite for intercultural adult education are placed within the broader context of pivotal discussions conducted within psychology, philosophy, and religious studies on the subject of our globalizing world.     

Self and Identity in Later Life: Protecting and Enhancing the Self

Self and identity are central concepts in the social and behavioral sciences for multiple reasons. At least three major research traditions focus on the self. First, sociologists view the self as a primary bridge between social structures and individual attitudes and behaviors, as a mechanism by which social structures and individuals affect and are affected by each other. Second, self and identity are viewed as cornerstones of well-being. Thus, social and behavioral scientists have documented important links between the self and physical and mental health, role performance, the quality of interpersonal relationships, and subjective well-being. Third, the self is conceptualized as a central motivating force in human behavior. Issues as diverse as self-selection into specific environments, defense mechanisms, and the desire and ability to break addictive behaviors have been informed by attention to the motivational force of the self. This latter tradition serves as the conceptual bedrock of this paper. This paper examines three components of the self: self-efficacy, self-esteem, and a sense of authenticity. The first two have received substantial theoretical and empirical attention; the latter, much less. I argue that this unequal distribution of scientific inquiry is a result of too much emphasis on the motivation to protect the self, to the neglect of motivation to enhance the self. I make a case for the particular importance of examining self-enhancement in late life.     

Dyadic nominations of bullying: Comparing types of bullies and their victims

Previous studies indicate that when identifying individuals involved in bullying, the concordance between self- and peer- reports is low to moderate. There is support that self- and peer- identified victims constitute distinct types of victims and differ in adjustment. Likewise, differentiating between self- and peer- reports of bullying may also reveal distinct types of bullies. The goal of this study was to examine differences between types of bullies identified via dyadic nominations (self-identified, victim-identified, and self/victim identified). First, we examined the concordance between dyadic nominations of bullying and traditional measures of bullying (i.e., self- and peer-reports). Second, we compared the behavioral profiles of the bully types to nonbullies, with a focus on aggressive behaviors and social status. Third, we examined whether the types of bullies targeted victims with different levels of popularity, as well as the role of their own popularity and prioritizing of popularity. Participants were 1,008 Dutch adolescents (50.1% male, M_age = 14.14 years, standard deviation [SD] = 1.30) who completed a classroom assessment of dyadic nominations, peer nominations, and self-report items. Results indicated that victim identified and self/victim identified bullies were more aggressive, more popular, and less socially preferred than self-identified bullies and nonbullies. Self/victim identified bullies targeted victims with the highest social status. The association between bully type and victims' popularity was further qualified by bullies' own popularity and the degree to which they prioritized popularity. Implications for the implementation of dyadic nominations are discussed.     

Limits and lessons of constructivism some critical reflections

Abstract

Despite their diversity, the articles in this special issue generally bear on three key problems facing constructivist theorists and therapists: (1) the relation between knowledge and reality, (2) the construction of self in social relationships, and (3) the facilitation of change in the clinical context. In this article I critically evaluate the recommendations and challenges of the contributors regarding these problems and clarify the implications for the practice of constructivist psychotherapy.     

The perceived impact of the mass media: Reconsidering the third person effect

Communication scholars describe a pervasive ‘third person effect’ wherein people see mass media as more likely to affect other people than themselves. Two experiments are reported demonstrating that this effect is not a universal response to the issue of social influence, but occurs in specific social comparative contexts. In Experiment I respondents judged the impact on self and other of three types of media content-negative content, positive content, and public service campaigns. Comparison others varied on two dimensions, vagueness and closeness. A third person effect was found for both negative and positive content, but was more pronounced for negative content. The effect was also more pronounced in comparisons with vague and distant others. In contrast, respondents saw themselves as relatively vulnerable to influence from public service campaigns. Moreover, the direction of perceived self-other differences varied with respondents' perceptions of the desirability of the intended influence. In Experiment 2 respondents judged the impact on self and other of media violence and drink-driving campaigns. Results confirmed a perception of relative invulnerability to negative content and indicated that comparisons with vague others, and particularly with vague-distant others like ‘the average person’, facilitate such perceptions. Perceived self-other differences on the issue of drink-driving were less evident and varied with the perceived desirability of the intended influence. Results are discussed in terms of the ego-defensive and self-enhancing functions of social comparisons.     

A social neuroscience approach to self and social categorisation: A new look at an old issue

We take a social neuroscience approach to self and social categorisation in which the current self-categorisation(s) is constructed from relatively stable identity representations stored in memory (such as the significance of one's social identity) through iterative and interactive perceptual and evaluative processing. This approach describes these processes across multiple levels of analysis, linking the effects of self-categorisation and social identity on perception and evaluation to brain function. We review several studies showing that self-categorisation with an arbitrary group can override the effects of more visually salient, cross-cutting social categories on social perception and evaluation. The top-down influence of self-categorisation represents a powerful antecedent-focused strategy for suppressing racial bias without many of the limitations of a more response-focused strategy. Finally we discuss the implications of this approach for our understanding of social perception and evaluation and the neural substrates of these processes.     

Do Split Brains Listen to Prozac?

Abstract. Cognitive science challenges our understandings of self and freedom. In this article, adapted from a chapter in Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences (Peterson 2003), I review some of the scientific literature with regard to issues of self and freedom. I argue that our sense of self is a construct and heavily dependent on the kind of brain that we have. Furthermore, understanding the issue of freedom requires an understanding of the findings of cognitive science. Human beings are constrained to be free; our biology in no small way determines the kinds of freedom that we are able to have.     

Does Language Affect Personality Perception? A Functional Approach to Testing the Whorfian Hypothesis

Whether language shapes cognition has long been a controversial issue. The present research adopts a functional approach to examining the effects of language use on personality perception and dialectical thinking. We propose that language use activates corresponding cultural mindsets, which in turn influence social perception, thinking, and behavior. Four studies recruited Chinese‐English bilinguals (N = 129 in Study 1, 229 in Study 2, 68 in Study 3, 106 in Study 4) and used within‐subjects and between‐subjects design, written and behavioral reports, and self‐ and other perceptions. The four studies converged to show that Chinese‐English bilinguals exhibit higher dialectical thinking and more variations in self‐ and observer ratings of personality when using the Chinese language than when using English. Furthermore, dialectical thinking predicted more self‐ and other‐perceived variations in personality and behavior across bilingual contexts. These results highlight the important role of culture in understanding the relations between language and cognition, and attest to the malleability of personality perception and dialectical thinking within and across individuals in response to culture‐related linguistic cues.     

The dramaturgic perspective: Implications for the study of person perception

The major theoretical contributions to the study of attribution, those of Heider (1958), Kelley (1967) and Jones and Davis (1965) have worked from the assumption that person perception is analogous to object perception and scientific investigation. Goffman's dramaturgic analysis of the social self provides an alternative framework for addressing the problem of how we perceive and understand the behaviour of others. In this paper, I explore the implications of the dramaturgic perspective for the study of person perception and discuss the ways in which it diverges from the traditional approach to attribution. In addition, I present an alternative account of the Fundamental Attributional Error that arises in light of Goffman's dramaturgic analysis.     

Categorizing others and the self: How social memory structures guide social perception and behavior

In keeping with the special issue theme of “Remembering the Future,” this article provides a selective review of research on how memory for social information (i.e., social category representation) influences future processing and behavior. Specifically, the authors focus on how categorization and stereotyping affect how we perceive others and ourselves. The first part of the article reviews research on how individuals perceive others. The authors review research on the determinants and outcomes of social categorization and stereotype activation, concluding with the influence of ingroup/outgroup categorization on face processing. The second part of the article reviews research on how individuals perceive themselves. The authors argue that stereotype threat—concerns about being judged or behaving in ways that confirm negative group stereotypes, leading to poor performance—is the result of both self-categorization and stereotype activation. Overall, the article highlights the complex relationship between memory for social category information and future social perception and behavior.     

The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future

Abstract: Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this article, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper understanding of this connection reveals that the abovementioned objection to reductionism cannot get off the ground. Though the connection I propose is weaker than the connection typically presupposed, I nonetheless run up against a conclusion reached by Susan Wolf in “Self‐Interest and Interest in Selves.” According to Wolf, metaphysical theses about the nature of personal identity have no significance for our attitude of special concern. By arguing against Wolf's treatment of self‐interest, I suggest that her arguments for this conclusion are misguided. This discussion leads to further clarification of the nature of the link between theories of personal identity and our special concern and, ultimately, to a better understanding of the rationality of this attitude.     

Not all positive categories are alike: Exploring the superiority of the self as a positive source for associative attitude change via intersecting regularities

In associative evaluative learning, attitudes can originate from intersecting regularities between a target and both positive- and self-related stimuli. Liking for a focal target is primarily driven by its reference to one source, but it might be qualified by the reference to a contrast target. This contribution focuses on how the nature of positive and contrast sources affects learning via intersecting regularities. In two studies (N = 199 and N = 185), the self and another positive category lead to increased implicit and explicit liking, regardless of the contrast source's valence. In Study 3 (N = 128), confronting the self and the positive category in the same paradigm yields only implicit preferences for self-related targets. Both implicitly and explicitly, this preference for self- over positive-related target was moderated by self-positivity. Our findings confirm the robustness of learning via intersecting regularities and suggest that the self is a special evaluative source.     

The influence of self‐efficacy,subjective norms,and risk perception on behavioral intentions related to the H1N1 flu pandemic: A comparison between Korea and the US

This study examined the extent to which individualism‐collectivism moderates the relative effects of agency control beliefs (i.e., self‐efficacy), social norms (i.e., subjective norms), and risk perception (perceived vulnerability and perceived severity) on behavioral intention to engage in self‐protection behavior in the context of the H1N1 flu pandemic. Using multistage stratified sampling, the present study sampled people from the US (n = 399) and Korea (n = 500), two countries that have been found to be prototypical of individualistic and collectivistic national cultures, respectively. Consistent with the contrast between individualism and collectivism, the results of moderated regression analyses showed that intrapersonal control beliefs (i.e., self‐efficacy) and risk perception (i.e., perceived severity) had stronger effects on behavioral intention in the American sample than in the Korean sample, whereas social norms (i.e., subjective norms) had a stronger predictive power for the Korean sample than for the American sample. Overall, the findings contribute to health and risk studies by specifying which aspects of risk perceptions or beliefs are affected by national culture and how this translates into cross‐national variations in health risk behavioral intention.     

Revisiting an era in Germany from the perspective of adolescents in mother‐headed single‐parent families

Much of the documented work on families headed by single mothers is based on empirical evidence from North America and a few Anglo‐Saxon countries. Many researchers consider single‐mother families to be at a disadvantage because of nonsupportive family policies. This paper uses data from a social context that differed hugely in this respect—the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The GDR provided extensive state support to single‐mother families and, thus, was vastly different from other countries. Based on a literature review and using Hill's family stress theory, this paper is based on the hypothesis that adolescents living in mother‐headed single‐parent families and those living with their biological parents would have near‐similar social outcomes (display of psychosomatic symptoms, perception of stress, display of delinquent behaviour, life satisfaction, academic self‐efficacy, and academic grades) and family‐related outcomes (relationship with parents and perception of family environment). Further, it was hypothesized that adolescents from stepfather families would display more negative social and family‐related outcomes when compared with respondents from the other two family types. The sample comprised 1302 adolescents (M  =  13.82 years, SD  =  1.88) who were recruited from the city of Leipzig in the year immediately following German unification, 1991. Respondents reported on measures of psychosomatic symptoms, stress, delinquency, life satisfaction, academic achievement, and family‐related variables. ANCOVAs, with a control for income adjusted for household size, indicated adolescents from single‐mother families to have very similar experiences to respondents living with their biological parents on all measures except for their assessment of family environment. Adolescents living in stepfather families reported the least favourable experiences. Results are indicative of a social context in Germany that, despite unification and the early hardships for single‐mother families, still provided these families with more opportunities than constraints.     

Thoughts from a Safe Harbor: Commentary on The Problem of Thinking by Yvette Esprey

Yvette Esprey’s claim that race has the capacity to disrupt thinking in the analytic situation accords with my own experience. In this discussion I take up the question as to why ruptures that occur around race may have a special capacity to disrupt and disable analytic thinking. I look in detail at Esprey’s instructive clinical experience as it gives us a template, something to fall back on, in those moments when anxiety overwhelms us around a racial disruption. Such a template can settle us until we can restore a sense of self that is both raced and analytically focused on the rupture at hand with all its personal and social/historical resonances.     

The Freedom of Thought: Patočka on Descartes and Husserl

Pato?ka highlights the central role of Cartesianism in our tradition of thinking. Yet, today, brain scientists often claim to have overcome Cartesian dualism. In this paper, I argue that the Cartesian conceptions of human nature and sensory perception remain presuppositions of brain science, where perception is largely equated with thinking. Equating perception and thinking means that thinking is a determined process, which leads to an erosion of critique. Critique, and the freedom of thought it entails, is essential to Descartes, Husserl and Pato?ka. I examine the differences, as well as the relationship, between Descartes method of doubt, Husserl’s phenomenological epochē and Pato?ka’s universalization of the epochē. I also show how Descartes’, Husserl’s and Pato?ka’s way into critique present different ways to understand self, things and the world. In conclusion, I suggest that Pato?ka presents a promising way to critique mechanistic understandings of thinking by rethinking both subject and object.