Lucky understanding without knowledge

Can one still have understanding in situations that involve the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge? Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009a; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009b) says yes, Prichard (Grazer Philos Stud 77:325–339, 2008; in: O’Hear A (ed) Epistemology, 2009; in: Pritchard D, Millar A, Haddock A (eds) The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, 2010) say sometimes, DePaul and Grimm (Philos Phenomenol Res 74:498–514, 2007) and Grimm (Br J Philos Sci 57:515–535, 2006; in: Bernecker S, Pritchard D (eds) The Routledge companion to epistemology, 2011), Kvanvig’s critics, say no. The cases put forth by Kvanvig’s critics share a common feature, which seems to drive the intuition that understanding can’t be lucky: the fact that the information that makes up the individual’s understanding comes exclusively from a bad source. I formulate a case that lacks this feature, drawing on the fact that understanding produced from scientific inquiry is often produced by collaboration. I argue that my case provides good evidence that understanding is not a species of knowledge.     

Dialogue of unconsciouses: conversations we have without our knowledge

Following Ferenczi's tradition of examining the dynamics between analyst and analysand, I will explore aspects of this relationship particularly around issues of mutuality versus inequality, all occurring without the conscious involvement of either participant. I propose that these issues of attachment can be further illuminated by examining the underlying neuropsychobiological processes. Case examples will be offered to illustrate these points.     

Control over grain size in memory reporting--with and without satisfying knowledge

When answering questions from memory, respondents strategically control the precision or coarseness of their answers. This grain control process is guided by 2 countervailing aims: to be informative and to be correct. Previously, M. Goldsmith, A. Koriat, and A. Weinberg Eliezer (2002) proposed a satisfying model in which respondents provide the most precise answer that passes a minimum-confidence report criterion. Pointing to social-pragmatic considerations, the present research shows the need to incorporate a minimum-informativeness criterion as well. Unlike its predecessor, the revised, "dual-criterion" model implies a distinction between 2 theoretical knowledge states: Under moderate-to-high levels of satisfying knowledge, a grain size can be found that jointly satisfies both criteria--confidence and informativeness. In contrast, under lower levels of unsatisfying knowledge, the 2 criteria conflict--one cannot be satisfied without violating the other. In support of the model, respondents often violated the confidence criterion in deference to the informativeness criterion, particularly when answering under low knowledge, despite having full control over grain size. Results also suggest a key role for the "don't know" response which, when available, can be used preferentially to circumvent the criterion conflict.     

Acquisition of structured knowledge without instruction: the relational schema induction paradigm

Participants learned about a structure without explicit explanation, either by using relational schema induction (G. S. Halford, J. D. Bain, M. T. Maybery, & G. Andrews, 1998), which requires completion of instances of the structure, or by memorizing instances. Emergence of structured knowledge over trials was assessed by ability to map the structure to an isomorph and thereby to generate novel instances of the structure (the generativity test). Schema induction was found to be an effective way to induce acquisition of the structure, and the generativity test was a sensitive measure of structure acquisition, as indicated by converging measures. Memorization produced only low levels of structured knowledge. A conception of structured knowledge acquisition based on relational schema induction is proposed.     

Epistemologische betrachtungen zu [S4, S5]

Zusammenfassung Die zahlreichen modallogischen Systeme zwischen den Standardkalkülen S4 und S5 werden vom epistemologischen Standpunkt aus untersucht, indem Notwendigkeit wahlweise als Wissen bzw. als Überzeugt-sein gedeutet wird. Dabei stellt sich heraus, daß — unter gewissen andernorts begründeten Voraussetzungen über epistemische Logik-S4.4 als Logik der wahren Überzeugungen aufgefaßt werden kann, während die Systeme S4.3.2 und S4.2 als Logiken für solche Leute erscheinen, die das Schema Wissen = wahre Überzeugung nur eingeschränkt für ganz spezielle rein doxastische bzw. rein epistemische Sätze akzeptieren. S4.2 ist dabei allem Anschein nach die Logik des Wissens.

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The numerous modal systems between S4 and S5 are investigated from an epistemological point of view by interpreting necessity either as knowledge or as (strong) belief. It is shown that-granted some assumptions about epistemic logic for which the author has argued elsewhere-the system S4.4 may be interpreted as the logic of true belief, while S4.3.2 and S4.2 may be taken to represent epistemic logic systems for individuals who accept the scheme knowledge = true belief only for certain special instances. There is strong evidence in favor of the assumption that S4.2 is the logic of knowledge.

     

Empirical bayes point estimates of latent trait scores without knowledge of the trait distribution

In this paper, recent developments in empirical Bayes procedures are tied in with current work in mental test theory. Point estimators of true scores are derived for the binomial and Rasch test models. These estimators are shown to be asymptotically optimal. Smoothing and an empirical study of the behavior of empirical Bayes estimates are taken up in the final section.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation, Division of Biological and Medical Sciences, Program in Psycho-Biology, Grant No. NSF GB-30779.     

Multidimensional scaling of measures of distance between partitions

The techniques of multidimensional scaling were used to study the numerical behavior of twelve measures of distance between partitions, as applied to partition lattices of four different sizes. The results offer additional support for a system of classifying partition metrics, as proposed by Boorman (1970), and Boorman and Arabie (1972). While the scaling solutions illuminated differences between the measures, at the same time the particular data with which the measures were concerned offered a basis both for counterexamples to some common assumptions about multidimensional scaling and for some conjectures as to the nature of scaling solutions. The implications of the latter findings for selected examples from the literature are considered. In addition, the methods of partition data analysis discussed here are applied to an example using sociobiological data. Finally, an argument is made against undue emphasis upon interpreting dimensions in nonmetric scaling solutions.     

Reduced relative frequency of knowledge of results without visual feedback in learning a golf-putting task

This study examined the effects of reduced relative frequency of knowledge of results (KR) on learning to putt in golf. Participants (19 men and 15 women) putted a golf ball, stopping the ball on a line at a distance of 3.5 m from the starting position, which included an uphill portion. After a pretest, participants were assigned as they arrived in balanced order by sex to one of two groups (100% KR, 33% KR) and practiced 60 trials. Those in the 100% KR group performed the task in its natural context, while others assigned to the 33% KR were shown the location of the putted ball after every third trial. All participants then performed a posttest and two retention tests, done 10 min. and 24 hr. after the posttest. Analysis at posttest showed each group had a constant error and an absolute constant error (/CE/) less than those at pretest. Also, in the retention test conducted the following day, the constant error of the 33% KR group was less than that of the 100% KR group. Third, in the posttest and both retention tests, the /CE/ of the 100% KR group was larger than that of the 33% KR group. These results suggest that reduced relative frequency of knowledge of results is effective in learning the accuracy of the golf putt.     

Performing the unexplainable: Implicit task performance reveals individually reliable sequence learning without explicit knowledge

Memory-impaired patients express intact implicit perceptual-motor sequence learning, but it has been difficult to obtain a similarly clear dissociation in healthy participants. When explicit memory is intact, participants acquire some explicit knowledge and performance improvements from implicit learning may be subtle. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether performance exceeds what could be expected on the basis of the concomitant explicit knowledge. Using a challenging new sequence-learning task, robust implicit learning was found in healthy participants with virtually no associated explicit knowledge. Participants trained on a repeating sequence that was selected randomly from a set of five. On a performance test of all five sequences, performance was best on the trained sequence, and two-thirds of the participants exhibited individually reliable improvement (by chi-square analysis). Participants could not reliably indicate which sequence had been trained by either recognition or recall. Only by expressing their knowledge via performance were participants able to indicate which sequence they had learned.