The effect of pretraining and feedback on the reasoning of young children

Three experiments are reported in which kindergarten and first-grade children were given one-trial multidimensional reasoning tasks that were modifications of those used by T. C. Toppino (1980, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 30, 496–512). In the first two experiments, the nature of the stimulus compounds (partitioned or unitary) was varied in a series of tasks of increasing complexity. First-grade children (Experiment 1) and kindergarten children (Experiment 2) performed extremely well on all of the tasks presented. Experiment 3 was designed to identify factors that contribute to these high levels of performance, relative to those obtained under the conditions used by Toppino (1980). The results indicated that a combination of feedback information and preliminary experience with simple forms of the tasks are sufficient to produce the high performance levels, and that the verbal labeling of stimulus components is not an essential constituent of the training.     

An experimental and theoretical investigation of the constant-ratio rule and other models of visual letter confusion

The constant-ratio rule (CRR) and four interpretations of R. D. Luce's (In R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, & E. Galanter (Eds.), Handbook of mathematical psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Wiley, 1963) similarity choice model (SCM) were tested using an alphabetic confusion paradigm. Four stimulus conditions were employed that varied in set size (three, four or five stimulus elements) and set constituency (block letters: A, E, X; F, H, X; A, E, F, H; A, E, F, H, X), and were presented to each subject in independent blocks. The four interpretations of the SCM were generated by constraining one, both, or neither of its similarity and bias parameter sets to be invariant in across-stimulus set model predictions. The strictest interpretation of the SCM (both the similarity and bias parameters constrained), shown to be a special case of the CRR, and the CRR produced nearly equivalent across-set predictions that provided a reasonable first approximation to the data. However, they proved inferior to the least strict SCM (neither the similarity nor bias parameters were constrained; the common interpretation of the SCM in visual confusion). Additionally, the least strict SCM was compared to J. T. Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50, 449–454) overlap model, the all-or-none model (J. T. Townsend, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1978, 18, 25–38), and a modified version of L. H. Nakatani's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 104–127) confusion-choice model. Both the least strict SCM and confusion-choice models produced nearly equivalent within stimulus set predictions that were superior to the overlap and all-or-none within-set predictions. Measurement conditions related to model structure and equivalence relations among the models, many of them new, were examined and compared with the statistical fit results of the investigation.     

An assessment of cerebral dominance in language-disordered children via a time-sharing paradigm

A time-sharing paradigm was used to assess language lateralization in language-disordered and normal children aged 4–7 years. Several expressive language tasks as well as a vocal, but nonlinguistic, task were administered concurrently with unimanual finger tapping. Dependent variables were percent disruption scores and number of syllables produced per concurrent trial. All language concurrent tasks produced tapping reductions for both hands for both groups. This result contrasts to similar time-sharing studies claiming asymmetrical interference and hence language lateralization in children (N. White & M. Kinsbourne, 1980, Brain and Language, 10, 215–223; J. Obrzut, G. Hynd, A. Obrzut, & J. Leitgeb, 1980, Brain and Language, 11, 181–194). A multiple regression analysis revealed a significant interaction effect differentiating language-disordered from normal children. Normals exhibited a parallel response pattern for speech and tapping (both increased or decreased in rate) under all lateralization conditions. Language-disordered children exhibited an inverse response pattern (e.g., if speech output increased, tapping rate decreased) only under left-hemisphere time-sharing.     

A reexamination of mental arithmetic models and data: A reply to Ashcraft

In a review of the chronometric literature, M. Ashcraft (1982, Developmental Review, 2, 213–236) concludes that adults store each basic arithmetic fact in a table-like retrieval network. In my commentary (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 225–230), I argued that procedural knowledge (stored rules, principles, or heuristics) might be a cognitively more economical basis for generating many number combinations. In this paper, I draw an analogy between this alternative model of number fact representation and how computers efficiently reconstruct arithmetic combinations, note that the research findings do not clearly support any one model of mental arithmetic, and attempt to address Ashcraft's (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 231–235) criticisms of my model.     

On the basis of early transitivity judgments

This research had two aims. The first was to test three explanations of performance on N-term series tasks by young children: the labeling model of B.DeBoysson-Bardies and K. O'Regan (1973), Nature (London), 246, 531–534, the sequential-contiguity model of L. Breslow (1981, Psychological Bulletin, 89, 325–351), and the ordered array or image model of C. A. Riley and T. Trabasso (1974, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 17, 187–202). In the first experiment, 5-year-old children were taught additional premises which would interfere with labeling and sequential-contiguity processes, but not with forming an ordered array. Reasoning performance was essentially comparable to previous results with the paradigm, thus supporting the ordered array model. The second aim was to reexamine children's ability to learn sets of premises which can be assembled into an ordered array, since there was reason to believe that previous studies had created false positives. In the second experiment, 3- to 7-year-old children were taught either overlapping (a > b, b > c, …) or nonoverlapping (a > b, c > d, …) premises. Overlapping premises can be integrated into an ordered array (a, b, c, d, e), but nonoverlapping premises cannot. However, the overlapping condition proved more difficult, and the success rate for preschoolers ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-olds}$) was of zero order. This raises doubts about their ability to learn a set of premises of the kind required for transitive inference. These doubts were strengthened by the third experiment which showed that when premises were not presented in serial order, preschool ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-old}$) children could not learn the premises of an N-term series task.     

Selective attention and the processing of integral and nonintegral dimensions: A developmental study

In two experiments, first- and fourth-grade subjects (age 6 and 9 years) performed a speeded card-sorting task with either integral or nonintegral dimensions. The dimensions were so arranged that subjects sorted on three types of task: (1) single dimension, (2) correlated dimensions, and (3) orthogonal dimensions. Results of the first experiment indicate that both first- and fourth-grade subjects sorted integral dimensions in a manner not qualitatively different from that of the adult (Garner & Felfoldy, Cognitive Psychology, 1970, 1, 225–241). In comparison with single-dimension tasks, performance was facilitated on the correlated-dimensions tasks and interference was observed on the orthogonal-dimensions tasks. Performances with nonintegral dimensions revealed an age-related processing difference. Fourth graders sorted nonintegral dimensions like the adult; no differences in performance were observed between the tasks. In contrast, first-graders sorted nonintegral dimensions as if they were integral. Interference was consistently observed on orthogonal-dimensions tasks. On correlated-dimensions tasks, interference was observed on easy tasks and redundancy facilitated difficult tasks. In the second experiment, first graders showed consistent facilitation on the correlated-dimensions task; all other results were indentical to those of Experiment I. The results were interpreted as consistent with perceptual learning theory (Gibson, Principles of perceptual learning and development. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969).     

Why Reading? Because it's there

Three papers (V. A. Mann, Reading skill and language skill. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 1–15; G. Wolford & C. A. Fowler, Differential use of partial information by good and poor readers. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 16–35; F. J. Morrison, Reading disability: A problem in rule learning and word decoding. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 36–47) are critiqued from the standpoint of their adequacy in advancing our understanding of a problem as complex as reading disability. Experimenters should be explicit about their guiding theoretical assumptions, and should think through the relations, if any, between their laboratory tasks and the actual processes of reading. The reading protocol of a dyslexic child is provided, and is interpreted within the frameworks of the Mann, Wolford and Fowler, and Morrison viewpoints.     

Masculinity-femininity perceptions of job requirements and their relationship to job-sex stereotypes

Perceived sex appropriateness of the work situation is believed to constrain work opportunities, particularly for women. However, sex appropriateness may be defined either with respect to the entire job or with respect to the tasks which comprise the job. In this study sex appropriateness of job tasks was examined by obtaining subjective estimates of the masculinity-femininity of the job requirement dimensions defined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). Results indicate that interacting with things is perceived as masculine, interacting with people is perceived as feminine, and interacting with data is perceived as falling between the other two. There is less agreement on the masculinity-femininity of specific types of interactions with data, people, and things. Sex appropriateness of specific requirements was found to be only moderately associated with the DOT's assessment of the complexity of those requirements. Further, sex appropriateness of job requirements was not highly related to the job sextypes established by Shinar (Shinar, E. H. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1975, 7, 99–110) and Krefting et al. (Krefting, L. A., Berger, P. K., and Wallace, M. J. Jr. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1978, 13, 181–191). This suggests that sex appropriateness of a job and sex appropriateness of the tasks which comprise the job are distinct, separate concepts.     

Occupational prestige: Exploration of a theoretical basis

Drawing on the theory and research of psychophysics, a nonlinear model is hypothesized to explain the connection between education and income and occupational prestige. To achieve this, Weber's (R. L. Gregory, 1981, Mind in Science, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 501–503) and Stevens' (S. S. Stevens, 1970, Science170, 1043–1050) laws are brought together in an intrinsically nonlinear model. Guided by the earlier work of R. L. Hamblin (1971, Sociometry, 34, 423–452) and others, the work of O. D. Duncan (1961, in A. J. Reiss, Jr., O. D. Duncan, P. K. Hatt, & C. C. North (Eds.), Occupations and Social Status, New York, Free Press) is reanalyzed testing the possibility that work on the socioeconomic index can be understood as a prestige allocation process which follows psychophysical principles. That is, prestige is assigned to occupations, given specifiable levels of educational and income attainment, in a manner parallel to the way in which individuals respond to changes in the intensity of other stimuli. Using first the data developed by Duncan (1961) to test the model and the 1963 NORC data (R. W. Hodge, P. M. Siegel, & P. H. Rossi, 1964, American Journal of Sociology, 70, 286–302) to replicate it, a measurement model consistent with the theoretical model is evaluated. Comparing the results of the nonlinear model to that of the linear, it is concluded that a model is obtained yielding theoretical confirmation with no loss in predictive accuracy. The resultant nonlinear model yields alternative substantive implications concerning the relative influence of income and education on occupational prestige to those to be inferred from linear models. Perhaps most important, however, is the candidacy given by these results to psychophysics as the explanatory mechanism in the prestige allocation process.     

Is it just reading?: Comments on the papers by Mann,Morrison, and Wolford and Fowler

Comments on the stimulating papers by V. A. Mann (Reading skill and language skill. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 1–15), F. Morrison (Reading disability: A problem in rule learning and word decoding. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 36–47), and G. Wolford and C. A. Fowler (Differential use of partial information by good and poor readers. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 16–35) come under four headings. First, their differences with respect to the organizing themes are identified. Second, the central difficulty, for theories of reading disability, posed by the high correlation between reading and IQ, and ways of dealing with this difficulty, are discussed. In the third and fourth sections, comments on the individual papers and a summary of the main lessons to be learned from this collection are presented.     

Why additive utility models fail as descriptions of choice behavior

This experiment sought to determine whether previously found metric violations of additive expectancy-value models C.F. J. C. Shanteau, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1974, 103, 680–691; J. G. Lynch and J. L. Cohen, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1978, 36, 1138–1151) were attributable to the inappropriateness of these models or to nonlinearities in the relationship between numerical ratings and underlying psychological impressions. Undergraduate participants performed two tasks employing the same experimental stimuli. In the first task, they rated the subjective values of hypothetical bets, judged separately and in combination. In the second task, they made pairwise comparisons of the same bets in terms of preference. The use of the same experimental stimuli in both tasks allowed a test of alternative models of utility judgment through application of the criterion of scale convergence (M. H. Birnbaum & C. T. Veit, Perception and Psychophysics, 1974, 15, 7–15). Results suggested that the additive expectancy-value model of judgments of the utilities of combinations of outcomes should be replaced by a weighted averaging rule in which the weight given to the value of each outcome in the averaging process is greater when this value is negative and extreme than when it is neutral.     

Conditional reasoning and the competence-performance issue: A developmental analysis of a training task

Empirical investigations of conditional reasoning have generally found that both children and young adults perform poorly on tasks that require the selection or evaluation of those propositions that test the truth status of conditional statements (if p then q). Earlier work (D. O'Brien & W. F. Overton, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 1980, 30, 44–60) suggested that poor performances with these tasks by young adults show improvement following the introduction of evidence that contradicts earlier faulty inferences, and this improvement generalizes to other conditional reasoning tasks. The effects of the contradiction training were not found with younger subjects. The present research is an extension of the contradiction training paradigm. Ten-, fourteen-, and eighteen-year-olds were tested to assess developmental differences in improvement with an evaluation and a conditional syllogism task. Significant improvement in performance was found for the twelfth grade students following the contradiction training, and this generalized across tasks. This effect was not found for the two younger groups. The usual poor performance of the oldest group is considered to be a false negative assessment of their conditional reasoning competency. Further, it is suggested that several correct performances of younger reasoners are false positive assessments of their conditional reasoning competency.     

A biased random walk model for two choice reaction times

This paper generalizes Stone's (1960, Psychometrika 25, 251–260) random walk model of two choice response times (RTs) that is based on the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) and that predicts equal correct and incorrect RTs to the same response. The generalized version allows a bias of the type found in signal detection theory to enter directly into the accumulation process so that ambivalent evidence may be seen as slightly favoring one alternative. The resulting biased SPRT model can predict any relation between correct and incorrect mean RTs. In particular, unlike the special symmetric case of Link and Heath's (1975, Psychometrika 40, 77–105) relative judgment theory (RJT), the biased SPRT model can predict that correct mean RTs are faster for one response but slower for the other. The biased SPRT model, the classical SPRT model, and the symmetric RJT model are all fit to the data of an RT deadline experiment reported by Green and Luce (1973, Attention and performance, New York: Academic Press) and it is shown that, of the three, the biased SPRT model provides the best account. Finally, a method for incorporating the same sort of bias into RJT models is sketched out.     

Schizophrenic speech,slips of the tongue,and jargonaphasia: A reply to Fromkin and to Lecours and Vanier-Clément

Chaika (1974, Brain & Language, 1, 257–276) raised the possibility that speech judged “schizophrenic” by researchers results from an intermittent, cyclical aphasia. Fromkin (1975, Brain and Language, 2, 498–503) judged such speech as no different from normal error and even as proof of intactness of linguistic competence. These claims are examined. Lecours and Vanier-Clément (1976, Brain and Language, 3, 516–565), on the other hand, found it not normal, but different from jargonaphasia, a claim not wholly substantiated. Schizophrenic speech is found to be different from that of normals on both formal and intuitive grounds, contributing to new understanding of the differences between normal, pathological, and artistic language.     

Developmental changes in incidental memory as a function of processing level,congruity, and repetition

Second-, fifth-, and ninth-grade students (8, 11, and 14 years of age, respectively) answered acoustic and semantic questions about words which were either congruent or incongruent with the questions. Subsequently, students' free recall of the words was unexpectedly tested. For words presented once in the list, only orienting task and congruity main effects were found. For twice-presented words, grade level interacted with both variables in that older students' recall was better than younger students' only for semantically encoded, congruent words. This finding is consistant with the hypothesis that developmental increases in semantic knowledge enhance the potential for encoding elaboration, but is in apparent conflict with the results of M. F. Geis and D. M. Hall (Child Development, 1978, 49, 857–861) who found no such interaction for second- and fifth-grade children. The different age spans included in the two studies provides one resolution of the discrepancy in results. However, a second experiment tested the importance of a procedural difference between the two studies. M. F. Geis and D. M. Hall (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1976, 22, 58–66; 1978) presented the question after the stimulus word while we presented the question before the word. For ninth-grade students, the question after condition resulted in an attenuation of the recall difference between semantic and acoustic questions compared to the question before condition. It was argued that the pattern of developmental differences in incidental memory that is obtained may be related to which procedure is utilized.     

Traits,processes, and the purpose of templates

The template method proposed by D. J. Bem and D. C. Funder 1978, Psychological Review, 85, 485–501) can have two separate purposes. First, template-behavior pairs can be used as a type of explanation in which situational influences are incorporated within a trait theory. Second, template matching can be used as a method for evaluating process theories. Recent discussion (D. J. Bem, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 390–393; D. C. Funder, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 283–289; W. Mischel & P. K. Peake, 1982, Psychological Review, 89, 730–755) confuses these two purposes. If used as a type of explanation, then templates can be criticized on the grounds of blunt empiricism; but if templates are used as a method for evaluating process theories, then process theorists should welcome this new technique.     

Children's preference for novelty in selective learning: Developmental stability or change?

Data relating novelty preference to age for normal children are inconsistent, although a current theory predicts a developmental shift from novelty to familiarity preference in selective learning (D. Zeaman, 1976, in T. J. Tighe & R. N. Leaton (Eds.), Habituation: Perspectives from child development, animal behavior, and neurophysiology (pp. 297–320), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum). Support for this theory, however, has been derived primarily from studies of retardate learning. Normal children's novelty preference was examined within a modified Moss-Harlow (E. Moss & H. F. Harlow, 1947, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 40, 333–342) design to compare Zeaman's model with that of S. L. Witryol and W. Wanich (1983, The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 143, 3–8). Each of 16 problems, consisting of three single-stimulus demonstration trials and one two-choice test, was administered to 180 children (mean CA 4, 5.5, and 7 years) in three reward conditions. Novelty was manipulated by varying stimulus familiarization in the demonstration trials. Experiment 1 showed strong preferences for novel over familiar (demonstrated) stimuli at each age. Experiment 2 revealed novelty preference across age levels, two levels of reward contrast, and two levels of task difficulty. It was reasoned that Moss-Harlow tasks designed for normal children typically present a much higher level of difficulty than that intended by researchers. Furthermore, developmental decreases in novelty preference by retardates may derive from (a) transfer of training from prior experiments and (b) specific, repetitive instructions which may have directed attention away from stimulus novelty.     

Encoding and incidental memory in children

First, third, and fifth graders (7.1, 8.8, 11.1 years old) performed semantic, acoustic, and orthographic orienting activities to different words in a list. Without forewarning, their free recall of the words was tested after the orienting activity. The semantic task yielded better recall than the acoustic or orthographic tasks, but the latter two did not differ. Age differences in recall were absent, and the effect of the three orienting tasks did not vary as a function of the child's age. The results support a direct extension of levels of processing theory (Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 1972, 11, 671–684) to children's memory. An obligatory-optional encoding distinction was suggested as a developmentally relevant addition to the levels of processing framework.     

Congruence and consistency derived from the circular and the hierarchical models as predictors of Occupational Choice Satisfaction

Peiser and Meir (Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1978, 12, 270–278) tested the predictability of Occupational Choice Satisfaction (OCS) using Holland's constructs of congruence and consistency as applied to Roe's classification of occupations and the circular structure of vocational interests. In the present study congruence and consistency are applied to the same data, but the constructs are defined according to the hierarchical model for the structure of interests (I. Gati,Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1979, 15, 90–106). The hierarchical and the circular models are found to be of similar efficiency in predicting OCS by congruence and by consistency. Each model, however, has its unique and distinctive predictions, and thus they seem to complement each other rather than to compete.     

Genetic mediation of sex differences in horizontality: A rejoinder

Neither M. G. McGee (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 289–295) nor M. J. Allen, M. A. Wittig, and K. Butler (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 284–288) suggest any alternative explanation for our finding that water-level performance appears to have an X-linked genetic basis. The power calculations of Allen et al. are found to be faulty, and McGee confuses the hypothesis we tested with a weaker hypothesis. Although the X-linked genetic model is not an adequate model of water-level performance the water-level data fit the X-linked model far better than color blindness and HCN data McGee presents as exemplars of X-linked characteristics.