多决策方法多交流方式的群体决策比较

采用人员选拔的实验室模拟实验,以160名被试组成40个4人群体,对4种决策方法和2类交流方式的群体决策进行了比较。结果发现（1）决策方法和交流方式对于讨论过程的信息交流具有显著影响;（2）以计算机为中介进行决策的被试知觉到的任务难度要高于面对面决策条件;决策方法对于群体成员有关实验任务难度知觉具有主效应;交流方式和决策方法对于群体决策过程满意感和结果满意感没有显著影响;（3）在以投票轮次来表明群体达成一致意见所需时间上,决策方法对于投票轮次具有显著影响。恶魔式辩护、辨证式查询两种方法下所需的投票轮次多于专家意见法和自由讨论法的投票轮次。     

损失-收益框架下责任感对建议采纳的影响

实验1和实验2分别探讨了在损失-收益框架下特质责任感和状态责任感对建议采纳的影响。结果发现：（1）无论是特质责任感还是状态责任感,高责任感的个体比低责任感个体更倾向于采纳他人建议。（2）收益框架下的个体比损失框架下的个体更愿意采纳他人建议。（3）无论是特质责任感还是状态责任感,高责任感的个体对他人建议的采纳程度不受框架的影响,而低责任感个体在收益框架下比在损失框架下的建议采纳程度高。     

The Role of Anticipated Regret in Advice Taking

Across five studies, we demonstrate that anticipated future regret influences receptiveness to advice. While making a revision to one's own judgment based on advice, people can anticipate two kinds of future regret: (a) the regret of following non‐beneficial advice and (b) the regret of ignoring beneficial advice. In studies 1a (scenario task) and 1b (judgment task), we find that anticipated regret from erring after following advice is greater than anticipated regret from erring after ignoring advice. Furthermore, receptiveness decreases as the difference between anticipated regret from following and from ignoring advice increases. In study 2, we demonstrate that perceived justifiability of one's own initial decision is greater than that of advice. This difference in perceived justifiability influences anticipated regret and that, in turn, influences receptiveness. In study 3, we investigate the effect of advisor's expertise on perceived justifiability, anticipated regret, and receptiveness. In study 4, we propose and test an intervention to improve receptiveness based on self‐generation of advice justifications. Participants who were asked to self‐generate justifications for the advice were more receptive to it. This effect was mediated by perceived justifiability and anticipated regret. These findings shed further light on what prevents people from being receptive to advice and how this can be improved. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differential weighting in choice versus advice: I’ll do this,you do that

We propose that when individuals make a decision for themselves they weight attributes more uniformly compared to when they give advice. In Study 1, 138 participants were given a hypothetical choice between two jobs varying on two dimensions and asked either to choose for themselves, offer advice to a best friend, or offer advice to an acquaintance. We hypothesized that respondents offering advice would favor the option with the higher value on the more important dimension. More participants in the acquaintance condition recommended the job with a higher value on the important dimension than participants making the choice for themselves. Study 2 (N=62) tested the hypothesis in a situation where the options consisted of three dimensions. One option was relatively high on two of the three dimensions and the other option was relatively high on the remaining ‘socially important’, or ‘prominent’, dimension. The uniform weighting hypothesis for self‐choice predicts higher frequency of choice for the former option. Data were consistent with this prediction. Study 3 (N=170) tested the hypothesis in students' choice of major at the university. We made use of an actual event, a pending university budget cut, that would require some students to change majors. Participants either made the decision for themselves, made a recommendation to a student in their same department, or made a recommendation to a student in another department facing the analogous dilemma. Replicating the findings of the first two studies, participants offering advice to a student in another department suggested staying with their current major significantly more than participants making the choice for themselves. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fast and frugal heuristics and naturalistic decision making: a review of their commonalities and differences

Both the fast and frugal heuristics (FFHs) and the naturalistic decision making (NDM) research programmes have identified important areas of inquiry previously neglected in the traditional study of human judgment and decision making, and have greatly contributed to the understanding of people's real-world decision making under environmental constraints. The two programmes share similar theoretical arguments regarding the rationality, optimality, and role of experience in decision making. Their commonalities have made them appealing to each other, and efforts have been made, by their leading academics, to promote synergy and integration. However, there has been little progress towards this during the last decade. This paper seeks to address this gap by seeking to better understand their commonalities and differences. To do so, literature relating to the two programmes is reviewed. The findings of the review indicated that an integration of the two could enhance FFHs' field research in applied settings, facilitate its investigation on boundary conditions of people's decision strategy selection, enable NDM to embrace emerging research opportunities in the age of big data, as well as permit each programme to enlighten the research topics and to validate the research findings of the other.     

Evaluating advisors: A policy‐capturing study under conditions of complete and missing information

Decision‐makers' relative preferences for various advisor characteristics were investigated in two multilevel policy‐capturing studies. The characteristics under consideration were: advisor expertise, advisor confidence, advisor intentions, and whether that advisor was the sole available source of advice. In Study 1, decision‐makers had access to all relevant information about the advisors. In contrast, some relevant information about the advisors was systematically made unavailable in Study 2, which allowed an investigation of the effect of missing information on decision‐makers' evaluations of advisors. Results from both studies indicated that advisor expertise and intentions were most important in promoting decision‐makers' positive evaluations of advisors, that this effect was even more pronounced under conditions of missing information, and that advisor expertise and intentions also interacted synergistically. Given that expertise and good intentions are determinants of an advisor's trustworthiness, the results highlight the interpersonal nature of advice giving and taking. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An assessment of the accuracy of self-assessment for career decision making

During the past few years, there has been a marked increase in the number of publications which focus on advice for individuals engaged in the process of career decision making. Most of these publications rely on self-assessment as the major input to the decision making process. This study compared the accuracy of self-assessment to expert assessment based on an assessment center procedure for a sample of potential college graduates. Significant discrepancies were found between the student's and assessor's ratings on 10 of the 13 dimensions assessed. Implications of these results are discussed and suggestions for further study are made.     

Skeptical rationalism

To improve our methods of rational inquiry and decision‐making we need to recognize that such methods should guide but not fully determine the choices of individuals. Failure to acknowledge the essential incompleteness of rational methods made the methods of Classical Rationalism quite impractical and opened them to skeptical refutation. Mitigated Skepticism and Fideism failed to correct the error, and as a result put undesirable limits on rational inquiry. When the guiding character of rational methods is recognized, existing methods of scientific research of personal and social decision‐making can themselves be rationally assessed and improved. Viewing rational methods as guides thus opens a whole field of inquiry, the inquiry into what rational methods are most useful for specific purposes and in specific situations.     

Devil′s Advocacy and Dialectical Inquiry Effects on Face-to-Face and Computer-Mediated Group Decision Making

For more than 20 years, researchers have investigated the effects of cognitive conflict techniques on the decision making performance of groups and individuals. Past research on two techniques, devil′s advocacy and dialectical inquiry, has shown that both techniques improve group performance over nonconflictual, expert-based approaches. More recently, researchers have begun to investigate how advanced decision and communication technologies can be used to enhance group processing and outcomes. In this paper, we extend both streams of research by reporting the results of a laboratory experiment on the effects devil′s advocacy and dialectical inquiry within face-to-face and computer-mediated groups. The results suggest that groups given the devil′s advocacy treatment developed and considered more alternative solutions to a case problem and selected a higher quality recommendation than those in the dialectical inquiry and expert-based treatments. Computer-mediated groups developed and considered more solution alternatives but required more voting rounds to reach agreement than did face-to-face groups. Computer-mediated groups were more satisfied with the process than face-to-face groups; no differences were found in satisfaction with decision outcome. The implications of the results for future research and practice are discussed.     

The Effect of Intuitive Advice Justification on Advice Taking

How do you respond when receiving advice from somebody with the argumentation “my gut tells me so” or “this is what my intuition says”? Most likely, you would find this justification insufficient and disregard the advice. Are there also situations where people do appreciate such intuitive advice and change their opinion accordingly? A growing number of authors write about the power of intuition in solving problems, showing that intuitively made decisions can be of higher quality than decisions based on analytical reasoning. We want to know if decision makers, when receiving advice based on an intuitive cognitive process, also recognize the value of such advice. Is advice justified by intuition necessarily followed to a lesser extent than an advice justified by analysis? Furthermore, what are the important factors influencing the effect of intuitive justification on advice taking? Participants across three studies show that utilization of intuitive advice varies depending on advisor seniority and type of task for which the advice is given. Summarizing, the results suggest that decision makers a priori doubt the value of intuitive advice and only assess it as accurate if other cues in the advice setting corroborate this. Intuitively justified advice is utilized more if it comes from a senior advisor. In decision tasks with experiential products, intuitively justified advice can even have more impact than analytically justified advice. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

建议距离和线索丰富性对建议采纳的影响

基于社会判断理论,研究以80名大学生为被试,通过JAS范式考察了建议距离对建议采纳和自信心变化的影响以及线索丰富性在这一过程中的作用。结果发现随着建议距离的增加,建议权重仅在线索信息较丰富的情况下呈先增后减的倒U型趋势,而绝对观点转变和自信心变化均不受线索丰富性的影响,分别呈递增和递减趋势。即建议距离对不同建议采纳指标有不同影响,建议距离与建议权重之间存在倒U曲线关系且线索丰富性起到了调节作用。     

Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from Others during Decision Making

Decision making is rarely context‐free, and often, both social information and non‐social information are weighed into one's decisions. Incorporating information into a decision can be influenced by previous experiences. Ostracism has extensive effects, including taxing cognitive resources and increasing social monitoring. In decision making situations, individuals are often faced with both objective and social information and must choose which information to include or filter out. How will ostracism affect the reliance on objective and social information during decision making? Participants (N = 245) in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized in a standardized, group task. They then performed a dynamic decision making task that involved the presentation of either non‐social (i.e. biased reward feedback) or social (i.e., poor advice from a previous participant) misleading information. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 105) completed either the ostracism non‐social condition or social misleading information condition with explicit instructions stating that the advice given was from an individual who did not partake in the group task. Ostracized individuals relied more on non‐social misleading information and performed worse than included individuals. However, ostracized individuals discounted misleading social information and outperformed included individuals. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Across two experiments, ostracized individuals were more critical of advice from others, both individuals who may have ostracized them and unrelated individuals. In other words, compared with included individuals, ostracized individuals underweighted advice from another individual but overweighed non‐social information during decision making. We conclude that when deceptive objective information is present, ostracism results in disadvantageous decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

正面自我标签对建议采纳的影响

研究设想给决策者“贴标签”会影响其建议采纳, 即当决策者受到某一词语或文字(标签)的描述, 其往往向标签所预示的方向发展。通过三个依次递进的研究, 探讨在有无获益希望及公开与否三种不同组合的决策场景中, 启动决策者正面自我标签对其建议采纳的影响。实验1采用2(正面自我标签：启动/未启动)×2(获益希望：有/无)组间设计, 实验2和实验3分别进一步研究无获益希望的公开场景和有希望获益的不公开场景, 分别以91、135和96名在校大学生为被试。结果发现：决策者正面自我标签启动使得其更容易采纳建议; 无获益希望公开条件下, 受印象管理或社会赞许性影响而显著提高建议采纳; 有获益希望的公开条件下, 决策者正面自我标签启动使得其积极情绪得到提升, 并进而促进其采纳建议, 而积极意义发现在积极情绪和建议采纳之间起中介作用。     

The detrimental effects of power on confidence, advice taking, and accuracy

Incorporating input from others can enhance decision quality, yet often people do not effectively utilize advice. We propose that greater power increases the propensity to discount advice, and that a key mechanism explaining this effect is elevated confidence in one’s judgment. We investigate the relationships across four studies: a field survey where working professionals rated their own power and confidence and were rated by coworkers on their level of advice taking; an advice taking task where power and confidence were self-reported; and two advice taking experiments where power was manipulated. Results consistently showed a negative relationship between power and advice taking, and evidence of mediation through confidence. The fourth study also revealed that higher power participants were less accurate in their final judgments. Power can thus exacerbate the tendency for people to overweight their own initial judgment, such that the most powerful decision makers can also be the least accurate.     

认知闭合需要、框架效应与决策偏好

在带有模糊性的决策情境中,决策者个人的认知特征会对其判断决策产生重要影响。通过实验的方法,考察了认知闭合需要和特征框架效应对个体决策偏好的影响。93名工商管理硕士（MBA）参与了实验,研究的结果支持了本研究的3个假设,即认知闭合需要与特征框架效应不仅对被试的决策偏好存在显著的影响,而且二者还存在显著的交互作用。具体来说,研究发现,在模糊情境中：高认知闭合需要的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而低认知闭合需要的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;接收到正向框架信息的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而接收到负向框架信息的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;认知闭合需要与特征框架对被试的决策偏好还存在显著的交互作用。研究结论为根据个体认知闭合需要的水平来选拔决策者、利用框架效应来影响个体的信息加工方式进而提高决策质量提供了理论依据     

Tell Me What I Wanted to Hear: Confirmation Effect in Lay Evaluations of Financial Expert Authority

In real life, people engage in interactive decision processes by consulting with experts. However, before taking advice, they must recognise the authority of an expert to assess the quality of the advice. The main goal of this research was to investigate how the confirmation effect affects lay evaluations of the epistemic authority of financial experts. Experiment 1 showed that lay people tend to ascribe greater epistemic authority to those experts whose advice confirms people's opinions, both measured and manipulated. Experiment 2 revealed that when participants' own opinions are not salient, people tend to evaluate experts' authority as higher when their advice confirms social norms. In Experiment 3 we jointly investigated the effects of participants' own opinions and social norms on the evaluations of authority. When both sources of expertise were made salient, decision‐makers favoured advice confirming their own beliefs and used it to evaluate experts' authority. Three interpretations of the role confirmation plays in the experts' authority evaluations are proposed: (1) self‐defensive strategies; (2) processing fluency; and (3) psychological consequences of naïve realism. The paper discusses practical implications of the results. We propose that increasing consumers' knowledge about biases might protect their evaluations of financial advice from being susceptible to the confirmation effect.     

解释水平视角下的自己-他人决策差异

研究基于解释水平理论, 考察自己决策和为他人提供建议是否存在认知和偏好上的差异。实验一采用2(自己决策/为他人建议)×2(价值：高/低)×2(可行性：高/低)被试间设计, 165名被试代表自己或他人评价选项的吸引力。实验二采用3×2混合设计, 81名被试代表自己、相似或不相似他人, 为“高价值-低可行”和“低价值-高可行”两选项出价。结果支持了“自己-他人决策差异”：自己决策比为他人提建议在更大程度上受可行性高低的影响, 更为偏爱可行性高的选项; 人际相似性能在一定程度上缩小上述差异。     

Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit

Seeking advice is a basic practice in making real life decisions. Until recently, however, little attention has been given to it in either empirical studies or theories of decision making. The studies reported here investigate the influence of advice on judgment and the consequences of advice use for judgment accuracy. Respondents were asked to provide final judgments on the basis of their initial opinions and advice presented to them. The respondents’ weighting policies were inferred. Analysis of the these policies show that (a) the respondents tended to place a higher weight on their own opinion than on the advisor’s opinion (the self/other effect); (b) more knowledgeable individuals discounted the advice more; (c) the weight of advice decreased as its distance from the initial opinion increased; and (d) the use of advice improved accuracy significantly, though not optimally. A theoretical framework is introduced which draws in part on insights from the study of attitude change to explain the influence of advice. Finally the usefulness of advice for improving judgment accuracy is considered.     

Emotions in Advice Taking: The Roles of Agency and Valence

Recently, advice taking has received attention in decision‐making research, and some studies suggest that emotions may play a role in this process. Yet a clear account of how emotions influence advice taking is lacking. The current research introduces a parsimonious explanation by suggesting that such effects can be predicted on the basis of two emotion dimensions: valence (positivity or negativity) and agency (self‐focused versus other‐focused). In five experiments with different emotion inductions and different measures for advice taking, the effects of positive emotions such as gratitude and pride and of negative emotions such as anger and shame on advice taking were studied. The findings reveal that emotion valence and agency exert an influence on advice taking and that this interaction effect is mediated by the perceived ability of the advisor. Together, these findings provide a unique theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of emotions in advice taking. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.