The scientistic stance: the empirical and materialist stances reconciled

van Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism, verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Materialists regard the theoretical picture of the world as matter in motion as a true and explanatory account and insist on not taking ‘spooky’ entities or processes seriously as potential explanations of phenomena that so far lie outside the scope of successful science. The history of science shows us that both stances have been instrumental in the achievement of progress at various times. It is therefore plausible for a naturalist to suggest that science depends for its success on the dialectic between empiricism and materialism. A truly naturalist approach to philosophy ought then to synthesise them. Call the synthesized empiricist and materialist stances ‘the scientistic stance’. This paper elaborates and defends it.     

The conjunction fallacy: A test of averaging hypotheses

The conjunction fallacy, in which individuals report that the conjunction of two events is more rather than less likely to occur than one of the events alone, is a robust phenomenon. We assessed the possibility that an analysis in terms of functional measurement methodology might be consistent with occurrence of the fallacy. A 3 × 3 design in which we varied the judged likelihood of the two components constituting the conjunction permitted us to assess the possibility that subjects judge the likelihood of conjunctions by averaging the likelihood of their component parts. The results were consistent with this possibility, and this interpretation was supported by analysis of the results in terms of functional measurement methodology.     

The broad applicability of memory bias and its coexistence with the planning fallacy: reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005)

People chronically underestimate how long tasks will take. In their original article, the present authors (M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, & C. R. M. McKenzie, suggested a simple, broadly applicable explanation: Biased predictions result from biased memories. In their comment article, D. Griffin and R. Buehler suggested that in many domains in which this memory-bias account appears to out-predict their own account, theirs actually makes no prediction at all. However, the present authors did not suggest that only 1 theory is right but that theirs is consistent with data that prior theories, including their own, cannot explain. Ignoring memories of past tasks is not a complete explanation for the phenomenon if the memories people could consult are themselves biased. Nonetheless, underestimating future task duration is almost certainly multiply determined, and thus our account and theirs can coexist.     

The contract ground: A reply to Jesse Kalin

Philosophical Studies -     

The sin of subjectivism: A reply to Shapiro

Shapiro criticises our book on two grounds. He first outlines a series of mistakes. None of them we believe, in fact, have been made and this is usually quite clear from our book. His second criticism rejects our ‘subjectivist’ approach to measurement. We argue that he misrepresents our methods and fails to grasp their ability both to collect accurate data and deal adequately with possible sources of bias. Indeed in these, in its attention to the dating of both independent and dependent variables, and in the flexibility of its approach to the respondent, we feel our approach is better equipped than other existing instruments to tackle the problem of the aetiological role of psycho-social factors in illness.     

The missing link: A reply to Joseph Rychlak

We oppose Rychlak's (1991a, 1991b) claim that the view of mind entailed in artificial intelligence (AD and cognitive psychology is fundamentally at odds with Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory. Kelly's model and Al have much in common: They both are centrally concerned with representation, cognitive processes and their structure, and are ultimately empirical in their methodology. Many Al researchers have usefully embraced personal construct theory as a working conceptual framework, in this article, we examine Rychlak's assertions and identify several mistakes.     

The utilitarian fallacy

The utilitarian fallacy, most egregiously committed by J. S. Mill but perpetuated ever since, consists of supposing that pleasure, being a noun, is, in every true statement in which it occurs, the name of afeeling, and that pleasant, in any such statement, means that whatever is so described is conducive to that feeling. In fact, pleasant is more commonly used as a positive term of appraisal, indicating that the thing so described is liked, and usually liked for its own sake, and pleasure typically has a similar use. These terms thus resemble words like awful, wonderful and so on, which typically donot mean evocative of awe, wonder and so on. What follows from this is that the feeling of pleasure, while perhaps good for its own sake, is not uniquely so. Almost anything correctly described as pleasant is apt to be such. Similar observations apply to the term happiness. Therefore utilitarianism, according to which there is only one thing good as an end, or for its own sake - namely, pleasure or happiness - is false as a philosophical theory of ethics.Don't think about it,look at it!Wittgenstein     

Accreditation: A reply to mathers

Accreditation in counselling is meant not for the benefit of the counsellor but for the protection of the public. It is concerned more with guaranteeing certain standards of ethics than with the acclamation of status. Whatever method is used, it must avoid the pitfalls of conservatism and academicism which in other professions have been jointly responsible for the attack on accreditation itself as a process. Those involved in counselling and psychotherapy should not wait passively until Parliament acts, but need to be critically involved in bringing into being a system of accreditation which is both flexible and creative.     

The suppression model remains unsound: A reply to Deutsch

In the present issue, we critically review the influentialsuppression model of the octave illusion (Chambers, Mattingley, & Moss, 2004). In a rejoinder to our article, Deutsch (2004b) defends the utility of the suppression model. Here, we respond to Deutsch’s arguments, many of which are based on criticisms of our recent experimental report (Chambers, Mattingley, & Moss, 2002). We argue that Deutsch’s criticisms of this previous investigation are unfounded and that her defense of the suppression model fails to account for the most important weaknesses of this theory. We conclude that the suppression model remains inadequate as an explanation of the octave illusion.     

The General Factor of Personality: A reply to Muncer

In previous studies we have shown that a General Factor of Personality (GFP) occupies the apex of the hierarchy of personality as well as the apex of the personality disorders in the same way that g, the general factor of mental ability, occupies the apex in the organization of cognitive abilities (Rushton & Irwing, 2011). In a critique, Muncer (2011) re-analyzed one of our data sets and concluded there was no evidence for a GFP. He also argued against the evolutionary theory we had proposed for the origin of the GFP. In this rejoinder I rebut Muncer’s conclusion and describe how directional selection can explain the GFP.