From thinking about what might have been to sharing what we know: The effects of counterfactual mind-sets on information sharing in groups

We hypothesized that the activation of a counterfactual mind-set minimizes group decision errors caused by the failure of groups to discuss unshared, uniquely held information. In two experiments, we manipulated the salience of counterfactual thoughts in a pre-task scenario and then had groups of three individuals discuss a murder mystery case. In both experiments, counterfactual mind-sets increased the discussion of unshared information and helped groups to identify the correct murder suspect. These results emerged regardless of whether the direction of the counterfactual thoughts was upward (Experiment 1) or downward (Experiment 2), suggesting that it is the process of thinking counterfactually, and not the content of the counterfactuals, that improves group decision making.     

Judgements vs affective evaluations of counterfactual outcomes

Counterfactual thoughts are imagined alternatives to past events and outcomes. Such thoughts may address possible consequences and effects of a counterfactual turn of events, and also an affective evaluation of that simulated outcome. Previous research has shown that estimates of counterfactual consequences are exaggerated (Teigen, Kanten, & Terum, 2011). The present research compared both consequence estimates and affective evaluations of factual and counterfactual outcomes. Consistent with previous findings, participants exaggerated consequence estimates, but affective evaluations indicated an opposite effect: Factual events were evaluated as more emotionally impressive than comparable counterfactual outcomes, for both negative (Experiment 1) and positive outcomes (Experiment 2). We discuss these apparently contradictory findings within the framework of construal level theory and suggest that both findings are compatible with an abstract, high-level account of counterfactual thinking.     

Irrelevant thoughts,emotional mood states,and cognitive task performance

In two experiments, we investigated the relationship shared by irrelevant thoughts, emotional mood states, and cognitive task performance. At an empirical level, irrelevant thoughts were defined as thoughts that did not facilitate successful task performance. We used the same general procedure for both experiments: three groups of college students received happy-, neutral-(control), or sad-mood inductions and performed a memory task. The procedure for obtaining thoughts varied between experiments. The subjects in Experiment 1 listed their thoughts after the memory recall task. In Experiment 2, the subjects were tape-recorded while performing a memory task and producing concurrent verbal protocols. The subjects in both experiments then judged their thoughts in terms of frequency, intensity, and irrelevance. We found a similar pattern of results in both experiments: (1) The proportions of irrelevant thoughts and recall performance were negatively related, and (2) happy and sad students produced reliably greater proportions of irrelevant thoughts than did neutral (control) students.     

Thinking within the box: The relational processing style elicited by counterfactual mind-sets

By comparing reality to what might have been, counterfactuals promote a relational processing style characterized by a tendency to consider relationships and associations among a set of stimuli. As such, counterfactual mind-sets were expected to improve performance on tasks involving the consideration of relationships and associations but to impair performance on tasks requiring novel ideas that are uninfluenced by salient associations. The authors conducted several experiments to test this hypothesis. In Experiments 1a and 1b, the authors determined that counterfactual mind-sets increase mental states and preferences for thinking styles consistent with relational thought. Experiment 2 demonstrated a facilitative effect of counterfactual mind-sets on an analytic task involving logical relationships; Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that counterfactual mind-sets structure thought and imagination around salient associations and therefore impaired performance on creative generation tasks. In Experiment 5, the authors demonstrated that the detrimental effect of counterfactual mind-sets is limited to creative tasks involving novel idea generation; in a creative association task involving the consideration of relationships between task stimuli, counterfactual mind-sets improved performance.     

Postdecisional counterfactual thinking by actors and readers

How do individuals think counterfactually about the outcomes of their decisions? Most previous studies have investigated how readers think about fictional stories, rather than how actors think about events they have actually experienced. We assumed that differences in individuals' roles (actor vs. reader) can make different information available, which in turn can affect counterfactual thinking. Hence, we predicted an effect of role on postdecisional counterfactual thinking. Reporting the results of eight studies, we show that readers undo the negative outcome of a story by undoing the protagonist's choice to tackle a given problem, rather than the protagonist's unsuccessful attempt to solve it. But actors who make the same choice and experience the same negative outcome as the protagonist undo this outcome by altering features of the problem. We also show that this effect does not depend on motivational factors. These results contradict current accounts of counterfactual thinking and demonstrate the necessity of investigating the counterfactual thoughts of individuals in varied roles.     

"Blaming the victim" under memory load

When presented with negative outcomes, people often engage in counterfactual thinking, imagining various ways that events might have been different. This appears to be a spontaneous behavior, with considerable adaptive value. Nevertheless, counterfactual thinking may also engender systematic biases in various judgment tasks, such as allocating blame for a mishap, or deciding on the appropriate compensation to a victim. Thus, counterfactuals sometimes require thought suppression or discounting, potentially resource-demanding tasks. In this study, participants made mock-jury decisions about control and counterfactual versions of simple stories. The judgments of two groups of participants, differing in their respective levels of working memory capacity, were compared. In addition, all participants held memory loads during various stages of the primary task. Lower-span individuals were especially susceptible to bias associated with the counterfactual manipulation, but only when holding memory loads during judgment. The results suggest that counterfactual thoughts arise automatically, and may later require effortful, capacity-demanding suppression.     

The functional theory of counterfactual thinking.

Counterfactuals are thoughts about alternatives to past events, that is, thoughts of what might have been. This article provides an updated account of the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, suggesting that such thoughts are best explained in terms of their role in behavior regulation and performance improvement. The article reviews a wide range of cognitive experiments indicating that counterfactual thoughts may influence behavior by either of two routes: a content-specific pathway (which involves specific informational effects on behavioral intentions, which then influence behavior) and a content-neutral pathway (which involves indirect effects via affect, mind-sets, or motivation). The functional theory is particularly useful in organizing recent findings regarding counterfactual thinking and mental health. The article concludes by considering the connections to other theoretical conceptions, especially recent advances in goal cognition.     

The impact of feedback from job and task autonomy in the relationship between dispositional resistance to change and innovative work behaviour

Building on an interactionist approach, the present study investigated the moderating role of two task design characteristics, namely task autonomy and feedback from job, in the relationship between dispositional resistance to change and innovative work behaviour. Consistent with a trait activation perspective, it was specifically hypothesized that dispositional resistance to change would have a stronger, positive association with innovative performance when autonomy and feedback were high than when they were low. In a sample of 270 employees from the public sector, task autonomy was found to significantly interact with both composite resistance to change and with three of the four dimensions (routine seeking, short-term thinking, and emotional reaction). Simple slope analyses specifically revealed that individuals high in short-term thinking and emotional reaction exhibited positive relationships with innovative behaviour only in the case of high task autonomy, whereas in the case of low autonomy the relationship was nonsignificant. Furthermore, feedback from job was found to moderate the relationship between overarching dispositional resistance to change, short-term thinking, and emotional reaction, on one hand, and innovative performance, on the other, such that a positive and significant association emerged only in the case of high feedback.     

Dispositional pessimism,defensive pessimism and optimism: The effect of induced mood on prefactual and counterfactual thinking and performance

This study analyses the extent to which dispositional pessimists differ from defensive pessimists and optimists in the generation of prefactual and counterfactual thoughts and in their performance in an anagram task, under different conditions of induced mood. Dispositional pessimists performed in a similar manner in all circumstances, recording an equal number of prefactual thoughts. By contrast, optimists and defensive pessimists optimised their performance under positive and negative conditions, respectively. It should be noted that after performing this task, the number of counterfactual thoughts expressed by dispositional pessimists varied according to mood states. The results are discussed in terms of the rigidity of the generalised expectations of dispositional pessimism.     

The debiasing effect of counterfactual mind-sets: Increasing the search for disconfirmatory information in group decisions

We hypothesized that the activation of a counterfactual mind-set minimizes decision errors resulting from the failure of groups to seek disconfirming information to test an initial hypothesis. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two experiments examining the decision making processes of groups. The task for both experiments was modeled after the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, and groups had to actively seek disconfirmatory information to make a correct decision. Prior to beginning the group decision making task, groups were exposed to one of two pre-task scenarios in which the salience of counterfactual thoughts was manipulated. In Experiment 1, groups in the counterfactual prime condition were significantly more likely to make the correct decision than groups in the non-counterfactual prime condition. In Experiment 2, we replicated the effect of counterfactual primes on decision accuracy and demonstrated that groups in the counterfactual prime condition were more likely to seek disconfirmatory information than groups in the non-counterfactual prime condition. We also conducted mediation analyses that clarify the decision making process. Implications for group decision making are discussed.     

Self-handicapping, excuse making, and counterfactual thinking: consequences for self-esteem and future motivation

Researchers interested in counterfactual thinking have often found that upward counterfactual thoughts lead to increased motivation to improve in the future, although at the cost of increased negative affect. The present studies suggest that because upward counterfactual thoughts indicate reasons for a poor performance, they can also serve as excuses. In this case, upward counterfactual thoughts should result in more positive self-esteem and reduced future motivation. Five studies demonstrated these effects in the context of self-handicapping. First, upward counterfactual thinking was increased in the presence of a self-handicap. Second, upward counterfactual thoughts indicating the presence of a self-handicap protected self-esteem following failure. Finally, upward counterfactual thoughts that protect self-esteem reduced preparation for a subsequent performance as well as performance itself. These findings suggest that the consequences of upward counterfactuals for affect and motivation are moderated by the goals of the individual as well as the content of the thoughts.     

The role of thought-content and mood in the preparative benefits of upward counterfactual thinking

Upward counterfactual thoughts identify how a prior outcome could have been better and have been shown to improve subsequent performance. Both the identification of corrective actions (content-specific effects) and the more general mobilization of effort as a result of negative affect (content-neutral effects) have been suggested to underlie performance benefits. The results of three experiments presented here indicate that counterfactual thoughts have broad benefits for performance, independent of their content and beyond the effects of planning. These benefits were consistently dependent upon the experience of negative affect, but were eliminated when negative affect could be (mis)attributed to an intervening task. This misattribution effect is consistent with the operation of a mood-as-input process in which affect informs judgments of goal progress. Overall, the findings suggest that the benefits of upward counterfactual thinking reflect more broad attempts to improve following a subjectively unsatisfactory performance.     

Mental time travel into the episodic future,episodic past,and episodic counterfactual past in everyday life

To date, studies exploring the relationship of counterfactual thoughts with episodic memories and episodic future thoughts have focused mainly on voluntary mental time travel. We explore mental time travel in everyday life and find that episodic counterfactual thinking occurs to a much lesser extent than thinking about the past or the future (12%, 22%, and 54%, respectively), is used mainly for mood regulation purposes, and the temporal distribution decreases as a function of time. We observe similarities in phenomenological detail: memories and counterfactual thoughts sharing similar ratings of sensory detail, memories and future thoughts sharing similar ratings of positivity, and counterfactual and future thoughts sharing similar ratings of mental time travel. We discuss the implications of episodic counterfactual thinking in everyday life.     

On the Counterfactual Nature of Gambling Near‐misses: An Experimental Study

Research on gambling near‐misses has shown that objectively equivalent outcomes can yield divergent emotional and motivational responses. The subjective processing of gambling outcomes is affected substantially by close but non‐obtained outcomes (i.e. counterfactuals). In the current paper, we investigate how different types of near‐misses influence self‐perceived luck and subsequent betting behavior in a wheel‐of‐fortune task. We investigate the counterfactual mechanism of these effects by testing the relationship with a second task measuring regret/relief processing. Across two experiments (Experiment 1, n = 51; Experiment 2, n = 104), we demonstrate that near‐wins (neutral outcomes that are close to a jackpot) decreased self‐perceived luck, whereas near‐losses (neutral outcomes that are close to a major penalty) increased luck ratings. The effects of near‐misses varied by near‐miss position (i.e. whether the spinner stopped just short of, or passed through, the counterfactual outcome), consistent with established distinctions between upward versus downward, and additive versus subtractive, counterfactual thinking. In Experiment 1, individuals who showed stronger counterfactual processing on the regret/relief task were more responsive to near‐wins and near‐losses on the wheel‐of‐fortune task. The effect of near‐miss position was attenuated when the anticipatory phase (i.e. the spin and deceleration) was removed in Experiment 2. Further differences were observed within the objective gains and losses, between “clear” and “narrow” outcomes. Taken together, these results help substantiate the counterfactual mechanism of near‐misses. © 2017 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Is understanding regret dependent on developments in counterfactual thinking?

Children's understanding of counterfactual emotions such as regret and relief develops relatively late compared to their ability to imagine counterfactual worlds. We tested whether a late development in counterfactual thinking: understanding counterfactuals as possibilities, underpinned children's understanding of regret. Thirty 5‐ and 6‐year‐olds completed tasks assessing counterfactual thinking and understanding regret. Performance on the counterfactual task was better than that on the regret task. We suggest that thinking about counterfactuals as possibilities is a necessary but not sufficient cognitive development in children's understanding of regret. We discuss how other developments in counterfactual thinking may underpin children's emotional understanding.     

Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations

We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual thoughts, people focus on normal events just as often as exceptional events, unlike in directed counterfactual thoughts. The findings are consistent with the suggestion that counterfactual thoughts tend to focus on how a specific unwanted outcome could have been prevented, whereas causal explanations tend to provide more general causal information that enables future understanding, prediction, and intervention in a wide range of situations.     

When debiasing backfires: accessible content and accessibility experiences in debiasing hindsight

Two studies demonstrated that attempts to debias hindsight by thinking about alternative outcomes may backfire and traced this to the influence of subjective accessibility experiences. Participants listed either few (2) or many (10) thoughts about how an event might have turned out otherwise. Listing many counterfactual thoughts was experienced as difficult and consistently increased the hindsight bias, presumably because the experienced difficulty suggested that there were not many ways in which the event might have turned out otherwise. No significant hindsight effects were obtained when participants listed only a few counterfactual thoughts, a task subjectively experienced as easy. The interplay of accessible content and subjective accessibility experiences in the hindsight bias is discussed.     

On the counterfactual nature of envy: “It could have been me”

We examined whether counterfactual thinking influences the experience of envy. Counterfactual thinking refers to comparing the situation as it is to what it could have been, and these thought processes have been shown to lead to a variety of emotions. We predicted that for envy the counterfactual thought “it could have been me” would be important. In four studies we found a clear link between such counterfactual thoughts and the intensity of envy. Furthermore, Studies 3 and 4 revealed that a manipulation known to affect the extent of counterfactual thinking (the perception of being close to obtaining the desired outcome oneself), had an effect on the intensity of envy via counterfactual thoughts. This relationship between counterfactual thinking and the experience of envy allows for new predictions concerning situations under which envy is likely be more intense.     

The effect of controllability and causality on counterfactual thinking

Previous research on counterfactual thoughts about prevention suggests that people tend to focus on enabling rather than causing events and controllable rather than uncontrollable events. Two experiments explore whether counterfactual thinking about enablers is distinct from counterfactual thinking about controllable events. We presented participants with scenarios in which a cause and an enabler contributed to a negative outcome. We systematically manipulated the controllability of the cause and the enabler and asked participants to generate counterfactuals. The results indicate that when only the cause or the enabler is controllable participants undid the controllable event more often. However, when the cause and enabler are matched in controllability participants undid the enabler slightly more often. The findings are discussed in the context of the mental model, functional and judgement dissociation theories as well as previous research on counterfactual thinking. The importance of controllability and possible reasons for the special role of enablers are considered.