Breaking script: Deviations and postevent information in adult memory for a repeated event

Witnesses to industrial incidents may be asked to recall a single instance of a familiar event. This research systematically tested if deviations to what typically occurs and postevent information (PEI) enhanced reporting of an instance of a repeated event. Across 2 experiments, each participant experienced 5 food‐tasting instances; these instances comprised the repeated event. Half of the participants in both Experiments 1 (continuous deviation setting) and 2 (continuous deviation integrated) experienced a deviation to how the third instance occurred. Also, half of the participants in both experiments received PEI about the third instance. All participants demonstrated superior reporting for the first instance of the repeated event. The continuous deviation setting in Experiment 1 enhanced reporting for all 5 instances of the repeated event (general effect). In Experiment 2, participants who received a continuous deviation integrated and PEI demonstrated superior reporting for the first and third instances of the event (targeted effect).     

Self-affirmation and affective forecasting: Affirmation reduces the anticipated impact of negative events

When forecasting how they will feel in the future, people overestimate the impact that imagined negative events will have on their affective states, partly because they underestimate their own psychological resiliency. Because self-affirmation enhances resiliency, two studies examined whether self-affirmation prior to forecasting reduces the extremity of affective forecasts. Participants in self-affirmation conditions completed a values scale or wrote an essay asserting their most important value, whereas participants in the no-affirmation condition asserted a relatively unimportant value. Participants then predicted their affective reactions to a negative or positive imagined event. In both studies, self-affirmation reduced the unpleasant affect expected to result from a negative event, but had no impact on affective forecasts for a positive event. This pattern was mediated by participants’ cognitive appraisals of the imagined event, but not by differential focus on that event. Results are consistent with self-affirmation activating or enhancing psychological resiliency to counteract immune neglect during affective forecasting of a negative event.     

Perceptions of Credibility for a Memory Report of a Single Versus Repeated Event

Summary: When a person experiences an event that has multiple similar instances (i.e., a repeated event), memories for details that change across instances are challenging to recall. We expected that third parties would perceive memory reports of instances of repeated events as less credible than they would unique (i.e., single) events. Undergraduates participated in a single or repeated event, during which critical details were presented. Participants were asked to recall the session 2 days later, and memory reports were video recorded. New participants then viewed one video and evaluated the credibility of the speaker's memory report. Overall, repeated‐event reports were seen as less credible than were single‐event reports, despite the reports being equally accurate. Although credibility research in the context of repeated events has focused exclusively on child populations, a range of applications exists for adults (e.g., criminal and industrial eyewitnesses, and asylum seekers); we discussed our findings in these areas.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How pleasant was your childhood? Beliefs about memory shape inferences from experienced difficulty of recall

People's beliefs about how memory works can affect their inferences from experienced difficulty of recall. Participants were asked to recall either 4 childhood events (experienced as an easy task) or 12 childhood events (experienced as a difficult task). Subsequently, they were led to believe that either pleasant or unpleasant periods of one's life fade from memory. When the recall task was difficult (12 events), participants who believed that memories from unpleasant periods fade away rated their childhood as less happy than participants who believed that memories from pleasant periods fade away. The opposite pattern was observed when the recall task was easy (4 events). This interplay of recall experiences and memory beliefs suggests that the judgmental impact of subjective experiences is shaped by beliefs about their meaning. It also suggests that the recall difficulty in clinical memory work may lead a person to make negative inferences about his or her childhood, provided the person shares the popular belief that memory represses negative information.     

Motivated prediction of future feelings: effects of negative mood and mood orientation on affective forecasts

This article examines the role of motivational factors in affective forecasting. The primary hypothesis was that people predict positive emotional reactions to future events when they are motivated to enhance their current feelings. Three experiments manipulated participants' moods (negative vs. neutral) and orientation toward their moods (reflective vs. ruminative) and then assessed the positivity of their affective predictions for future events. As hypothesized, when participants adopted a reflective orientation, and thus should have been motivated to engage in mood-regulation processes, they predicted more positive feelings in the negative than in the neutral mood condition. This pattern of mood-incongruent affective prediction was not exhibited when participants adopted a ruminative orientation. Additionally, within the negative mood condition, generating affective forecasts had a more positive emotional impact on reflectors than on ruminators. The findings suggest that affective predictions are sometimes driven by mood-regulatory motives.     

Evidence for an implicit influence of memory on future thinking

The capacity to think about specific events that one might encounter in the future—episodic future thought— involves the flexible (re)organization of memory. The present study demonstrates that implicit processes play an important role here. In two experiments (N = 180), participants were asked to generate a personal event that they expected to plausibly occur in the following week. The content of the participants’ responses was biased (i.e., primed) by recent thoughts about a specific category of experiences. For instance, participants who had recently been induced to think about social experiences, in the context of an ostensibly unrelated task, were more likely than nonprimed participants to generate similar events occurring in their immediate future. Importantly, the participants were unaware of this unintentional influence of memory. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings for understanding episodic future thought and its relation to memory are discussed.     

Thinking about memories for everyday and shocking events: Do people use ease-of-retrieval cues in memory judgments?

Extant research shows that people use retrieval ease, a feeling-based cue, to judge how well they remember life periods. Extending this approach, we investigated the role of retrieval ease in memory judgments for single events. In Experiment 1, participants who were asked to recall many memories of an everyday event (New Year's Eve) rated retrieval as more difficult and judged their memory as worse than did participants asked to recall only a few memories. In Experiment 2, this ease-of-retrieval effect was found to interact with the shocking character of the remembered event: There was no effect when the event was highly shocking (i.e., learning about the attacks of September 11, 2001), whereas an effect was found when the event was experienced as less shocking (due either to increased distance to "9/11" or to the nonshocking nature of the event itself). Memory vividness accounted for additional variance in memory judgments, indicating an independent contribution of content-based cues in judgments of event memories.     

Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role of Counterfactual Thought in the Experience of Regret and Disappointment

Regret and disappointment are emotions that can be experienced in response to an unfavorable outcome of a decision. Previous research suggests that both emotions are related to the process of counterfactual thinking. The present research extends this idea by combining it with ideas from regret and disappointment theory. The results show that regret is related to behavior-focused counterfactual thought in which the decision-maker's own actions are changed, whereas disappointment is related to situation-focused counterfactual thought in which aspects of the situation are changed. In Study 1 participants (N= 130) were asked to recall an autobiographical episode of either a regretful or a disappointing event. When asked to undo this event, regret participants predominantly changed their own actions, whereas disappointment participants predominantly changed aspects of the situation. In Study 2 all participants (N= 50) read a scenario in which a person experiences a negative event. Participants who were instructed to undo the event by changing the person's actions reported more regret than disappointment, while participants who were instructed to undo the event by changing aspects of the situation reported more disappointment than regret. Study 3 (N= 140) replicated the findings from Study 2 with a different scenario, and a design in which regret and disappointment were measured between rather than within subjects. In the discussion we address the relation among counterfactual thinking, attributions and affective reactions to decision outcomes, and the implications for decision research.     

Me Too!: Social modelling influences on early autobiographical memories

To investigate the malleability of early memories, 200 participants were asked to describe their earliest memories. Before doing so, approximately half were exposed to confederates who described very early memories such as their first steps or a second birthday party, while others were asked only to think about their earliest memories for two minutes before beginning writing. Participants who were exposed to confederate very early memories produced memories that were nearly a year younger on average than the memories reported by controls (2.99 years vs. 3.96 years). Additionally, when participants in the memory discussion condition were asked about an early event that a confederate had recounted they were more confident than controls that they could recall the event in their own lives. These results indicate that autobiographical memories for early events are quite susceptible to social influence and that simply hearing the very early memories of others can alter autobiographical memory. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

分析思维降低情感预测影响偏差

人们在决策前需要对决策可能带来的结果进行预测。人们往往会高估未来事件对情感的影响, 这被称为影响偏差。本研究从双系统理论出发, 考察了分析思维是否会降低情感预测影响偏差。实验1(采用图片启动)和实验2(采用语言流畅性任务)考察了分析思维对影响偏差的影响, 并分析了情感预测程度的中介作用。实验3在现场中以真实的决策(生育二孩)为例, 考察了分析思维启动对情感预测的影响。结果发现:分析思维会降低情感预测强度, 进而降低影响偏差。     

Bears in our midst: Familiarity with Level 2 driving automation and attending to surprise on-road events

This study presents an on-road paradigm to measure the effect of Level 2 (L2) system familiarity on attention strategies to salient, but non-hazardous, driving-related events when using the driving automation. A vehicle with an oversized pink teddy bear on the back overtook participants three times while they drove a 2019 Mercedes-Benz C300 equipped with a L2 system for 1 h. This L2 system requires drivers to keep their hands on the wheel while activated. The L2 system was turned on or off, depending on the assigned condition, and participants varied in their familiarity with L2 systems. Cameras recorded participant eye glance behavior. After the drive, participants were asked to recall the bear and the number of times their mind had wandered from the driving task during the drive. Results show that the driving automation support gave only participants familiar with L2 systems an advantage for greater bear recall. Unfamiliar participants were at a relative disadvantage when assisted by the L2 system, with generally poorer bear recall than unfamiliar participants who drove with the system off. Better bear recall corresponded with wider on-road gaze dispersion and more instances of mind wandering. Our findings support the effectiveness of this paradigm to measure driver attention when using a L2 system under real-world conditions and highlight the need to consider the role of driving automation familiarity in future research.     

Mispredicting distress following romantic breakup: Revealing the time course of the affective forecasting error

People evidence significant inaccuracies when predicting their response to many emotional life events. One unanswered question is whether such affective forecasting errors are due to participants’ poor estimation of their initial emotional reactions (an initial intensity bias), poor estimation of the rate at which these emotional reactions diminish over time (a decay bias), or both. The present research used intensive longitudinal procedures to explore this question in the wake of an upsetting life event: the dissolution of a romantic relationship. Results revealed that the affective forecasting error is entirely accounted for by an initial intensity bias, with no contribution by a decay bias. In addition, several moderators of the affective forecasting error emerged: participants who were more in love with their partners, who thought it was unlikely they would soon enter a new relationship, and who played less of a role in initiating the breakup made especially inaccurate forecasts.     

情感强度不同负性生活事件对个体情感反应和行为选择的影响

采用系列实验方法探讨不同情感强度负性生活事件对个体情感反应和行为选择的影响。结果发现：（1）复合生活事件（1高负性+1低负性）为异类时,个体对复合事件的负性感受比单独1高负性事件更低,选择经历前者,出现平均效应;（2）复合生活事件为同类时,其负性感受比单独1高负性事件更高,选择经历后者,出现累加效应;（3）复合事件有明显的时间特点时,其情感和行为选择受事件发生时间影响,符合峰-终定律。结论：人们对负性生活事件的加工受其特点的影响,加工方式不同。     

Focalism and the underestimation of future emotion: when it's worse than imagined

People typically exaggerate the emotional impact of future events. This occurs because of focalism, the tendency to focus on one event and neglect to consider how emotion will be mitigated by the surrounding context. Neglecting context, however, should lead people to underestimate future emotion when context focuses attention on the event. In Study 1, participants underestimated the intensity of their future negative emotions when they reported reactions to a romantic break-up on Valentine's Day versus 1 week before. This relationship was mediated by how frequently they thought about the break-up. In Study 2, participants underestimated the emotional impact of a lost prize when the experimental context forced them to focus on the prize versus when the prize was less evident. Thus, failing to account for the extent to which context would focus attention on the event, a form of focalism, led to underestimation of emotional reactions to a negative event.     

Reminiscence bump in autobiographical memory: Unexplained by novelty,emotionality, valence,or importance of personal events

People tend to recall a disproportionately large number of personal events from their adolescence and early adulthood. This “reminiscence bump” has been examined extensively, but its causes remain unclear. In this Internet-based experiment, nearly 3,500 participants were given 10 cue words and were asked to describe the personal events that came to mind. Furthermore, they were asked to date each event and to indicate whether it was a first-time experience. Finally, the participants were asked to rate the strength of the emotional reaction to the event or the valence or the importance of the event. Surprisingly, the reminiscence bump consisted of relatively fewer novel, emotional, important positive or negative events. This result increases the likelihood of an alternative explanation—namely, that memory is generally enhanced in adolescence and early adulthood. However, this account has not been tested directly.     

Processing memories of anger-eliciting events: the effect of asking 'why' from a distance

Preliminary experimental evidence suggests that ruminating about anger-eliciting events exacerbates anger and associated affect. However, no research has investigated the effect of rumination on processing memories of these events. This study examined the impact of manipulating cognitive processing when recalling anger-eliciting events. Participants (N=60) outlined an anger-related experience and were randomly allocated to recall the event according to an experimental instruction that manipulated recall perspective and emotional focus (distanced-why, distanced-what, immersed-why or immersed-what). Participants completed measures of negative affect and implicit and explicit anger, and returned the following day to complete measures that indexed frequency of intrusive memories of the event and memory-related distress. Contrary to prediction, participants allocated to the distanced-why condition did not report reduced anger. However, participants instructed to think about 'why' they experienced the emotions they did during the event (compared with 'what' emotions they experienced) reported more intrusions 24h later, regardless of vantage perspective. These results accord with theoretical models that emphasise the negative impact of a ruminative 'why' focus on the processing of past events.     

On emotionally intelligent time travel: individual differences in affective forecasting ability

In two studies, the authors examined whether people who are high in emotional intelligence (EI) make more accurate forecasts about their own affective responses to future events. All participants completed a performance measure of EI (the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test) as well as a self-report measure of EI. Affective forecasting ability was assessed using a longitudinal design in which participants were asked to predict how they would feel and report their actual feelings following three events in three different domains: politics and academics (Study 1) and sports (Study 2). Across these events, individual differences in forecasting ability were predicted by participants' scores on the performance measure, but not the self-report measure, of EI; high-EI individuals exhibited greater affective forecasting accuracy. Emotion Management, a subcomponent of EI, emerged as the strongest predictor of forecasting ability.     

Fading of Affect Associated with Negative Child‐Related Memories Varies by Parental Child Abuse Potential

Positive memories tend to hold their affective intensity across time better than negative memories, a phenomenon referred to as the fading affect bias (FAB). An initial study explored this bias in the context of parents' affective responses to memories involving their children. Specifically, parents (N = 90 for Study 1) were asked to recall three positive events and three negative events involving their children. Next, parents rated how positively or negatively they felt when each event occurred and at recall. Results revealed that parents at high risk of physical child abuse showed a smaller FAB than low‐risk parents. The smaller FAB effect observed among high‐risk parents occurred largely because affect associated with negative child‐related events faded minimally over time. This risk moderation effect did not emerge in a second study in which parents (N = 90 for Study 2) recalled general events that were not limited to events involving children. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Ease of Retrieval and Attribution in Memory Judgments: Judging Your Memory as Worse Despite Recalling More Events

Participants who had to recall 12 childhood events (a difficult task) were more likely to infer that they could not remember large parts of their childhood than participants who had to recall 4 events (an easy task), although the former recalled three times as many events. This pattern of results suggests that memory judgments are based on the experienced ease or difficulty of recall. Accordingly, the negative impact of recalling 12 events was attenuated when participants were led to attribute the experienced difficulty to the task rather than to the poor quality of their memory. The findings emphasize the role of subjective experiences and attribution in metamemory judgments.