Seeing is believing: how participants in different subcultures judge people's credulity

We presented a scenario in which a protagonist saw an object in Location A but later heard a message saying it was in Location B. Participants judged where the protagonist believed the object was. In one condition, participants had additional information that the message was true. Those from an individualistic subculture tended to judge that the protagonist believed the message when they (the participants) knew it was true but disbelieved the message when they had no additional information. In contrast, participants from a collectivist subculture tended to judge that the protagonist believed the message in both circumstances. The results suggest that culture is related with subtle aspects of understanding the mind and especially how people evaluate messages. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Gaining knowledge via other minds: Children's flexible trust in others as sources of information

In five experiments, we examined 3‐ to 6‐year‐olds’ understanding that they could gain knowledge indirectly from someone who had seen something they had not. Consistent with previous research, children judged that an informant, who had seen inside a box, knew its contents. Similarly, when an informant marked a picture to indicate her suggestion as to the content of the box, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds trusted this more frequently when the informant had seen inside the box than when she had not. Going beyond previous research, 3‐ to 4‐year‐olds were also sensitive to informants’ relevant experience when they had to look over a barrier to see the marked picture, or ask for the barrier to be raised. Yet when children had to elicit the informant's suggestion, rather than just consult a suggestion already present, even 4‐ to 5‐year‐olds were no more likely to do so when the informant had seen the box's content than when she had not, and no more likely to trust the well‐informed suggestion than the uninformed one. We conclude that young children who can ask questions may not yet fully understand the process by which they can gain accurate information from someone who has the experience they lack.     

Older children's misunderstanding of uncertain belief after passing the false belief test

A four-location belief task was designed to examine children's understanding of another's uncertain belief after passing a false belief (FB) task. In Experiment 1, after passing the FB task, participants were asked what a puppet would do after he failed to find his toy at the falsely believed location. Most 4-year-olds and half of 6-year-olds children who passed the FB test showed difficulty in handling uncertain belief; answering that the puppet would then look for his toy at the current (moved-to) location. Eight-year-old children and adults all recognized that the puppet would look for the toy everywhere, or at random. In Experiment 2, 4- and 6-year-olds were presented two other search tasks; it was shown that preschoolers could use search strategies to solve a similar search problem when FB was not involved. This new aspect of post-FB understanding can be interpreted in terms of limited understanding of uncertainty in a less-knowledgeable individual and of limited ability to infer the consequences of belief-disconfirmation.     

篇章阅读理解中背景信息的通达

该研究采用实时窗口阅读技术探讨篇章阅读理解中背景信息的通达机制。在该研究所用的阅读材料中,主人公特征与目标句行为分别形成一致、冲突与冲突限制三种关系,其中,冲突限制条件下既描述了主人公与目标行为有所冲突的特征,但这些特征要么是主人公过去具有的、要么是虚假的,在此基础上,阅读材料又提供了主人公当前的、与目标句行为一致的特征描述。结果发现,不论把冲突限制条件下的冲突信息限制在过去发生,还是作为一种虚假的情况来加以描述,都不能完全消除冲突的效应,冲突限制条件下目标句阅读时间总是长于一致条件下的阅读时间,这支持了记忆基础文本加工观,说明在篇章阅读中背景信息通达不是一个更新追随的过程,过去的或虚假的背景信息也会被重新激活并影响当前信息的加工。     

Accessing relevant information during problem solving: Time constraints on search in the problem space

An experiment examines the effect of time constraints on the ability of subjects to utilize relevant information during problem solving. Previous studies found that potentially relevant information was not effectively utilized unless subjects were explicitly informed of the information’s relevance to the problem. The present study demonstrates that subjects who are not informed of the relation between relevant information and the problem are still able to access the information if allowed adequate time. These findings are interpreted within a model of problem solving that postulates search in a problem space as fundamental to the problem solving process.     

Judgments About Fact and Fiction by Children From Religious and Nonreligious Backgrounds

In two studies, 5‐ and 6‐year‐old children were questioned about the status of the protagonist embedded in three different types of stories. In realistic stories that only included ordinary events, all children, irrespective of family background and schooling, claimed that the protagonist was a real person. In religious stories that included ordinarily impossible events brought about by divine intervention, claims about the status of the protagonist varied sharply with exposure to religion. Children who went to church or were enrolled in a parochial school, or both, judged the protagonist in religious stories to be a real person, whereas secular children with no such exposure to religion judged the protagonist in religious stories to be fictional. Children's upbringing was also related to their judgment about the protagonist in fantastical stories that included ordinarily impossible events whether brought about by magic (Study 1) or without reference to magic (Study 2). Secular children were more likely than religious children to judge the protagonist in such fantastical stories to be fictional. The results suggest that exposure to religious ideas has a powerful impact on children's differentiation between reality and fiction, not just for religious stories but also for fantastical stories.     

Genetic Risk Communication: Experiences of Adolescent Girls and Young Women from Families with Fragile X Syndrome

Little is known about how and what genetic risk information parents communicate to their children and even less is known about what children hear and remember. To address this void, we explored how genetic risk information was learned, what information was given and who primarily provided information to adolescent girls and young adult women in families with fragile X syndrome. We explored three levels of risk knowledge: learning that fragile X syndrome was an inherited disorder, that they could be a carrier, and for those who had been tested, actual carrier status. These data were collected as part of a study that also explored adolescent self concept and age preferences about when to inform about genetic risk. Those findings have been presented separately. The purpose of this paper is to present the communication data. Using a multi-group cross-sectional design this study focused on girls ages 14–25 years from families previously diagnosed with fragile X syndrome, 1) who knew they were carriers (n = 20), 2) noncarriers (n = 18), or 3) at-risk to be carriers (n = 15). For all three stages of information the majority of the study participants were informed by a family member. We identified three different communication styles: open, sought information, and indirect. The content of the remembered conversations varied based on the stage of genetic risk information being disclosed as well as the girls’ knowledge of her own carrier status. Girls who had been tested and knew their actual carrier status were more likely to report an open communication pattern than girls who knew only that they were at-risk.     

Clause boundaries and recognition latencies for words in sentences

In 35 sessions of 10 trials apiece, each of eight Ss viewed and judged a display which produced simultaneous brightness contrast. All Ss were given an instructional set toward realistic perception. Members of one subgroup were informed as to the magnitude of their judgments; members of another were not. For every S, there occurred highly significant changes in magnitude of simultaneous brightness contrast over time. There were wide individual differences in the nature of the changes, not all of which were decremental. No significant differences were found as between informed and noninformed groups. The results are viewed as giving limited support to the notion of learning in the perception of simultaneous brightness contrast.     

Children's evaluation of the certainty of another person's inductive inferences and guesses

In three studies, 5–10-year-old children and an adult comparison group judged another's certainty in making inductive inferences and guesses. Participants observed a puppet make strong inductions, weak inductions, and guesses. Participants either had no information about the correctness of the puppet's conclusion, knew that the puppet was correct, or knew that the puppet was incorrect. Children of all ages (but not adults) rated the puppet as more certain about statements the child knew to be correct than statements the child knew to be incorrect. When assessing another's certainty, children have difficulty inhibiting their own knowledge and focusing on the other's perspective. Children were more likely to differentiate between inductions and guesses when the puppet made an Incorrect Statement, but even the oldest children did not differentiate consistently. The distinction between induction and guessing appears to be only acquired gradually but is important as a contributor to more advanced forms of reasoning and epistemological understanding.     

Savvy or Haphazard? Comparing Preschoolers’ Performance Across Selective Learning Tasks Based on Different Epistemic Indicators

Children frequently select learning sources based on epistemic cues, or cues pertaining to informants’ knowledge. Previous research has shown that preschoolers preferentially learn from informants who have been accurate in the past, appear confident, or have had visual access to relevant information. The present series of studies aimed to investigate the relation between these 3 types of epistemic selective learning abilities in 176 children ages 3 years to 6 years. Results indicated that children’s performance was mostly uncorrelated across the different selective learning tasks and tasks measuring theory of mind and executive function were not found to predict any selective learning skills. Implications for the reliability and current conceptual understanding of these selective learning tasks are discussed.     

纸质与视频补充材料对手术知情同意体验的影响：以腹腔镜胆囊切除手术为例

知情同意书在医患沟通中起着间接传递信息的重要作用。以159名大学生为被试,通过操纵不同的知情同意方式,考察了纸质或视频补充信息对患者知情同意满意度、理解程度以及患者信息需求的满足程度影响。结果发现,接受纸质补充知情同意或视频补充知情同意的被试对知情同意过程的满意度、对手术信息的理解程度与知情同意信息需求的满足程度显著高于接受普通知情同意的被试。同时,纸质补充知情同意使得“治疗信息需求的满足程度”最高。这表明,纸质补充知情同意更能满足患者对治疗信息的需求。     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

There has been some debate about whether infants 10 months and younger can use featural information to individuate objects. The present research tested the hypothesis that negative results obtained with younger infants reflect limitations in information processing capacities rather than the inability to individuate objects based on featural differences. Infants aged 9.5 months saw one object (i.e. a ball) or two objects (i.e. a box and a ball) emerge successively to opposite sides of an opaque occluder. Infants then saw a single ball either behind a transparent occluder or without an occluder. Only the infants who saw the ball behind the transparent occluder correctly judged that the one-ball display was inconsistent with the box-ball sequence. These results suggest that: (a) infants categorize events involving opaque and transparent occluders as the same kind of physical situation (i.e. occlusion) and (b) support the notion that infants are more likely to give evidence of object individuation when they need to reason about one kind of event (i.e. occlusion) than when they must retrieve and compare categorically distinct events (i.e. occlusion and no-occlusion).     

Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception

Understanding of another person's wrong belief requires explicit representation of the wrongness of this person's belief in relation to one's own knowledge. Three to nine year old children's understanding of two sketches was tested. In each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location x and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from x to location y. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in x. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return. None of the 3–4-year old, 57% of 4–6-year old, and 86% of 6–9-year old children pointed correctly to location x in both sketches. Of the many cases where 4–6-year olds made an error they failed in only about 20% to remember the initial location correctly. As a test of the stability of children's representation of the protagonist's wrong belief the sketches continued with a statement about the protagonist's intention to either deceive an antagonist or truthfully inform a friend about the object's location. Independent of age, of those children who correctly thought that the protagonist would search in x, 85% of the time they also correctly thought that he would direct his antagonist to location y and his friend to location x. This shows that once children can represent a person's beliefs they can constrain their interpretation of this person's stated intentions to the person's beliefs. In a more story-like situation another group of children had to infer a deceptive plan from the depiction of a goal conflict between two story characters and one character's expedient utterance. At the age of 4–5 years children correctly judged this utterance as a lie only 28% of the time while 5–6-year olds did so 94% of the time. These results suggest that around the ages of 4 to 6 years the ability to represent the relationship between two or more person's epistemic states emerges and becomes firmly established.     

Differential access to information and anticipated group interaction: impact on individual reasoning

Two studies examined the impact of relative differences in access to information and anticipated group interaction on individual reasoning. On 2 different reasoning tasks (P. C. Wason's [1966] selection task and D. Kahneman & A. Tversky's [1973] lawyer-engineer problem), participants sensing that they knew more in anticipation of group interaction or knew less when not anticipating interaction were less susceptible to typical cognitive biases demonstrated by these tasks. Study 2 also showed that the effect of these social contexts was contingent on the task presentation format. Thus, knowing more in anticipation of group interaction and knowing less when not anticipating group interaction seemingly compensated for task features that enhance suboptimal reasoning strategies. These results illustrate the importance of the social context in which reasoning is situated and are discussed in terms of cognitive tuning, social comparison, and social motivations.     

We'll miss you Steve: how the death of a technology innovator emotionally impacts those who use and love his digital devices

The death of Apple co-founder Steven Jobs was accompanied by a period of public mourning. Reflections shared by both those he knew and those who were connected to him through the devices he pioneered were imbued with expressions of loss. The goal of the present research was to understand the grieving of those who knew Jobs through his devices, as a way of exploring how interpersonal emotions are shaped by relationships with technology. The findings from three studies conducted in the weeks after Jobs' death indicated demographic variability in mourning across the general population, suggesting that many people were more deeply affected by his passing. Latter studies highlighted the motivational factors that are related to the use of the Apple devices which were at play in shaping feelings of sadness and loss.     

Roles of Visual Information for Control of Reaching Movements in Children

What visual information do children normally require for the control of reaching movements? How is performance affected when children do not have access to the preferred mode of perceptual information? These questions were studied in 28 children who were tested on 3 occasions: at 6, 7, and 8 years of age. The task was to pick beads, 1 at a time, from 1 cup and carry them to another cup. With the aid of a mirror arrangement and a curtain, the amount of visual information was manipulated with regard to both the target and the performing hand. The movements were monitored with an optoelectronic device (SELSPOT II) and analyzed in terms of transport and object-handling phases. Results showed that object handling required visual information on both hand and target. For the transport phase of the movement, visual information on the spatial location of the target was sufficient, and sight of the hand did not improve performance. In contrast to adult subjects, when children did not have access to the required visual information, their performances deteriorated markedly. These results indicate that from the age of 6, children use visual information for control of arm movements in a manner like that of adults, although with less accuracy and speed. However, even 8-year-old children are limited in their ability to use alternative perceptual strategies for movement control, and they therefore become less flexible and more dependent on visual information.     

A lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution in young children: Relationships with linguistic ability and mothers' mental‐state language

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental‐state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief‐based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief‐based emotion‐attribution tasks. A standard task in which the protagonist was a story character and the emotional outcomes were imagined, and two videos in which the story protagonist was a real infant and the emotional outcomes were observable (high and low expressed emotion conditions). Children's verbal ability (semantic competence) was also measured. In Experiment 2, children (N = 75) were given two belief‐based emotion tasks: the standard story task and the high expressed emotion video. In addition, children's verbal ability (syntactic competence) and mothers' use of mental‐state attributes when describing their children were also measured. The results showed that: (1) the lag between understanding false belief and emotion attribution was a stable feature of children's reasoning across the three tests; and (2) children who were more linguistically advanced and whose mothers' described them in more mentalistic terms were more likely to understand the association between false belief and emotion. The findings underline the continuing importance of verbal ability and linguistic input for children's developing theory‐of‐mind understanding, even after they display an understanding of false belief.     

Reconsidering the role of movement in perceiving action-scaled affordances

Many locomotor tasks require actors to choose among different categories of action, such as when deciding whether to cross the street in front of an approaching vehicle or wait until it passes. In such cases, the actor’s locomotor capabilities partly determine which actions are possible, and therefore must be taken into account. The present study was designed to re-evaluate the claim that people do not know their locomotor capabilities until they begin moving because they rely entirely on information that is picked up “on the fly” (Oudejans, Michaels, Bakker, & Dolné, 1996). Three experiments were conducted in which participants judged while stationary or moving whether it was within their capabilities to catch a fly ball or pass through a shrinking gap. The main finding was that judgments were equally accurate regardless of whether participants were stationary or allowed to move for a brief period. We conclude that stationary and moving actors know their locomotor capabilities equally well, and that actors do not rely entirely on information that is picked up on the fly.     

Projective invariance and picture perception

Four experiments test the assumption that, in the visual perception of pictures, observers have reliable and direct access to the equivalence of shapes in projective geometry. The assumption is that perception of projective equivalence is the basis of shape constancy ('the projective thesis'). Observers matched or reproduced abstract planar shapes under conditions of rotation in the picture plane, and pictured rotation in depth. Departure from projective equivalence was assessed in each study by measuring the planar analogue of cross ratio. Projective equivalence was not found to be perceived uniformly where Euclidean equivalence was not judged uniformly, either in recognition tasks or in production tasks. When the projective thesis is put to a suitably general test, confidence in the thesis is undermined.