Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation

In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2) a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure of inner-representational states.     

Cartesian epistemology and infallible justification

In this paper I examine contemporary accounts of noninferential justification in light of what I take to be the Cartesian project of building epistemology on foundations made secure by the impossibility of error. I argue that familiar abstract arguments for foundationalism, by themselves, don’t seem to motivate Cartesianism. But I further argue that there is one version of foundationalism that is more closely linked to the way in which Descartes sought ideal knowledge.     

Alpha factor analysis of infallible variables

The relationship between the factor pattern,F, derived from fallible (containing measurement error) observations on variables and the factor pattern,F*, derived from infallible observations on variables is investigated. A widely believed relationship betweenF andF*, viz.,F*=AF whereA is a diagonal matrix containing the inverses of the square roots of the reliabilities of the variables, is shown to be false for several factor analytic techniques. Under suitable assumptions, it is shown that for Kaiser and Caffrey's alpha factor analysisF* andF are related byF*=AF. Empirical examples for which the corresponding elements ofF* andAF are equal to two decimal places are presented. The implications of the equality ofF* andAF for alpha factor analysis are discussed.I wish to acknowledge the generous assistance of Drs. Chester W. Harris and Henry F. Kaiser in the execution of the research reported in this paper.     

No one can serve two epistemic masters

Consider two epistemic experts—for concreteness, let them be two weather forecasters. Suppose that you aren’t certain that they will issue identical forecasts, and you would like to proportion your degrees of belief to theirs in the following way: first, conditional on either’s forecast of rain being x, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be x. Secondly, conditional on them issuing different forecasts of rain, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be some weighted average of the forecast of each (perhaps with weights determined by their prior reliability). Finally, you’d like your degrees of belief to be given by an orthodox probability measure. Moderate ambitions, all. But you can’t always get what you want.     

No,one should not believe all truths

In a recent paper, Alexander Greenberg defends a truth norm of belief according to which if one has some doxastic attitude towards p, one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true (da). He responds, in particular, to the ‘blindspot’ objection to truth norms such as da: in the face of true blindspots, such as it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining, truth norms such as da are unsatisfiable; they entail that one ought to believe p, but if one does believe p, they entail that it is not the case that one ought to believe p. In this paper, it is argued that Greenberg’s response to the blindspot objection is unsatisfactory.     

There is No Education After Postmodernism

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

Transit Space: No Place is Nowhere

This article deals with representations of one specific city, Århus, Denmark, especially its central district. The analysis is based on anthropological fieldwork conducted in Skåde Bakker and Fedet, two well-off neighborhoods. The overall purpose of the project is to study perceptions of space and the interaction of cultural, social, and spatial organizations, as seen from the point of view of people living in Skåde Bakker and Fedet. The focus is on the city dwellers’ representations of the central district of Århus with specific reference to the concept of transit space. When applied to various Århusian locations, this might highlight unforeseen meanings and paradoxes.     

On knowing with which eye one is seeing

Experiments were performed to determine whether it is possible to discriminate which eye or eyes are being stimulated by a point source of light in a dark room when the subject is unaware which eye, if any, is occluded.

There were two stimulus conditions, (a) a continuous source of light, and (b) a flash. The results show that in these conditions discrimination is faulty and, in some instances, at chance level, although there is considerable individual variation. The implications of these results for the argument from transfer, as applied to after-effects, and the theory of depth perception are considered.     

No Trust is Hybrid: Reply to Faulkner

Philosophia - There is a well-developed literature on trust. In his important article Faulkner (Analysis, 75(3), 424?429, 2015) distinguishes three-place, two-place and one-place trust...     

The psychological implications of believing that everything is one

ABSTRACT

A variety of philosophical, religious, spiritual, and scientific perspectives converge on the notion that everything that exists is part of some fundamental entity, substance, or process. People differ in the degree to which they believe that everything is one, but we know little about the psychological or social implications of holding this belief. In two studies, believing in oneness was associated with having an identity that includes distal people and the natural world, feeling connected to humanity and nature, and having values that focus on other people’s welfare. However, the belief was not associated with a lower focus on oneself or one’s concerns. Participants who believed in oneness tended to view themselves as spiritual but not necessarily religious, and reported experiences in which they directly perceived everything as one. The belief in oneness is a meaningful existential belief that has numerous implications for people’s self-views, experiences, values, relationships, and behavior.     

"一阴一阳之谓道"析议

一阴一阳之谓道,包含着三个问题:一是一阴一阳的关系;二是一阴一阳与道的关系;三是道究 竟是二元的或是一元的。本文结合中西哲学史对此展开分析,并得出结论认为,“一阴一阳之谓道”,已将 易之三义(即易简、变易、不易)全部涵括在其中了。