孟子推恩说何以可能

推恩说是孟子实现其“仁政”理想的主要措施,它与孟子“爱有等差”的思想并不矛盾.推恩说具有可能性是因为孟子将血缘情感赋予自然的、本能的含义,同时强调这种血缘情感又具有高于自然的理性自觉.孟子以“孝”为“仁”的起点,实质是强调“仁”以人的自然性为起点,这使孟子的“仁”学具有高扬人的自觉性和能动性的内容;同时孟子并不局限于自然因素,他所强调的只是仁义礼智等社会道德需要奠基在人的自然而真实的情感之上,否则会导致虚伪的道德、导致对人性的扭曲.“仁者以其所爱及其所不爱”,“仁”的自然性起点并不意味着对理性自觉的否定.     

王阳明“心外无物”思想的内在义蕴及其展开——以“南镇观花”为中心的讨论

"南镇观花"中花的色彩的"明白"既是客体的呈现方式,也是主体综合地领悟世界的体知方式。由前者说,"明白"是自然的生机与生意的流溢,是"仁",具有本体性;自后者论,"明白"是人通过"感"建立与世界的多重联系,与世界形成生命共同体。"寂"不是物不存在,而是人对物的存在无感应,物不在人的意义世界之内,不与人构成生命共同体。接着阳明的思路讲,心外无物的义蕴可展开为:(1)"存在应当被感知",即人应当通过感知与物相通,构成意义世界;(2)"存在应当被关切",即人应当让外物成为道德关注的对象,与之构成生命共同体;(3)"存在应当与人为一体",即人应当通过致良知的道德实践达到与天地万物为一体的境界,使自身的价值和世界的意义同时得到澄明和提升。"南镇观花"本质上表达的是人的存在方式,是人成为圣人的一条路径,而不是物的存在方式。     

良知与自然

一阳明的良知说,充分显示了人的主体性,达到了儒家主体哲学的高峰。但是这所谓主体,既不能理解为主客对立意义上的认识主体,也不能理解为“本体即实体”意义上的道德主体,只能理解为“天人合一”论的德性主体或生命主体。作为生命主体,良知与自然界有一种息息相关的有机联系。阳明说,良知是“灵明”,这首先是从人与自然界的“感应之机”上说的。所谓“感应”,不是反应与被反应,认识与被认识的关系,而是相互感通的关系。物我相通,内外相通,天人相通,我的灵明就是天地万物的灵明,是一体相通的。阳明又说,良知不是一团血肉之心…     

仁性:价值之根与人的自觉

仁性：价值之根与人的自觉东方朔、新元基本上可以说,心、性、仁是儒家思想中的核心观念。然而对这些观念所具有的超越而内在、抽象而具体的了解方式却殊不同于西方。从理论上看,人性的伦理价值设定有三个方面的内容：什么是什么？什么是可欲的？什么是可能的？对此三问...     

朱熹人性论与儒家道德哲学

儒家道德哲学的建构是以人性论的建构为基础的。先秦儒家思孟学派以人的内在德性为人性,并且希望建立人性的超越源头。但人性的超越性依据如何建立?此超越性依据与人的道德主体性有何内在关联?以朱熹为代表的宋儒对此作了出色的回答。朱熹的"性即理"从宇宙本体论推演出人性论,肯定人的道德本性源于宇宙本体;"心统性情"把人的理性和情感纳入心的统御之下,凸显了超越性依据与人的道德主体性的内在关联。     

作为人性科学的心理学

确立心理学的学科属性是审查该学科发展状况的基础。心理学作为一门人性科学,却没有按照人的本质属性来发展适合自身独特对象的研究方法而直接照搬探究物的自然科学的客观实验方法。因此,人作为心理学的主题和对象逐渐迷失在大量的经验研究中,以至于当人们读完心理学的著作之后,根本不能回答"人是什么"这个促使近代心理学诞生的古老哲学问题,甚至没有意识到这是一个问题。要使心理学健康发展,就必须认识到本学科旨在探究人性的历史使命,必须意识到心理学作为人性科学这个基本前提。只有在这个基础上,才可能建立起符合人性本身的方法论、学科观、价值观,进而发展出具有独特学科价值的心理学。     

当代新康德主义研究述介(续二)

当代新康德主义研究述介（续二）毛怡红五、关于西南学派在继承康德的批判主义、繁荣德国哲学的历史进程中,西南学派与马堡学派被认为有着同样重要的贡献。一般说来,两个学派的思想并无根本分歧。它们只是从不同角度和侧重点来接受发展康德。马堡学派通常被称为“创造哲学”,因为在它那里,认识是对认识对象的创造,主体创造对象的逻辑规定性是哲学的中心问题。而西南学派则被标记为“价值批判的体系”,它的创造人Ｋ．费舍尔、文德尔班、洛来等人提出,哲学的对象不是一般的现实存在,也不是对认识过程某种特殊的规定,哲学的意义在于它能够揭示关于具有普遍意义的价值学说。当然,西南学派的价值规范的观点是在对历史科学根据的分析基础上建立起来的。在历史潮流中价值理论凝结为科学。但是,价值不是存在的某物,而是存在东西的意义,就价值总是与主体性相关联、从而必定在所谓正常意识中有其先验地位而言,人们认为,价值理论并不与马堡学派的认识论背道而驰。相反,在这两个学派中,意识与文化因素都是密不可分的。只不过后者明显地注重功能的主体性,而前者则强调主体判断的理念根据。①一般说来,当代关于西南学派的讨论,可以归纳为以下几点：１．历史研究中的个别记述方法自然科学与文化科     

有别于社会科学的人文学科及其现代意义

人文学科有别于社会科学,它具有如下特征:(1) 以作为主体的人为对象。没有实体性对象或固定领域,只有把各学科视作主体性活动的不同领域,视作人的本质的多项规定域;(2) 评价性而非纯描述。其内涵有“应当是什么”的价值指向,其终极指归是作为人类学本体论意义的人;(3) 践     

论坛荟萃

陈志尚:对主体问题的几点认识 一、主体性是人性在对象性活动和关系(即主客体关系)中的体现。人的活动和关系是多层次,多方面的,主体性也是多层次、多方面的。有三点特别重要,即自觉能动性、社会性、对自由的追求。 二、要全面地理解主体的自觉能动性。自觉能动性中最根本的是实践性。现在值得注意的一种倾向是:极端夸大实践的作用(所谓“实践本休是存在的本质”,“离开了人的实践活动,一切存在对人来说都无从谈起”……甚至公然说是人的实践创造了自然界,等等),夸大非理性、无意识甚至本能的作用,贬低或忽视理性在人的主体性中的地位。必须重视研究情感、意志、直觉、     

反思“人性自利”

动物的本性是趣乐避苦,人的本性是好利恶害,二者存在本质差异。好利恶害的人必怀赏畏罚,故人皆有好利恶害、怀赏畏罚的自利性。说人性自利,属于事实陈述,不等于说人性恶。只有当人采取不同的行为方式自利时,才会出现善恶问题。说人性自利,也不是理论假设,而是事实如此。非但经济人自利,政治人自利,道德人也自利。哪怕最高尚的道德人,也是为了追求自己所看重的利益而行动。所以,无人不自利。很多著名思想家在承认人性自利的同时,也声称人有利他性。但这一意味人性存在分裂症的说法,实属运思不当的误解。实际的情况是:人虽有利他行为,并无利他人性;其他各种人性,也内在地服从于自利性。     

The Normative Resources of Kierkegaard's Subjectivity Principle

Kierkegaard's subjectivity principle is a critique of modern epistemology that remains normative. These norms result from analysis of subjectivity in terms of its reflexive and constitutional elements. Kierkegaard's epistemology is intrinsically theological and explicates human subjectivity in terms of Christian doctrinal concepts such as revelation, sin and atonement. Here the superiority of Christianity is located not in its propositions as such, but in a way of being that effectuates a certain propositional understanding of the world as it establishes the ground for human subjectivity.     

Bergson & Lévinas on the Genealogy of Mind

This paper presents the influence that Bergson’s theory of subjectivity had on Lévinas. We start by examining Bergson’s “centripetal theory of mind.” Considering the relationship between perception and action, Bergson develops an understanding of subjectivity as a process that unifies disparate perceptions. Guided by the body, this unifying principle is deemed affective. This being done, we then present a contradiction in Bergson’s thinking: While humans are described as different in kind from other animals, the framework used to determine the nature of their world remains unchanged. Bergson never fully embraced the centripetal theory. We then turn to Lévinas and compare his critiques of Bergson and Heidegger. Lévinas believes that both instrumentalize desire, and that a philosophy of subjectivity can only escape this problem by radically embracing the affective nature of Bergson’s centripetal theory. The latter accounts for the place of Lévinas’ phenomenology of enjoyment.     

Object relations in borderlines, depressives, and normals: an examination of human responses on the Rorschach

Recently, researchers and clinicians have become increasingly interested in diagnostic distinctions between borderline and mood disorders. Object relations theory provides a useful framework for the comparison of these two overlapping diagnostic categories. In our study, a measure of object relations as represented on the Rorschach, developed by Blatt, Brenneis, Schimeck, and Glick (1976), was applied to data produced by borderline and depressive inpatients and by normal comparison subjects. Portions of the Blatt measure that tap the subject's experience of human action and interaction distinguish among the three diagnostic groups. Specifically, borderlines tend to understand human action as more highly motivated and human interaction as more malevolent in nature than do either depressive or normals. The data indicate that borderlines experience the object-relational world in a way that is fundamentally different from the way normals and depressives perceive it. Implications are discussed for theories of borderline object relations.     

Object Relations in Borderlines,Depressives, and Normals: An Examination of Human Responses on the Rorschach

Recently, researchers and clinicians have become increasingly interested in diagnostic distinctions between borderline and mood disorders. Object relations theory provides a useful framework for the comparison of these two overlapping diagnostic categories. In our study, a measure of object relations as represented on the Rorschach, developed by Blatt, Brenneis, Schimeck, and Glick (1976), was applied to data produced by borderline and depressive inpatients and by normal comparison subjects. Portions of the Blatt measure that tap the subject's experience of human action and interaction distinguish among the three diagnostic groups. Specifically, borderlines tend to understand human action as more highly motivated and human interaction as more malevolent in nature than do either depressives or normals. The data indicate that borderlines experience the object-relational world in a way that is fundamentally different from the way normals and depressives perceive it. implications are discussed for theories of borderline object relations.     

THE USE OF THE ANALYST AND THE SENSE OF BEING REAL: THE CLINICAL MEANING OF WINNICOTT'S “THE USE OF AN OBJECT”

“The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications” (1968) represents Donald Winnicott's theoretical and clinical legacy. The author develops this concept from a clinical point of view, through the analysis of a woman with psychotic functioning. He reflects upon the dramatic quality of risks inherent in the processes linked to the use of the object with seriously disturbed patients. He explores different meanings of the analyst's survival, linking it to the analyst's response. The processes of the use of the object—that is, the encounter between the patient's potential destructiveness and the analyst's capacity to respond through his own judicious subjectivity—let the patient experience the analyst's capacity to keep his own subjectivity, authenticity, and creativity alive. It is starting from the traces of this live object that patients gradually form their own personal sense of being real.     

Fictions of the internal object

This paper examines internal objects in their role as theoretical constructs which analysts use to make sense of human experience. Object relations theory is based upon a vision that the personality is divided or split into parts. Clinical experience reveals that such splits are commonly expressed in the language of our analysing. However, a lexical reality is not a thing-in-itself, but a way of organizing and understanding experience. Jung's vision of the dynamics of the split self encompass a unique 'object relations theory' that is both similar and yet quite different from the object relations theories of Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott and Thomas Ogden A clinical example is used to examine the way in which these different theoretical views explain the same clinical phenomenon. The last section of the paper is devoted to a narrational analysis of the place of internal objects in analytic theory. The split self, dynamic is seen as a narrative device - one that makes sense and provides coherence, but is neither the only view of psychic reality nor necessarily an accurate reflection of the nature of the internal world.     

从“自然主体观察”论《周易》经传的书写

传统以来,中国社会向以儒家人文精神为主体,如此虽提升了人文精神,然亦导致后学末流过度重视人的主体性,而忽略经典中对"自然"的书写,及其中蕴含的超越性。再加上西方理性思潮的影响、科技文明的进步,更助长人的主导与支配性格,如此不仅破坏了自然的秩序,无形中也斫丧了人的超越性。《周易》哲学在揭示自然与人类相互间的关系,故前人往往侧重天人的观照。本文尝试以"自然"为主体观察,试图阐发《周易》经传中对"自然"的书写及其与人文、宗教三者的关系与安排。     

心理学研究中人的命运与文化的命运

目的:通过追踪文化研究历史,探究对当今文化心理学研究的启示意义。方法:整理和回顾心理学史上关于文化的研究及文献,并对各阶段的文化研究进行评述。结果:文化在心理学史上经历了坎坷多桀的命运,文化在各阶段的不同遭遇与研究者们对人的本质的认识密切相关。结论:对人的本质的正确理解是当今文化心理学健康发展的前提。     

弗洛姆的道德认识理论

弗洛姆的道德认识理论建立在对人的研究的基础上。认识善、恶以及道德规范,主要是对人性以及蕴含在人性中的可能性的认识。由于人是有生命的,处于不断的生成过程中,因此,对人的认识必须打破客观主义的认识模式,认识主体打破与对象之间的鸿沟,实现融合合一,以整个的内在体验对象,从而获得如对象本来所是的样子去认识对象。弗洛姆的体验性知识在强调人的主观情感投入到认识中的同时,认为认识对象是外在实在的,知识是普遍性有效的,因而是一种客观的认识。弗洛姆的道德认识理论与认识论的实践转向的暗相契合。     

Subjectivity and objectivity in analytic listening.

Analysts use the concepts of subjectivity and intersubjectivity to support many different technical recommendations; this represents a misuse of theory. The dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity is a false one. Arguing against the notion of objectivity, analysts conflate it with the idealized notion of pure objectivity and then eliminate various technical devices in its name. One cannot have a concept of subjectivity without a concept of objectivity, or an intersubjective perspective that does not include some agreed-upon concept of objectivity. The simplest definition of objectivity is a directional one. Objectivity is the perception or experience of the external; subjectivity is the perception or experience of the internal. Subjectivity and objectivity are both necessary pathways to knowledge and are dependent on each other. Any form of looking or listening does to some extent preclude another, but to speak solely from a subjective or an objective perspective represents a regression in thinking to a form of naive objectivism or naive subjectivism. Clinical examples illustrate how the forming and testing of hypotheses require the cooperation of both subjective and objective listening.