Who Is to Blame? Children's and Adults' Moral Judgments Regarding Victim and Transgressor Negligence

Research has documented that individuals consider outcomes, intentions, and transgressor negligence when making morally relevant judgments (Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Engelhardt, 2017). However, less is known about whether individuals attend to both victim and transgressor negligence in their evaluations. The current study measured 3- to 6-year-olds (N = 70), 7- to 12-year-olds (N = 54), and adults' (N = 97, ages 18–25 years) moral judgments about scenarios in which an accidental transgression occurred involving property damage or physical harm. Participants were either assigned to conditions where the victim or the transgressor was negligent. Results revealed attention to negligence among all participants across a range of different moral judgment measures (including acceptability judgments, punishment judgments, and attributions of blame), with age-related increases in attention to negligence evident. Results provide novel evidence that children and adults consider not just outcomes and intentions, but also the role of negligence in both victims and transgressors, when making social decisions.     

Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning

The present studies investigate how the intentions of third parties influence judgments of moral responsibility for other agents who commit immoral acts. Using cases in which an agent acts under some situational constraint brought about by a third party, we ask whether the agent is blamed less for the immoral act when the third party intended for that act to occur. Study 1 demonstrates that third‐party intentions do influence judgments of blame. Study 2 finds that third‐party intentions only influence moral judgments when the agent's actions precisely match the third party's intention. Study 3 shows that this effect arises from changes in participants' causal perception that the third party was controlling the agent. Studies 4 and 5, respectively, show that the effect cannot be explained by changes in the distribution of blame or perceived differences in situational constraint faced by the agent.     

Effects of Severity of Accident,History of Drunk Driving,Intent, and Remorse on Judgments of a Drunk Driver1

A total of 160 women and 160 men read scenarios of an accident caused by a male drunk driver. The severity of the accident was either high (death) or low (monetary damage) and the driver either had or did not have a history of drunk driving. In addition, the driver expressed or denied feeling remorse and expressed or denied intent (or negligence-he admitted or denied knowing he was drunk before deciding to drive). The driver was evaluated on character traits and cause, responsibility, blame, and punishment. Participants also recommended sanctions (fine and prison sentence). Trait ratings of the driver were influenced negatively by history and positively by remorse. The driver who expressed intent was evaluated as more believable and more reckless. Participants with high belief in a just world evaluated the driver as being less responsible and believable and more of a cause of the accident. There were no differences in judgments given by men and women. Severity did not affect trait ratings, but was the only variable influencing sanctions. Although the driver's self presentation strategies were effective in moderating judgments about his character, they had no bearing on recommended sanctions.     

Evaluating Decision Makers: The Role of Choice Congruence and Outcome

Two studies were conducted in which decision makers were evaluated by subjects who had agreed or disagreed with the decision maker's choice. Subjects read one of two vignettes describing the alternatives available to the decision maker, indicated which alternative they personally favored, and then learned about the decision maker's choice and the outcome that occurred. Study 1 varied whether the outcomes of the decision maker's choice were positive or negative, and whether the subject's preferred option matched (congruent choice) or did not match (incongruent choice) that of the decision maker. Subjects rated the extent to which they thought the decision maker was worthy of praise (in the case of positive outcomes) or blame (in the case of negative outcomes), and the decision maker's likableness and competence. Results revealed a strong effect of congruence on attributions of praise and blame: More praise was ascribed to an agreeing decision maker and more blame to a disagreeing decision maker. The degree to which the decision maker was seen as likable was affected by congruence only, whereas perceived competence was influenced by both outcome and congruence. Study 2 addresses some methodological issues that were unresolved in Study 1 and replicated the results of the first study, using new stimulus materials and an expanded set of dependent measures.     

When Mental States Matter,When They Don't,and What That Means for Morality

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.     

Better Safe than Sorry: Risking Irresponsibility by Seeking Uncertainty

Research findings differ as to whether choosing a risky option is an efficient strategy for decision makers seeking to avoid responsibility for potential failures. A risky choice may leave the final outcome to chance factors, but the decision maker can still be held responsible for choosing risk. Further, it is unclear whether a risky choice is a responsible choice. The present article investigates the putative relationship between risk‐taking and responsibility by drawing a distinction between being responsible for the outcome (R1) versus acting responsibly (R2). Four experiments were performed, in which participants were presented with scenarios describing decision makers facing a choice between a risky (uncertain) option and a riskless (certain) option, framed in terms of losses or equivalent gains. The results showed that decision makers who chose the risky alternative were judged to have acted in a less responsible manner (R2), while still being held equally responsible for the outcome (R1), unless they were ignorant of the risks involved. Choosing risk did not absolve decision makers from blame, despite being less causal and less in control than those who chose the riskless option. Risky decision makers were also judged to be more personally involved. The dissociation between R1 and R2 ratings confirms earlier findings and serves to clarify an alleged relationship between risky choices and responsibility aversion. Framing effects for own choices were found in both scenarios. In contrast, responsibility ratings were only slightly affected by frame. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intergroup helping during the coronavirus crisis: Effects of group identification,ingroup blame and third party outgroup blame

Two studies tested predictors of helping across national boundaries. British participants reported blame attributions for the coronavirus crisis, either to the British government (ingroup blame), or to the Chinese government (third party outgroup blame), and it was tested whether this was associated with intentions to donate money to help outgroup members suffering from effects of the coronavirus crisis in the world's poorer countries. It was hypothesized that strength of identification with the national ingroup would be negatively associated with blame attributions to the ingroup, and that it would be positively associated with blame attributions to a third party outgroup. Blame attributions were predicted in turn to be related to outgroup helping, with ingroup blame being positively associated with helping intentions, and third party outgroup blame being negatively associated with helping intentions. Support for these predictions were found in one exploratory (N = 100) and one confirmatory (N = 250) study.     

The Effects of Decision Outcome Dispersion Upon Organizational Decision Making

The effects of varying decision outcome dispersion on organizational decision making were investigated under individual and group decision making conditions. Thirty-six female and pg]36 male subjects made decisions for organizational decision scenarios in which outcomes affected primarily the decision maker, people other than the decision maker, or a group of which the decision maker was a member. Subjects rated their levels of perceived risk and confidence in their decisions and made decisions within a simulated context of either a small or a large organization. Results indicated that subjects perceived significantly less risk and more confidence in their decisions when outcomes affected primarily themselves rather than others regardless of whether the decisions were made individually or by a group. Males perceived their decisions as significantly more risky than females. Induced organizational size did not significantly influence decision making.

     

Is Negligence a First Cousin to Intentionality? Lay Conceptions of Negligence and Its Relationship to Intentionality

In three studies, we examined lay conceptions of negligence and how they are used when making judgments about actors' intentions, negligence, and blame. Study 1 examined the extent to which participants agreed about what constitutes negligence and accidents. After finding a high level of agreement between participants, Study 2 explored the features that defined participants' folk understanding of negligence. Additionally, we examined if definitions of negligence overlapped with key features of definitions of intentionality proposed in the literature. Study 2 suggested there were some key overlapping features and differences between negligence and intentionality. Finally, Study 3 examined how two key features of intentionality and negligence (knowledge and awareness) were related to attributions of negligence, accidental causation, blame, and desire to punish. The findings suggested that knowledge and awareness are positively related to judgments of negligence, blame, and desire to punish. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Concept of Responsibility and Determinants of Responsibility Judgment in the Japanese Context

As in the case of the English word responsibility, the Japanese equivalent sekinin is an over-used term with multiple meanings. At least two distinctive usages are noted for the Japanese concept of responsibility: 1) to describe duties or obligations pertaining to a person's role or position; and 2) to assign blame or sanction to someone when an untoward occurrence is observed. By utilizing a number of peculiar incidents that resulted in some harm, the present study has found that subjects' responsibility judgments in terms of the second type of usage were largely determined by the following two factors: 1) the causal relationship of the agent's act to the harm that ensued; and 2) the morality of the act itself without regard to consequences. In the cases where these two aspects contradicted, especially where the blameworthy act was not directly connected to the harm, judgments about the agent's responsibility were found to diverge among subjects. It was also shown that subjects most often referred to these aspects in elucidating the reasons for attributing responsibility to, or negating the responsibility of, the agent.     

Absolute and Relative Decision Processes in Eyewitness Identification

A prominent and long-standing theory of eyewitness identification decision making distinguishes between absolute judgments, based on the lineup members' match to the witness's memory of the perpetrator, versus relative judgments, based on match values relative to other lineup members. This distinction was implemented in a computational model and simulations showed that the model predicts an accuracy advantage for absolute judgments over relative judgments under some conditions. The present experiment tested this prediction by evaluating the accuracy of witnesses instructed to use relative or absolute rules. Contrary to predictions, the overall analysis did not show an absolute advantage. Additional exploratory analyses showed a relative advantage when the suspect was surrounded by high-similarity foils. These results are consistent with a model that assumes that side-by-side comparisons of lineup members increase diagnostic accuracy by allowing witnesses to give greater weight to more diagnostic features and less weight to less diagnostic features.     

The Effect of Training Children to Consider Intentions When Making Moral Judgments

Summary

Prekindergarten children were trained to consider intentions when making moral judgments. Children were read pairs of stories that described an act producing damage. They were then asked to identify the worst act. In a verbal discrimination group, children were reinforced when they selected the act where the doer intended damage. The discussion group was also asked to identify the more negative act, but then participated in a discussion of their choices. The control group was given stories that did not contain acts producing damage. The results indicated that both types of training were instrumental in aiding children to consider the intentions of an agent when making moral judgments.     

Perceptions of Deservedness of Social Aid as a Function of Prenatal Diagnostic Testing1

This study examined whether judgments of deservedness of social aid subsequent to the birth of a disabled child vary as a function of prenatal diagnostic testing (PDT) use as predicted by the attribution‐affect‐action model (Weiner, 1980). A sample of family physicians/obstetricians (n= 341) and a university employee sample (n= 281) made attribution ratings in 3 scenarios in which an at‐risk pregnant woman gave birth to a disabled child. The findings indicate that women who chose not to use PDT or who chose to continue the pregnancy following a diagnosis were judged more responsible, more to blame, and less deserving of both sympathy and social aid subsequent to giving birth to a disabled child than were women to whom testing was not made available.     

The distinction between desires and intentions

Within attitude theory the concepts of desires and intentions are not differentiated but are often treated as synonyms. However, we argue that there are theoretical reasons for distinguishing between desires and intentions, and we articulate three main criteria, perceived performability, action‐connectedness, and temporal framing, that differentiate between the two constructs. Two studies are reported to test the distinction. Study 1 (n = 188) revealed that desires, compared to intentions, are less performable, are less connected to actions, and are enacted over longer time frames. Study 2 (n = 249) showed, among other things, that the perceived feasibility for actions that are desired and intended is higher than for those that are only desired, but only when the action refers to relatively short time frames (i.e. 1 week or 4 weeks vs. 4 months). The findings are discussed in the light of the distinction between intentions and desires and the role that they play in individual decision making. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral Philosophy,Ethical Evaluations,and Sales Manager Hiring Intentions

A growing body of evidence shows an influence of moral philosophies on ethical decision-making. Despite the importance of ethical considerations in sales force selection, the influence of sales managers’ ethical evaluations on hiring practices has received scant attention. This study examines sales managers’ ideological orientations, ethical evaluations of hypothetical salespeople portrayed in scenarios, and the effect of such evaluations on the intent to hire salespeople. Results of a cluster analysis highlight that four ideology-based segments of sales managers exist, with absolutists dominating the 268 sales executives surveyed. Furthermore, it was found that ideological relativism influences managers’ judgments of ethical behavior and hiring intentions, but idealism did not play a role. In turn, ethical judgments of justness, fairness, moral rightness, and acceptability influence hiring intentions.     

Judgments of blame and forgiveness: A comparison of young adults,older adults,and older adults with dementia

IntroductionAlzheimer's disease may modify moral judgment.ObjectiveIn two studies, we assessed the impact of dementia on blame and forgiveness. Study 1 compared the ways in which young adults, older adults, and older adults with dementia cognitively integrated two factors. Study 2 assessed the number of different factors that older adults with dementia were able to integrate during these moral judgments.MethodThe participants recorded their moral judgements in a blame task and in a forgiveness task. In study 1, the two questionnaires contained scenarios built from the combination of two factors. In study 2, the participants were confronted with the same tasks under three different conditions with scenarios that combined three, four or five factors.ResultsThe data from study 1 showed that the older adults with dementia did not combine the two factors in the same way as young adults did: the combination depended on the type of moral judgment. Study 2 revealed differences in moral judgment between older adults with dementia and adults without dementia in all tasks (i.e. with three, four or five factors combined).ConclusionDementia has an impact on moral judgments. Moral judgment among people with dementia is both task- and condition-dependant.     

Attributions of Blame in Sexual Assault to Perpetrators and Victims of Both Genders1

Previous research found that men attribute more blame to rape victims than do women; men also attribute less blame to perpetrators. In rape situations with a male perpetrator and a female victim, the roles of perpetrator and victim are confounded with gender category. To determine whether men are more lenient toward perpetrators or toward other males, the present study examined attributions of blame in scenarios that varied the gender category of both perpetrator and victim. Results showed that men's and women's attributions of blame to perpetrators were based on the role that was enacted, rather than gender per se: Men attributed less blame to perpetrators than did women, regardless of the perpetrator's gender category, indicating that men were more lenient toward perpetrators than were women. In addition, when the victim was female, the perpetrator was blamed more and the victim was blamed less than when the victim was male.     

The differential processing of price in gains and losses: the effects of frame and need for cognition

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of decision theory is that more money is preferred to less: the principle of desired wealth. Based on this and other principles such as reference dependence and loss aversion, researchers have derived and demonstrated mental accounting (MA) rules for multiple outcome situations. Experiment 1 tested the invariance of the desired wealth principle and two mental accounting rules (mixed gain, e.g. $100 gain and a $50 loss; mixed loss, e.g. $100 loss and a $50 gain) across types of decision maker and frame. The desired wealth principle and the MA rule for mixed gains were found to vary depending upon (1) the thoughtfulness of the decision maker (need for cognition, NC), and (2) the frame used to describe gains and losses (e.g. a gain of $x versus a gain of y%). The MA rule for mixed losses, however, was found to be immune to framing effects, even among people who are generally less thoughtful. The differential processing of gains and losses across frames (dollar versus percentage) and individuals (less versus more thoughtful) was tested further in Experiment 2 where evaluations of mixed losses were made at the level of the gestalt as well as the constituent (the gain and the loss being evaluated separately). Framing effects were evidenced only among subjects lower in NC and only when the constituent gain was evaluated. Evaluations of the overall mixed loss and the constituent loss were comparable across situation and individual, suggesting that losses motivate greater processing among people otherwise inclined toward cognitive miserliness. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE NEUTRALITY OF RIGHTNESS AND THE INDEXICALITY OF GOODNESS: BEYOND OBJECTIVITY AND BACK AGAIN

My purpose in the present paper is two‐fold: to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the difference between rightness and virtue; and to systematically account for the role of objective rightness in an individual person's decision making. I argue that a decision to do something virtuous differs from a decision to do what's right not simply, as is often supposed, in being motivated differently but, rather, in being taken from a different point of view. My argument to that effect is the following. The ‘objectively right’ course of action must be right, ‘neutrally’ speaking, that is right for each of the participants in a given situation: if it is right for you to do A, then it cannot, at the same time, be right for me to prevent you from doing A. But the latter is precisely how things work with virtuous action: for instance, it may be virtuous of you to assume responsibility for my blunder, but it isn't virtuous of me to let you do so. I maintain, on this basis, that, while objectivity does have normative force in moral decision‐making, the objective viewpoint is not, typically, the viewpoint from which decisions to act virtuously are taken. I then offer an account of objectivity's constraining power.     

Women's Reactions to Rape Victims: Motivational Processes Associated With Blame and Social Support1

A study was conducted with 128 female college students to test the hypothesis that when observers feel vulnerable to rape, they are more likely to blame a rape victim³ and are less willing to offer social support. Similarity and empathy were expected to moderate the effects of perceived vulnerability on blame and predict greater social support. Assumptions about the world were predicted to be associated with greater blame. A multivariate model was tested with structural equation modeling techniques. Perceived vulnerability did not directly or indirectly predict blame. However, similarity directly predicted less blame and indirectly predicted greater social support through associations with blame, perceived vulnerability, and empathy. World assumptions directly predicted greater blame and indirectly predicted less social support through blame. These findings suggest that blame and social support are interrelated processes which are associated with social observers' perceptions of the victim and their basic assumptions about the world.