Spinoza’s Announcement of Psychological Practice

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - Following Freud’s admission of his own ‘dependence on Spinoza’s doctrine’, the present paper extends psychoanalytic discernment of a...     

Spinoza on the Conditions that Nominally Define the Human Condition

ABSTRACT

In ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ Harry Frankfurt argues that a successful analysis of the concept ‘human’ must reveal something that distinguishes humans from non-humans, as well as indicate something informative about ‘those attributes [of ourselves] which are the subject of our most humane concern.’ In this paper, I present an analysis of Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ as it is employed within his Ethics. I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ satisfies Frankfurt’s desiderata because I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ is, at core, a version of Frankfurt’s own. I argue that Spinoza’s account of human bondage and human freedom indicate that Spinoza sees humans as beings that possess higher-order volitions, and that comments Spinoza makes throughout his corpus shows that he views beings that lack higher order desires to be, in an important sense, non-human. The analysis here sheds light upon the community of entities that Spinoza’s Ethics is written for, as well as upon issues concerning the nature of Spinoza’s Free Man.     

Between Sigmund Freud and Paul Federn: culture as a shared path of sublimation

Freud’s interest in culture and its various manifestations – one could even call it a passion of his – is well known. We examine the correspondence between Freud and Paul Federn – which consists of 147 cards and letters, some of them completely new, and includes Freud’s letters to Federn’s wife – in order to show that their relationship too was based on their shared interest in culture. Federn was more than a colleague: he was both Freud’s right-hand man institutionally in Vienna and a trusted person to whom he referred some of his patients. This correspondence has not only historical significance but also brings to light the theoretical stakes in issues that continue to remain central to psychoanalysis.     

Compelling Fictions: Spinoza and George Eliot on Imagination and Belief

Spinoza took it to be an important psychological fact that belief cannot be compelled. At the same time, he was well aware of the compelling power that religious and political fictions can have on the formation of our beliefs. I argue that Spinoza allows that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ fictions. His complex account of the imagination and fiction, and their disabling or enabling roles in gaining knowledge of Nature, is a site of disagreement among commentators. The novels of George Eliot (who translated Spinoza's works) represent a significant development for those who aim to resolve such disagreement in favour of the epistemic value of the imagination and fiction. Although Eliot agreed with Spinoza that belief cannot be compelled, she nevertheless affirmed the potential of certain kinds of fiction to be not only compelling but also edifying. The parallel reading of Eliot and Spinoza offered here raises the question of whether his philosophy can accommodate a theory of art in which the artist is seen to be capable of attaining and imparting dependable knowledge.     

Dreaming of freud: Ferenczi,freud, and an analysis without end

The beginning of this paper documents Sigmund Freud's pre-psychoanalytic experience as a ‘first hand’ observer of childhood behavior both professionally and as the patriarch of a large extended family in Vienna. During 1898, Freud was in the midst of an intensive correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess – his most trusted confidant, mentor and colleague – when he wrote, in part, about his sister Marie whose family was relocating in Berlin. She was apparently about to consult Fliess as her prospective physician. During the process, Freud voiced psychological assessments not only about his sister; but, also about her husband and their three daughters. The youngest among them was a 5-year old whom he characterized as “a rather gifted child, severely [hysterical]” (bracketed word in quotation juxtaposed for clarity).

Eleven years later, Freud wrote a case study about a 5-year old boy whose pseudonym, for publication purposes, was Little Hans. The life of Little Hans (as well as the lives of his parents) has been thoroughly examined and we now know something about how he matured as an adult. In a contrasting context, less is known about the ‘psychological trajectory’ of Freud's 5-year old niece who also distinguished herself in certain respects as she matured during her abbreviated later life. She remained the subject of documentable correspondence mailed to him by his youngest daughter Anna as well as foreboding prospects articulated in a letter he subsequently wrote to an English nephew.     

How translations of Freud’s writings have influenced French psychoanalytic thinking1

Translations of Freud ’s writings have had a lasting influence on psychoanalytic thinking in France. They have, all the same, given rise to some conceptual distortions as regards the ego and the id, the ideal ego and the ego ideal, and splitting. Lacan’s ‘return to Freud ’ certainly reawakened interest in Freud ’s writings; however, by focusing mainly on Freud ’s early work, Lacan’s personal reading played down the importance of the texts Freud wrote after his metapsychological papers of 1915. The fact that there is no French edition of Freud ’s complete works makes it difficult for French psychoanalysts to put them in a proper context with respect to his developments as a whole. The Oeuvres Complètes [Complete Works] edition may well turn out to be the equivalent of the Standard Edition, but it is as yet far from complete – and, since the vocabulary employed is far removed from everyday language, those volumes already in print tend to make the general public less likely to read Freud. In this paper, the author evokes certain questions that go beyond the French example, such as the impact that translations have within other psychoanalytic contexts. Now that English has become more or less the lingua franca for communication between psychoanalysts, we have to face up to new challenges if we are to avoid a twofold risk: that of mere standardization, as well as that of a ‘Babelization’ of psychoanalysis.     

Little Hans and the thought police: the 'policeman fantasies' as the first reported supervisory transference fantasies

The ‘policeman fantasies’ in Freud ’s case of Little Hans, famous for being Freud ’s most direct evidence for specifically sexual oedipal desire by Hans for his mother, are reconsidered. The Hans case is the first recorded instance of psychoanalytic supervision, and recent studies suggest that it is common for patients in supervised treatment to experience fantasies about the supervisor. It is argued that the policeman fantasies are the first recorded instances of such transference fantasies about psychoanalytic supervision and the patient–therapist–supervisor triangle. The explanatory power of this interpretation is supported by the nuances of the features of the fantasies themselves, as well as by the context in which they occurred that might serve as ‘day residues’. Moreover, this interpretation provides an answer to the central mystery of the two fantasies, which goes unaddressed by Freud ’s oedipal interpretation: Who is the policeman?     

Notes on ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ and Strachey’s translation as ‘instinct for mastery’

This short paper looks at Freud’s use of the term ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ and its translation by Strachey as ‘instinct for mastery’ when Freud was describing the motives behind his grandson’s game with the wooden reel and string in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The word ‘Macht’ [power], which is contained in the word ‘Bemächtigung’ points to Freud’s difficult relationship with Alfred Adler, whose early theories on the aggressive drive and later theories on ‘striving for power’ were initially rejected by Freud. Looking at the changes in Freud’s reception of Adlerian terms, some of which he later integrated into his own theory, throws light on his choice of the word ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ in 1920, when he was just beginning to introduce his thoughts on the death instinct. A slightly different translation of the word ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’, one which takes these historical and theoretical aspects into account, could make these connections clearer for the English reader.     

Author's Précis of Henry James and Modern Moral Life

The sheer complexity of Spinoza's thinking makes it impossible for any movement to use him as a patron. But philosophically engaged ecologists and environmentalists may find in his system an inexhaustible source of inspiration. This holds good even if he was personally a ‘speciesist’ and uninterested in animals or landscapes. Underestimation of his potential help is due to a variety of factors: failure to pay enough attention to the structure of his system, belief in its close resemblance to that of Hobbes, and interpretation of ‘understanding love of God’ as a contemplative, general attitude incompatible with environmentalist activism and interest in every living being. The system of Spinoza is compatible with activism ‐ like that of Jan de Witt ‐ and with respect for all things as ‘expressions of the power of God or Nature’.     

The brunhilde fantasy freud's countertransference in the analysis of elma

Abstract

The authors start from the hypothesis that there existed a “blind-spot” in Freud's countertransference in his analysis of Elma, an ex-patient of Sandor Ferenczi. In their search for support for this idea, they review the correspondence between Freud and Ferenczi contemporary to Elma's treatment in addition to works by Freud on theory and technique. They believe to have found therein several facts which support the above idea: for instance, the diagnosis of “dementia praecox” that Freud formulated in his first interview with the patient; and some of the vicissitudes of the treatment, in particular, the circumstances which determined its termination. The Brunhilde fantasy, which Freud attributes to Elma in a letter to Ferenczi, enables them to penetrate further the possible relationship between this “blind-spot” and details of Freud's life and childhood as revealed in his self-analysis.     

Why Didn’t Freud Reject Pfister? A Response to Isabelle Noth and Christoph Morgenthaler

The Freud-Pfister correspondence is in some sense an Urtext for the most friendly debate imaginable between the self-identified “godless Jew” who founded psychoanalysis, and the liberal Swiss pastor who was drawn to psychoanalysis while retaining his belief in God. Why didn’t Freud reject Pfister? This article will probe this question using the tools of psychoanalysis itself. After reviewing Freud’s associations to childhood religion, the Bible, and his father (citing Rizzuto), I am proposing that Pfister functioned unconsciously for Freud not only as an admiring son and disciple, but also a father substitute—much like Freud’s beloved antiquities—who represented both a God and a father who would admire and love him, and carry Freud’s name forward in the Book of Life.     

On True Friendship and on the Anthropological Relevance of Freud’s The Future of an Illusion

In this response article to Isabelle Noth and Christoph Morgenthaler’s text on the correspondence between Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister, the author reflects on two issues: first, Freud’s theoretical ideas on friendship and, second, his essay The Future of an Illusion as a text in which Freud abandons his general theoretical starting point, namely the analysis of the human condition, normality, and cultural and religious phenomena from the perspective of clinical anthropology.     

On authenticity: the question of truth in construction and autobiography

Freud was occupied with the question of truth and its verification throughout his work. He looked to archaeology for an evidence model to support his ideas on reconstruction. He also referred to literature regarding truth in reconstruction, where he saw shifts between historical fact and invention, and detected such swings in his own case histories. In his late work Freud pondered over the impossibility of truth in reconstruction by juxtaposing truth with ‘probability’. Developments on the role of fantasy and myth in reconstruction and contemporary debates over objectivity have increasingly highlighted the question of ‘truth’ in psychoanalysis. I will argue that ‘authenticity’ is a helpful concept in furthering the discussion over truth in reconstruction. Authenticity denotes that which is genuine, trustworthy and emotionally accurate in a reconstruction, as observed within the immediacy of the analyst/patient interaction. As authenticity signifies genuineness in a contemporary context its origins are verifiable through the analyst’s own observations of the analytic process itself. Therefore, authenticity is about the likelihood and approximation of historical truth rather than its certainty. In that respect it links with Freud’s musings over ‘probability’. Developments on writing ‘truths’ in autobiography mirror those in reconstruction, and lend corroborative support from another source.     

Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom

We seem to have a direct experience of our freedom when we act. Many philosophers take this feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. Spinoza denies that we have free will of any sort, although he admits that we nonetheless feel free. Commentators often attribute to him what I call the ‘Negative Account’ of the feeling: it results from the fact that we are conscious of our actions but ignorant of their causes. I argue that the Negative Account is flawed. The feeling of freedom also depends on a vacillation of the mind. When the mind forms too many incompatible associations, it vacillates between them. When we act, the mind vacillates back and forth between the kinds of actions that we associate with our present mental state. We then mistake this subjective vacillation for an objective feature of ourselves—namely, the power to do otherwise.     

Ferenczi and Freud – From psychoanalysis as a “professional and personal home” to the creation of a “psychoanalytic home” for the patient1

Abstract

The author explores the relationship between Sándor Ferenczi and Sigmund Freud in the light of their correspondence. This allows us to see how Freud was able to offer and create for Ferenczi a “professional and personal home” that enabled the latter to find a much more meaningful and creative contact with himself. According to the author, this experience played an important role in Ferenczi’s later readiness to offer to and create with his patients a similar “psychoanalytic home.” As Freud was not able to share such clinical research work with Ferenczi, a conflict developed between them whose nature has occupied psychoanalysts ever since, and whose seeds can be found in the 1246 letters that they exchanged between January 1908 and May 1933. From this point of view, Ferenczi’s Clinical diary (written in 1932 and published only in 1985) can be seen as the continuation of the dialogue they had entertained for so many years, as well as Ferenczi’s attempt not to give up the “professional and personal home” that they had created together.     

The Two-Sense Reading of Spinoza’s definition of attribute

Spinoza’s definition of ‘attribute’ (E1d4) has been described as ‘one of the most puzzling passages in the Ethics’ and ‘a longstanding worry’ for Spinoza interpreters. Its puzzling status stems from (a) its apparent ‘subjectivist’ character and (b) the dominant understanding of Spinoza’s notion of attribute as an ‘objectivist’ notion. The paper aspires to remove this puzzlement by proposing and defending a reading of E1d4 in which it is understood to have two senses. First, I defend the objectivist character of Spinoza’s notion of attribute, and explain why E1d4 is problematic within the framework of an objectivist interpretation of the Spinozistic attribute. Second, I propose a reading of E1d4 as having two senses and explain the cause of an apparent contradiction in E1d4. Finally, I devote the largest part of the paper to a defence of the Two-Sense Reading of E1d4. More specifically, I draw on four sources for this defence: (a) the structure of E1d1 and E1d3, (b) the content and form of E1p4 and its demonstration, (c) Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism and (d) Descartes’ treatment of attribute and its influence on Spinoza.     

Spinoza’s Christology A Brief Summary

Abstract

This article summarizes a number of Spinoza texts relating to his Christology and soteriology based on his Christology. The texts show that Spinoza’s Christology underpins his formulation of human nature or the constitution of the essence of the human mind. Considering Spinoza’s texts concerning God or Nature, “Christ according to the spirit”, the spirit or mind of Christ, and human salvation or blessedness; this article illustrates that given the texts, the study of Spinoza’s Christian religion is skewed and ought to be more balanced. The author’s reading of Spinoza and its application to his work presented in this article provides a coherent and tenable understanding of Spinoza’s efforts “to commend and establish the authentic purpose of the Christian Religion”.     

Spinoza on Lying and Suicide

Spinoza is often taken to claim that suicide is never a rational act, that a ‘free’ person acting by the guidance of reason will never terminate his/her own existence. Spinoza also defends the prima facie counterintuitive claim that the rational person will never act dishonestly. This second claim can, in fact, be justified when Spinoza's moral psychology and account of motivation are properly understood. Moreover, making sense of the free man's exception-less honesty in this way also helps to clarify how Spinoza should, and indeed does, recognize the possibility of rational suicide.     

The empiricist as rebel: Jung,Freud, and the burdens of discipleship

However little they share in common, both Freudian and Jungian commentators have long agreed that Jung's theoretical development in the years following his psychoanalytic affiliation prompted an open “split” with Freud and the psychoanalytic movement. Careful examination of Jung's principal “rebel” works does not sustain this thesis, however, but rather indicates Jung's honest belief that his limited appropriation of certain psychoanalytic mechanisms and attendant theoretical modifications constituted full-fledged loyalty to psychoanalysis as he understood it. This perception receives significant support from the Freud-Jung correspondence which reveals Jung openly articulating the ground rules defining his loyalty to psychoanalysis as early as 1906, and Freud accepting, and even approving, his protégé's empirical reservations over the course of the next five years.     

Spinoza's Definition Of Attribute: An Interpretation

Since it has generally been accepted that to Spinoza attributes are real features of substance, the interpretation of his attribute definition has become a notorious problem. The reason is that interpreters have failed to see that the definition formulates a purely epistemological account of the state of affairs. The article presents and justifies such an interpretation. It will be shown that the definition in spite of its epistemological character implies a real ontological definition, which specifies the critical features of an attribute. As to the reason why Spinoza has stated the definition in an ‘indirect way’, it is shown that it is likely that he has done so in order to have a more efficient, a more unambiguous and a more elegant definition. The relevance of the new interpretation is not only that it provides us with an interpretable, transparent attribute definition, but it also contributes to the establishment of a coherent picture of Spinoza’s metaphysics around this definition.