Seeing and Being Seen: Courage and the Therapist in Cross-Racial Treatment

ABSTRACT

Correction of the patient's distortion is often the focus of therapeutic treatment. However, the therapist's distortions, based upon pre-existing fears, which themselves are often rooted in greater societal issues and energized by the work with the patient (especially as they relate to issues of racial difference between the therapist and patient), can lead to clinical impasse. Just as an effective treatment relies upon the patient's opening up to correcting distortions, so too the therapist must be able to use transference response and become vulnerable to knowing and moving beyond his own fears and distortions.     

Aristotle on a Puzzle about Logical Consequence: Necessity of Being vs. Necessity of Saying

In the Posterior Analytics (I 6, 75a18–27) Aristotle discusses a puzzle which endangers the possibility of inferring a non-necessary conclusion. His solution relies on the distinction between the necessity of the conclusion's being the case and the necessity of admitting the conclusion once one has admitted the premisses. The former is a factual necessity, whereas the latter is meant to be a normative or deontic necessity that is independent of the facts stated by the premisses and the conclusion. This paper maintains that Aristotle resorts to this distinction because he thinks that, as long as it is conceived as a factual relation, logical consequence cannot exist independently of the facts expressed by the premisses and the conclusion. As a corollary, the necessity of such a consequence relation always requires the necessity of these facts. Aristotle holds this factual conception of logical consequence responsible for the puzzle, since it cannot account for valid syllogisms with contingent or false premisses. The alternative conception of necessity is then introduced by him in order to make good this deficiency. The distinction between the necessity of being and the necessity of saying was revived by the Oxford logician E. W. B. Joseph, and taken over by Frank Ramsey in his seminal Truth and Probability, but has not received attention from recent interpreters of Aristotle's logic. This paper, however, argues that, in spite of its intrinsic interest, the distinction bore no significant fruit in Aristotle's logical doctrine.     

Husserl vs. Derrida

This paper was presented as the Aaron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture, sponsored by the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc., at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, October 1988.     

Sex vs. Gender

SUMMARY

This article was first published in D. R. Laub and P. Gandy, (eds), Proceedings of the Second Interdisciplinary Symposium on Gender Dysphoria Syndrome, Stanford University Medical Center, Stanford, California, 1973, pp. 20–24. Prince argues that previous contributors to the symposium in using such terms as “gender conversion surgery” and “anatomic and genetic gender” were failing to grasp the distinction between sex and gender. Genital anatomy is about sex; gender role is about a lifestyle. Out of 100 people applying for a surgery perhaps only 10 percent should have it. The majority confuse sex and gender and fail to appreciate that what they are seeking is a gender change and not a sexual change. Prince likes the word “dysphoria” but argues for distinguishing sexual dysphoria from gender dysphoria. They are different and people should be treated according to which one they happen to be suffering from.     

Holism vs. Wholism

Ervin Laszlo's Science and the Akashic Field claims that there is a shift in Zeitgeist that allows us to view a field that entails coherence among residents of the universe, residents that hitherto have seemed far apart both in space and time. I agree with this claim but suggest that we need to clear up several ambiguities that have hindered understanding and therefore acceptance. Basic to clarification are an understanding of waves, spectra, and the formulations of quantum physics.     

Truth vs. Rorty

In his article 'Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry?' Rorty claims that the difference between truth and justification makes no difference to practice. His argument for this is that assessment of truth and assessment of justification are the same activity. This argument is insufficient, for the difference to practice can be found elsewhere. I shall demonstrate that, and also show in which way this difference manifests itself in utility/risk calculations in which the risk is that a certain justified belief might be false. Since decisions are often based upon such utility/risk calculations, and since these calculations presuppose the difference between truth and justification, the difference between truth and justification does make a difference to practice.     

Magic vs. enchantment

This paper draws on a distinction by J. R. R. Tolkien between Magic (an exercise of the will to change something in the world) and Enchantment (the creation of and entering into a secondary world). After elaborating this contrast and some of its consequences—one of which is to illuminate the common ground between science and what is usually thought of as magic, as distinct (in both cases) from art—I suggest some complications and refinements, including a third category, Glamour. I then discuss contemporary modernist magic, including Weberian ‘disenchantment’ which, 1 argue, is actually central to the triumph of the former. One consequence of that triumph is to place an historically unique emphasis upon enchantment as a source of resistance and possibly re‐enchantment. I then take a closer look at wonder, as the hallmark of enchantment, and at the special relationship between wonder and nature, before concluding with some suggestions for how to recognise genuine contemporary re‐enchantment.