Wittgenstein Studies and Contemporary Pyrrhonism

Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s statement ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ and consequences of rule-following paradox is the topic of this article. The revision of Wittgensteinian approach to the relations between speech and mind, and approaches to the speech by Vygotsky and Austin allow approving the disagreement with Wittgenstein and exhibit the cases when is necessary ‘to break silence and speak’. Argument is based on the hermeneutical approach to the skeptical image of Wittgenstein studies that disclose the meaning of hypothetic relevance between performative utterances and impulses generated by inner speech. Wittgenstein’s ideas are demonstrated as the contemporary version of a Pyrrhonism. Classical skepticism intensifies procedures for justification of philosophical knowledge, because philosophy tries to disprove skeptical claims. Wittgenstein studies play approximately the same role. Interpretation of the proposition ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ in a view of performative utterance allow coordinating the inner philosophical speech made by Wittgenstein, and the speech made by his commentators and critics.     

Working with chronic and relentless self‐hatred,self‐harm,and existential shame: a clinical study and reflections (Paper 2 of 2)

This second of two papers focuses on the shame which emerged in the first 14 years of analysis of a woman who was bulimic, self‐harmed, and repeatedly described herself as ‘feeling like a piece of shit’. To explore this intense and pervasive shame I draw on Jung's and Laplanche's emphasis on experiences of unresolvable, non‐pathological ‘foreignness’ or ‘otherness’ at the heart of the psyche. Images, metaphors, elements of clinical experience, and working hypotheses from a number of analytic traditions are used to flesh out this exploration. These include Kilborne's use of Pirandello's image of shame as like a ‘hole in the paper sky’ which, I suggest, points to a crack in subjectivity, and reveals our belief in the efficacy of the self to be illusory. Hultberg's observations on shame as having an existential mode (function) are also explored, as is the nature of analytic truth. Using these ideas I describe my patient's process of finding some small but freeing space in relation to her shame and self‐hatred. Through enduring and learning from her shame in analysis she realized that it was part of a desperate unconscious attempt to draw close to her troubled father and so to ‘love him better’.     

Can One Be Cognitively Conscious of God?

How do humans ‘register’ God: attain knowledge or revelation of God? Analysis is familiar in terms of explanatory hypothesis, necessity, authority and commitment. However individuals speak also of ‘experience’ or ‘consciousness’ of God/Christ/grace – received widely, not just by an esoteric few. But may we properly hold that people can be cognitively aware of God? Undoubtedly such speech has problematic aspects. Not only do psychosis, self-deception, gullibility recur. Commentators are liable to enlist what may be termed the A-conceptual Lucidity picture, which critically fails. Various positions urged by thinkers rule out by definition the very possibility of cognitive awareness of God. Some analysts assert: a person’s experiencing x is constituted throughout by the person’s use of concepts in toto reached previously and independently. But, why adopt any a priori dismissiveness? We should favour a portrayal of people’s epistemic situation respecting God called the Consciousness Portrayal. Phrases therein include: ‘God’s gracious, guiding activity’; ‘a person’s access to God’; ‘attentive consciousness/conceptualization/knowledge of God’; ‘diverse levels or modes of consciousness’; ‘God’s guidance in a person’s creatively picking out concepts’; and ‘“cognition” which, as regards meaning, is not just a function of calculative reasoning’. Alertness to usage in non-religious contexts aids our finding the religious phrasing intelligible. The Portrayal is approachable from an internal and external angle. Opponents’ challenges to the Portrayal invoke some broad epistemological theses, often pronounced intrinsic to ‘rationality’. But we fittingly espouse certain contrasting epistemological views. And these prove to fortify the Consciousness Portrayal.     

Faith and the practising analyst

Abstract: In this brief essay, I reflect on three questions: What is ‘faith’ in a modern and post‐modern cultural context? Do I, a Jungian analyst, have ‘faith’ or do I not? Does having ‘faith’ or not make a difference in the practice of analysis? I make reference to Jung's understanding of ‘faith’ and his frequent disclaimers about making metaphysical claims. I conclude that a post‐credal ‘faith’ is possible for contemporary Jungian analysts, that I do have such a faith personally, and that in my experience this makes a significant difference in analytic practice at least with some patients. Traditional faith statements must be translated into depth psychological terms, however, in order for them to be applicable in post‐modern, multicultural contexts.     

On Trygve Braatøy’s concept of analytic love. An assumption on the actuality of one of the pioneers in Norwegian psychoanalysis

Is analysis still a cure of love? And is the analyst’s love and warm feelings for his patient a prerequisite for doing psychoanalysis? Trygve Braatøy addresses these complex matters in his book from 1954. The concept of love and its relation to sexuality is discussed, and how to understand love in the analytic setting. His points of view are compared with Freud’s and those of some second-generation analysts, his Norwegian colleagues and contemporary analysts, as well as modern writers. Braatøy defines himself as a true Freudian, but his clinical theory regarding love and countertransference has strong resemblances to Rank and Ferenczi and his followers, both in Europe and USA. Braatøy sums up that the therapist’s capacity to love and have a surplus of warmth ought to be the most prominent factor when selecting candidates for psychoanalytic training. Braatøy is a modern writer, with his ideas founded on clinical experience and intuition.     

The uncomfortable truth about wrongful life cases

Our ambivalent attitudes toward the notion of ‘a life worth living’ present a philosophical puzzle: Why are we of two minds about the birth of a severely disabled child? Is the child’s life worth living or not worth living? Between these two apparently incompatible evaluative judgments, which is true? If one judgment is true and the other false, what makes us continue to find both evaluations appealing? Indeed, how can we manage to hold these inconsistent judgments simultaneously at all? I critically examine two solutions to this puzzle: the hidden-indexical account and Velleman’s anti-realist account. I propose an alternative explanation which appeals to (a) state-given, as opposed to object-given, reasons for belief and (b) the distinction between belief and acceptance. I argue that (1) the fact that a severely disabled life is not worth living provides object-given reason to believe that that life is not worth living, but (2) after the birth of a severely disabled child, the psychological utility of positive evaluation gives us a state-given reason to believe that that child’s life is worth living, and a reason to accept that, in our relation with the child, her life is worth living. I conclude by drawing a practical lesson about wrongful life suits.     

Piper’s question and ours: a role for adversity in group-centred views of non-agentive shame

This paper aims to contribute to ‘group-centred views’ of non-agentive shame (victim shame, oppression shame), by linking them to an ‘anepistemic’ model of the experience and impact of human failing. One of the most vexing aspects of those group-centred views remains how susceptivity to such shame ought to be understood. This contribution focuses on how a basic familiarity with adversity, in everyday life, may open individuals up to these forms of shame. If, per group-centred views, non-agentive shame is importantly driven by participation in social practices with others, a better understanding of the impact of adversity on individuals’ lives may offer a way of explaining how embodied experience instils in individuals a need for such participation. The upshot is an understanding of the individual’s susceptivity to non-agentive shame, which affords it the same legitimacy as more conventional notions of shame.

     

The Emperor's clothes: Some serious problems in psychoanalytic training

The author discusses some of the key problems in psychoanalytic training, in particular those problems that stem from the power differential between training analysts and students in training. One effect of this differential can be that some students feel a pressure to comply with their teachers and supervisors, even their training analyst, in ways that can be seriously detrimental to their development. Further, when something goes wrong in a student's training, how is this to be viewed by those in charge of the training? Also, how are complaints dealt with? Is suffi cient weight given to external reality? Too often training analysts, and training committees, get into pathologising a student in a process that should be recognised as ‘wild analysis in committee’, rather than considering more carefully the external realities that may be affecting a student's progress in the training. This ‘analysis’ in committee should never be allowed. There is an urgency for immediate changes to be made in psychoanalytic training so that the problems discussed, with more care being taken, should be prevented from happening. Too often, however, an institutional resistance to change dominates discussions in committee, and in society meetings, with the result that little or no change takes place even after years of debate.     

Authoritativeness and Responsibility in the Analytic Exploratory Process Discussion of Elisa’s Case

Following the clinical exploratory process of Francesca Colzani’s case, this discussion emphasizes how the authoritativeness of the analysts’ contribution has to do with her/his responsibility for a self-reflexive attitude. We do not speak of power as much as of the possibility for and openness to change, which is stimulated by both of the subjectivities that are brought into play. The paper underlines the dialogue between poetic meaning and analytic meaning suggesting an innovative bidirectionality: from poetic language to the analytic process, but also from the analytic process to poetic language.     

What Is Terrorism?

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is not to try to formulate the meaning the word ‘terrorism’has in ordinary use; the word is used in so many different, even incompatible ways, that such an enterprise would quickly prove futile. My aim is rather to try for a definition that captures the trait, or traits, of terrorism which cause most of us to view it with moral repugnance. I discuss the following questions: Is the historical connection of terrorism with terror to be preserved on the conceptual level, or relegated to the psychology and sociology of terrorism? Does mere infliction of terror qualify as terrorism, so that we can speak of non-violent terrorism? If terrorism is a type of violence, does it have to be against persons, or should violence against property also count? In what sense can terrorism be described as indiscriminate violence? Should we use the word only in a political context? In such a context, can we speak of ‘state terrorism’, or should the word be restricted to actions not sanctioned by law? Is the terrorist necessarily oblivious to moral considerations, as those who define terrorism in terms of antinomianism imply? My answers to these questions lead up to the following definition: terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.     

Mottainai: a Japanese sense of anima mundi

The Japanese expression ‘Mottainai!’ can be translated as ‘What a waste!’ or ‘Don't be wasteful!’ However, mottainai means much more than that. It expresses a sense of concern or regret for whatever is wasted because its intrinsic value is not properly utilized. Buddhism and Japan's indigenous religion, Shinto, are integral to the Japanese psyche, accordingly the other‐than‐human world is also experienced and lived in daily life. In the Japanese worldview everything in nature is endowed with spirit, every individual existence is dependent on others and all are connected in an ever‐changing world. Mottainai offers a glimpse of the anima mundi inherent in this worldview. This contrasts with our anthropocentric Zeitgeist, which manifests outwardly as environmental crisis and inwardly as fixation upon social interactions, especially through communication technologies, to the exclusion of all else. Jung's statement, ‘The decisive question for man is: Is he related to something infinite or not? That is the telling question of his life’, has never been more pertinent. Encounters beyond the human world could be understood as touching this ‘something infinite’, and the apparent benefits of such experiences in the analytical process are illustrated with clinical vignettes from the author's practice.     

Secrets in the Analytic Group

Secrets are common, universal, and not pathological. But, holding secrets may damage the work of an analytic group. We believe that secrets may be considered much like dreams; they can reveal important unconscious material, which constitutes both a challenge and an opportunity for the conductor and the group-as-a-whole. Secret telling, like dream telling, may facilitate a sense of closeness and belonging, and could be understood as a request for containment. Moreover, secrets represent a path toward discussing unconscious material about an individual, and at the same time they may express a group’s secret. In addition, some secrets can arouse intense affect in the group, a quality we call “dark unconscious materials.” Once explored in the group through free-floating discussion, a new meaning is reconstructed, leading to a sense of acceptance and transformation from shame and guilt to a new feeling of courage.     

This White ‘I’: The Reciprocal Shame of Oppressor and Oppressed

Abstract

Vice’s answer to the question of this white ‘I’ who must try to live well in South Africa, configures shame, political silence and humble self-reconfiguration. I accept her insightful analysis of ‘whiteness’ in terms of the oppressor’s shame, but find that her specification of identity does not accommodate the multiplicity of privilege/oppression relations in which individuals participate. Since this implies that many South Africans, albeit unevenly, share the oppressor’s shame, her advice concerning ‘whites only’ political withdrawal seems inappropriate and curiously self-subversive. Focussing instead on her reflections concerning moral emotions in ethically-compromised selves, which should motivate self-reconfiguration, and drawing from Kristeva on ‘forgiveness’, I argue that compromised selves in privilege/oppression relations cannot reconfigure themselves independently, and should rather negotiate on-going forgiveness relationships. Further, since privileged and oppressed shoulder different but reciprocal ethical responsibilities, besides considering the privileged self who should appeal for forgiveness,¹ one must address a gap in Vice’s argument concerning the reciprocal shame of the oppressed.     

On shame,countertransference, and analytic style

Some analysands experience a restricted space in the analytic situation with special counter-transferential consequences. The author discusses how shame is involved in these situations, and projected on to the analyst. This leads to an important choice of direction for the analyst regarding counter-transference acting out or conditions for a real analytic situation. Shame plays a special rôle in these choices of direction. The author illustrates the problem with a clinical vignette and shows how integration of shame is accomplished clinically, and continues with a discussion of the connections between the analyst's analytic style, his own communicative style as a defense against shame and the analytic styles of different analytic “schools”. A discussion of Liberman's concept, of “asymmetrical dialogue” and its connection with countertransference acting out and analytic styles, forms a conclusion to the paper.     

Speech after Rape: Towards a Theological Poetics of Identity and Loss after Philomela's ‘Voice of the Shuttle’

Abstract

This article seeks to reconsider the tale of Philomela's ‘Voice of the Shuttle’ and recent criticism of the work from Patricia Klindienst and Geoffrey Hartman to exemplify the concerns in figuring a poetics that seeks to disclose and describe that which is essentially the unspeakable, namely rape. Central to this discussion are the following two concerns: First, what is the declaration of principle within a given work that attempts to speak of violence such as rape? Is it to speak the act anew as testimony? Is it to artificially suture the wounds that cannot be sutured? Second, how can art function as an incarnation of this coming together of form, content and import around the unspeakable such as rape, and what should this embodiment within literary space ultimately concern? It is the aim of this article to illustrate the way that speech after rape and violence moves into a refining of the category of what is considered speech, thereby calling for a poetics of communitas which does not merge identities to suture wounds of the unspeakable, rather liberates voices of both loss and hope.     

The Problem of Criteria and the Necessity of Natural Theology

Most streams of Christianity have emphasized the unknowability of God, but they have also asserted that Christ is the criterion through whom we may have limited access to the depths of God, and through whose life and death we can formulate the doctrine of God as Triune. This standpoint, however, leads to certain complications regarding ‘translating’ the Christian message to adherents of other religious traditions, and in particular the question, ‘Why do you accept Christ as the criterion?’, is one that Christian thinkers have attempted to answer in different ways. There are two influential responses to this query in recent Christian thought: an ‘evidentialist’ approach which gradually moves from a theistic metaphysics to a Christ‐centred soteriology, and an ‘unapologetic’ standpoint which takes God's self‐disclosure in Christ as the perspectival lens through which to view the world. The opposition between these two groups is primarily over the status of ‘natural theology’, that is, whether we may speak of a ‘natural’ reason, which human beings possess even outside the circle of the Christian revelation, and through which they may arrive at some minimalist understanding of the divine reality. I outline the status of ‘natural theology’ in these strands of contemporary Christian thought, from Barthian ‘Christomonism’ to post‐liberal theology to Reformed epistemology, and suggest certain problems within these standpoints which indicate the need for an appropriately qualified ‘natural theology’. Most of the criticisms leveled against ‘natural theology’, whether from secular philosophers or from Christian theologians themselves, can be put in two groups: first, the arguments for God's existence are logically flawed, and, second, even if they succeed they do not point to the Triune God that Christians worship. In contrast to such an old‐fashioned ‘natural theology’ which allegedly starts from premises self‐evidently true for all rational agents and leads through an inexorable logic to God, the qualified version is an attempt to spell out the doctrinal beliefs of Christianity such as the existence of a personal God who interacts with human beings in different ways, and outline the reasons offered in defence of such statements. In other words, without denying that Christian doctrines operate at one level as the grammatical rules which structure the Christian discourse, such a natural theology insists on the importance of the question of whether these utterances are true, in the sense that they refer to an objective reality which is independent of the Christian life‐world. Such a ‘natural theology’, as the discussion will emphasize, is not an optional extra but follows in fact from the internal logic of the Christian position on the universality of God's salvific reach.     

What Do Happiness Studies Study?

What do, or should, happiness studies study? Everything to which we refer with the word ‘‘happiness’’ is worth some study. But the study of subjective states covers only part of the ground covered by the word ‘‘happiness’’ and by no means all the ground central to understanding happiness. On the central use of ‘‘happiness,’’ to be happy is to be glad or satisfied or content, which suggests subjectivity, with having a good measure of what is important in life, which suggests objectivity. We find the same suggestion of both subjectivity and objectivity in the list of what enhances the quality of life. There are strong arguments in favour both of the subjectivity of what enhances life and of its objectivity. I argue that neither is right, that the story is more complicated. The conclusion of the story is that there is a list of several non-reducible features that contribute to the quality of a characteristic human life, and that anything that contributes to the quality of any human life will be one or other of these features. But there is a problem. When we speak of the quality of a human life, there may be no one thing we have in mind. Perhaps some of us are not disagreeing with one another over the nature of a ‘‘happy’’ life but speaking of different things.     

Locating religion in victory-making: the 1973 war discourse in Egypt

Most of the literature on the Arab–Israeli war in 1973 takes material gains and military advances as measurements that indicate victory or defeat. Accordingly, based on the magnitude of weaponry used and the associated tactics employed, scholarly works declare Egypt or Israel the winner. This article moves away from such ‘materialistic’ accounts of the war’s conclusion by exploring a similarly significant victory-maker: the use of the discourse of religion. By looking at previously untapped official and semi-official texts from the war’s onset through the eight years of President Anwar Sadat’s rule, the article finds this discourse to be composed of three thematic structures. These structures cohere into patterns that facilitated an account of the war as a massive and unquestionable Egyptian ‘victory’. The study also addresses how the interplay of language and religion was so closely attuned to the broader context that included the use of authoritarianism in politics and in the media as well as a so-called Islamic revival. Rather than supposing that the religious references in this discourse may have been in some way truthful, I show that it relied on a set of intentional falsehoods.