A Right against Risk-Imposition and the Problem of Paralysis

In this paper I examine the prospects for a rights-based approach to the morality of pure risk-imposition. In particular, I discuss a practical challenge to proponents of the thesis that we have a right against being imposed a risk of harm. According to an influential criticism, a right against risk-imposition will rule out all ordinary activities. The paper examines two strategies that rights theorists may follow in response to this “Paralysis Problem”. The first strategy introduces a threshold for when a risk-imposition is a rights violation. The second strategy drops the claim that rights are absolute and maintains that all rights infringements generate compensation duties. It is argued that both strategies face significant practical problems of their own and that the Paralysis Problem seems fatal for a right against risk-imposition in the absence of an adequate account of the morally relevant threshold risk.     

春雨的叮咛

日子过得真快,在南岳坤道班的学习不知不觉已过月余。清晨下雨了,春天的雨,静静的柔柔的,润物无声,“善利万物而不争”。晶莹的雨珠密密地连缀成雨丝,从的天空中飘荡下来,雨珠打在水面上有趣地形成一簇簇素色的花朵,漾起一个个小小的“酒窝”。清新的空气注满了早春特有的气息与活力。墨绿、浅绿、新绿、鲜红的杜鹃与粉红的桃花,在烟雨朦胧中流淌着神秘、和谐、美丽,造化天工。冥冥中我听到了春雨的叮咛。大道无言,大音希声,此情此景正无声地向我昭示,自然之道,与道之自然。是的,既然我选择了道,道也选择了我,我就应从从容容地走下去,亦如这…     

Pulling out the intentional structure of action: the relation between action processing and action production in infancy

Adults and children readily construct action representations organized with respect to an ultimate goal. These representations allow one to predict the consequences of action, interpret and describe actions, and categorize action sequences. In this paper, we explore the ontogeny of hierarchically organized action representations, and its relation to infants' ability to produce similar sequences. To do so, we examine infants' perception and performance of a means-end sequence: pulling a cloth to retrieve a toy. Using a visual habituation paradigm, we demonstrate that 12-month-old infants understand that the initial step of the cloth-pulling sequence is directed toward the ultimate goal of attaining the toy, and use their knowledge of the causal constraints of the sequence to make this goal attribution. Ten-month-olds, however, appear transitional with respect to this understanding: their ability to identify the goal of the cloth-pulling sequence is related to their own ability to planfully solve a similar sequence. These findings are consistent with a burgeoning body of literature suggesting an intimate link between action production and perception, and suggest that this link is in place by at least 10 months of age.     

The Sleep Paralysis Nightmare,Wrathful Deities,and the Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious

The sleep paralysis nightmare has been reported from antiquity to modernity across manifold cultures. Many people who experience nocturnal assaults by dark entities, demons, hags, or incubi during sleep paralysis ascribe them to evil spirits with varying degrees of malevolence. The majority report the episodes as terrifying, mysterious, and uncanny. Known in the neurocognitive literature as “isolated sleep paralysis” or “sleep paralysis with hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations,” the phenomenon is fascinating to researchers across disciplines because it occurs when we are both asleep and awake, presenting fundamental questions on the subject of conscious experiences in sleep.

This article considers the nightmare of sleep paralysis to be an archetypal psychic process akin to Jung’s night sea journey and having correspondence to the wrathful deities presented in the Tibetan Book of the Dead. With a Jungian perspective directed at artwork created by a person who has experienced sleep paralysis, archetypal imagery emerges and reveals elements missing from conscious view. Utilizing the interpretive frameworks of Jungian-oriented depth psychology and Tibetan Buddhist psychology, this universally experienced nightmare of terror can also be undergone as a dream of transformation with potential for psychological and spiritual growth.

Swiss psychiatrist C. G. Jung turned to the stories and images of religion and mythology to explore psychic life, in general, and the religious function of the psyche, in particular. For Jung, both myths and what Jung termed “big dreams” are expressions of psychic content emerging from the collective unconscious, which includes the entire spiritual inheritance of humankind’s evolution. Because dreams contain images that are not created with conscious intent, they provide self-portraits of the psychic life process and can be utilized for their objective insights into the psyche’s teleological directedness. Jung’s psychological theories drew on a vast number of sources, including shamanism, art, religion, alchemy, parapsychology, and Eastern philosophy. Notably, Tibetan Buddhist cosmology strongly influenced his thought (Jung, 1935/1989a Jung, C. G. (1989a). Psychological commentary on “the Tibetan book of the dead.” In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Eds.), The collected works of C.G. Jung (R.F.C. Hull, Trans.; Vol. 11, pp. 509–526). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1935, revised 1953) [Google Scholar]).

Whereas Jungian psychology is rooted, albeit loosely, in the philosophies of empiricism that presuppose a subject–object duality, Tibetan Buddhist philosophy emphasizes the empty and illusory nature of the separate self, whether in waking life or nightly dreams. Nevertheless, although all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, they are, at the same time, pure manifestations of Buddha mind. In this philosophical system, the world of dream occupies an interesting paradox. On the one hand, dreams are considered to be unreal and deceptive, yet they are also a magical art to be mastered by the seeker, and their meanings are deemed of highest importance (Wallace, 2012 Wallace, B. A. (2012). Dreaming yourself awake: Lucid dreaming and Tibetan dream yoga for insight and transformation. Boston, MA: Shambhala. [Google Scholar]; Young, 1999 Young, S. (1999). Dreaming in the lotus: Buddhist dream narrative, imagery and practice. Boston, MA: Wisdom. [Google Scholar]).

Drawing on the dreams and subsequent paintings of one person, this article investigates the sleep paralysis nightmare—a phenomenon that has been recognized universally across time in folklore and myths, as well as by contemporary science—through the lens of both Tibetan Buddhism and Jungian-oriented depth psychology. With its emphasis on image and symbol, Jungian-oriented depth psychology is especially well suited to dialogue with art in the exploration of psyche. Both expressive product (image) and experience (meaning) are essential in this process. Jung (1946/1972 Jung, C. G. (1972). On the nature of the psyche. In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Eds.), The collected works of C. G. Jung (R. F. C. Hull, Trans.; Vol. 8, pp. 159–234). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1946) [Google Scholar]) stated, “Image and meaning are identical; and as the first takes shape, so the latter becomes clear” (p. 204, par. 402).     

Paralysis at the Adolescent Gate: Peter Pan Meets Godzilla

When a 13-year-old develops a disturbance so great that he is unable to go to school, is disinclined to see his friends or go out, and is deeply sad and anxious, clinicians tend to turn to his history to understand what is happening. In the case of Peter, what emerges is that it is not his history but rather what he perceived to be his future that led to his breakdown. This article explicates how the perception of what was to come dovetailed with where he was in his development, and how these coalesced to create an emotional paralysis.     

Knowledge and the permissibility of action

Synthese - I argue in favor of a certain connection between knowledge and the permissibility of action. On this approach, we do not think of the relation between those notions as reflecting a...     

Substitution and the explanation of action

This paper examines a potential problem area for theories of direct reference: that of the substitution of co-referential names within the belief context of a belief attribution used to explain an action. Of particular interest are action explanations which involve cases of repetition — wherein beliefs are held which, though about one (other) individual, are mistakenly thought to concern two different people. It is argued that, despite the commonly held view to the contrary, no problem is posed by substitution in such circumstances to theories of direct reference.     

The influence of action observation on action execution: Dissociating the contribution of action on perception,perception on action,and resolving conflict

For more than 15 years, motor interference paradigms have been used to investigate the influence of action observation on action execution. Most research on so-called automatic imitation has focused on variables that play a modulating role or investigated potential confounding factors. Interestingly, furthermore, a number of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have tried to shed light on the functional mechanisms and neural correlates involved in imitation inhibition. However, these fMRI studies, presumably due to poor temporal resolution, have primarily focused on high-level processes and have neglected the potential role of low-level motor and perceptual processes. In the current EEG study, we therefore aimed to disentangle the influence of low-level perceptual and motoric mechanisms from high-level cognitive mechanisms. We focused on potential congruency differences in the visual N190 ? a component related to the processing of biological motion, the Readiness Potential ? a component related to motor preparation, and the high-level P3 component. Interestingly, we detected congruency effects in each of these components, suggesting that the interference effect in an automatic imitation paradigm is not only related to high-level processes such as self-other distinction but also to more low-level influences of perception on action and action on perception. Moreover, we documented relationships of the neural effects with (autistic) behavior.     

Discovery of the pendulum and spring dynamics in the early stages of walking

The authors investigated the self-selected, overground walking patterns of 7 children (aged 11 months to 1 year, 5 months) at the initiation of walking (brand-new walkers [BNWs]) and for the next 6 months at 1-month intervals. Walking speed, stride length, and stride frequency increased significantly between the first 2 visits without significant changes in height and weight. The authors calculated sagittal plane angular accelerations of the center of mass over the foot for each step as an indicator of the escapement pulse. Results for the acceleration profiles changed after the 1st visit to positive, single-peaked accelerations that occurred < 0.20 s after initial foot contact. Increases in sagittal plane hip angular displacement and decreases in frontal plane pelvic angular displacement were observed. The pattern changes suggest that children quickly discover appropriately timed and directed escapements that initiate and support the conservative sagittal plane pendulum and spring dynamics observed in older children.     

Joint action and group action made precise

The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be nonintentional. Actions performed by social groups are analyzed in terms of the notions of joint action (basically DO and Stit).A precise semantical analysis of the aforementioned kinds of joint action is given in terms of time-trees. With each participant a tree is connected, and the trees are joined defining joint possible worlds in terms of state-expressing nodes from the trees. Sentences containing DO and Stit are semantically evaluated with respect to such joint possible worlds. Intentional joint actions are characterized in terms of the notion of we-intention (joint intention), characterized formally by means of a special operator.     

Collective action and the politics of affect

The anti-globalisation has shifted away from a politics that aims to uncover and resist neoliberal ideology to one that bypasses and potentially disrupts habits of thinking about neoliberalism. Focusing on mass gatherings such as the Seattle demonstrations in 1999, several scholars suggest that the anti-globalisation movement has embraced a politics of affect that, while potentially increasing the collective's capacity for action, also risks strengthening existing divisions and creating sad passions. In response to these concerns, this article develops an account of the affective politics the World Social Forum has moved to. Drawing on my experiences at the 2005 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre I describe the Forum as a space in which social movements from around the globe testify to their experiences of struggle. I employ Freireian pedagogical techniques and theories of brain-body connections to develop an account of the way in which testimony and dialogue generate new thinking from which a collective language can emerge. I suggest that the discourse that arises can lead to new ways of being.     

Con-reasons and the causal theory of action

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con-reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory role not played by pro-reasons (the reason the agent takes to count in favour of the action taken). Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con-reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con-reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic principle; this argument has an added benefit, since the principle has been taken by many to show that the causal theory generates a puzzle about the possibility of weak-willed action. I then argue that a causal theorist has good reason to reject the possibility of Ruben's imagined cases. If successful, my arguments make clearer the commitments of the causal theory and show that it can accommodate con-reasons in the way I think they ought to be accommodated.