Remembering the past and imagining the future: examining the consequences of mental time travel on memory

Cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on overlapping processes in episodic memory. The three experiments reported here examine the consequences of remembering the past and imagining the future on the accessibility of other information in memory. Participants first studied events associated with a specific context and then either (a) retrieved past autobiographical events associated with that same context or (b) imagined future autobiographical events associated with that same context. Replicating and extending evidence of retrieval-induced forgetting, remembering autobiographical events from the past caused participants to forget the related studied events. However, imagining future autobiographical events failed to cause participants to forget the related studied events. These results suggest an important difference in the memorial consequences of remembering and imagining.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: Examining the consequences of mental time travel on memory

Cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on overlapping processes in episodic memory. The three experiments reported here examine the consequences of remembering the past and imagining the future on the accessibility of other information in memory. Participants first studied events associated with a specific context and then either (a) retrieved past autobiographical events associated with that same context or (b) imagined future autobiographical events associated with that same context. Replicating and extending evidence of retrieval-induced forgetting, remembering autobiographical events from the past caused participants to forget the related studied events. However, imagining future autobiographical events failed to cause participants to forget the related studied events. These results suggest an important difference in the memorial consequences of remembering and imagining.     

Manic thinking: independent effects of thought speed and thought content on mood

This experiment found that the speed of thought affects mood. Thought speed was manipulated via participants' paced reading of statements designed to induce either an elated or a depressed mood. Participants not only experienced more positive mood in response to elation than in response to depression statements, but also experienced an independent increase in positive mood when they had been thinking fast rather than slow--for both elation and depression statements. This effect of thought speed extended beyond mood to other experiences often associated with mania (i.e., feelings of power, feelings of creativity, a heightened sense of energy, and inflated self-esteem or grandiosity).     

The influence of mood on the intensity of emotional responses: Disentangling feeling and knowing

The results of three experiments suggest that pre-existing mood increases the intensity of affectively congruent emotions while dampening the intensity of incongruent emotions independent of attributional knowledge. This result was obtained using a new method for inducing mood states unobtrusively and with minimal or no cognitive concomitants. The results of Experiment 1 revealed that for participants who were exposed to positive feedback a pre-existing positive mood led to stronger feelings of pride in comparison to negative mood. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that pre-existing mood directly influences the experience of subsequently elicited emotions independent of what one knows about the causes of this feeling. When participants were required to differentiate between the funniness of a cartoon and their subjective humour response, mood influenced only the latter judgement (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, reminding participants of the mood induction resulted in a contrast effect in judging the funniness of a cartoon. However, the pre-existing mood continued to exert an assimilation effect on the overt mirth response. In conclusion, these results suggest that the feeling and knowledge component are partly independent bases of emotional responses.     

Anxiety and depression: Past,present, and future events

This article focuses on differences between anxiety and depression. The first study is concerned with the timing (past, present, future) of negative events associated with high levels of anxiety and depression in normal participants. Depression was associated more with past events than future events, whereas the opposite was the case with anxiety. These findings are consistent with those reported in several studies on clinical samples. In a second study, participants provided their emotional reactions to scenarios referring to negative events lying in the past or in the future with the future events being either uncertain or probable. Past events were associated with more depression and less anxiety than future events whether uncertain or probable. Probable future events were associated with more anxiety and depression than uncertain ones. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Mood and recall of autobiographical memory: the effect of focus of self-knowledge

Mood state facilitates recall of affectively congruent memories (i.e., mood-congruent recall). Mood state may also promote motivation to alleviate a negative affective state, leading to retrieval of affectively incongruent memories (i.e., mood incongruent recall). The present study demonstrates that the focus of self-knowledge influences the occurrence of both mood-congruent recall and mood-incongruent recall. Three experiments found that mood-congruent recall occurred when participants recalled their experiences from a self-aspect that was related to the elicitor of moods, whereas mood-incongruent recall occurred when they recalled their experiences from a self-aspect that was unrelated to the elicitor of moods. These results suggest that the nature of the self-aspect from which persons recall their experiences determines whether mood-congruent or mood-incongruent recall occurs.     

The Influence of Dysphoria on Reactivity to Naturalistic Fluctuations in Anger

Abstract We used an experience sampling methodology to explore the relationship between current symptoms of dysphoria and momentary mood fluctuations following everyday experiences of anger. Using PDA devices, participants rated their mood, ruminative cognitions, feelings of dependency, and stressful events 4 times per day for 1 week. We hypothesized and found that those higher in dysphoria would demonstrate a stronger link between anger and depressed mood than those who were lower in dysphoria. Those participants who reported higher initial dysphoria indicated more anger over the course of the week, a stronger within-person association between anger and depressed mood, and a slower recovery from anger experiences. Multilevel moderated mediation analyses indicated that the link between anger and depressed mood for those high in dysphoria is largely explained by a stronger carryover of anger from one assessment to the next and partially explained by greater increases in ruminative cognitions and feelings of dependency. The change in depressed mood appears to occur with increases in anger, specifically, and not other negative mood states. Our results extend previous research on the anger–depression relationship by investigating the short-term relationships between anger and depressed mood among those with varying levels of dysphoria.     

On the dynamics of implicit emotion regulation: Counter-regulation after remembering events of high but not of low emotional intensity

Valence biases in attention allocation were assessed after remembering positive or negative personal events that were either still emotionally hot or to which the person had already adapted psychologically. Differences regarding the current state of psychological adjustment were manipulated experimentally by instructing participants to recall distant vs. recent events (Experiment 1) or affectively hot events vs. events to which the person had accommodated already (Experiment 2). Valence biases in affective processing were measured with a valence search task. Processes of emotional counter-regulation (i.e., attention allocation to stimuli of opposite valence to the emotional event) were elicited by remembering affectively hot events, whereas congruency effects (i.e., attention allocation to stimuli of the same valence as the emotional event) were obtained for events for which a final appraisal had already been established. The results of our study help to resolve conflicting findings from the literature regarding congruent vs. incongruent effects of remembering emotional events on affective processing. We discuss implications of our findings for the conception of emotions and for the dynamics of emotion regulation processes.     

Positive and negative appraisals of the consequences of activated states uniquely relate to symptoms of hypomania and depression

Individuals may appraise internal states positively or negatively. Positive appraisals involve desiring or pursuing the state or experience, while negative appraisals involve dreading or avoiding the experience. The extent to which individuals make extreme positive or negative appraisals of high, activated, energetic states might determine whether they experience symptoms of high or low mood. This study extends the existing literature by considering the role of opposing appraisals and beliefs about the same internal states and by controlling for the potential correlation between depression and activation symptoms. Extreme, positive and negative appraisals of activated mood states related distinctly to experiences of activation and depression symptoms respectively, in an analogue sample (n=323). Positive appraisals of activated internal states were uniquely associated with elevated activation and hypomania symptoms. Negative appraisals of the same states were uniquely associated with elevated depression symptoms. Opposing appraisals of internal states may underlie mood swing symptoms.     

Depression history, depression vulnerability and the experience of everyday negative events

This study examined whether deficits in dealing with daily problems emerge before a depressive episode (i.e., pre-existing vulnerability) or after a depressive episode (i.e., psychosocial scar). Participants completed a 30-day daily diary in which they reported their most negative event of the day, their appraisals of that event, and their mood. Three years later, they completed a structured depression interview. The sample consisted of 350 college students, 24 of whom had a past history of depression and 54 of whom experienced a depressive episode subsequent to dairy completion. Multilevel modeling revealed that students with past depression blamed others more than the never-depressed and those with subsequent depression, which supported the scar hypothesis. In support of the vulnerability hypothesis, as compared to the never-depressed group, participants with past depression demonstrated steeper declines in positive mood on more stressful days but did not significantly differ from the subsequent depression group. Overall, our findings do not provide clear support for either hypothesis; however, this study is the first to use a daily diary design to directly compare individuals with past depression to individuals who would subsequently experience depression.     

Exploring alternative deterrents to emotional intensity: Anticipated happiness,distraction, and sadness

A recent theory of emotional intensity (Brehm, 1999) argues that emotions are functionally identical to motivational states. Like motivational states, the intensity of an emotion should be a joint function of the importance of instigating events and the magnitude of deterrence to the emotion. “Deterrence” is definable as impediments or forces that interfere with the experience or expression of the emotion?reasons for not feeling what one is feeling. When experiencing an emotion, a person will feel it more intensely as the reasons for not feeling that emotion increase, up to a point. When great enough, the reasons for not feeling the emotion overwhelm it and reduce it to a low level. The deterrents investigated thus far have all involved events whose valence opposes the emotion's valence. Two experiments explore the breadth of events that have deterrent power. The first was designed to see if merely anticipating an event of opposite valence has a deterrent effect on an emotion. The second explored whether an affectively neutral stimulus (background noise) would also have deterrent effects. The results of the first experiment partially supported the theory, whereas the results of the second provided complete support.     

Factors affecting conscious awareness in the recollective experience of adults with Asperger's syndrome

have shown a small but significant impairment of autonoetic awareness or remembering involved in the episodic memory experiences of adults with Asperger's syndrome. This was compensated by an increase in experiences of noetic awareness or knowing. The question remains as to whether the residual autonoetic awareness in Asperger individuals is qualitatively the same as that of typical comparison participants. Three experiments are presented in which manipulations that have shown differential effects on different kinds of conscious awareness in memory in typical populations are employed with a sample of adults with Asperger's syndrome. The results suggest that the experiences of remembering reported by such individuals, although reduced in quantity, are qualitatively similar to those seen in the typical population. The results are discussed in the context of current theories of awareness in episodic memory.     

Positive and negative appraisals of the consequences of activated states uniquely relate to symptoms of hypomania and depression

Individuals may appraise internal states positively or negatively. Positive appraisals involve desiring or pursuing the state or experience, while negative appraisals involve dreading or avoiding the experience. The extent to which individuals make extreme positive or negative appraisals of high, activated, energetic states might determine whether they experience symptoms of high or low mood. This study extends the existing literature by considering the role of opposing appraisals and beliefs about the same internal states and by controlling for the potential correlation between depression and activation symptoms. Extreme, positive and negative appraisals of activated mood states related distinctly to experiences of activation and depression symptoms respectively, in an analogue sample (n=323). Positive appraisals of activated internal states were uniquely associated with elevated activation and hypomania symptoms. Negative appraisals of the same states were uniquely associated with elevated depression symptoms. Opposing appraisals of internal states may underlie mood swing symptoms.     

Sleep Quality and the Subjective Experience of Autobiographical Memory: Differential Associations by Memory Valence and Temporality

The primary goal of the present research was to examine associations between sleep quality and the subjective experience of autobiographical events. In an online study, 141 university students reported on past events that varied by valence (positive or negative) and temporality (most significant or from the previous 2 weeks); they also completed measures of sleep quality and depression. Relative to participants with good sleep quality, participants with poor sleep quality thought more about their negative experiences, reported negative events that occurred more frequently, and used more negative emotion words when describing recent negative events. In some instances, depressive symptoms mediated the relation between sleep quality and elements of autobiographical reports. Future experimental work should examine the directionality of these effects, with the ultimate goal of improving sleep quality, mental health, and the manner in which individuals discuss and make meaning of their negative life events. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Future events,early experience,and mental health: clinical assessment using the anticipated life history measure

This study's goals were (a) to provide convergent validity for the Anticipated Life History measure (ALH), an instrument prompting participants to describe their future life course from their 21st birthday until their death, and (b) to assess the impact of early experience and early memories on the ALH. The ALH narratives were coded for the presence and/or absence of future life events and for five clinical features (Narrative Integrity, Depression, Fantasy Distortion, Impulsivity, and Malevolence) using a detailed scoring manuaL A sample of 285 young adults completed the ALH and a battery of cognitive, mood, and life events measures. The results confirm the utility of this new instrument: Participants whose ALH scored high on the clinical measures also had higher levels of current depression, lower quality-of-life satisfaction, reported more negative early life experiences, and recounted negative early memories.     

Mood congruence and depressive deficits in memory: a forced-recall analysis

Two experiments examined the contribution of reporting biases to mood-congruent recall patterns and diminished levels of recall frequently associated with depressed mood states. In Experiment 1, participants classified as dysphoric (n = 14) or nondepressed (n = 21) on the basis of scores on the Beck Depression Inventory and the Profile of Mood States made self-referential judgements regarding a series of affectively valenced words. Subsequently they were given an unexpected forced-recall test, which encouraged guessing to meet the output requirement (i.e. 40 responses) of the test. Nondepressed subjects confidently reported more positive words than dysphoric subjects, but the latter produced significantly more correct guesses of words that were positively valenced. Similar findings were obtained in Experiment 2, in which dysphoric (n = 40) and nondepressed subjects (n = 40) performed both self-referent and orthographic judgements of affectively valenced words, followed by either a free- or forced-recall test. The findings suggest that positive and negative trait words were adequately encoded in memory, but, consistent with cognitive theories of depression, their accessibility to retrieval was differentially limited. In addition, however, the results implicate an important contribution of diminished motivation and/or conservative report criterion in the manifestation of depression-related biases and deficits in recall.     

The perception of integrality: remembering through the validation of expectation

Five experiments investigated the role of sentence context in influencing recognition decisions. Sentence stems were presented only in the study phase, only in the test phase, or in both; in addition, the coherence of the sentences was varied, such that terminal words were highly constrained by, merely consistent with, or actually incongruous with their stems. These stimulus combinations produced 4 unique patterns of response. These patterns are difficult to explain through encoding and retrieval alone; they seem also to require an understanding of the principles by which people react subjectively to their own processing. The results are discussed in terms of the differential effects of definite expectations developed in past experiences versus indefinite expectations developed in the moment of remembering.     

Psychophysics of Remembering: The Discrimination Hypothesis

In a psychophysical approach to remembering, the events to be remembered are discriminated from other possibilities at the time of remembering, and not at the time of encoding or learning. The discrimination is specific to the retention interval at which remembering occurs, as shown by experiments demonstrating that discriminability and response bias are delay–specific. This article discusses a discrimination model for remembering that emphasizes the individual's history of learning about reward payoffs in similar experiences in the past. This model predicts the two characteristics of forgetting functions, initial discriminability and rate of forgetting.     

Mood-induction research—its implications for clinical depression

Mood-induction procedures (MIPs) are increasingly being used as laboratory analogues of clinical depression. Four methods of mood induction are described: reading depressing self-referent statements: remembering past unpleasant events; listening to a taped depressing story: and failure on a task. The effects of these MIPs on affect, behaviour and related variables and parallels between these effects and clinical deficits are reviewed. The implications of MIP research for clinical depression are discussed in the light of self-awareness theory, mood effects on memory, and the inter-relationship between cognitive and somatic variables in depression.     

"Mood contagion": the automatic transfer of mood between persons

The current studies aimed to find out whether a nonintentional form of mood contagion exists and which mechanisms can account for it. In these experiments participants who expected to be tested for text comprehension listened to an affectively neutral speech that was spoken in a slightly sad or happy voice. The authors found that (a) the emotional expression induced a congruent mood state in the listeners, (b) inferential accounts to emotional sharing were not easily reconciled with the findings, (c) different affective experiences emerged from intentional and nonintentional forms of emotional sharing, and (d) findings suggest that a perception-behavior link (T. L. Chartrand & J. A. Bargh, 1999) can account for these findings, because participants who were required to repeat the philosophical speech spontaneously imitated the target person's vocal expression of emotion.