Memory for media: investigation of false memories for negatively and positively charged public events

Despite a large body of false memory research, little has addressed the potential influence of an event's emotional content on susceptibility to false recollections. The Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis predicts that negative emotion generally facilitates memory but also heightens susceptibility to false memories. Participants were asked whether they could recall 20 "widely publicised" public events (half fictitious) ranging in emotional valence, with or without visual cues. Participants recalled a greater number of true negative events (M=3.31/5) than true positive (M=2.61/5) events. Nearly everyone (95%) came to recall at least one false event (M=2.15 false events recalled). Further, more than twice as many participants recalled any false negative (90%) compared to false positive (41.7%) events. Negative events, in general, were associated with more detailed memories and false negative event memories were more detailed than false positive event memories. Higher dissociation scores were associated with false recollections of negative events, specifically.     

Detecting and constructing meaning in life events

Three studies examined the meaning ascribed to events varying in intensity and valence and how meaning detection and construction relate to the experience of meaning in life events. In Study 1, participants were more likely to expect meaning to emerge from major life events particularly if they are negative, while trivial events were expected to be meaningful if they were positive. Study 2 showed that constructed meaning was more likely to occur in response to negative events while detected meaning was more likely to be associated with positive events. Study 3 showed that this ‘match’ between valence and meaning strategy predicted enhanced experience of meaning in those events. These studies suggest that the more subtle experience of meaning detection may provide a way to understand the meaning that emerges from positive events and experiences.     

Prospective and positive mental imagery deficits in dysphoria

We know less about positive mental imagery than we do about negative mental imagery in depression. This study examined the relationship between depressed mood and the subjective experience of emotion in imagined events; specifically, prospective imagery, and imagery in response to emotionally ambiguous stimuli. One hundred and twenty-six undergraduates completed measures of depression, imagery vividness for future events, and a homograph interpretation task in which they generated images and subsequently rated image pleasantness and vividness. As predicted, compared to low dysphoria, high dysphoria was associated with poorer ability to vividly imagine positive (but not negative) future events. These findings were augmented by the observation that high dysphorics provided lower pleasantness ratings of images generated in response to homographs they interpreted as positive. We suggest that an imbalance in the inability to vividly imagine positive but not negative future events may curtail the ability of high dysphorics to be optimistic. High dysphoric individuals are further disadvantaged: even when they interpret ambiguity positively, the resulting images they generate are associated with less positive affect. Therapeutic strategies that address both such positive-specific imagery biases hold promise for depression treatment innovation.     

Interpretation and judgmental biases in social phobia

Previous research demonstrated that social phobia is characterized by content-specific interpretation and judgmental biases. The present study investigated whether this interpretation bias occurs not only in ambiguous, but also in positive and negative social events, and whether social phobic patients (SPs) are more characterized by a judgmental bias in costs than in probability. Besides, we argued that the judgmental bias observed in former studies could also be attributed to accurate estimations of SPs (of, for example, stuttering). Therefore, we assessed judgmental bias by the ratings of probability and costs of a negative evaluation (e.g. ‘people dislike me’) and not, as in previous studies, of negative social events (e.g. ‘stuttering’). SPs (n=228) and normal controls (n=33) were presented social and non-social events ranging from positive to profoundly negative. They ranked four different interpretations on likelihood to assess interpretation bias, and rated the profoundly negative interpretation on probability and cost to assess judgmental bias. SPs demonstrated content-specific interpretation and judgmental biases that also occurred in positive and negative social events. In contrast with expectations, SPs were characterized by a judgmental bias in both costs and probability.     

The psychic costs of intense positive affect

Recent research indicates that happiness, or affective well-being, is related primarily to the frequency, not to the intensity, of positive affect (PA). The question arises as to why intense positive affect (PI) is not a larger contributor to subjective well-being. Whether processes that yield PI also produce intense negative affect was examined. Studies 1 and 2 suggested that cognitive mechanisms that amplify or dampen affect can carry over from positive to negative events. Study 3 demonstrated that, because of judgment mechanisms, an extremely positive event can make other events less positive. Study 4 revealed that naturally occurring intensely positive experiences are often preceded by negative ones. Study 5 suggested that the more persons valence success at a task, the happier they will be if they succeed, but unhappier if they fail. The 5 studies reveal that intense positive experiences may sometimes have costs that counterbalance their desirable nature.     

Mental contrasting of counterfactual fantasies attenuates disappointment,regret, and resentment

Negative emotions elicited by positive counterfactuals about an alternative past—“if only” reconstructions of negative life events—are functional in preparing people to act when opportunities to restore the alternative past will arise. If the counterfactual past is lost, because restorative opportunities are absent, letting go of the negative emotions should be the better solution, sheltering people from feelings of distress. In six experimental studies, the self-regulation strategy of mental contrasting (Oettingen, European Review of Social Psychology 23:1–63, 2012) attenuated the negative emotions elicited by positive fantasies about a lost counterfactual past, specifically, disappointment, regret and resentment. Mental contrasting (vs. relevant control conditions) led people to feel less disappointed when evaluating their lost counterfactual past compared with their current reality, indicating reduced commitment to the lost counterfactual past (Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4), and it attenuated post-decisional regret and resentment (Studies 5 and 6). These findings held when participants were induced to focus on lost counterfactual pasts for which they were responsible (Studies 4 and 5), for which they blamed another person (Study 6), or for which they deemed no one responsible (Studies 2 and 3). The findings are relevant for building interventions that help people to come to terms with their lost counterfactual past.     

Effectiveness of Positive Hypothesis Testing for Cooperative Groups

In a rule induction problem positive hypothesis tests select evidence that the tester expects to be an example of the correct rule if the hypothesis is correct, whereas negative hypothesis tests select evidence that the tester expects to be a nonexample if the hypothesis is correct. We extend previous analyses of the effectiveness of positive and negative tests for ambiguous verification or conclusive falsification of hypotheses by emphasizing the importance of examples following positive or negative tests. Cooperative four-person groups solved rule induction problems from a single known example of the correct rule by proposing hypotheses and selecting evidence on each of four arrays on a series of trials. There were more examples following positive tests than negative tests. The transition probability from an incorrect hypothesis on trialtto the correct hypothesis on trialt+ 1 was higher for positive tests than for negative tests, higher for positive tests followed by examples than positive tests followed by nonexamples, and higher for negative tests followed by examples than negative tests followed by nonexamples. Once the group proposed the correct hypothesis on trialtthey were highly likely to continue to propose the correct hypothesis on trialt+ 1.     

Anxiety and unrealistic optimism

Substantial evidence suggest that people tend to be unrealistically optimistic that positive events will happen to them and that negative events will not. However, recent research indicates that under certain conditions they may be unrealistically pessimistic. Variations in the levels of optimism and pessimism experienced towards events are generally given cognitive explanations. A relation between optimism and pessimism and anxiety, a variable related to emotion as well as cognition, was investigated in the present study. An inverse correlation was found between how anxious female students in England felt about certain negative events and how unrealistically optimistic they were about the occurrence of those events. It was concluded that the degree of anxiety experienced toward a negative event may affect the level of unrealistic optimism or pessimism toward it.     

Insurance, risk, and magical thinking

The possession of an insurance policy may not only affect the severity of a potential loss but also its perceived probability. Intuitively, people may feel that if they are insured nothing bad is likely to happen, but if they do not have insurance they are at greater peril. In Experiment 1, respondents who were reminded of their medical insurance felt they were less likely to suffer health problems in the future compared to people who were not reminded of their medical insurance. In Experiment 2a, participants who were unable to purchase travel insurance judged the probability of travel-related calamities higher compared to those who were insured. These results were replicated in Experiment 3a in a simulation of car accident insurance. The findings are explained in terms of intuitive magical thinking, specifically, the negative affective consequences of "tempting fate" and the sense of safety afforded by the notion of "being covered."     

Binocular detection of positive and negative flashes

Binocular forced-choice detection rates were measured under conditions where both eyes received positive flashes, both eyes received negative flashes, and one eye received a positive flash while the other received a negative flash. When both eyes received the same kind of flash, both positive or both negative, detection rates were,greater than probability summation. When one eye received a positive flash while the other received a negative flash, detection rates were near a level expected on the basis of probability summation. It is concluded that, at the level of forced-choice detection. positive and negative flashes are detected as though they were separate, independent events.     

All's well that ends well? Outcome bias in pilots during instrument flight rules

The objective of the present study was to examine if the Outcome Bias also occurs in pilots flying under instrument flight rules (IFR). In a scenario-based survey, 60 pilots evaluated weather-related decisions made by hypothetical pilots. Participants rated the decisions as better, less risky, and regarded the probability that they would have made the same decision as higher when they were followed by a positive outcome, than when they were followed by a negative outcome. This effect showed likewise for novice pilots and for experienced pilots. These findings could be relevant for the flight-related decision-making of pilots, which sometimes is affected by the decisions made by third-party pilots. In particular, decisions made by other pilots that have led to positive outcomes might be hastily followed, whereas those that have led to negative outcomes might be hastily rejected.     

Counterfactual processing and the correspondence between events and outcomes: Normality versus value

Kahneman and Tversky (1982) have proposed a simulation heuristic such that perceivers tend to substitute ‘normal’ antecedent events for exceptional ones in psychologically ‘undoing’ a given outcome. Recently Gavanski and Wells (1989) have demonstrated that exceptional outcomes tend to be perceived as caused by exceptional events and normal outcomes by normal events, a finding more in line with the representativeness heuristic than this ‘normalization’ principle. We argue that representativeness may be determined by the evaluative tone of events as well as by probability—namely that positive events are assumed to underlie positive outcomes and negative events, negative outcomes. Both normality and value were independently manipulated in order to test the relative effects of each of these factors. In contrast to Gavanski and Wells our data indicate that preference was given to the similarity of value between events and outcome for undoing both positive and negative and normal and exceptional outcomes. Some implications of these findings for counterfactual processing are discussed.     

情感强度不同负性生活事件对个体情感反应和行为选择的影响

采用系列实验方法探讨不同情感强度负性生活事件对个体情感反应和行为选择的影响。结果发现：（1）复合生活事件（1高负性+1低负性）为异类时,个体对复合事件的负性感受比单独1高负性事件更低,选择经历前者,出现平均效应;（2）复合生活事件为同类时,其负性感受比单独1高负性事件更高,选择经历后者,出现累加效应;（3）复合事件有明显的时间特点时,其情感和行为选择受事件发生时间影响,符合峰-终定律。结论：人们对负性生活事件的加工受其特点的影响,加工方式不同。     

解释水平视角下的乐观偏差效应

研究基于解释水平理论,考查心理距离对乐观偏差效应的影响。实验从心理距离的事件概率维度、时间距离维度、空间距离维度入手,采用自编的材料对677名被试进行测量,探讨心理距离的远近对乐观偏差产生的影响。结果表明,被试对未来生活事件的判断存在总体上的乐观偏差。在较远的心理距离条件下,被试表现出更大的乐观偏差;而在较近的心理距离中,乐观偏差效应明显减小。但在时间距离维度以及消极事件的概率维度上,表现出与总体乐观偏差不一致的现象。     

网络突发事件中的负性偏向：产生与表现

在网络突发事件的产生和传播中, 人们往往更关注负面信息的加工和传递, 存在负性偏向。本研究依据事件酝酿、爆发、蔓延阶段的特征, 构建心理机制模型, 通过3项研究分别检验了信息内容、信息加工和信息传递中负性偏向的产生和发展。结果表明, 负性偏向不仅产生于网络突发事件的源头语篇中, 还产生于个体信息加工和人际信息传递过程, 表现为个体对负性词汇更好的记忆效果及更高的辨别力, 以及网民间对负性信息的选择性传递和对模糊信息的负性解读。研究有利于认识网络突发事件信息传播规律, 科学应对舆情危机, 创新网络治理。     

Emotional reactions and regulatory responses to negative and positive events: Associations with attachment and gender

In two studies, we examined inter-individual variability in responses to both negative and positive events. In the first study, participants (119 college students) reported on negative and positive events from their own lives. The second was an experiment in which participants (133 college students) were given either negative or positive feedback about their personality. With negative events, more insecure individuals, especially anxiously attached, evidenced more intense negative emotional reactions and greater processing of (i.e., ruminating on) negative experiences. With positive events, securely attached individuals and less anxiously attached engaged in greater processing of positive experiences (maximized), whereas more insecure individuals tended to minimize positive experiences. Gender differences for emotion regulation were moderated by either attachment or event type. Findings for negative events generally coincide with prior research, and those for positive events provide new evidence that attachment style could affect how people react to positive events and emotions.     

Adult attachment and memory of emotional reactions to negative and positive events

Relations between adult attachment and memory for earlier emotional reactions to negative and positive events were examined. Hypotheses were that avoidance would be associated with underestimating earlier negative affect, whereas anxiety would be associated with overestimating earlier negative affect. Also, both avoidance and anxiety were expected to relate to underestimating earlier positive affect intensity. Participants (119 college students) completed daily report forms three times a day for 4 days on which they described and rated their immediate emotional reactions to events within each time period. Approximately 10 days later, they were asked to estimate their immediate emotional reaction to one negative event and one positive event. Events were coded as interpersonal or non-interpersonal. Contrary to hypotheses, for those lower on avoidance, anxiety related to lower levels of recalled negative affect (i.e., greater underestimation) for negative interpersonal events. As expected, with positive events, anxiety and avoidance related to lower levels of recalled positive emotions. Results suggest that memory processes could be one explanation of how working models operate and are sustained over time.     

不同情感强度正性生活事件的情感和行为反应:多模型的检验和整合

3个实验探讨情感强度不同正性生活事件对个体情感和行为反应的影响。发现:(1)面对复合正性生活事件(1高正+1低正),个体会感觉比面对1个单独的高正性情感强度事件的正性感受更低,出现平均效应,2个正性生活事件不如1个好;进一步研究发现:(2)当复合正性生活事件为异类时,出现平均效应;当事件为同类时,出现累加效应;(3)当复合正性生活事件有明显的时间特点时,个体加工符合峰-终定律的解释。     

Cookies,Disposition, and Job Attitudes: The Effects of Positive Mood-Inducing Events and Negative Affectivity on Job Satisfaction in a Field Experiment

Reasoning from findings in a variety of literatures, three hypotheses were advanced: (1) negative affectivity (NA), a disposition to experience aversive emotional states, is associated negatively with job satisfaction; (2) positive mood-inducing events at the time of questionnaire administration increases job satisfaction; and (3) NA and positive mood-inducing events interact such that the effects on job satisfaction of positive events are weaker among high NA individuals than it is among low NAs. Support was obtained for all three hypotheses among a sample of 57 hospital workers randomly assigned to attend on-site questionnaire administration sessions at which small gifts (e.g., cookies) were or were not distributed. Implications of the findings are discussed in terms of the need to broaden further theoretical perspectives on job satisfaction. More generally, they also are discussed in reference to the study of the effects of NA and mood on judgments.     

Depression, self-focused attention, and expectancies for positive and negative future life events for self and others

In two studies, we examined depressed and nondepressed persons' judgments of the probability of future positive and negative life events occurring to themselves and to others. Study 1 demonstrated that depressed subjects were generally less optimistic than their nondepressed counterparts: Although nondepressed subjects rated positive events as more likely to happen to themselves than negative events, depressed subjects did not. In addition, relative to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects rated positive events as less likely to occur to themselves and more likely to occur to others and negative events as more likely to occur to both self and others. Study 2 investigated the role that differential levels of self-focused attention might play in mediating these differences. On the basis of prior findings that depressed persons generally engage in higher levels of self-focus than nondepressed persons do and the notion that self-focus activates one's self-schema, we hypothesized that inducing depressed subjects to focus externally would attenuate their pessimistic tendencies. Data from Study 2 supported the hypothesis that high levels of self-focus partially mediate depressive pessimism: Whereas self-focused depressed subjects were more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects, externally focused depressed subjects were not. The role of attentional focus in maintaining these and other depressive pessimistic tendencies was discussed.