Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium: Comparing What with What,and in What Respect?

Comparison is fundamental to the practice and subject-matter of philosophy, but has received scant attention by philosophers. This is even so in “comparative philosophy,” which literally distinguishes itself from other philosophy by being “comparative.” In this article, the need for a philosophy of comparison is suggested. What we compare with what, and in what respect it is done, poses a series of intriguing and intricate questions. In Part One, I offer a problematization of the tertium comparationis (the third of comparison) by examining conceptualizations of similarity, family resemblance, and analogy, which it is sometimes argued can do without a tertium comparationis. In Part Two, I argue that a third of comparison is already required to determine what is to be compared, and insofar as that determination precedes the comparison that tertium may be called “pre-comparative.” This leads me to argue against incomparability and to show how anything can indeed be compared to anything. In Part Three, I relate my arguments to what is today commonly labelled “comparative philosophy.” Finally, I raise some questions of ontology and politics in order to demonstrate the relevance of a philosophy of comparison.     

Who,What, When,Where, How,and Mostly Why?

SUMMARY

The death of a client by suicide was very emotionally destabilizing to this therapist. She worked hard to distance herself personally from the pain at first and at the same time she found herself overfocused on the “psychological autopsy.” She had difficulty accepting new clients and wanted to withdraw from a meaningful appointment to a state advisory committee. Only when she was able to identify with the client's pain and realize how that pain touched her own history of loss was she able to grieve productively. She realized that gender was relevant in her identification with the victim and in sorting out each of their histories of loss.     

Exploring Traumas in the Development of Talent: What Are They,What Do They Do,and What Do They Require?

It has recently been argued that performers benefit from trauma (i.e., memorable challenges) during development. To deepen knowledge in this area, we explored perceived traumas in the development of 20 senior-international performers with a multimethods, temporal-based design. Results showed that perceived traumas were primarily sports based, recognized from onset of investment, associated with immediately negative but ultimately positive impact, and negotiated through skills that were brought to, rather than generated by, these experiences. The findings provide an interesting contrast to messages in other early trauma-focused research and promote focus on the process and mechanisms of responding to and recovering from traumatic experiences.     

What is manipulative behavior, anyway?

One of the most common ways of characterizing patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder is that they are manipulative. Clinical usage of the term varies widely but clearly carries a pejorative meaning. Furthermore, behaviors that look similar to those called manipulative in clinical contexts are not called manipulative in broader society. It is crucial to become clear on what manipulation is, because studies show that carers routinely perceive BPD patients as manipulative and so have less empathy for them. In this paper the concept of manipulativity is clarified and its scope narrowed by distinguishing it from a number of related concepts, and a number of reasons why manipulating others is morally objectionable are suggested. I argue that, while some BPD patients may be manipulative, much of their behavior can and should be understood in a different light. Moral and clinical values are conflated in carers' judgments of manipulativity, and clinicians and researchers need to clarify when and why manipulative behavior is dysfunctional, and when it is merely morally wrong. Separating these two domains will enable carers to be more empathetic and less blaming of their patients' behavior.     

If Folk Intuitions Vary,Then What?

We have recently presented evidence for cross‐cultural variation in semantic intuitions and explored the implications of such variation for philosophical arguments that appeal to some theory of reference as a premise. Devitt (2011) and Ichikawa and colleagues (forthcoming) offer critical discussions of the experiment and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. In this response, we reiterate and clarify what we are really arguing for, and we show that most of Devitt’s and Ichikawa and colleagues’ criticisms fail to address our concerns.     

What,After All,Is the Work of Culture?

This paper offers an overview of Joseph Margolis’s philosophy of culture, highlighting how Margolis’s radical historicism is not inconsistent with our realistic intuitions regrading facts and objectivity. While Margolis identifies interpretation as the work of culture, the paper suggests that a much more basic sense of human labor needs to be thematized more fully than Margolis does in any defensible account of culture. Margolis of course appreciates work in this sense, but he does not consistently make it integral to his conception of culture. Even so, what he so forcefully defends is, as one commentator has put it, “beautiful. It’s also erudite, elegant, and insightful (and frightfully, dialectically intricate).”     

Once Again,What Counts as Art?

Philosophia - The question of what art is and why certain objects and events are considered art is examined. In the light of John Searle’s Social Philosophy, a hybrid...     

Why,and to What Extent,Is Sexual Infidelity Wrong?

Sexual infidelity is widespread, but it is also widely condemned, yet relatively little philosophical work has been done on what makes it wrong and how wrong it is. In this paper, I argue that sexual infidelity is wrong if it involves breaking a commitment to be sexually exclusive, which has special significance in the relationship. However, it is not necessarily worse than other kinds of infidelity, and the context in which it takes place ought to be considered. I finish the paper by looking at how the hegemonic norm of monogamy makes infidelity both more likely and more difficult to deal with.     

Email, voicemail, and privacy: What policy is ethical?

Business people repeatedly asked Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) to recommend a policy to deal with email and voicemail. After many such requests to our organization, we attempted to construct guidelines that we could endorse. This paper outlines the guidelines that we proposed and the public reaction to them. The paper discusses the tensions inherent in a business environment, and the means of identifying ethical behavior for both companies and their employees. A version of this paper was presented at ETHICOMP98, the Fourth International Conference on Ethical Issues of Information Technology, March 25–27, 1998. Erasmus University, the Netherlands. Dr. Woodbury is the former Chair of CPRS. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. She is also a curriculum developer and faculty member of the Information Group of the Women’s International University (ifu) in Germany in 2000.     

Comparing What to What,on What Scale? The Impact of Item Comparisons and Reference Points in Communicating Risk and Uncertainty

The mandated public availability of individual hospital's audit data for children's heart surgery in the UK creates a challenging scenario for communicating these complex and sensitive data to diverse audiences. On the basis of this scenario, we conducted three experiments with the aim of understanding how best to help lay people understand these data and the practical goal of improving the public presentation of these data. The experiments compared different outcome measures for displaying the survival rate (percentage scale versus the ratio of the predicted/observed rates) and presentation formats (individual hospital versus all hospitals shown) for outcomes data presented relative to prediction intervals generated by a risk model that adjusts for case mix. Our data highlight how easily inappropriate comparisons can influence evaluations of complex data: for instance, both a survival ratio of 1 and the presence of other hospitals seemingly provided reference points that resulted in inappropriately harsh evaluations of some hospitals. By drawing on evaluability theory, we demonstrate how to enhance people's understanding of these complex data while also discouraging inappropriate comparisons, which has implications for communicating risk and uncertainty and for choice architecture design in a range of contexts. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What,why, and whence logic? A response to the commentators

This article presents our response to the four commentators. Specifically, the article aims to further justify the method we employed to show the logical autonomy of the various thought domains described by our theory, to explain the role of logic in cognitive development and to elaborate on the factors affecting its development.     

Surprise,defence, or making sense: What removes hindsight bias?

This paper examines predictions concerning the absence of hindsight bias. Some hypothesise that because hindsight bias increases with outcome "surprisingness", only unsurprising outcomes will remove it. Others suggest the opposite--that very surprising outcomes will reduce or reverse the bias. A proposed sense-making model suggests that unexpected outcomes (i.e., initially surprising) invoke greater sensemaking, which typically produces greater hindsight bias. If the process is not successful, however, the bias may be reduced or reversed. Expected outcomes will also produce little hindsight bias, but only because they invoke relatively little sensemaking in the first place. Feelings of surprise arising from sensemaking (i.e., resultant surprise) should be inversely related to hindsight bias. Results of four experiments provide support for the model. A secondary goal was to determine the boundaries of a defensive-processing mechanism also thought to reduce hindsight bias for negative, self-relevant outcomes. Results suggest that a sense of responsibility for the outcome may be necessary for defensive processing to be activated.     

Awareness of Infants: What Do They,and We,Seek?

I study the biological foundations of human cultural intelligence, and how they are supported. I observe the development of human motives for agency, the emotions that evaluate what is discovered, and the ways interests and discoveries and feelings may be shared with others. Ed Tronick and I have been privileged to study infants closely over several decades in which ideas of the dynamic powers of the human mind have been transformed, principally by recording how infants act in intimate companionship with their mothers in the first year or two. Here I try to clarify the ways we have, for different purposes and in different environments, taken complementary routes to understanding the meaning of infant life. His responsibilities are clinical and occupied with supporting the mental health of both the infant and the mother, and the building of a strong affectionate trust for life with others. My task has been trying to understand the subtle creativity and aesthetic and moral principles that animate a widening circle of relationships for a child, and that lead to cultural learning that is rich and playful. Ed and I are lucky to be discovering what every infant wants, and privileged to be supporting pride in good company, while striving to guard against causes of despair and shame in young children and their families.