The Relevance of Decision Theory to Ethical Theory

Morality for the purposes of this paper consists of sets of rules or principles intended for the general regulation of conduct for all. Intuitionist accounts of morality are rejected as making reasoned analysis of morals impossible. In many interactions, there is partial conflict and partial cooperation. From the general social point of view, the rational thing to propose is that we steer clear of conflict and promote cooperation. This is what it is rational to propose to reinforce, and to assist in reinforcing in society; it is not necessarily what it is individually rational to do. Even so, given the general situation, the rationality of its reinforcement will typically support the rationality of individual action as well. Game theory makes it possible to clarify these interactions, and these proposals for social solutions.     

Game Theory and Rational Decision

In its classical conception, game theory aspires to be a determinate decision theory for games, understood as elements of a structurally specified domain. Its aim is to determine for each game in the domain a complete solution to each player's decision problem, a solution valid for all real-world instantiations, regardless of context. “Permissiveness” would constrain the theory to designate as admissible for a player any conjecture consistent with the function's designation of admissible strategies for the other players. Given permissiveness and other appropriate constraints, solution sets must contain only Nash equilibria and at least one pure-strategy equilibrium, and there is no solution to games in which no symmetry invariant set of pure-strategy equilibria forms a Cartesian product. These results imply that the classical program is unrealizable. Moreover, the program is implicitly committed to permissiveness, through its common-knowledge assumptions and its commitment to equilibrium. The resulting incoherence deeply undermines the classical conception in a way that consolidates a long series of contextualist criticisms. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A Peircean Theory of Decision

It is sometimes argued that the fact that possession of perfect knowledge about the future is impossible, means that it is impossible for decisions to be rational. This reasoning is fallacious. If rationality is given a new interpretation, then decisions can be considered rational. A theory of decision that has as its basis Peirce’s theory of abduction can provide a new way of understanding decisions as rational processes. The Peircean theory of decision (i) considers decisions as part of a complete strategy, and (ii) shows that decision making is governed by the same rules as scientific abduction. These rules are neither permissive rules like rules of deductive inference nor predictive like laws of nature, but rather genuine laws of conduct that determine what step should be made, if a given end is to be reached. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Causal Decision Theory and EPR correlations

The paper argues that on three out of eight possible hypotheses about the EPR experiment we can construct novel and realistic decision problems on which (a) Causal Decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory conflict (b) Causal Decision Theory and the EPR statistics conflict. We infer that anyone who fully accepts any of these three hypotheses has strong reasons to reject Causal Decision Theory. Finally, we extend the original construction to show that anyone who gives any of the three hypotheses any non-zero credence has strong reasons to reject Causal Decision Theory. However, we concede that no version of the Many Worlds Interpretation (Vaidman, in Zalta, E.N. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2014) gives rise to the conflicts that we point out.     

Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory

This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its biggest current problem – the medical Newcomb problems – don’t work. The latest approach is described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it – Huw Price and CR Hitchcock – clearly distinguished and examined. It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential to understanding means-end agency.     

Corrected item-test correlations

Previous papers on this subject derive the correlation between an item and the remainder of the test. This correlation is unsatisfactory because the reliability of the remainder varies inversely with the reliability of the item omitted. The present paper derives the correlation between an item and the total test, with that item replaced by a rationally equivalent item. The general formula is then modified, for dichotomus items, to give the corrected point-biserial, biserial, and Brogden biserial correlations. The results apply strictly only to factorially homogeneous tests: those in which the same trait or combination of traits is measured (apart from error) by every item.     

Convex MV-Algebras: Many-Valued Logics Meet Decision Theory

This paper introduces a logical analysis of convex combinations within the framework of ?ukasiewicz real-valued logic. This provides a natural link between the fields of many-valued logics and decision theory under uncertainty, where the notion of convexity plays a central role. We set out to explore such a link by defining convex operators on MV-algebras, which are the equivalent algebraic semantics of ?ukasiewicz logic. This gives us a formal language to reason about the expected value of bounded random variables. As an illustration of the applicability of our framework we present a logical version of the Anscombe–Aumann representation result.     

行为决策理论之父：纪念Edwards教授2周年忌辰

著名心理学家W ard Edwards对行为决策的学科形成与理论发展作出了巨大贡献。文章简要介绍了Edwards的生平,以主观期望效用模型和贝叶斯决策为核心回顾了Edwards的决策理论、主要成就及其对行为决策研究的学术贡献。文章并从行为决策领域的研究、科普、应用及人才培养等方面总结了中国行为决策研究的发展历程,以及Edwards的学术思想对中国行为决策研究的主要影响。文章展望了行为决策研究的前景,并呼吁更多的中国心理学工作者投身于行为决策研究。     

Decision Theory and the Sale of Alcohol1

Two studies examined the role of representativeness in determining the legal age of customers seeking to purchase alcohol. In Study 1, subjects were presented with a series of common grocery products along with an alcoholic beverage and a shopper. Results indicated that products which cued an older consumer produced higher age estimates of the shopper and decreased the likelihood that they would be asked to provide proof of legal age. Study 2 extended these findings in two important ways: (a) The target was presented as either a college student or parent and (b) individual differences in self-consciousness were related to susceptibility to manipulations of representativeness. Results indicated that the parent/student manipulation affected both the decision to request identification and age estimates of the target. Age estimations were positively related to individual differences in public self-consciousness, whereas the decision to request identification depended upon individual levels of social anxiety and private self-consciousness. Implications of these data for restricting access to alcohol among minors are considered.     

The Harmful Influence of Decision Theory on Ethics

In the last half century, decision theory has had a deep influence on moral theory. Its impact has largely been beneficial. However, it has also given rise to some problems, two of which are discussed here. First, issues such as risk-taking and risk imposition have been left out of ethics since they are believed to belong to decision theory, and consequently the ethical aspects of these issues have not been treated in either discipline. Secondly, ethics has adopted the decision-theoretical idea that action-guidance has to be based on cause–effect or means–ends relationships between an individual action and its possible outcomes. This is problematic since the morally relevant connections between an action and future events are not fully covered by such relationships. In response to the first problem it is proposed that moral theory should deal directly and extensively with issues such as risk-taking and risk imposition, thereby intruding unabashedly into the traditional territory of decision theory. As a partial response to the second problem it is proposed that moral theorizing should release itself from the decision-theoretical requirement that the moral status of an action has to be derivable from the consequences (or other properties) that are assignable to that action alone. In particular, the effects that an action can have in combination with other actions by the same or other agents are valid arguments in an action-guiding moral discourse, even if its contribution to these combined consequences cannot be isolated and evaluated separately.     

Standard Quantification Theory in the Analysis of English

Standard first-order logic plus quantifiers of all finite orders (SFOL) faces four well-known difficulties when used to characterize the behavior of certain English quantifier phrases. All four difficulties seem to stem from the typed structure of SFOL models. The typed structure of SFOL models is in turn a product of an asymmetry between the meaning of names and the meaning of predicates, the element-set asymmetry. In this paper we examine a class of models in which this asymmetry of meaning is removed. The models of this class permit definitions of the quantifiers which allow a desirable flexibility in fixing the domain of quantification. Certain SFOL type restrictions are thereby avoided. The resulting models of English validate all of the standard first-order logical truths and are free of the four deficiencies of SFOL models.     

A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory With Conditionals

This paper investigates the role of conditionals in hypothetical reasoning and rational decision making. Its main result is a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences), where an agent’s preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed by the former. The theorem shows that a rational preference ordering of conditional sentences determines probability and desirability representations of the agent’s degrees of belief and desire that satisfy, in the case of non-conditional sentences, the axioms of Jeffrey’s decision theory and, in the case of conditional sentences, Adams’ expression for the probabilities of conditionals. Furthermore, the probability representation is shown to be unique and the desirability representation unique up to positive linear transformation. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Decision Making in Vocational Theory: Evolution and Implications

This article examines the evolution of decision making from a position of minor significance to one of primary importance in vocational theory.     

The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making

Central to Alex George's work was a concern with the psychology of presidential decision making. Our analysis focuses on George's work at the intersection of leadership psychology and the psychology of judgment in the making of consequential foreign policy decisions, specifically those dealing with issues of war and peace. We begin with a review of the fundamental dilemmas of political decision making, focusing on the various factors that present challenges to leaders seeking to make high-quality decisions. We then move to an analysis of the nature of judgment and the ways in which it both shapes and is shaped by cognitive dynamics and conclude by examining a number of steps designed to help leaders avoid the most damaging blind spots of their own psychologies and cognitive biases.