What is the connection between true and false memories? The differential roles of interitem associations in recall and recognition.

Veridical memory for presented list words and false memory for nonpresented but related items were tested using the Deese/Roediger and McDermott paradigm. The strength and density of preexisting connections among the list words, and from the list words to the critical items, were manipulated. The likelihood of producing false memories in free recall varied with the strength of connections from the list words to the critical items but was inversely related to the density of the interconnections among the list words. In contrast, veridical recall of list words was positively related to the density of the interconnections. A final recognition test showed that both false and veridical memories were more likely when the list words were more densely interconnected. The results are discussed in terms of an associative model of memory, Processing Implicit and Explicit Representations (PIER 2) that describes the influence of implicitly activated preexisting information on memory performance.     

Are nonconscious processes sufficient to produce false memories?

Seamon, Luo, and Gallo (1998) reported evidence that nonconscious processes could produce false recognition in a converging-associates task, whereby subjects falsely remember a nonstudied lure (e.g., sleep) after studying a list of related words (bed, rest, awake...). Zeelenberg, Plomp, and Raaijmakers (2003) failed to observe this false recognition effect when list word recognition was at chance. We critically evaluate the evidence for nonsconscious processing and report the results of a new experiment designed to overcome previous methodological limitations. Consistent with Seamon et al., we found that conscious activation of a related lure during study was not necessary for its subsequent recognition; consistent with Zeelenberg et al., we found no evidence for recognition of related lures under conditions where there was no memory for studied words. It is currently unknown whether conscious recollection of the studied items is necessary for false recognition or if nonconscious activation of the lure is sufficient.     

Are children more accurate than adults? Spontaneous use of metaphor by children and adults

This study examined an observation in which children outscored adults on a series of test questions, which included unusual items such as, "Do you see with your ears?" We assumed that the adults were treating the questions metaphorically because the literally correct answer was so obvious, an assumption consistent with Grice's theory. In Study 1, we tested this assumption by manipulating pretest and test items so as to suggest, or not suggest, a metaphorical or factual response. In Study 2, we used a similar manipulation involving the order of questions of various sorts and we more directly tested the Gricean hypothesis by giving college students a reason to treat the question literally. The results replicated the previous finding in which college students' scores were lower than those of children, and the condition effects suggested that the college students' performance was due to their responding metaphorically.     

You say tomato? Collaborative remembering leads to more false memories for intimate couples than for strangers

Research on memory conformity shows that collaborative remembering--typically in the form of discussion--can influence people's memories. One question that remains is whether it matters with whom we discuss our memories. To address this question we compared people's memories for an event after they discussed that event with either their romantic partner or a stranger. Pairs of subjects watched slightly different versions of a movie, and then discussed some details from the movie, but not others. Subjects were better at remembering non-discussed details than discussed details: when remembering discussed details they incorrectly reported information from their partner's version instead of their own. In addition, subjects who discussed the event with their romantic partner (rather than with a stranger) were even more likely to report false memories. We discuss our findings in relation to other research on memory conformity, social influences on false memories, and memory systems within romantic relationships.     

Do children need to learn to collaborate?: The effect of age and age differences on collaborative recall

We used a collaborative recall task to explore the nature and consequences of children's interaction with another child at the same or different age. Ninety-six children memorised word lists for recall. In a first condition children recalled collaboratively: in a pair with another child. In a second condition children recalled words independently (this made possible the creation of “nominal” pairs for comparison). Pairs were either composed of two 7-year-olds, two 9-year-olds, or a 7- and a 9-year-old. Older pairs, like adults, showed a net negative effect of collaborative recall. However, younger children showed no effects of collaboration. Analyses of the different contributions offered by each child in a pair, and of measures of social dominance suggest that older children dominate social aspects of interaction and recall when paired with a younger child. We argue that younger children may lack full awareness of the role of interaction as a forum for the co-construction of knowledge.     

How similar is false recognition to veridical recognition objectively and subjectively?

Three recognition memory experiments were conducted using modified Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) and DRM paradigms. In Experiment 1, the reaction time (RT) of the false alarms to critical nonpresented words (false memory) was compared with the RT of hits to the critical presented words and with the RT of hits to the studied list words (true memory). The RT of the false alarms to the critical nonpresented words was significantly longer than that of the hits to the critical words and than that of the studied list words. In Experiment 2, in addition to RT, participants' confidence level was measured on a 4-point scale for a yes or no response. Confidence rating was significantly higher for the hits to the critical presented words and to the list words than for the false alarms to the critical non-presented words. Experiment 3 further showed that how similar false memory experience was to that of true memory was a function of retention size (number of lists of words retained in memory). In all three experiments, the participants' recognition RTs distinguished false memory from veridical memory, and in Experiments 2 and 3, so did their confidence ratings. Therefore, false memory and veridical memory differ at both the objective and the subjective levels. The results are consistent with a single familiarity dimension model of recognition memory.     

Semantic contribution to verbal short-term memory: Are pleasant words easier to remember than neutral words in serial recall and serial recognition?

In the four experiments reported here, we examined the role of word pleasantness on immediate serial recall and immediate serial recognition. In Experiment 1, we compared verbal serial recall of pleasant and neutral words, using a limited set of items. In Experiment 2, we replicated Experiment 1 with an open set of words (i.e., new items were used on every trial). In Experiments 3 and 4, we assessed immediate serial recognition of pleasant and neutral words, using item sets from Experiments 1 and 2. Pleasantness was found to have a facilitation effect on both immediate serial recall and immediate serial recognition. This study supplies some new supporting arguments in favor of a semantic contribution to verbal short-term memory performance. The pleasantness effect observed in immediate serial recognition showed that, contrary to a number of earlier findings, performance on this task can also turn out to be dependent on semantic factors. The results are discussed in relation to nonlinguistic and psycholinguistic models of short-term memory.     

Get the gist? The effects of processing depth on false recognition in short-term and long-term memory

Gist-based processing has been proposed to account for robust false memories in the converging-associates task. The deep-encoding processes known to enhance verbatim memory also strengthen gist memory and increase distortions of long-term memory (LTM). Recent research has demonstrated that compelling false memory illusions are relatively delay-invariant, also occurring under canonical short-term memory (STM) conditions. To investigate the contributions of gist to false memory at short and long delays, processing depth was manipulated as participants encoded lists of four semantically related words and were probed immediately, following a filled 3- to 4-s retention interval, or approximately 20 min later, in a surprise recognition test. In two experiments, the encoding manipulation dissociated STM and LTM on the frequency, but not the phenomenology, of false memory. Deep encoding at STM increases false recognition rates at LTM, but confidence ratings and remember/know judgments are similar across delays and do not differ as a function of processing depth. These results suggest that some shared and some unique processes underlie false memory illusions at short and long delays.     

Who exhibits more stereotypical thinking? The effect of need and ability to achieve cognitive structure on stereotyping

Need for cognitive structure (NCS) could affect stereotypical thinking. In the present paper, it is suggested that the effect of NCS on stereotyping is moderated by the ability to achieve cognitive structure (AACS). NCS is defined as the preference to use cognitive structuring (versus piecemeal processing) as a way to achieve certainty. AACS is defined as the extent to which individuals are able to use information processing processes (cognitive structuring or piecemeal) consistent with their level of NCS. Two studies were conducted to examine this hypothesis. The first examined the effect of NCS and AACS on negative stereotypes held by Israelis towards Palestinians. The second examined the effect of NCS and AACS on perceived in‐group (psychology students) and out‐group (engineering students) variability. Results of both studies showed that for high‐AACS participants, higher NCS was associated with greater stereotypical thinking, whereas for low‐AACS participants, higher NCS was associated with less stereotyping. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does sex sell? The effect of sexual programme content on the recall of sexual and non-sexual advertisements

This study looked at the recall of sexual and non‐sexual television advertisements embedded within programmes, with or without, sexual content. It was predicted that there would be a detrimental effect of sexual programme content, and a beneficial effect of sexual advertisement content on ability to recall advertisements. Further, when programme and advertisement content were congruous (i.e. both sexual), this also would hinder recall. Participants aged between 18 and 31 were placed in one of four conditions and were shown either ‘Sex and the City’ (sexual programme) or ‘Malcolm in the Middle’ (non‐sexual programme) with sexual or non‐sexual advertisements embedded in each. Participants were then asked to recall advertisement details from the advertisements. The results indicated that there was a main effect of programme type, demonstrating that sexual programme content hindered recall of advertisements. However, there was no main effect of the type of advertisements seen (sexual or non‐sexual) on recall, nor was there a negative effect on recall when programme and advertisement content were congruous. An interaction between advertisements and sex of participants showed that males recalled sexual advertisements better and females recalled non‐sexual advertisements better. Limitations of the study are considered. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are Asians forgetful? Perception, retention, and recall in episodic remembering

Cross-cultural studies have shown that Asians exhibit less accessibility to episodic memories than Euro-Americans. This difference is often attributed to differential cognitive and social influences on memory retention, although there have been no empirical data concerning the underlying mechanism. Three studies were conducted to examine encoding and retention processes that may underlie the cultural difference in episodic recall. While Asians recalled fewer personal event episodes than Euro-Americans across different retention intervals, the two groups showed similar forgetting functions over time (Study 1). Asians also recalled fewer episodes of fictional events than Euro-Americans when the retention interval was kept to a minimum (Study 2). Finally, Asians perceived fewer discrete episodes than Euro-Americans when reading events in a narrative text (Study 3). Collectively, these findings suggest that the cultural difference in episodic recall may not be a mere consequence of memory retention but culture-specific perceptual processing and encoding. They have great theoretical, developmental, and clinical relevance.     

Are two heuristics better than one? The fluency and distinctiveness heuristics in recognition memory

Four experiments were conducted to test the impact of having multiple heuristics (distinctiveness and fluency) available during a recognition test. Recent work by Gallo, Perlmutter, Moore, and Schacter (Memory & Cognition 36:461–466, 2008) suggested that fluency effects are reduced when the distinctiveness heuristic can be applied to a recognition decision. In Experiment 1, we used a response reversal paradigm (Van Zandt & Maldonado-Molina Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 30:1147–1166, 2004) to demonstrate that participants transitioned from an early response strategy that was largely reliant on fluency to a later strategy in which the influences of fluency and distinctiveness were both observable. Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3 showed no evidence for reduction of the fluency heuristic after picture study when the test required a delayed response (Exp. 2a), confidence ratings (Exp. 2b), or the application of conceptual fluency (Exp. 3). The results are consistent with models of memory that assume that familiarity and recollection influence individual memory decisions Wixted (Psychological Review, 114:152–176, 2007).     

Are written and spoken recall of text equivalent?

Writing is less practiced than speaking, graphemic codes are activated only in writing, and the retrieved representations of the text must be maintained in working memory longer because handwritten output is slower than speech. These extra demands on working memory could result in less effort being given to retrieval during written compared with spoken text recall. To test this hypothesis, college students read or heard Bartlett's "War of the Ghosts" and then recalled the text in writing or speech. Spoken recall produced more accurately recalled propositions and more major distortions (e.g., inferences) than written recall. The results suggest that writing reduces the retrieval effort given to reconstructing the propositions of a text.     

Underestimation of prior remembering and susceptibility to false memories: two sides of the same coin?

In two studies, we explored whether susceptibility to false memories and the underestimation of prior memories (i.e., forgot-it-all-along effect) tap overlapping memory phenomena. Study 1 investigated this issue by administering the Deese/Roediger–McDermott task (DRM) and the forgot-it-all-along (FIA) task to an undergraduate sample (N = 110). It was furthermore explored how performances on these tasks correlate with clinically relevant traits such as fantasy proneness, dissociative experiences, and cognitive efficiency. Results show that FIA and DRM performances are relatively independent from each other, suggesting that these measures empirically apparently refer to separate dimensions. However, they do not seem to define different profiles in terms of dissociation, fantasy proneness, and cognitive efficiency. Study 2 replicated the finding of relative independence between false memory propensity (as measured with the DRM task) and the underestimation of prior memories (as measured with an autobiographical memory dating task) in people with a history of childhood sexual abuse (N = 35).     

Are two spaces better than one? The effect of spacing following periods and commas during reading

The most recent edition of the American Psychological Association (APA) Manual states that two spaces should follow the punctuation at the end of a sentence. This is in contrast to the one-space requirement from previous editions. However, to date, there has been no empirical support for either convention. In the current study, participants performed (1) a typing task to assess spacing usage and (2) an eye-tracking experiment to assess the effect that punctuation spacing has on reading performance. Although comprehension was not affected by punctuation spacing, the eye movement record suggested that initial processing of the text was facilitated when periods were followed by two spaces, supporting the change made to the APA Manual. Individuals’ typing usage also influenced these effects such that those who use two spaces following a period showed the greatest overall facilitation from reading with two spaces.     

The origin of children's implanted false memories: Memory traces or compliance?

A longstanding question in false memory research is whether children's implanted false memories represent actual memory traces or merely result from compliance. The current study examined this question using a response latency based deception task. Forty-five 8-year-old children received narratives about a true (first day at school) and false event (hot air balloon ride). Across two interviews, 58/32% of the participants developed a partial/full false memory. Interestingly, these children also showed higher false recall on an unrelated DRM paradigm compared to children without a false memory. The crucial finding, however, was that the results of the deception task revealed that children with partial and full false memories were faster to confirm than to deny statements relating to the false event. This indicates that children's implanted false memories reflect actual memory traces, and are unlikely to be explained by mere compliance.     

Are some first dates easier to read than others? The role of target well-being in distinctively accurate first impressions

Some people are open books, with their distinctive personalities being accurately perceived after a brief interaction, whereas others are harder to read. Such open books have in turn been found to have greater well-being, at least within lower-stakes, platonic getting-acquainted interactions. Do individual differences in expressive accuracy emerge in higher-stakes settings, such as first dates, and are people higher in well-being still easier to read? Using a speed-dating paradigm (N = 372; N_dyads = 4723), accuracy on average was significant but relatively low. Nevertheless, strong individual differences in expressive accuracy emerged and were associated with well-being. In sum, although it may be more difficult to form accurate impressions on first dates, targets higher in well-being may make the task easier.     

How accurate are time-use reports? Effects of cognitive enhancement and cultural differences on recall accuracy

In order to assess the accuracy of time-use reports, 80 young adults were observed for 2-hour periods, and were interviewed about their activities by a different person the following day. Two experiments were performed. In the first, three different levels of cognitive enhancement were used to improve recall accuracy. Subjects were 60 California college students, 20 per group. In the second study the maximum enhancement condition was replicated with 20 Guatemalan subjects, similar in age, sex and level of education to the California subjects. Both the accuracy of their recall of specific activities, and the accuracy of their time-duration estimates were calculated. Results indicated that the enhancement conditions in Study 1 significantly increased both the number of activities recalled accurately (from 40 to 63 per cent) and the amount of time accurately recalled (from 58 to 70 per cent). In Study 2 the Guatemalans recalled 60 per cent of their activities accurately, and recalled as much time accurately as the Californians. The Guatemalans were significantly more likely to underestimate their time. In other words, when they made errors, these were almost always underestimations. Most of the recall error could be accounted for by forgetting an activity altogether, rather than by estimating its time inaccurately.     

Imagination and memory: Does imagining implausible events lead to false autobiographical memories?

Previous studies have reported that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories. This finding has been used to suggest that psychotherapists who have clients imagine suspected repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse may, in fact, be inducing false memories for the imagined events. In this study, at Time 1 and then, 2 weeks later, at Time 2, 145 subjects rated each of 20 events on the Life Events Inventory as to whether each had occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, the subjects were told that 2 target events were plausible and 2 were implausible. They were then asked to imagine 1 plausible and 1 implausible target event. Plausibility and imagining interacted to affect occurrence ratings; whereas imagining plausible events increased the change in occurrence ratings, imagining implausible events had no effect on occurrence ratings.     

Are forward and backward recall the same? A dual-task study of digit recall

There is some debate surrounding the cognitive resources underlying backward digit recall. Some researchers consider it to differ from forward digit recall due to the involvement of executive control, while others suggest that backward recall involves visuospatial resources. Five experiments therefore investigated the role of executive-attentional and visuospatial resources in both forward and backward digit recall. In the first, participants completed visuospatial 0-back and 2-back tasks during the encoding of information to be remembered. The concurrent tasks did not differentially disrupt performance on backward digit recall, relative to forward digit recall. Experiment 2 shifted concurrent load to the recall phase instead and, in this case, revealed a larger effect of both tasks on backward recall, relative to forwards recall, suggesting that backward recall may draw on additional resources during the recall phase and that these resources are visuospatial in nature. Experiments 3 and 4 then further investigated the role of visual processes in forward and backward recall using dynamic visual noise (DVN). In Experiment 3, DVN was presented during encoding of information to be remembered and had no effect upon performance. However, in Experiment 4, it was presented during the recall phase, and the results provided evidence of a role for visual imagery in backward digit recall. These results were replicated in Experiment 5, in which the same list length was used for forward and backward recall tasks. The findings are discussed in terms of both theoretical and practical implications.