The Substantive Impact of Computers on Philosophy Prolegomena to a Computational and Information-Theoretic Metaphysics

I survey in this article the practical uses of computers in philosophy: except for logic, computers have not yet noticeably improved the quality of philosophizing, research, or pedagogy. They have made work easier. My main interest, however, is in the "substantive" impact that computers may have on philosophical problems, especially in metaphysics. I argue that logic, the notion of decidability, and the theory of computation all predated and did not require modern digital computers. In the philosophy of mind, there has been a persistent conflation of computationalism and physicalism. The two theses can and should be separated. Finally, I suggest that we see glimpses of a new metaphysics based on information and information transformations that goes far beyond the well-trodden mind-brain debates.     

类比推理的认知过程与计算模型

该文主要论述了类比推理的认知过程及其计算模型。文章对类比推理的概念进行了分析,论述了类比推理的主要成分和认知过程,并进一步围绕类比推理的重要成分介绍了当前类比推理的主要实证研究及研究成果,在此基础上文章进一步概括了类比推理的主要计算模型。     

Metaphysics Within Science: Against Radical Naturalism

In Every Thing Must Go James Ladyman and Don Ross argue for a radical version of naturalistic metaphysics and propose that contemporary analytic metaphysics is detached from science and should be discontinued. The present article addresses the issues of whether (i) science and metaphysics are separable, (ii) intuitions and understanding should be excluded from scientific theory, and (iii) Ontic Structural Realism satisfies the criteria of the radical version of naturalism advanced by Ladyman and Ross. The point underlying those topics is that successful scientific research presupposes metaphysics, and that basic epistemic virtues common to metaphysics and science may allow us—as opposed to what Ladyman and Ross suggest—to increase our understanding of the world and to put constraints on allowable metaphysical theories.     

Finding Missing Proofs with Automated Reasoning

This article features long-sought proofs with intriguing properties (such as the absence of double negation and the avoidance of lemmas that appeared to be indispensable), and it features the automated methods for finding them. The theorems of concern are taken from various areas of logic that include two-valued sentential (or propositional) calculus and infinite-valued sentential calculus. Many of the proofs (in effect) answer questions that had remained open for decades, questions focusing on axiomatic proofs. The approaches we take are of added interest in that all rely heavily on the use of a single program that offers logical reasoning, William McCune's automated reasoning program OTTER. The nature of the successes and approaches suggests that this program offers researchers a valuable automated assistant. This article has three main components. First, in view of the interdisciplinary nature of the audience, we discuss the means for using the program in question (OTTER), which flags, parameters, and lists have which effects, and how the proofs it finds are easily read. Second, because of the variety of proofs that we have found and their significance, we discuss them in a manner that permits comparison with the literature. Among those proofs, we offer a proof shorter than that given by Meredith and Prior in their treatment of ukasiewicz's shortest single axiom for the implicational fragment of two-valued sentential calculus, and we offer a proof for the ukasiewicz 23-letter single axiom for the full calculus. Third, with the intent of producing a fruitful dialogue, we pose questions concerning the properties of proofs and, even more pressing, invite questions similar to those this article answers.     

Steps Toward a Science of Free Will

A conceptual confusion might lie at the heart of the free will-determinism controversy. Reconceptualizing the issue by positing two independent bipolar dimensions (determinism versus nondeterminism and self-determination versus nonagentic mechanism), instead of the single free will versus determinism dimension, seems to create the conceptual space for belief in both free will and determinism. A number of recent agentic theories of human action, and a growing body of research with humans, suggest the joint action of agentic self-determination and nonagentic causation in the genesis of human behavior. Implications for counselors are offered.     

Unity,Plurality, and Hylomorphic Composition in Aristotle's Metaphysics

How should we understand the relationship, for Aristotle, between matter, form, and hylomorphic composite? Are matter and form distinct from each other, so that each hylomorphic unity harbours a plurality within it, or would such a plurality undermine the unity of the composite? A recent strand of argument in both Aristotelian and contemporary literature on hylomorphism has concluded that no genuine unity can be composed of a plurality. I will argue that the objection motivating this conclusion falls away as improperly formulated in light of Aristotle's metaontology—in particular, his thesis that unity (and therefore also plurality) is indeterminate. The genuine objection threatening hylomorphic unity is one that Aristotle himself formulates as a central concern in his Metaphysics: no substance can be composed of substances. He answers this genuine objection in his appeal to the actuality/potentiality distinction, and in Metaphysics VIII.6 he reminds us why no more basic problem of hylomorphic unity arises. Against the backdrop of Aristotle's metaontology, hylomorphic unity cannot be undermined by the plurality, just as such, of matter and form.     

Ontology and Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy

This paper begins with a critique of the uses of the term "bentilun 體論 (ontology)" in modem Chinese scholarship by tracing their claim to being theoretical paradigms for understanding Chinese philosophy as a philosophical tradition.It is supplemented by a contrastive discussion of bentilun and its original ancient Greek counterpart,i.e.ontology,to show that the object of discourse in bentilun does not match up with that of ontology,namely "being qua being." This comparative study also demonstrates that bentilun finds its philosophical significance in connection with the theory of xinxing心性(heart-mind).In the second section of this paper,a comparative study of "xingershangxue形而上學 (metaphysics)" and "metaphysics" highlights the central tenet that the dao essentially transcends language.Daoist philosophy is used as an example that identifies a unique predilection toward philosophical concepts that transcend the realm of nameable thoughts and objects in Chinese philosophy.Textual evidence is provided to show that the conceptual possibility of xingershangxue is based upon a fundamental difference between you (being) and wu無 (not-being),in a way that is similar to philosophical developments in other early civilizations.Nonetheless,in addition to a philosophical interest in principles and values that transcend the material world,Daoist xingershangxue exhibits an idiosyncratic attention to notions and theories whose object of discourse is essentially unnameable.This characteristic philosophical interest is identified with the aim of locating essential disciplines within Chinese philosophy,including the theory of xinxing,practical wisdom,and the theory of jingjie境界 (state-of-attainment) in a wider framework of east and west philosophical traditions.     

回到道德现象本身——康德道德形而上学的论证方法初探

在康德理性的道德形而上学的建构过程中,两种论证方法即分析法和综合法起到了重要的作用。他首先用分析法从普通人的相互混杂的道德认识中逐步分离出纯粹的道德现象和原则,力图给真正的道德哲学奠基。随后他又用综合法来论证道德律的实在性并使它在经验世界中能得到现实的应用,以说明纯粹的道德原则并非人的主观臆造。两种方法相互依赖,相辅相成,共同支撑起道德形而上学的大厦。     

Rorty's Debt to Sellarsian Metaphysics

Rorty regards himself as furthering the project of the Enlightenment by separating Enlightenment liberalism from Enlightenment rationalism. To do so, he rejects the very need for explicit metaphysical theorizing. Yet his commitments to naturalism, nominalism, and the irreducibility of the normative come from the metaphysics of Wilfrid Sellars. Rorty's debt to Sellars is concealed by his use of Davidsonian arguments against the scheme/content distinction and the nonsemantic concept of truth. The Davidsonian arguments are used for Deweyan ends: to advance secularization and anti‐authoritarianism. However, Rorty's conflation of theology and metaphysics conceals the possibility of post‐theological metaphysics. The key distinction lies between “metaphysics” and “Metaphysics.” The former provisionally models the relations between different vocabularies; the latter continues theology by other means. Sellars shows how to do metaphysics without Metaphysics. This approach complements Rorty's prioritization of cultural politics over ontology and his vision of Enlightenment liberalism without Enlightenment rationalism.     

Metaphysics, Reductivism, and Spiritual Discourse

Although significant revival of talk of the spiritual and spirituality has been a striking feature of recent public debate about wider social and moral values in contemporary Western liberal-democratic polities, it seems worth asking whether there might be any substantial philosophical basis for such renewal. On the face of it, any meaningful discourse about spirituality seems caught between the rock of an antiquated mind-body dualism—now widely regarded (some notable contemporary pockets of resistance aside) as implausible—and the hard place of a scientific physicalism that offers little harbor for irreducible spiritual entities. The present essay explores two possibilities of escape from this dilemma in the shape of eliminative dualism and noneliminative monism and argues for the conceptual advantages of the second over the first of these possibilities.     

《易经》:早期儒家的形上学与意识进化学

相关资料初步表明,在中国古代,客观地把握人性及人与宇宙交互作用的自觉与努力业已发生。本文试图阐明《易经》的思维理路,借此思维理路,《易经》不仅塑造和影响了早期儒家形上学,而且也塑造和影响了诸如意识研究,尤其是意识学之类的当代研究领域。《易经》的发展及其在西方的传播,正说明了这一点。意识学研究人性,思考存在的其他领域。在这些方面,意识学与《周易》是相通的。将意识学同中国古代思想相比较可以看出,我们现在所研究的意识学在中国古代思想中早已有之。基于这一历史事实,我们有必要在意识学的起始处研究意识学。在意识学研究中,意识进化学是一个不可或缺的、必须进行研究的内容。我们可以通过《易经》来探索意识的进化。     

The Virtues of Metaphysics: A Review of Iris Murdoch's Philosophical Writings

Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy has long influenced contemporary ethics, yet it has not, in general, received the kind of sustained critical attention that it deserves. Existentialists and Mystics and Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals provide new access to most of Murdoch's philosophical writings and make possible a deeper appreciation of her contribution to current thought. After assessing the recent critical reception of Murdoch's thought, this review places her moral philosophy in the context of contemporary trends in ethics by tracing her influence on the work of Charles Taylor, highlights the distinctive features of her moral philosophy (especially her analysis of consciousness), and suggests future directions for Murdochian ethics.     

The Virtues of Metaphysics: A Review of Iris Murdoch's Philosophical Writings

Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy has long influenced contemporary ethics, yet it has not, in general, received the kind of sustained critical attention that it deserves. Existentialists and Mystics and Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals provide new access to most of Murdoch's philosophical writings and make possible a deeper appreciation of her contribution to current thought. After assessing the recent critical reception of Murdoch's thought, this review places her moral philosophy in the context of contemporary trends in ethics by tracing her influence on the work of Charles Taylor, highlights the distinctive features of her moral philosophy (especially her analysis of consciousness), and suggests future directions for Murdochian ethics.     

Metaphysics in China and in the West: Common Origin and Later Divergence

There are two tendencies in the arguments of the legitimacy of metaphysics in ancient China: the tendency to argue that there was no metaphysics in ancient China and the tendency to argue that ancient Chinese metaphysics is totally different from that of the West. In this article, the author counters these tendencies and argues that Chinese and western metaphysics both originated from a dynamic cosmology and shared objects of investigation and characteristics of thinking in terms of Becoming. However, in their later development, due to the difference in the problems of their focus, traditions of “moral metaphysics” and “(natural) metaphysics of Being” were formed in China and in the West, respectively. The author also explores the reasons for the rise of modern science in the West and its lack of progress in China. Translated from Shehui Kexue Zhanxian, 2005:3     

Minimizing Arbitrariness: Toward a Metaphysics of Infinitely Many Isolated Concrete Worlds

A particular fact or event often appears arbitrary and puzzling, until it is exhibited as the outcome of certain causal processes. Usually, though not always, such a causal explanation helps to relieve the feeling of arbitariness, at least for a while. But it is easy and natural for our feeling to reassert itself: We are moved to ask why just those causal processes governed the situation of that fact or event, rather than some others. To deal with this further, larger question, often we can exhibit those causal processes as being, themselves, the results of, or certain specific instances of, prior or more general causalities. Or, much the same, we can redescribe the initial particular fact, and perhaps the cited cause as well, and display the items thus described as an instance of some very general, fundamental law or phenomenon. But any of this will only push the question back one step more. For we can always press on and ask: Why is it that just that very general phenomenon, or law, should be so fundamental, or indeed obtain at all, in the world in which we have our being? Within the usual framework of explanation, law and causation, there seems no place for such curiosity to come to rest. There seems no way for us to deal adequately with the brute and ultimate specificity of the ways in which almost everything appears to happen. And what seems worse, the specific character of certain of these laws or ways, even of quite fundamental ones, often seems so quirky, the very height of arbitrariness.     

Revising Process Metaphysics in Response to Ian Barbour's Critique

In Religion in an Age of Science , Ian Barbour concludes that the contemporary evolutionary worldview with its emphasis on the interplay of law and chance, relationality and autonomy, can be properly accounted for only by something like the process-relational metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead. At the same time, he expresses serious reservations about certain features of Whitehead's scheme, notably, his perceived inability to account for the ongoing identity of the human self and for the fact of multilevel organization within organisms and in the world of inanimate compounds. In this article, I suggest that both of these difficulties can be resolved if one adopts a revisionist understanding of the Whiteheadian category of society according to which democratically organized societies possess an ontological unity and exercise a corporate agency proper to their own level of existence and activity. Furthermore, if one applies this revisionist understanding of societies to the Whiteheadian doctrine of God, a Trinitarian understanding of God becomes possible within the overall parameters of process-relational metaphysics. In this way, traditional belief in the doctrine of the Trinity can be reconciled with a scientifically credible worldview.     

Johnson on the Metaphysics of Argument

This paper responds to two aspects of Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000). The first is his critique of deductivism. The second is his failure to make room for some species of argument (e.g., visual and kisceral arguments) proposed by recent commentators. In the first case, Johnson holds that argumentation theorists have adopted a notion of argument which is too narrow. In the second, that they have adopted one which is too broad. I discuss the case Johnson makes for both claims, and possible objections to his analysis.     

Steps Toward Evaluating Post-Traumatic Stress Reaction as a Psychiatric Disorder1

This brief paper summarizes comments made in discussing papers given in the November 1988 NIHM workshop “Traumatic Stress: Defining Terms and Instruments”. It raises questions about current criteria for posttraumatic stress in terms of the traumatic events considered appropriate, the coherence of the syndrome described, and the scarcity of data on its course, its familiarity, and its relationship to other syndromes. It is suggested that long-term studies of general population cases will be needed to answer these questions.