Lorsque la logique rencontre l'argumentation

It is well known that classical logics are able to represent only some aspects of ordinary reasoning. In particular, by accepting the law of obversion, they remove the possibility of defining any but a propositional negation; certain natural uses of negation thus elude them. Logical theories do exist, however, that are exempt from such limitations. Among these theories are those of S. Leniewski, which differ profoundly from classical formal systems. Unlike the latter, they do not have a determined list of functors of syntactical-semantical categories. Due to formalized directives for definitions, the logics of Leniewski are constructed progressively, making new theses and consequently functors of new syntactical-semantical categories accessible. In this article we use some of these theses-definitions to define a principle of appropriateness. With this principle it is possible to represent certain logical subtleties that are used quite naturally but are neglected due to the law of obversion.

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Lorsque la logique rencontre l'argumentation

     

On the completeness of first degree weakly aggregative modal logics

This paper extends David Lewis result that all first degree modal logics are complete to weakly aggregative modal logic by providing a filtration-theoretic version of the canonical model construction of Apostoli and Brown. The completeness and decidability of all first-degree weakly aggregative modal logics is obtained, with Lewiss result for Kripkean logics recovered in the case k=1.     

Models for relevant modal logics

Semantics are given for modal extensions of relevant logics based on the kind of frames introduced in [7]. By means of a simple recipe we may obtain from a class FRM (L) of unreduced frames characterising a (non-modal) logic L, frame-classes FRM (L.M) characterising conjunctively regular modal extensions L.M of L. By displaying an incompleteness phenomenon, it is shown how the recipe fails when reduced frames are under consideration.     

Sequent-systems and groupoid models. I

The purpose of this paper is to connect the proof theory and the model theory of a family of propositional logics weaker than Heyting's. This family includes systems analogous to the Lambek calculus of syntactic categories, systems of relevant logic, systems related toBCK algebras, and, finally, Johansson's and Heyting's logic. First, sequent-systems are given for these logics, and cut-elimination results are proved. In these sequent-systems the rules for the logical operations are never changed: all changes are made in the structural rules. Next, Hubert-style formulations are given for these logics, and algebraic completeness results are demonstrated with respect to residuated lattice-ordered groupoids. Finally, model structures related to relevant model structures (of Urquhart, Fine, Routley, Meyer, and Maksimova) are given for our logics. These model structures are based on groupoids parallel to the sequent-systems. This paper lays the ground for a kind of correspondence theory for axioms of logics with implication weaker than Heyting's, a correspondence theory analogous to the correspondence theory for modal axioms of normal modal logics.The first part of the paper, which follows, contains the first two sections, which deal with sequent-systems and Hubert-formulations. The second part, due to appear in the next issue of this journal, will contain the third section, which deals with groupoid models.     

Abstract modal logics

In this paper we develop a general framework to deal with abstract logics associated with a given modal logic. In particular we study the abstract logics associated with the weak and strong deductive systems of the normal modal logicK and its intuitionistic version. We also study the abstract logics that satisfy the conditionC ⁺(X)=C( _in I ⁿ X) and find the modal deductive systems whose abstract logics, in addition to being classical or intuitionistic, satisfy that condition. Finally we study the deductive systems whose abstract logics satisfy, in addition to the already mentioned properties, the property that the operatorC ⁺ is classical relative to some new defined operations.Work partially supported by Spanish DGICYT grant PB90-0465-C02-01.Presented byJan Zygmunt     

Some kinds of modal completeness

In the modal literature various notions of completeness have been studied for normal modal logics. Four of these are defined here, viz. (plain) completeness, first-order completeness, canonicity and possession of the finite model property — and their connections are studied. Up to one important exception, all possible inclusion relations are either proved or disproved. Hopefully, this helps to establish some order in the jungle of concepts concerning modal logics. In the course of the exposition, the interesting properties of first-order definability and preservation under ultrafilter extensions are introduced and studied as well.     

On the non-availability of Dawson-modeling into certain relevance alethic modal logics

This paper shows that the Dawson technique of modelling deontic logics into alethic modal logics to gain insight into deontic formulas is not available for modelling a normal (in the spirit of Anderson) relevance deontic modal logic into either of the normal relevance alethic modal logics R _S4or R _M. The technique is to construct an extension of the well known entailment matrix set M ₀and show that the model of the deontic formula P (A v B). PA v PB is excluded.     

An application of Rieger-Nishimura formulas to the intuitionistic modal logics

The main results of the paper are the following: For each monadic prepositional formula which is classically true but not intuitionistically so, there is a continuum of intuitionistic monotone modal logics L such that L+ is inconsistent.There exists a consistent intuitionistic monotone modal logic L such that for any formula of the kind mentioned above the logic L+ is inconsistent.There exist at least countably many maximal intuitionistic monotone modal logics.The author appreciates very much referees' suggestions which helped to improve the exposition.     

Logical equations and admissible rules of inference with parameters in modal provability logics

This paper concerns modal logics of provability — Gödel-Löb systemGL and Solovay logicS — the smallest and the greatest representation of arithmetical theories in propositional logic respectively. We prove that the decision problem for admissibility of rules (with or without parameters) inGL andS is decidable. Then we get a positive solution to Friedman's problem forGL andS. We also show that A. V. Kuznetsov's problem of the existence of finite basis for admissible rules forGL andS has a negative solution. Afterwards we give an algorithm deciding the solvability of logical equations inGL andS and constructing some solutions.     

Models for stronger normal intuitionistic modal logics

This paper, a sequel to Models for normal intuitionistic modal logics by M. Boi and the author, which dealt with intuitionistic analogues of the modal system K, deals similarly with intuitionistic analogues of systems stronger than K, and, in particular, analogues of S4 and S5. For these prepositional logics Kripke-style models with two accessibility relations, one intuitionistic and the other modal, are given, and soundness and completeness are proved with respect to these models. It is shown how the holding of formulae characteristic for particular logics is equivalent to conditions for the relations of the models. Modalities in these logics are also investigated.This paper presents results of an investigation of intuitionistic modal logic conducted in collaboration with Dr Milan Boi.     

Propositional Epistemic Logics with Quantification Over Agents of Knowledge

The paper presents a family of propositional epistemic logics such that languages of these logics are extended by quantification over modal (epistemic) operators or over agents of knowledge and extended by predicate symbols that take modal (epistemic) operators (or agents) as arguments. Denote this family by \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\). There exist epistemic logics whose languages have the above mentioned properties (see, for example Corsi and Orlandelli in Stud Log 101:1159–1183, 2013; Fitting et al. in Stud Log 69:133–169, 2001; Grove in Artif Intell 74(2):311–350, 1995; Lomuscio and Colombetti in Proceedings of ATAL 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), vol 1193, pp 71–85, 1996). But these logics are obtained from first-order modal logics, while a logic of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) can be regarded as a propositional multi-modal logic whose language includes quantifiers over modal (epistemic) operators and predicate symbols that take modal (epistemic) operators as arguments. Among the logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) there are logics with a syntactical distinction between two readings of epistemic sentences: de dicto and de re (between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing of’). We show the decidability of logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) with the help of the loosely guarded fragment (LGF) of first-order logic. Namely, we generalize LGF to a higher-order decidable loosely guarded fragment. The latter fragment allows us to construct various decidable propositional epistemic logics with quantification over modal (epistemic) operators. The family of this logics coincides with \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\). There are decidable propositional logics such that these logics implicitly contain quantification over agents of knowledge, but languages of these logics are usual propositional epistemic languages without quantifiers and predicate symbols (see Grove and Halpern in J Log Comput 3(4):345–378, 1993). Some logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) can be regarded as counterparts of logics defined in Grove and Halpern (J Log Comput 3(4):345–378, 1993). We prove that the satisfiability problem for these logics of \({\mathcal {P}\mathcal {E}\mathcal {L}}_{({ QK})}\) is Pspace-complete using their counterparts in Grove and Halpern (J Log Comput 3(4):345–378, 1993).     

A Method of Generating Modal Logics Defining Jaśkowski’s Discussive Logic D<Subscript>2</Subscript>

Ja?kowski’s discussive logic D₂ was formulated with the help of the modal logic S5 as follows (see [7, 8]): \({A \in {D_{2}}}\) iff \({\ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\rm S}5}\), where (–)^? is a translation of discussive formulae from For^d into the modal language. We say that a modal logic L defines D₂ iff \({{\rm D}_{2} = \{A \in {\rm For^{\rm d}} : \ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\it L}\}}\). In [14] and [10] were respectively presented the weakest normal and the weakest regular logic which (?): have the same theses beginning with ‘\({\diamond}\)’ as S5. Of course, all logics fulfilling the above condition, define D₂. In [10] it was prowed that in the cases of logics closed under congruence the following holds: defining D₂ is equivalent to having the property (?). In this paper we show that this equivalence holds also for all modal logics which are closed under replacement of tautological equivalents (rte-logics).We give a general method which, for any class of modal logics determined by a set of joint axioms and rules, generates in the given class the weakest logic having the property (?). Thus, for the class of all modal logics we obtain the weakest modal logic which owns this property. On the other hand, applying the method to various classes of modal logics: rte-logics, congruential, monotonic, regular and normal, we obtain the weakest in a given class logic defining D₂.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">γ</Emphasis>-admissibility of Relevant Modal Logics I — The Method of Normal Models

The admissibility of Ackermann’s rule γ is one of the most important problems in relevant logic. While the γ-admissibility of normal modal logics based on the relevant logic R has been previously discussed, the case for weaker relevant modal logics has not yet been considered. The method of normal models has often been used to prove the γ-admissibility. This paper discusses which relevant modal logics admit γ from the viewpoint of the method of normal models.     

Some Useful 16-Valued Logics: How a Computer Network Should Think

In Belnaps useful 4-valued logic, the set 2={T,F} of classical truth values is generalized to the set 4=(2)={,{T},{F},{T,F}}. In the present paper, we argue in favor of extending this process to the set 16=(4) (and beyond). It turns out that this generalization is well-motivated and leads from the bilattice FOUR₂ with an information and a truth-and-falsity ordering to another algebraic structure, namely the trilattice SIXTEEN₃ with an information ordering together with a truth ordering and a (distinct) falsity ordering. Interestingly, the logics generated separately by the algebraic operations under the truth order and under the falsity order in SIXTEEN₃ coincide with the logic of FOUR₂, namely first degree entailment. This observation may be taken as a further indication of the significance of first degree entailment. In the present setting, however, it becomes rather natural to consider also logical systems in the language obtained by combining the vocabulary of the logic of the truth order and the falsity order. We semantically define the logics of the two orderings in the extended language and in both cases axiomatize a certain fragment comprising three unary operations: a negation, an involution, and their combination. We also suggest two other definitions of logics in the full language, including a bi-consequence system. In other words, in addition to presenting first degree entailment as a useful 16-valued logic, we define further useful 16-valued logics for reasoning about truth and (non-)falsity. We expect these logics to be an interesting and useful instrument in information processing, especially when we deal with a net of hierarchically interconnected computers. We also briefly discuss Arielis and Avrons notion of a logical bilattice and state a number of open problems for future research.Dedicated to Nuel D. Belnap on the occasion of his 75th Birthday     

Schrödinger logics

Schrödinger logics are logical systems in which the principle of identity is not true in general. The intuitive motivation for these logics is both Erwin Schrödinger's thesis (which has been advanced by other authors) that identity lacks sense for elementary particles of modern physics, and the way which physicists deal with this concept; normally, they understandidentity as meaningindistinguishability (agreemment with respect to attributes). Observing that these concepts are equivalent in classical logic and mathematics, which underly the usual physical theories, we present a higher-order logical system in which these concepts are systematically separated. A classical semantics for the system is presented and some philosophical related questions are mentioned. One of the main characteristics of our system is that Leibniz' Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles cannot be derived. This fact is in accordance with some authors who maintain that quantum mechanics violates this principle. Furthermore, our system may be viewed as a way of making sense some of Schrödinger's logical intuitions about the nature of elementary particles.The authors very much would like to thank the anonymous referee for his quite interesting suggestions, which contributed significantly to improve the paper.Presented byJan Zygmunt;     

Logical truth in modal languages: reply to Nelson and Zalta

Does general validity or real world validity better represent the intuitive notion of logical truth for sentential modal languages with an actuality connective? In (Philosophical Studies 130:436–459, 2006) I argued in favor of general validity, and I criticized the arguments of Zalta (Journal of Philosophy 85:57–74, 1988) for real world validity. But in Nelson and Zalta (Philosophical Studies 157:153–162, 2012) Michael Nelson and Edward Zalta criticize my arguments and claim to have established the superiority of real world validity. Section 1 of the present paper introduces the problem and sets out the basic issues. In Sect. 2 I consider three of Nelson and Zalta’s arguments and find all of them deficient. In Sect. 3 I note that Nelson and Zalta direct much of their criticism at a phrase (‘true at a world from the point of view of some distinct world as actual’) I used only inessentially in Hanson (Philosophical Studies 130:436–459, 2006), and that their account of the philosophical foundations of modal semantics leaves them ill equipped to account for the plausibility of modal logics weaker than S5. Along the way I make several general suggestions for ways in which philosophical discussions of logical matters–especially, but not limited to, discussions of truth and logical truth for languages containing modal and indexical terms–might be facilitated and made more productive.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">γ</Emphasis>-admissibility of Relevant Modal Logics II — The Method using Metavaluations

The γ-admissibility is one of the most important problems in the realm of relevant logics. To prove the γ-admissibility, either the method of normal models or the method using metavaluations may be employed. The γ-admissibility of a wide class of relevant modal logics has been discussed in Part I based on a former method, but the γ-admissibility based on metavaluations has not hitherto been fully considered. Sahlqvist axioms are well known as a means of expressing generalized forms of formulas with modal operators. This paper shows that γ is admissible for relevant modal logics with restricted Sahlqvist axioms in terms of the method using metavaluations.     

Constructing a continuum of predicate extensions of each intermediate propositional logic

Wajsberg and Jankov provided us with methods of constructing a continuum of logics. However, their methods are not suitable for super-intuitionistic and modal predicate logics. The aim of this paper is to present simple ways of modification of their methods appropriate for such logics. We give some concrete applications as generic examples. Among others, we show that there is a continuum of logics (1) between the intuitionistic predicate logic and the logic of constant domains, (2) between a predicate extension ofS4 andS4 with the Barcan formula. Furthermore, we prove that (3) there is a continuum of predicate logics with equality whose equality-free fragment is just the intuitionistic predicate logic.Dedicated to the memory of the late Professor S. MaeharaThis research was supported in part by Grant-in Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists No. 06740140, Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, Japan.Presented byHiroakira Ono     

Basic properties of the equivalence

In this paper we investigate some basic semantic and syntactic conditions characterizing the equivalence connective. In particular we define three basic classes of algebras: the class of weak equivalential algebras, the class of equivalential algebras and the class of regular equivalential algebras (see [12]).Weak equivalential algebras can be used to study purely equivalential fragments of relevant logics and strict equivalential fragments of some modal logics (for investigations of strict implicational fragments of modal logics see [20]). Equivalential algebras are suitable to study purely equivalential fragment of BCI and BCK logic (see [21], p. 316). A subclass of the class of regular equivalential algebras is suitable to study equivalential fragments of ukasiewicz logics. Some subvarieties of the class of regular equivalential algebras provide natural semantics for equivalential fragments of the intuitionistic prepositional logic and various intermediate logics (see [13]).The last chapter is a selection of research problems which in the author's opinion are worth to be solved.