Change we can believe in: using perceptions of changeability to promote system-change motives over system-justification motives in information search

People are motivated to defend and rationalize the status quo, a phenomenon known as system justification. We propose the existence of a second, countervailing system-level motivation: system-change motivation, which is concerned with bettering the status quo over time. The opportunity to receive diagnostic information about the status quo pits the two system-level motives against each other. Whereas system justification promotes a preference for positive information about the status quo, system-change motivation promotes a preference for negative information about the status quo. In three experiments, we found that people preferred negative over positive feedback about the status quo when it was presented as being changeable. Our findings are the first to suggest the operation of a system-change motive.     

Reference dependence in cumulative prospect theory

A central feature of (cumulative) prospect theory is reference dependence, i.e. the value function depends on gains and losses relative to a status quo and not on final wealth positions as in expected utility theory. Until now, all theoretical work on prospect theory only considered a fixed status quo. In this case, however, reference dependence and the dependence of the value function on final wealth positions are equivalent concepts, at least if the status quo is known. In order to identify the differences between both concepts, an axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory is developed which allows for a variable status quo. In this framework a preference condition can be formulated which discriminates between reference dependence and the dependence on final wealth positions. Furthermore, this framework allows one to analyze in which way the shape of the value and weighting functions change with increasing status quo. With respect to this question several hypotheses are defined and characterized in terms of preference conditions.     

Error Patterns in the Prediction of Fertility Behavior1

Two separate three-wave, 2-year, longitudinal studies investigated error patterns in two decision models' predictions of couples' birth-planning decisions. One study tested the subjective expected utility model with a sample of married couples from the state of Washington and the other study tested the Fishbein model using a sample of married women from Illinois. Consistent with the proposal that predictions of deviation from the status quo result in a higher proportion of prediction errors than predictions of nondeviation from the status quo, both studies demonstrated that when couples were predicted to decide not to become pregnant, predictive accuracy was very high, but when couples were predicted to decide to become pregnant, predictive accuracy was significantly lower. Two hypothesized explanations for the biased error pattern were considered and received some support. The first, resembling the concept of inertia, is that a stronger motivational force is required to compel a person to elect a change from the status quo than is required to maintain the status quo. The second focuses on changes in decisions as a function of time and events. The heuristic value of directly examining prediction errors, in contrast to the more prevalent practice of reporting only one summary index of goodness of fit, was discussed.     

Agents,objects, and their powers in Suarez and Hobbes

The paper examines the place of power in the action theories of Francisco Suarez and Thomas Hobbes. Power is the capacity to produce or determine outcomes. Two cases of power are examined. The first is freedom or the power of agents to determine for themselves what they do. The second is motivation, which involves a power to which agents are subject, and by which they are moved to pursue a goal. Suarez, in the Metaphysical Disputations, uses Aristotelian causation to model these two forms of power. Freedom is efficient causation, but in a special form that I explain as involving something that ordinary causation does not – the contingent determination of outcomes. Motivating power is final causation, which Suarez characterizes as the power of a goal or end to move us to attain it through its goodness or desirability. Suarez regards these two forms of power as consistent – we can be moved by the goodness of a goal freely to determine for ourselves that we act in order to attain it. Hobbes denied the existence of all forms of power beyond ordinary causation, the power of one motion in matter to determine another. So he denied the very existence both of freedom and of any form of motivating power beyond the ordinary causal power of desires as materially based psychological states to produce actions. The goodness itself of a goal never moves us, whether to desire the goal in the first place or to act in order to attain it. The paper examines Hobbes’s arguments and their consequence – establishing the foundations for Hume’s scepticism about practical reason.     

Partisanship and the status quo

Individuals advancing the status quo in partisan conflict are more favorably evaluated compared to individuals advocating change (Keltner & Robinson, 1997 ). We explore two aspects of this intergroup bias: first, a target effect whereby groups who aim to change the status quo are judged more negatively than those favoring its preservation; and second, an observer effect whereby those favoring the status quo define the conflict in terms of the status quo versus change to a greater extent than those advancing change. We sought to extend our understanding of these partisan effects via a minimal‐group induction of partisanship in the laboratory. In our study, participants viewed a negotiation between two group representatives, where half of the groups either defended the status quo or advocated change. As predicted, partisan observers: (a) favored the negotiator advancing the status quo (consistent with the target effect), (b) were more likely to attribute actions to the negotiators as stemming from their status quo versus change preference when they themselves were aligned with the status quo rather than change (consistent with the observer effect), and (c) when aligned with the status quo, expected a more effortful conflict than those seeking change (consistent with the observer effect). It is suggested that these biased perceptions are basic to intergroup, partisan processes involving change. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consulting With Teachers in Two Areas: Grief and Mourning: Relaxation Techniques

Consultation with teachers remains untried by many counselors despite mandates, role definitions, and models for consultation. Barriers include the preference for the status quo and the lack of information and preparation. Involvement and training can help overcome these barriers. Two possible consultation areas are grief management and relaxation training. Grief is the normal reaction to any kind of loss. Being aware of the various stages is the first step in helping someone through the grief process. Relaxation techniques can be learned with proper guidance. Before tying any new ideas, however, counselors and teachers must have sufficient information and training.     

Moderating Loss Aversion: Loss Aversion Has Moderators,But Reports of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated

Loss aversion, the principle that losses impact decision making more than equivalent gains, is a fundamental idea in consumer behavior and decision making, though its existence has recently been called into question. Across five unique samples (N_total = 17,720), we tested several moderators of loss aversion, which supported a preference construction account. Across studies, more domain knowledge and experience were associated with lower loss aversion, though people of all knowledge and experience levels were loss averse. Among car buyers, those who knew more about a particular car attribute (e.g., fuel economy) were less loss averse for that attribute but not other attributes (e.g., comfort), consistent with the idea that people with less attribute knowledge are more likely to construct preferences, thereby increasing loss aversion. Additionally, older consumers were more loss averse across different loss aversion measures and studies. We discuss implications for several accounts of loss aversion, including accounts rooted in status quo bias, emotion, or ownership. In addition to discovering loss aversion moderators, we cast doubt on recent claims that loss aversion is a fallacy or is fully explained by status quo bias, risk aversion, or the educated laboratory samples often used to study loss aversion.     

Protesting to challenge or defend the system? A system justification perspective on collective action

Social identity, shared grievances, and group efficacy beliefs are well-known antecedents to collective action, but existing research overlooks the fact that collective action often involves a confrontation between those who are motivated to defend the status quo and those who seek to challenge it. Using nationally representative data from New Zealand (Study 1; N = 16,147) and a large online sample from the United States (Study 2; N = 1,513), we address this oversight and demonstrate that system justification is negatively associated with system-challenging collective action, but positively associated with system-supporting collective action, for members of both low-status and high-status groups. Group identification, group-based injustice, group-based anger, and system-based dissatisfaction/anger mediated these relationships. These findings constitute the first empirical integration of system justification theory into a model of collective action that explains when people will act collectively to challenge—and, just as importantly, defend—the status quo.     

Status Quo Effects in Decision-Making about Training and Career Development

Within the context of the Theory of Work Adjustment and Image Theory, two studies examined status quo effects in “mini” decisions about training and career development. In Study 1 (N= 78), 32% of the employees demonstrated a status quo effect in that they were not considering any training or skill development options. As predicted by consistency theory, positive information was considered more important than negative information among the non status quo group, particularly for the non status quo alternative. In Study 2 (N= 114) training was given a low priority, although a “major change” frame of reference did increase the priority accorded to training to improve future job prospects. Results are discussed in relation to theoretical issues and the wider implications of encouraging investment in skill development where outcomes are delayed.     

Re‐construing politics: The dual impacts of abstraction on political ideology

The influence of construal level on political ideology is unclear. Some research says that abstraction polarizes political attitudes by making liberals more liberal and conservatives more conservative. Other research instead argues that an abstract construal causes people to exhibit similar political attitudes as each other. The current research presents two experiments in which abstraction polarizes political attitudes on issues of social inequality. However, abstraction also increases traditionalism, and so it increases a preference for maintaining the societal status quo, such as by increasing one's disagreement with or opposition to homosexuality. The dual impacts of abstraction parallel the two distinct dimensions of political ideology (i.e., acceptance of social inequality and preference for the status quo), both of which prior research on construal level has not yet considered. Overall, the current findings indicate that the effects of construal level and the dimensions underlying political ideology need to be teased apart to fully understand the exact relationship between the two.     

Should We Want God to Exist?

Whether God exists is a metaphysical question. But there is also a neglected evaluative question about God’s existence: Should we want God to exist? Very many, including many atheists and agnostics, appear to think we should. Theists claim that if God didn’t exist things would be far worse, and many atheists agree; they regret God’s inexistence. Some remarks by Thomas Nagel suggest an opposing view: that we should want God not to exist. I call this view anti‐theism. I explain how such view can be coherent, and why it might be correct. Anti‐theism must be distinguished from the argument from evil or the denial of God’s goodness; it is a claim about the goodness of God’s existence. Anti‐theists must claim that it’s a logical consequence of God’s existence that things are worse in certain respects. The problem is that God’s existence would also make things better in many ways. Given that God’s existence is likely to be impersonally better overall, anti‐theists face a challenge similar to that facing nonconsequentialists. I explore two ways of meeting this challenge.     

Blaming a Few Bad Apples to Save a Threatened Barrel: The System‐Justifying Function of Conspiracy Theories

This research demonstrates that conspiracy theories—often represented as subversive alternatives to establishment narratives—may bolster, rather than undermine, support for the social status quo when its legitimacy is under threat. A pilot study (N = 98) found a positive relationship between conspiracy belief and satisfaction with the status quo. In Study 1 (N = 120), threatening (vs. affirming) the status quo in British society caused participants to endorse conspiracy theories. In Study 2 (N = 159), exposure to conspiracy theories increased satisfaction with the British social system after this had been experimentally threatened. In Study 3 (N = 109), this effect was mediated by the tendency for participants exposed (vs. not exposed) to conspiracy theories to attribute societal problems relatively more strongly to small groups of people rather than systemic causes. By blaming tragedies, disasters, and social problems on the actions of a malign few, conspiracy theories can divert attention from the inherent limitations of social systems.     

Reference-dependent utility with shifting reference points and incomplete preferences

Many empirical studies have shown that people's preferences are reference-dependent. Previous theoretical studies of reference-dependence assumed that the reference point was fixed and then imposed the usual assumptions of decision theory, in particular completeness of preferences. This paper gives preference foundations for additive reference-dependent utility when the reference point varies across decisions and is one of the options in the decision maker's opportunity set. This decision situation is common, for example because usually the retention of the status quo is an available option, but is difficult to handle axiomatically because it implies incompleteness of preferences. The results of this paper provide tools to extend existing theories of reference-dependent preferences, such as prospect theory, to new and empirically important decision contexts.     

Regional Variation in Preferences for Vernacular Houses

This paper tests 2 theories of relevance to design review and design guidelines. In Study I. a between-subjects design. III college students in Connecticut and 93 college students in Ohio judged goodness of example, familiarity, or preference for 6 houses. The results failed to uncover differences in response related to local experience, suggesting that global features of the houses may overcome local experience. In Study 2, a within-subjects design, 110 students from Connecticut and 49 from Ohio rated goodness of example, familiarity, and preference for the same 6 houses. Results indicate minor effects of goodness of example and familiarity on preference. The results show preference as multidimensional, reflecting knowledge structure, physical features, and connotative meanings.     

Trichotomous preferences for gambles

Let G_X be the set of all gambles on a set X of decision outcomes. Trichotomous preferences divide G_X into three disjoint subsets, viz., the set P⁺ of preferable gambles, the set P⁰ of indifferent gambles, and the set P^- of unpreferable gambles. Those preference comparisons are made against the status quo, i.e., the do-nothing alternative. This paper presents and discusses dyadic representations of such trichotomous preferences and identifies necessary and sufficient axioms for the existence of those representations.     

Disentangling Status Quo and Omission Effects: An Experimental Analysis

The status quo bias as described by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) can be decomposed into two primary effects-an exaggerated preference for the current or previous state of affairs and an exaggerated preference for inaction. We describe an experiment designed to disentangle these effects. Analysis of results shows that both effects can occur, they appear to be additive, and subjects exhibit these effects unknowingly. These effects relate to and may interact with loss aversion, ambiguity, and regret.     

Gain/Loss Asymmetry and Riskless Choice: Loss Aversion in Choices among Job Finalists

Tversky and Kahneman (1991) extended the notions of reference points and gain/loss asymmetry to multiattribute choice tasks having alternatives that cannot be assigned explicit probabilities. Two experiments were designed to test these propositions in the context of choices among job finalists. In the first experiment, undergraduates (N= 82) were provided with attribute information on two job candidates, along with (incomplete) attribute information on a previous job incumbent. The results showed that the relative standing of the job finalists was evaluated from the reference point of the incumbent's performance on the non-missing attributes. Candidates representing the status quo (i.e., no change in performance on the non-missing attributes) were preferred over candidates representing a loss. However, candidates representing a gain were not preferred over candidates representing the status quo. In the second experiment, undergraduates (N= 74) received assessor training and then watched a demonstration of performance in one of two work samples. Participants told that the demonstration was one of excellent performance strongly preferred the status quo candidate (i.e., the one that performed equally well on the demonstration work sample). However, participants told that the example was one of poor performance were indifferent between the status quo and gain candidate. We conclude that the gain/loss asymmetry commonly found in risky choice can also be found in riskless choice tasks such as choosing among job finalists.     

Aquinas' Quinque Viae: Fools,Evil, and the Hiddenness of God

At present a broad consensus may be discerned on Aquinas' ‘five ways' for proving the existence of God: either he is responding to atheism per se by means of five rational arguments, or he is not responding to any formal denial of God's existence. Both of these approaches ignore the two specific objections Aquinas raises prior to the five ways: evil is incompatible with the existence of an infinite goodness (the first objection), and the world does not require an external explanation (the second objection). While some have speculated on the structural significance of the second objection, the first has been universally regarded as irrelevant. This, I argue, is an oversight; Aquinas' first objection (from evil) is central to the quinque viae. Seen in this light, while Aquinas' five ways are not responses to atheism per se, they do address, and ultimately subvert, a specific form of disbelief.     

Position toward the status quo: Explaining differences in intergroup perceptions between left‐ and right‐wing affiliates

Challengers, as opposed to defenders, of the status quo ascribe more negative motives for the attitudes of their opponents and more positive motives to their allies. This may be associated with a heightened social cost involved in challenging the generally considered good and true. Most social issues are associated with ideology, and conservatives display more prejudices than liberals. Hence, it is unclear whether ideology or position toward the status quo per se drives these attributions. In two studies, position showed to be a stronger predictor of biased intergroup perceptions than ideology. Both left‐ and right‐wing affiliates displayed stronger biases when in opposition. This supports the notion that the challenging position per se, elicits group differentiation. Results are important for understanding of negative campaigning and political action.