Toward an understanding of the influence of affective states on attentional tuning: comment on Friedman and Förster (2010)

Friedman and F?rster (2010) reviewed an extensive program of research that was consistent with the view that positive affective states broaden, whereas negative affective states narrow, the scope of attention. We applaud their creative investigations into these important psychological questions and appreciate their thorough review. However, recent evidence strongly suggests that the conclusions drawn by Friedman and F?rster need to be tempered, for the recent evidence suggests that motivational intensity rather than affective valence causes the modulations of attentional tuning. That is, affective states of low motivational intensity (e.g., sadness, postgoal positive affect) broaden attention, whereas affective states of high motivational intensity (e.g., disgust, pregoal positive affect) narrow attention. Our viewpoint is that attentional narrowing occurs during affective states of high motivational intensity to aid organisms in acquiring desirable objects and avoiding aversive ones. Attentional broadening occurs during affective states of low motivational intensity to open organisms to new opportunities.     

Negative affect varying in motivational intensity influences scope of memory

Emotions influence cognitive processes involved in memory. While some research has suggested that cognitive scope is determined by affective valence, recent models of emotion–cognition interactions suggest that motivational intensity, rather than valence, influences these processes. The present research was designed to clarify how negative affects differing in motivational intensity impact memory for centrally or peripherally presented information. Experiments 1 & 2 found that, relative to a neutral condition, high intensity negative affect (anger) enhances memory for centrally presented information. Experiment 3 replicated this effect using another high intensity negative affect (threat). Experiment 4 extended this by finding that, relative to a neutral condition, low intensity negative affect (sadness) enhanced memory for peripherally presented information. Finally, in Experiment 5, the effects of sadness and threat on scope of memory were directly compared, finding that threat narrowed scope of memory, while sadness broadened scope of memory. Together, these results provide additional support for the motivational dimensional model of cognitive scope, in that high intensity emotions narrow cognitive scope, while low intensity emotions broaden cognitive scope.     

The effect of embodied emotive states on cognitive categorization

Research has uncovered that positive affect broadens cognitive categorization. The motivational dimensional model, however, posits that positive affect is not a unitary construct with only one cognitive consequence. Instead, this model puts forth that there are different positive affects varying in approach motivational intensity. According to this model, only positive affects lower in motivational intensity should broaden cognitive processes, whereas positive affects higher in motivational intensity should narrow cognitive processes. Consistent with these predictions, high approach positive affect has been shown to narrow attention, whereas low approach positive affect has been shown to broaden it (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). High approach positive affect, therefore, might narrow categorization. Two experiments investigated this possibility by having participants respond to cognitive categorization tasks in 3 body postures designed to elicit different levels of approach motivation: reclining backward, which should evoke low approach motivation; sitting upright, which should evoke moderate approach motivation; and leaning forward, which should evoke high approach motivation. Participants smiled while in each posture in order to experience positive affect. Experiment 1 provided initial support for the idea that high approach positive affect narrows categorization and low approach positive affect broadens categorization. Experiment 2 replicated these findings with improved smiling instructions. These results extend previous work by showing that the motivational model's predictions hold for basic attentional processes as well as higher level cognitive processes such as categorization.     

On motivational influences,moving beyond valence,and integrating dimensional and discrete views of emotion

ABSTRACT

The field of cognition and emotion has grown considerably over the past 30 years, with an increased emphasis on the relationships between emotional and motivational components and how they contribute to basic perceptual, cognitive, and neural processes. For instance, research has revealed that emotion often influences these processes via emotion’s relationship with motivational dimensions, as when positive emotions low versus high in approach motivational intensity have different influences on attentional and other cognitive processes. Research has also revealed that motivational direction (approach vs. withdrawal) and affective valence (positive vs. negative) are not as closely related as once was theorised; that is, positive affect is not inevitably associated with approach motivation and negative affect is not inevitably associated with withdrawal motivation. These and other lines of research with anger have suggested that the field needs to move beyond a focus on affective valence and it needs to consider an integration of dimensional and discrete models of emotion. The article also includes some suggestions for improving methods of measuring and inducing emotions and some recommendations for future researchers.     

超越效价和唤醒—— 情绪的动机维度模型述评

情绪的动机维度模型认为, 高动机强度的情绪窄化(narrow)认知加工而低动机强度的情绪扩展(broaden)认知加工。该理论超越了先前对效价和唤醒两大情绪维度的二分法, 证明了情绪的动机维度对注意、记忆等认知加工产生扩展和窄化效应, 深化了积极情绪的扩展-建设理论, 有助于深入理解情绪与认知的交互作用。未来研究应建立动机维度的操作性定义, 并进一步发展出诱发不同动机维度情绪的标准化刺激材料或任务。     

Attentional consequences of pregoal and postgoal positive affects

Decades of research have suggested that all positive affective states broaden attention. Recent studies have found that positive affects high in approach motivation narrow attention, whereas positive affects low in approach motivation broaden attention. However, these studies were limited because they used only affective pictures to manipulate positive affect. The pictures, rather than the affective states created by them, may have caused individuals to focus on the emotional details of the picture, and this attentional focus may have caused the narrowing of attentional scope. Moreover, no experiment has yet to examine both low and high approach-motivated positive affect within the same individuals in the same study. The current experiments manipulated pregoal (high approach) and postgoal (low approach) positive states by giving participants the opportunity to win money on a game. Results revealed that pregoal positive affect caused a narrowing of attention, whereas postgoal positive affect caused a broadening of attention.     

Motivational intensity modulates the effects of positive emotions on set shifting after controlling physiological arousal

Recent research on the construct of emotion suggests the integration of a motivational dimension into the traditional two‐dimension (subjective valence and physiological arousal) model. The motivational intensity of an emotional state should be taken into account while investigating the emotion‐cognition relationship. This study examined how positive emotional states varying in motivational intensity influenced set shifting, after controlling the potential confounding impacts of physiological arousal. In Experiment 1, 155 volunteers performed a set‐shifting task after being randomly assigned to five states: high‐ vs. low‐motivating positive affect (interest vs. serenity), high‐ vs. low‐motivating negative affect (disgust vs. anxiety), and neutral state. Eighty‐five volunteers participated in Experiment 2, which further examined the effects of higher vs. lower degree of interest. Both experiments measured and compared participants' physiological arousal (blood pressure and pulse rate) under the normal and experimental conditions as the covariate. Results showed no difference in switching performance between the neutral and serenity groups. As compared with the neutral state, the high‐motivating positive affect significantly increased set‐switching reaction time costs, but reduced error rate costs; the higher the motivational intensity, the greater the time‐costs impairment. This indicates a role of the high‐motivating positive affect in regulating the balance between the flexible and stable cognitive control. Motivational intensity also modulated the effects of negative emotional states, i.e., disgust caused a larger increase in time costs than anxiety. Further exploration into neurobiological mechanisms that may mediate the emotional effects on set shifting is warranted.     

不同趋近动机强度积极情绪对认知控制的影响

情绪的动机维度模型认为, 积极情绪对认知加工的影响受其趋近动机强度的调节, 高、低趋近动机积极情绪对认知加工的影响不同。本研究运用情绪图片诱发被试高、低趋近动机积极情绪, 采用停止信号任务和任务转换作业考察了不同趋近动机强度积极情绪对认知控制的影响。结果发现：(1)与中性条件相比, 高趋近动机积极情绪促进了停止信号任务中Go任务和任务转换作业中重复任务的反应执行。(2)在停止信号任务中, 相对于中性条件, 低趋近动机积极情绪条件下的停止信号反应时显著缩短; 在任务转换作业中, 低趋近动机积极情绪条件下的反应时转换损失和错误率转换损失均显著降低, 而高趋近动机积极情绪条件下的反应时转换损失显著增加。因此, 积极情绪对认知控制的影响受其趋近动机强度的调节, 即低趋近动机积极情绪增强认知灵活性, 提高停止反应与任务转换的速度; 而高趋近动机积极情绪增强认知稳定性, 加快停止信号任务中Go任务和任务转换作业中重复任务的反应执行, 增加了反应时转换损失。     

The effect of personal relevance and approach-related action expectation on relative left frontal cortical activity

Past research using a variety of methods has suggested that the frontal cortex is asymmetrically involved in the experience and expression of positive (or approach motivational) and negative (or withdrawal motivational) affects, with the left frontal region being involved in positive affects (or approach) and the right frontal region being involved in negative affects (or withdrawal). However, some studies have failed to replicate these effects, leaving many scientists questioning the meaning of the past supportive findings. To examine these inconsistencies in results, we tested the hypothesis that increasing the personal relevance of the stimuli and approach motivational intensity would increase relative left frontal activation. Results supported the predictions. Moreover, by showing the predicted effects with anger-inducing stimuli, the results demonstrated that motivational direction, rather than affective valence, accounts for asymmetrical frontal cortical activity.     

Cognitive operations associated with individual differences in affect intensity

There are wide individual differences in the characteristic intensity of affective response to the same emotion-evoking event. The processes whereby individuals come to experience strong or mild emotional responses when exposed to the same affect-provoking stimuli are still unclear. In these studies, we propose that individual differences in affect intensity are associated with certain cognitive operations used during exposure to emotion-relevant stimuli. Specifically, cognitive operations that involve personalizing, generalizing, and selective abstraction were hypothesized to discriminate subjects high and low in affect intensity. Two studies replicated support for the hypothesis that subjects high on the affect-intensity dimension engage in more personalizing/empathic and more generalizing/elaborative cognitive operations than do subjects low on the affect-intensity dimension. The same cognitive operations discriminated groups high and low in affect intensity in response to both positive and negative emotional stimuli. Also, the cognitions that discriminated subjects high and low in affect intensity occurred only in response to affective stimuli; neutral stimuli did not evoke divergent cognitive operations for these two groups. Finally, a high degree of consistency was found in the use of emotion-relevant cognitive operations across positive and negative affective stimuli.     

Smiling faces and cash bonuses: Exploring common affective coding across positive and negative emotional and motivational stimuli using fMRI

Although it is clear that emotional and motivational manipulations yield a strong influence on cognition and behaviour, these domains have mostly been investigated in independent research lines. Therefore, it remains poorly understood how far these affective manipulations overlap in terms of their underlying neural activations, especially in light of previous findings that suggest a shared valence mechanism across multiple affective processing domains (e.g., monetary incentives, primary rewards, emotional events). This is particularly interesting considering the commonality between emotional and motivational constructs in terms of their basic affective nature (positive vs. negative), but dissociations in terms of instrumentality, in that only reward-related stimuli are typically associated with performance-contingent outcomes. Here, we aimed to examine potential common neural processes triggered by emotional and motivational stimuli in matched tasks within participants using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Across tasks, we found shared valence effects in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus (part of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), with increased activity for positive and negative stimuli, respectively. Despite this commonality, emotion and reward tasks featured differential behavioural patterns in that negative valence effects (performance costs) were exclusive to emotional stimuli, while positive valence effects (performance benefits) were only observed for reward-related stimuli. Overall, our data suggest a common affective coding mechanism across different task domains and support the idea that monetary incentives entail signed basic valence signals, above and beyond the instruction to perform both gain and loss trials as accurately as possible to maximise the outcome.     

When Arousal Influences Ad Evaluation and Valence Does Not (and Vice Versa)

This research examines, across 2 studies, the interplay between the valence and arousal components of affective states and the affective tone of a target ad. In the first study, music was used to induce a pleasant or unpleasant mood, while controlling for arousal. Participants were subsequently exposed to an ad that either had a positive‐affective tone or was ambiguous in its affective tone. As predicted, the valence of the affective state colored the evaluation of the ad in a mood‐congruent direction, but this coloring effect occurred only when the ad had an ambiguous‐affective tone. In the second study, the target ad had a clear positive or negative affective tone, and the valence and arousal dimensions of the mood state were manipulated independently. As predicted, the arousal dimension, but not the valence dimension, influenced ad evaluation. Ad evaluations were more polarized in the direction of the ad's affective tone under high arousal than under low arousal. This effect was more pronounced for self‐referent evaluations (e.g., “I like the ad”) than for object‐referent evaluations (e.g., “The ad is good”), favoring an attributional explanation—the excitation transfer hypothesis—over an attention‐narrowing explanation—the dynamic complexity hypothesis. Taken together, the results of the 2 studies stress the important contingency of the affective tone of the ad, when examining the effects of the valence and arousal dimensions of a person's affective state on ad evaluation. The results also provide additional insights into how and when affect serves as information in judgment processes.     

Integration of Positive and Negative Affective Stimuli

The research reported in this article examines how multiple affective stimuli of differing valence (i.e., both positive and negative) are integrated into an overall affective response. Prior research on the integration of positive and negative information has not focused on affect, and previous affect integration research has not considered both positive and negative feelings. Two experiments investigate how positive and negative affective stimuli combine to influence overall affective responses to an advertisement, content‐specific beliefs, and overall ad evaluations. Both recency and contrast effects were observed on positive affective response and positive beliefs, but comparable effects on negative affective response and negative beliefs were not evident. The results support a motivational influence of affect on judgments.     

Incongruency effects in affective processing: automatic motivational counter-regulation or mismatch-induced salience?

Attention is automatically allocated to stimuli that are opposite in valence to the current motivational focus (Rothermund, 2003; Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008). We tested whether this incongruency effect is due to affective-motivational counter-regulation or to an increased salience of stimuli that mismatch with cognitively activated information. Affective processing biases were assessed with a search task in which participants had to detect the spatial position at which a positive or negative stimulus was presented. In the motivational condition, positive or negative affective-motivational states were induced by performance feedback after each trial. In the cognitive activation condition, participants memorised the word "good" or "bad" during the search task. The affective incongruency effect was replicated in the motivational condition, whereas an affective congruency effect obtained in the cognitive activation condition. These findings support an explanation of affective incongruency effects in terms of automatic counter-regulation that is motivational in nature.     

Feeling and thinking: An affect‐as‐cognitive‐feedback account

Despite the abundance of evidence demonstrating a dedicated link between positive and negative affect and specific ways of thinking, not all findings are consistent with this view. New research suggests that the relationship between affect and thinking can be altered and often reversed, by varying the mental context in which affect is experienced. The affect‐as‐cognitive‐feedback account can explain a wide range of phenomena, including both prior findings and this more recent research, and generate new predictions. According to this account, affective reactions confer value on accessible information processing strategies (e.g., global vs. local processing) and other mental content that happens to be accessible at the time. This view underscores that the relationship between affect and cognition is not fixed but instead is highly malleable. We present evidence that supports this account, along with new findings that suggest a malleable influence of specific affective states on cognition.     

Affective guidance of intelligent agents: How emotion controls cognition

How do emotions and moods color cognition? In this article, we examine how such reactions influence both judgments and cognitive performance. We argue that many affective influences are due, not to affective reactions themselves, but to the information they carry about value. The specific kind of influence that occurs depends on the focus of the agent at the time. When making evaluative judgments, for example, an agent’s positive affect may emerge as a positive attitude toward a person or object. But when an agent focuses on a cognitive task, positive affect may act like feedback about the value of one’s approach. As a result, positive affect tends to promote cognitive, relational processes, whereas negative affect tends to inhibit relational processing, resulting in more perceptual, stimulus-specific processing. As a consequence, many textbook phenomena from cognitive psychology occur readily in happy moods, but are inhibited or even absent in sad moods (149).     

Investigating the role of time in affective forecasting: temporal influences on forecasting accuracy

Using extensive diary data from people taking their driver's license exam, the authors investigated the role of time in affective forecasting accuracy. Replicating existing findings, participants grossly overestimated the intensity and duration of their negative affect after failure and only slightly overestimated the intensity and duration of their positive affect after success. Extending existing findings, participants accurately predicted a decrease of their affective reactions over time but underestimated the speed with which this decrease would occur. In addition, they showed greater forecasting accuracy for positive affect than negative affect when the exam was distant and greater forecasting accuracy for negative affect than positive affect when the exam was close. The motivational processes underlying these findings are being discussed.     

不同回避动机强度的消极情绪对类比推理的影响:来自ERP的证据

研究采用类比推理的四项比例式任务和事件相关电位技术,探究不同回避动机强度的消极情绪(恐惧—高动机强度、悲伤—低动机强度、中性情绪)对类比推理的影响及脑机制。结果发现:(1)行为:不同回避动机强度的消极情绪均会延长类比推理的反应时; 与中性情绪相比,悲伤会提高推理的正确率,而恐惧会降低推理的正确率。(2)脑电:图式提取阶段,N400、P300、LNC被诱发; 类比映射阶段,N400和LNC被诱发,情绪在N400和LNC上的主效应均显著,恐惧情绪下的N400和LNC幅值比悲伤情绪和中性情绪下的更大。研究表明,情绪对类比推理的作用发生在类比映射阶段。恐惧情绪窄化认知,悲伤情绪扩展认知,支持情绪动机维度模型。     

Neural activity underlying motor-action preparation and cognitive narrowing in approach-motivated goal states

High-approach-motivated (pre-goal) positive affect states encourage tenacious goal pursuit and narrow cognitive scope. As such, high approach-motivated states likely enhance the neural correlates of motor-action preparation to aid in goal acquisition. These neural correlates may also relate to the cognitive narrowing associated with high approach-motivated states. In the present study, we investigated motor-action preparation during pre-goal and post-goal states using an index of beta suppression over the motor cortex. The results revealed that beta suppression was greatest in pre-goal positive states, suggesting that higher levels of motor-action preparation occur during high approach-motivated positive states. Furthermore, beta and alpha suppression in the high approach-motivated positive states predicted greater cognitive narrowing. These results suggest that approach-motivated pre-goal states engage the neural substrates of motor-action preparation and cognitive narrowing. Individual differences in motor-action preparation relate to the degree of cognitive narrowing.     

The experience of positive emotion is associated with the automatic processing of positive emotional words

The current study examines the relationship between attention bias for positive emotional words and self-reported emotional experience. Previous research suggests that the experience of positive emotion momentarily broadens cognitive processes, potentially allowing individuals to build an array of enduring personal resources. However, it is unknown whether the experience of positive emotion also broadens emotional information processing. Participants included 60 healthy undergraduate students who completed measures of psychopathology, self-reported emotional experience, and an emotional Stroop task designed to measure attentional bias to positive and negative emotional information. Results indicate significant associations between reaction times for high-intensity happiness words and self-reported high levels of positive emotion and low levels of negative emotions. These associations were not present for low intensity happiness words. Findings suggest that individuals who experience high levels of positive emotion and low levels of negative emotion demonstrate an attention bias for positive information and, from an information processing perspective, provide insight into the manner in which positive emotions broaden cognitive processes.