Dual systems Competence ←-→ Procedural processing: A relational developmental systems approach to reasoning

Many current psychological models of reasoning minimize the role of deductive processes in human thought. In the present paper, we argue that deduction is an important part of ordinary cognition and we propose that a dual systems Competence ←-→ Procedural processing model conceptualized within relational developmental systems theory offers the most coherent and productive framework for integrating and explaining the sometimes conflicting findings on the development of deductive reasoning across the lifespan. This model invokes a distinction that is quite similar to, though not identical with, the system 2–system 1 dichotomy employed in other dual systems models. In addition, the Competence ←-→ Procedural processing model maintains the more specific distinction between algorithmic and reflective subsystems of system 2. In this account, the algorithmic system is represented as a kind of mental logic while the reflective system is the seat of practical and epistemic self-regulation, including emergent epistemic and metalogical norms. While the proposed systems of mind often appear as split-off component features in other dual systems models, relational developmental systems theory conceives of them as the highly complex and relationally integrated outcome of a self-organizing and self-regulating adaptive developmental process.     

社会治理中的心理学问题

近年来社会治理中的心理学问题开始受到心理学者的关注。要正确识别这些问题, 我们必须从社会治理的心理内涵出发, 认识到社会治理的核心是“人”：社会治理的主体是人, 治理的对象是以人为中心的社会事务, 治理的过程是多元主体的群体决策过程, 治理的路径之一是面向人的心理建设。由此, 心理学家应该着力研究社会治理内生的各种心理学问题, 包括各种主体的治理能力, 作为治理对象的现实社会心理问题(尤其是社会心态问题), 群体决策心理, 以及心理建设的战略和实践方案。对这些问题的深入研究, 有望建立“社会治理心理学”的原创理论体系, 实现“由心而治”。     

What are symbols symbols of? Situated action,mythological bootstrapping and the emergence of the Self

This paper addresses the question of how symbols should be understood in analytical psychology and psychoanalysis. The point of view examined focuses on the recent turn to more cognitive and developmental models in both disciplines and briefly reviews and critiques the evolutionary and cognitive arguments. The paper then presents an argument based on dynamic systems theory in which no pre-existing template or structure for either mind or behaviour is assumed. Within the dynamic systems model the Self is viewed as an emergent phenomenon deriving from the dynamic patterns existing in a complex system that includes the physiological characteristics of the infant, the intentional attributions of the caregiver and the cultural or symbolic resources that constitute the environment. The symbol can then be seen as a discrete, and in important ways an autonomous, element in the dynamic system. Conclusions are drawn for further research into the nature of the symbol with implications for both theory and practice in analytical psychology and psychoanalysis.     

Information search activity: An overview

IntroductionThis article exposes a brief history of information search models, from general and behavioural models to cognitive ones and presents recent theoretical advances in this research field.Literature findingsSince the beginning of 1990s, many theoretical models have tried to describe and predict the human behaviours involved in the information search tasks, and specifically when this activity is performed in computer systems. Some of these models elaborated by psychologists have attempted to infer the cognitive processes involved.DiscussionInformation search can be considered as a complex cognitive activity that involves various individual (cognitive, affective), contextual and social factors.ConclusionWe also suggest research issues to be developed in order to increase our knowledge in this area and we plead for further research on specific concepts depending on future and/or recent areas of interest.     

Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning

In this paper, it is argued that single function dual process theory is a more credible psychological account of non-monotonicity in human conditional reasoning than recent attempts to apply logic programming (LP) approaches in artificial intelligence to these data. LP is introduced and among other critiques, it is argued that it is psychologically unrealistic in a similar way to hash coding in the classicism vs. connectionism debate. Second, it is argued that causal Bayes nets provide a framework for modelling probabilistic conditional inference in System 2 that can deal with patterns of inference LP cannot. Third, we offer some speculations on how the cognitive system may avoid problems for System 1 identified by Fodor in 1983. We conclude that while many problems remain, the probabilistic single function dual processing theory is to be preferred over LP as an account of the non-monotonicity of human reasoning.     

“认知科学”与“第二代认知科学”刍议

以计算隐喻为核心假设的传统认知心理学以及联结主义心理学均不能克服离身心智（disembodied mind）的根本缺陷,当代认知心理学正面临着新的范型转换。以具身性和情境性为重要特征的第二代认知科学将日受重视,并促使认知神经科学进入新的发展阶段。作者认为在身心关系上应该坚持生理只是心理的必要条件,而非充分条件的立场,克服生理还原论的危险;应该重新审视基于二元论的生理机制这种说法;心理学传统中的科学主义和人文主义有可能在第二代认知科学强调认知情境性的基础上达成某种融合;第一代认知科学对意识的研究是不成功的,因为对知觉、注意、记忆、思维等心理过程的研究不能代替意识的研究,同时还应避免以意识内容的研究取代心理学研究的倾向。第二代认知科学中的动力系统理论关于变量（因素）之间的偶合（coupling）关系完全不同于变差分析中的变量之间的交互作用关系”,其动力系统模式可能更有助于破解意识的产生（涌现）之谜,并引发心理学研究的方法论的变革新潮。第二代认知科学的兴起将启发人们对身心关系、生理还原论、意识研究在心理学中的地位、人工智能对心智完全模拟的可能性等重大问题重新思考     

青少年风险决策的发展认知神经机制

随着认知神经科学技术的发展, 青少年风险决策的发展认知神经机制成为了新近的一个热点课题。从双系统理论模型(社会情感神经网络系统、认知控制神经网络系统)出发, 对与青少年风险决策相关的大脑结构、功能的变化进行了阐述, 重点分析了新近的大脑功能连接、脑网络的研究; 阐述了青少年风险决策认知神经机制的主要理论模型：双系统模型和三角模型。未来研究还应加强对认知神经机制理论模型的检验、整合和创新, 从社会认知神经科学的角度深入研究社会参照系统(同伴关系、亚文化等)在青少年风险决策中的作用及机制, 以及从认知神经层面如何预防和干预青少年高风险行为。     

L’enfance et l’adolescence in situ : facteurs environnementaux facilitateurs et inhibiteurs de troubles cognitifs et comportementaux

The definition of mental health associates three fundamental variables: biological variables, psychological variables and environmental variables. In this article, we will focus on environmental variables that inhibit and facilitate cognitive and behavioural disorders in childhood and adolescence. Environmental psychology considers the interrelations between human and environment in its spatial, social and chronological dimensions and considers it as a characterized and undissociated system. We will bring to mind social and physical environmental variables with which children and adolescents interact frequently and, through a literature review, we will enlighten environmental variables that are susceptible to induce behavioural disorders and psychological variables that modulate children's and adolescent's relations to environment. We then suggest possible outcomes of this approach in clinical practice as well as in terms of therapeutic applications in child psychology and psychiatry. Finally, we evoke the necessity of taking in account neurobiological fields in order to outline a model of human development integrating the three variables that define mental health.     

Intuition: A fundamental bridging construct in the behavioural sciences

The concept of intuition has, until recently, received scant scholarly attention within and beyond the psychological sciences, despite its potential to unify a number of lines of inquiry. Presently, the literature on intuition is conceptually underdeveloped and dispersed across a range of domains of application, from education, to management, to health. In this article, we clarify and distinguish intuition from related constructs, such as insight, and review a number of theoretical models that attempt to unify cognition and affect. Intuition's place within a broader conceptual framework that distinguishes between two fundamental types of human information processing is explored. We examine recent evidence from the field of social cognitive neuroscience that identifies the potential neural correlates of these separate systems and conclude by identifying a number of theoretical and methodological challenges associated with the valid and reliable assessment of intuition as a basis for future research in this burgeoning field of inquiry.     

Origins of spatial, temporal and numerical cognition: Insights from comparative psychology

Contemporary comparative cognition has a large repertoire of animal models and methods, with concurrent theoretical advances that are providing initial answers to crucial questions about human cognition. What cognitive traits are uniquely human? What are the species-typical inherited predispositions of the human mind? What is the human mind capable of without certain types of specific experiences with the surrounding environment? Here, we review recent findings from the domains of space, time and number cognition. These findings are produced using different comparative methodologies relying on different animal species, namely birds and non-human great apes. The study of these species not only reveals the range of cognitive abilities across vertebrates, but also increases our understanding of human cognition in crucial ways.     

Social neuroscience evidence for dehumanised perception

Dehumanisation describes perceiving a person as nonhuman in some ways, such as lacking a mind. Social psychology is beginning to understand cognitive and affective causes and mechanisms—the psychological how and why of dehumanisation. Social neuroscience research also can inform these questions. After background on social neural networks and on past dehumanisation research, the article contrasts (a) research on fully humanised person perception, reviewing studies on affective and cognitive factors, specifically mentalising (considering another's mind), with (b) dehumanised perception, proposing neural systems potentially involved. Finally, the conclusion suggests limitations of social neuroscience, future research directions, and real-world consequences of this all-too-human phenomenon.     

The vicissitudes of attitudes and similar representational constructs in twentieth century psychology

‘Attitudes’ has been the central concept of social psychology in three different periods, over which the interest evolved to three progressively more sophisticated topics. The first of these three peakings was the 1920s and 1930s preoccupation with the static topics of attitude scaling and relation to behaviour. Then, after a 1935–1955 interlude in which the study of group processes supplanted attitude as the central concern of social psychology, attitude research re-emerged as the dominant interest during the 1950s and 1960s enthusiasm for the dynamic topic of attitude change, approached by a convergent style in the 1950s and a divergent style in the 1960s. During the 1965–1985 period interest shifted from attitudes to social cognition, including representational reductions in information encoding and decoding as well as inferential extrapolations in meaning attribution, person perception, and cognitive ramifications. Now we are experiencing the beginnings of a third flourishing of attitude research likely to dominate the 1980s and 1990s, this third peaking focused on more evolved structural issues, including the structure of individual attitudes, of systems of attitudes, and of attitudinal systems as they relate to other systems within the person. Intrinsic and extrinsic forces underlying these shifts of interest are considered.     

Cognition and Emotion over twenty-five years

In the 25 years since its foundation, Cognition and Emotion has become a leading psychological journal of research on emotion. Here we review some of the ways in which this has occurred. Questions have included how parallel systems of cognition and emotion can operate in emotion regulation and psychological therapies (including the issue of free will), how the cognitive approach to emotion works, how emotion affects attention, memory, and decision making, and how emotion research is moving beyond the individual mind into the space of the interpersonal.     

How Otto did not extend his mind,but might have: Dynamic systems theory and social-cultural group selection

Proponents of cognitive Situationism argue that the human mind is embodied, embedded in both natural and social-cultural environments and extended creating both extended and distributed cognition. Anti-situationists reject all or some of these claims. I argue that four major objections to extended cognition: (1) the mark of the cognitive, (2) the function-identity fallacy, (3) cognitive bloat, and (4) scientific irrelevance lose much of their sting in the case of distributed cognition, the extension of cognitive agency to a group of cognitive agents, such as a scientific research team. However, I claim that a crucial fifth challenge, that advocates of the extended mind commit the causal-constitution fallacy, has yet to be satisfactorily addressed. I focus on Spyridon Palermos’ use of dynamic systems theory to refute this charge and I argue that his appeal to dynamic systems theory as a way of understanding system-constitution fails. Instead, I suggest a social-cultural group selection hypothesis for understanding system-constitution. But, I leave it for another day to elaborate that hypothesis’ empirical plausibility.     

Chaos and self-organization: emergent patterns at critical life transitions

A feeling of chaos can accompany many real-life events over which we have little or no control, and latent developmental needs may create tension that manifests in symptoms of depression or anxiety. Particularly at critical life transitions, conflicts may arise which have no obvious solution. From an analytic perspective, recent scientific models from the area of complexity theory can prove illuminating as analogies to Jung's archetypal view of the individuation process. Throughout life, human beings, like many complex, open systems, pass from disordered phases to more complex stages of order. This paper shows how the scientific concept of self-organization can be compared with our physical and psychological developmental processes. From embryology, the model of the 'epigenetic landscape' (C.H. Waddington) is introduced as an analogy to Jung's individuation process, with a clinical example to illustrate these parallels. The emergent nature of behaviour and development is seen from the viewpoint of the organism as a dynamical system, and Jung's concept of the archetype viewed as an emergent property of the activity of the brain/mind.     

Alcoholism and memory: broadening the scope of alcohol-expectancy research

Current biopsychosocial research on the etiology of alcoholism has begun to focus on memory processes as a possible common pathway for drinking decisions. The alcohol-expectancy construct is rooted both in cognitive psychology and alcohol research and can serve as a vehicle for this study. Reexamination of one recent review of issues in alcohol-expectancy research provides an opportunity to broaden the scope of this research with theoretical and methodological alternatives to those suggested in that review. Most importantly, this article shows that expectancy findings, discussed by Leigh (1989a) as reflecting "psychometric" limitations, are instead quite consistent with recent network models of memory structure. Such models can provide an informative guide to future research activities. It is also recommended that alcohol-expectancy research remain open to inputs from expectancy theories already developed in several psychological domains, as well as to theories of social cognition and attitude structure in addition to those advanced by Leigh.     

Reducing mind to molecular pathways: explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience

As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot explain cognition and complex behavior directly. These experimental practices involve intervening directly with molecular components of sub-cellular and gene expression pathways in neurons and then measuring specific behaviors. These behaviors are tracked using tests that are widely accepted by experimental psychologists to study the psychological phenomenon at issue (e.g., memory, attention, and perception). Here I illustrate these practices and their importance for explanation and reduction in current mainstream neuroscience by describing recent work on social recognition memory in mammals.     

Self‐esteem and anomie: An integration of Adler and Merton as a theory of deviance

The purpose of this paper is to show that while anomie theory on the social level offers a valid explanation of deviance, in order to understand the phenomenon in its entirety, we must consider the individual level as well. The psycho‐dynamic dimension of individual action is a crucial component of deviant behavior and one which must be integrated into a broader theory of overall deviance. With this in mind we will attempt to integrate the social and the psychological by incorporating the Adlerian and Mertonian models in order to create a more dynamic theory of deviance.     

Implicit Consistency Processes in Social Cognition: Explicit‐Implicit Discrepancies Across Systems of Evaluation

What happens when our automatic evaluations conflict with our attitudes that we can reflect on and articulate? In this paper, we review some processes by which explicit implicit evaluative discrepancies (EIEDs) arise and can impact our thoughts, feelings, and behavior, using a dual‐systems perspective on attitudes to explain the psychological processes underlying these evaluative inconsistencies. EIEDs emerge when differential positive and negative evaluations toward attitude objects reside in systems of knowledge governed by language and reasoning (i.e., explicit evaluations) and systems of knowledge that are association‐based (i.e., implicit evaluations). We discuss factors that produce EIEDs, including the influence of extrapersonal associations on attitudes, temporal, and qualitative differences in encountering attitude‐relevant information, and the differential influence of processing goals. Finally, we discuss consequences of holding EIEDs, including their impact on behaviors toward attitude objects, enhanced elaboration and scrutiny of social information, motivated reasoning, errant affective forecasting, and self‐regulatory success and failure.     

Executive functions and self-regulation

Self-regulation is a core aspect of adaptive human behavior that has been studied, largely in parallel, through the lenses of social and personality psychology as well as cognitive psychology. Here, we argue for more communication between these disciplines and highlight recent research that speaks to their connection. We outline how basic facets of executive functioning (working memory operations, behavioral inhibition, and task-switching) may subserve successful self-regulation. We also argue that temporary reductions in executive functions underlie many of the situational risk factors identified in the social psychological research on self-regulation and review recent evidence that the training of executive functions holds significant potential for improving poor self-regulation in problem populations.