Reflective Self‐Control in Self‐Control Scholarship: A Peircean Analysis

Vosgerau, Scopelliti, and Huh (this issue) present an important critique of much self‐control research, highlighting some of the ways that our customary operationalizations and methods may have created more confusion than clarity. Their insights, rooted in past literature and new data, offer recommendations that will undoubtedly help us improve our research in consumption self‐control. In this commentary, I frame their work using the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, a philosopher, mathematician, and logician whose frustration with the management of the self‐control construct and subsequent revision parallels Vosgerau et al's in many ways. Further, his thought proposes that their thought traces the boundary of another type of self‐control problem, which I'll refer to as “reflective self‐control.” Taking together consumption self‐control and reflective self‐control, we're able to address a wide range of human experiences and connect self‐control to ethics, consistent with a long tradition bridging the two. Perhaps most importantly, though, a Peircean analysis suggests that Vosgerau et al's paper—whether we agree or disagree with its conclusions—exemplifies the kind of scholarly self‐control we need to display to make scientific progress, regardless of our specific domain of study.     

Addiction and Self‐Deception: A Method for Self‐Control?

Neil Levy argues that while addicts who believe they are not addicts are self‐deceived, addicts who believe they are addicts are just as self‐deceived. Such persons accept a false belief that their addictive behaviour involves a loss of control. This paper examines two implications of Levy's discussion: that accurate self‐knowledge may be particularly difficult for addicts; and that an addict's self‐deceived belief that they cannot control themselves may aid their attempts at self‐control. I argue that the self‐deceived beliefs of addicts in denial and of self‐described addicts differ in kind. Unlike the self‐deception of an addict in denial, that of the self‐described addict allows them to acknowledge their behaviour. As such, it may aid an addict to develop more self‐control. A paradoxical implication is that this self‐deception may allow an addict more self‐knowledge.     

Effortless Self‐Control: A Novel Perspective on Response Conflict Strategies in Trait Self‐Control

Self‐control is of invaluable importance for well‐being. While previous research has focused on self‐control failure, we introduce a new perspective on self‐control, including the notion of effortless self‐control, and a focus on self‐control success rather than failure. We propose that effortless strategies of dealing with response conflict (i.e., competing behavioral tendencies) are what distinguishes successful self‐controllers from less successful ones. While people with high trait self‐control may recognize the potential for response conflict in self‐control dilemmas, they do not seem to subjectively experience this conflict as much as people with low self‐control. Two strategies may underlie this difference: avoidance of response conflict through adaptive, habitual behaviors, and the efficient downregulating of response conflict. These strategies as well as the role of response conflict are elaborated upon and discussed in the light of existing literature on self‐control.     

A Self‐Regulatory Model of Resource Scarcity

Academics have shown a growing interest in the effects of resource scarcity—a discrepancy between one's current resource levels and a higher, more desirable reference point. However, the existing literature lacks an overarching theory to explain the breadth of findings across different types of resources. To address this, we introduce a self‐regulatory model of resource scarcity. In it, we propose that consumers respond to resource scarcity through two distinct psychological pathways: a scarcity‐reduction route aimed at reducing the discrepancy in resources and a control‐restoration route aimed at reestablishing diminished personal control by attaining security in other domains. We explain how a key determinant of which route the consumer will pursue is the perceived mutability of the resource discrepancy. We also specify moderators, based on our proposed model, to identify when each of the two routes is pursued. This model is assessed in the context of alternative theoretical perspectives, including commodity theory, life history theory, and models of compensatory behavior. Finally, we provide a research agenda for those interested in studying the psychology of resource scarcity from a self‐regulatory perspective.     

Self‐Control Inhibits Aggression

Aggression brings tremendous costs to individuals, relationships, and society. Yet, people behave aggressively toward strangers and close others at alarmingly high rates. The current article seeks to unlock part of the mystery of why people behave aggressively. We review evidence that self‐control failure plays an integral role in many acts of aggression and violence. We begin by reviewing theoretical models that emphasize the importance of self‐control processes in understanding aggressive and other criminal behaviors. We also discuss how a theoretical model that originally neglected self‐control processes can be extended to incorporate self‐control theorizing. We then discuss recent empirical evidence (a) showing that self‐control failure is a crucial predictor of aggression toward strangers and romantic partners and (b) identifying the neural processes relevant to the self‐control of aggression. Finally, we review evidence that self‐control processes can also explain why people engage in displaced aggression toward bystanders. By appreciating the importance of self‐control processes, researchers and laypersons can gain a better understanding of why people behave aggressively – and how aggression can be prevented.     

Motivation and Self‐Control: Implicit Motives Moderate the Exertion of Self‐Control in Motive‐Related Tasks

Using a dual‐task paradigm, two experiments tested whether aroused implicit motives would moderate the exertion of self‐control in motive‐related tasks. In Study 1, 67 participants first watched a power dialogue and were then asked to either enact the dialogue or simply reproduce it by writing it down. In Study 2, 74 participants performed either the frustrating or the simple version of an achievement‐related sensorimotor task. Participants who were high (compared to low) on the implicit power motive and had exerted power over another person subsequently showed more success at controlling their emotional responses (Study 1). Participants who were high (compared to low) on the implicit achievement motive and who had mastered a frustrating sensorimotor task scored better on a subsequent Stroop task (Study 2). Participants in the control conditions did not differ in self‐control performance regardless of their level of implicit motives. These studies provide evidence that aroused implicit motives regulate how much self‐control is exerted when performing motive‐related tasks that require self‐control.     

Procrastination,Self‐Downing,Self‐Doubt,and Rational Beliefs: A Moderated Mediation Model

A cross‐sectional study tested the integrated effects of self‐downing, self‐doubt, and rational beliefs on procrastination in a sample of Turkish undergraduate students (N = 315). Results suggest that both self‐downing and rational beliefs have a direct and interactive effect on self‐doubt, and self‐doubt mediates the relationship between self‐downing and procrastination. Results suggest that the indirect effect of self‐downing on procrastination via the mediation of self‐doubt may vary depending on the level of rational beliefs. Implications for counselors and future research directions are discussed.     

Suicidal Intent and Method of Self‐Harm: A Large‐scale Study of Self‐Harm Patients Presenting to a General Hospital

Data from the Oxford Monitoring System for Attempted Suicide (2004–2011) were used to study hospital presentations for self‐harm in which Suicidal Intent Scale (SIS) scores were obtained (N = 4,840). Regression of medians was used to control for the confounding effect of age and gender. Higher estimated median SIS scores were associated with increasing age, male gender, self‐poisoning versus self‐injury, multiple methods of self‐harm versus self‐injury alone, use of gas (mainly carbon monoxide), dangerous methods of self‐injury (including hanging, gunshot), and use of alcohol as part of the act. For self‐poisoning patients, there was a correlation between the number of tablets taken and the total SIS score. Compared with self‐poisoning with paracetamol and paracetamol‐containing compounds, self‐poisoning with antipsychotics was associated with a lower median SIS score while antidepressants had the same estimated median as paracetamol. Use of alcohol within 6 hours of self‐harm was associated with lower SIS scores. In conclusion, certain methods of self‐harm, particularly dangerous methods of self‐injury and self‐poisoning with gas, were associated with high intent and should alert clinicians to potential higher risk of suicide. However, apart from use of gas, suicidal intent cannot be inferred from type of drugs used for self‐poisoning.     

A multi‐process model of self‐regulation: Influences of Mindfulness,Integrative Self‐Knowledge and Self‐Control in Iran

Self‐regulation presumably rests upon multiple processes that include an awareness of ongoing self‐experience, enduring self‐knowledge and self‐control. The present investigation tested this multi‐process model using the Five‐Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) and the Integrative Self‐Knowledge and Brief Self‐Control Scales. Using a sample of 1162 Iranian university students, we confirmed the five‐factor structure of the FFMQ in Iran and documented its factorial invariance across males and females. Self‐regulatory variables correlated negatively with Perceived Stress, Depression, and Anxiety and positively with Self‐Esteem and Satisfaction with Life. Partial mediation effects confirmed that self‐regulatory measures ameliorated the disturbing effects of Perceived Stress. Integrative Self‐Knowledge and Self‐Control interacted to partially mediate the association of Perceived Stress with lower levels of Satisfaction with Life. Integrative Self‐Knowledge, alone or in interaction with Self‐Control, was the only self‐regulation variable to display the expected mediation of Perceived Stress associations with all other measures. Self‐Control failed to be implicated in self‐regulation only in the mediation of Anxiety. These data confirmed the need to further examine this multi‐process model of self‐regulation.     

The Selfish Side of Self‐Control

Self‐control is a powerful tool that promotes goal pursuit by helping individuals curb personal desires, follow norms, and adopt rational thinking. In interdependent social contexts, the socially acceptable (i.e. normative) and rational approach to secure long‐term goals is prosocial behaviour. Consistent with that, much research associates self‐control with prosociality. The present research demonstrates that when norm salience is reduced (i.e. social relations are no longer interdependent), high self‐control leads to more selfish behaviour when it is economically rational. In three studies, participants were asked to allocate an endowment between themselves and another person (one‐round, zero‐sum version of the dictator game), facing a conflict between a socially normative and an economically rational approach. Across the studies, norm salience was manipulated [through manipulation of social context (private/public; Studies 1 and 2), measurement of social desirability (Studies 1 and 3), and measurement (Study 2) and manipulation (Study 3) of social power] such that some participants experienced low normative pressure. Findings showed that among individuals in a low normative pressure context, self‐control led to economically rational, yet selfish, behaviour. The findings highlight the role of self‐control in regulating behaviour so as to maximize situational adaptation. Copyright © 2014 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.     

Prejudice as Self‐Control Failure1

Research has suggested that whereas stereotypical attitudes may be automatically activated, the response to these stereotypes can be controlled. Anything that interferes with self‐control may result in more biased behavior. The ego strength model hypothesizes that after exerting self‐control, subsequent self‐control performance will suffer. Hence, depletion of ego strength may lead to increased prejudice. In 2 studies, depletion was found only to affect individuals who normally try to control their prejudicial responses. Participants who do not normally try to control their use of stereotypes were equally prejudiced, regardless of their level of ego strength. The results have implications for prejudice and stereotyping, as well as models of self‐control.     

Self‐Control as a Normative Capacity

Recently, two apparent truisms about self‐control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self‐control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self‐control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self‐control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self‐control should be understood as a mechanism, suggesting that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self‐control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self‐control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self‐control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self‐control and goodness/activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non‐mechanistic understanding of self‐control as a normative capacity.     

Exerting Self‐Control ≠ Sacrificing Pleasure

Self‐control is a prominent topic in consumer research, where it is often conceptualized as the abstinence from hedonic consumption. We examine whether this conceptualization accurately captures consumers’ experiences of self‐control conflicts/failures in light of seminal self‐control theories in economics and psychology. Rejecting that notion, we argue that self‐control failures are choices in violation of superordinate long‐term goals accompanied by anticipated regret, rather than choices of hedonic over utilitarian consumption. This conceptualization has important methodological, theoretical, and practical implications. Methodologically, it highlights the need for experimental paradigms with higher construct validity. Theoretically, it helps elucidate how self‐control is distinct from impatience and self‐regulation. Practically, it provides a rich set of implications for deducing interventions on the individual and public policy level to help consumers exert self‐control.     

A Computational Model of the Self‐Teaching Hypothesis Based on the Dual‐Route Cascaded Model of Reading

The self‐teaching hypothesis describes how children progress toward skilled sight‐word reading. It proposes that children do this via phonological recoding with assistance from contextual cues, to identify the target pronunciation for a novel letter string, and in so doing create an opportunity to self‐teach new orthographic knowledge. We present a new computational implementation of self‐teaching within the dual‐route cascaded (DRC) model of reading aloud, and we explore how decoding and contextual cues can work together to enable accurate self‐teaching under a variety of circumstances. The new model (ST‐DRC) uses DRC’s sublexical route and the interactivity between the lexical and sublexical routes to simulate phonological recoding. Known spoken words are activated in response to novel printed words, triggering an opportunity for orthographic learning, which is the basis for skilled sight‐word reading. ST‐DRC also includes new computational mechanisms for simulating how contextual information aids word identification, and it demonstrates how partial decoding and ambiguous context interact to achieve irregular‐word learning. Beyond modeling orthographic learning and self‐teaching, ST‐DRC’s performance suggests new avenues for empirical research on how difficult word classes such as homographs and potentiophones are learned.     

Self‐Enhancement on a Self‐Categorization Leash: Evidence for a Dual‐Process Model of First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

Research suggests that first‐ and third‐person perceptions are driven by the motive to self‐enhance and cognitive processes involving the perception of social norms. This article proposes and tests a dual‐process model that predicts an interaction between cognition and motivation. Consistent with the model, Experiment 1 (N = 112) showed that self‐enhancement drove influence judgments when messages were normatively neutral—people reported first‐person perceptions for in‐group‐favoring messages and third‐person perceptions for out‐group‐favoring messages. Experiment 2 (N = 208) showed an additive effect when social norms were also in‐group‐enhancing, but showed a decreased effect when social norms and group‐enhancement were discordant. The findings are hard to reconcile with pure motivational or cognitive explanations, but are consistent with the proposed dual‐process model.