Game theoretical semantics and entailment

The essence of the meaning of a declarative sentence is given by stating its truth conditions, and consequently semantics, the study of meaning, must include a theory of truth conditions. Such a theory must not only describe accurately the truth conditions of declarative sentences, it must also answer the question of when two sentences have the same truth conditions. The fundamental semantic relation of having the same truth conditions cannot be ignored by any reasonable theory.This paper is an attempt to find a partial account of this relation by using game theoretical semantics as developed by Hintikka and his followers. The account given will establish a connection between this approach to semantics and the theory of firstdegree entailment formulated by Anderson and Belnap.     

Towards a Semantics Based on the Notion of Justification

Suppose we want to take seriously the neoverificationist idea that an intuitionistic theory of meaning can be generalized in such a way as to be applicable not only to mathematical but also to empirical sentences. The paper explores some consequences of this attitude and takes some steps towards the realization of this program. The general idea is to develop a meaning theory, and consequently a formal semantics, based on the idea that knowing the meaning of a sentence is tantamount to having a criterion for establishing what is a justification for it. Section 1 motivates a requirement of epistemic transparency imposed onto justifications conceived as mental states. In Section 2, the formal notion of justification for an atomic formula is defined, in terms of the notion of cognitive state. In Section 3, the definition is extended to logically complex formulas. In Section 4, the notion of truth-ground is introduced and is used to give a definition of logical validity.     

Grammatical properties of sentences as a basis for concept formation

A concept-formation study was run using sets of sentences in eight different syntactic patterns as target categories. These were based on all possible combinations of voice (active or passive), mood (declarative or interrogative), and modality (affirmative or negative). Subjects were 32 senior high school students who participated as volunteers in the computer-controlled experiment. Subjects were able to categorize sentences based solely on sentence types rather than semantic content, but an analysis of the errors committed in the course of learning showed that it was the semantic significance of different types rather than pattern differences as such to which a subject responded. The implications of this for grammatical formulations and the interpretation of psychological research were discussed.     

Algebraic foundations for the semantic treatment of inquisitive content

In classical logic, the proposition expressed by a sentence is construed as a set of possible worlds, capturing the informative content of the sentence. However, sentences in natural language are not only used to provide information, but also to request information. Thus, natural language semantics requires a logical framework whose notion of meaning does not only embody informative content, but also inquisitive content. This paper develops the algebraic foundations for such a framework. We argue that propositions, in order to embody both informative and inquisitive content in a satisfactory way, should be defined as non-empty, downward closed sets of possibilities, where each possibility in turn is a set of possible worlds. We define a natural entailment order over such propositions, capturing when one proposition is at least as informative and inquisitive as another, and we show that this entailment order gives rise to a complete Heyting algebra, with meet, join, and relative pseudo-complement operators. Just as in classical logic, these semantic operators are then associated with the logical constants in a first-order language. We explore the logical properties of the resulting system and discuss its significance for natural language semantics. We show that the system essentially coincides with the simplest and most well-understood existing implementation of inquisitive semantics, and that its treatment of disjunction and existentials also concurs with recent work in alternative semantics. Thus, our algebraic considerations do not lead to a wholly new treatment of the logical constants, but rather provide more solid foundations for some of the existing proposals.     

The dynamic lexicon in a truth-conditional framework; or how to have Your cake and eat it

A fundamental principle of all truth-conditional approaches to semantics is that the meanings of sentences of natural language can be compositionally specified in terms of truth conditions, where the meanings of the sentences’ parts (words/lexical items) are specified in terms of the contribution they make to such conditions their host sentences possess. Thus, meanings of words fit the meanings of sentences at least to the extent that the stability of what a sentence might mean as specified in a theory is in accord with the stability of what a word might mean as similarly specified. In this paper, I shall be concerned with Ludlow’s (2014) idea that, in fact, there need be no such sympathy between words and sentences. He proposes that we can square what he calls a dynamic lexicon, where word meaning is not stable at all, with a traditional truth-conditional approach of the kind indicated, where sentence meaning is delivered via ‘absolute truth conditions’. I share Ludlow’s aspiration to accommodate dynamic features of word meaning with a truth conditional approach, but not his belief that the marriage is an easy deal. Thus, I shall present a problem for Ludlow’s position and show how resolving this problem leads to an alternative picture of how the meaning of a sentence may be truth-conditionally specified with all relevant dynamic features of the lexicon retained.     

Memory for the form and force of declaratives and interrogatives

Memory for the illocutionary force and surface form of direct and indirect speech acts was studied in two recall tasks. Both examined the effects of the context of original presentation on subjects’ ability to recall declarative and interrogative sentences. Subjects more accurately recalled the verbatim form of indirect requests and offers than that of direct assertions and queries. When prompted by contexts that preserved or changed in illocutionary force of a declarative or interrogative, subjects were equally likely to recall sentences originally used as indirect requests and offers. However, they more frequently recalled sentences originally used as direct assertions or queries when prompted by force-preserving contexts than when prompted by force-changing contexts.     

Presuppositions as Anaphoric Duality Enablers

The key to an adequate account of presupposition projection is to accommodate the fact that the presuppositions of a sentence cannot always be read off the sentence but can often be identified only on the basis of prior utterances in the conversation in which the sentence is uttered. In addition, an account of presupposition requires a three-valued semantics of assertibility and deniability in a context. Presuppositions can be explicated as sentences that belong to the conversation and the assertibility of which ensures that the remaining assertibility and deniability conditions of the presupposition-bearing sentence are dual to one another. The prevailing approach to presuppositions, grounded in Heim’s context-change semantics, can be criticized both on philosophical grounds and for failing to accommodate the phenomena.     

The Justification of the Logical Laws Revisited

The proof-theoretic analysis of logical semantics undermines the received view of proof theory as being concerned with symbols devoid of meaning, and of model theory as the sole branch of logical theory entitled to access the realm of semantics. The basic tenet of proof-theoretic semantics is that meaning is given by some rules of proofs, in terms of which all logical laws can be justified and the notion of logical consequence explained. In this paper an attempt will be made to unravel some aspects of the issue and to show that this justification as it stands is untenable, for it relies on a formalistic conception of meaning and fails to recognise the fundamental distinction between semantic definitions and rules of inference. It is also briefly suggested that the profound connection between meaning and proofs should be approached by first reconsidering our very notion of proof.     

Imagery effects and semantic similarity in sentence recognition memory

The idea that subjects often use imagery to discriminate semantically similar sentences was tested in three experiments. In the first experiment, subjects heard subject-verb-object sentences in the context of either a comprehension task or an image-generation task. Their memory for the sentences was tested using a two-alternative forced-choice recognition test in which different types of distractor sentence were used. A sentence semantically similar to the target sentence was one type; a sentence with the same subject and object nouns as the target sentence, but dissimilar in meaning, was another type; and a sentence similar in meaning to one of the stimulus sentences, but not to the target sentence, was a third type. The results showed that the image-generation instructions enhanced later recognition performance, but only for semantically similar test items. A second experiment showed that this finding only holds for high-imagery sentences containing concrete noun concepts. A third experiment demonstrated that the enhanced recognition performance could not be accounted for in terms of a semantic model of test-item discrimination. Collectively, the results were interpreted as providing evidence for the notion that subjects discriminate the semantically similar test items by elaborating the sentence encoding through image processing.     

Sentence-type variables as aural concept formation dimensions

An aural conjunctive concept formation experiment used as stimuli sentences varying systematically in Voice (active/passive), Mood (declarative/interrogative), Modality (affirmative/negative), tense, and lexical content. Target classes were the eight sentence types defined by all combinations of the first three syntactic variables. Aural processing was more difficult than visual, but higher education level facilitated concept acquisition for males and females equally (cf. Bakeret al., 1973). The 64 undergraduate subjects tended to avoid syntactic analysis in depth, classifying sentences on as cursory a basis as the task allowed. The simple, unequivocal syntactic signals of Mood and Modality meaning were readily apparent, but the discrimination of Voice was complicated by ambiguous syntactosemantic associations and lack of discourse context. Voice is thus not seen as a determinant of utterance type, but as a context- and content-dependent realization of agent or object focus in transitive messages.This report is based on an M.Sc. thesis completed at the University of Alberta (Edmonton, Canada), in 1972     

Characterizing hallucination epistemically

According to the epistemic theory of hallucination, the fundamental psychological nature of a hallucinatory experience is constituted by its being ‘introspectively indiscriminable’, in some sense, from a veridical experience of a corresponding type. How is the notion of introspective indiscriminability to which the epistemic theory appeals best construed? Following M. G. F. Martin, the standard assumption is that the notion should be construed in terms of negative epistemics: in particular, it is assumed that the notion should be explained in terms of the impossibility that a hallucinator might possess a certain type of knowledge on a certain basis. I argue that the standard assumption is mistaken. I argue that the relevant notion of introspective indiscriminability is better construed in terms of positive epistemics: in particular, I argue that the notion is better explained by reference to the fact that it would be rational for a hallucinator positively to make a certain type of judgement, were that judgement made on a certain basis.     

Scope Processing in Chinese

The standard view maintains that quantifier scope interpretation results from an interaction between different modules: the syntax, the semantics as well as the pragmatics. Thus, by examining the mechanism of quantifier scope interpretation, we will certainly gain some insight into how these different modules interact with one another. To observe it, two experiments, an offline judgment task and an eye-tracking experiment, were conducted to investigate the interpretation of doubly quantified sentences in Chinese, like Mei-ge qiangdao dou qiang-le yi-ge yinhang (Every robber robbed a bank). According to current literature, doubly quantified sentences in Chinese like the above are unambiguous, which can only be interpreted as ‘for every robber x, there is a bank y, such that x robbed y–surface scope reading), contrary to their ambiguous English counterparts, which also allow the interpretation that ‘there is a bank y, such that for every robber x, x robbed y–inverse scope reading). Specifically, three questions were examined, that is, (i) What is the initial reading of doubly quantified sentences in Chinese? (ii) Whether inverse scope interpretation can be available if appropriate contexts are provided? (iii) What are the processing time courses engaged in quantifier scope interpretation? The results showed that (i) Initially, the language processor computes the surface scope representation and the inverse scope representation in parallel, thus, doubly quantified sentences in Chinese are ambiguous; (ii) The discourse information is not employed in initial processing of relative scope, it serves to evaluate the two representations in reanalysis; (iii) The lexical information of verbs affects their scope-taking patterns. We suggest that these findings provide evidence for the Modular Model, one of the major contenders in the literature on sentence processing.     

Multivalent Semantics for Vagueness and Presupposition

Both the phenomenon of presupposition and that of vagueness have motivated the use of one form or another of trivalent logic, in which a declarative sentence can not only receive the standard values true (1) and false (0), but also a third, non-standard truth-value which is usually understood as ‘undefined’ (#). The goal of this paper is to propose a multivalent framework which can deal simultaneously with presupposition and vagueness, and, more specifically, capture their projection properties as well as their different roles in language. Now, there is a prima facie simple way of doing this, which simply consists in assimilating the two phenomena, and using an appropriate type of trivalent logic. On this view, we just need a compositional system that deals with the ‘undefined’ truth-value, and does not care about whether the source of undefinedness is ‘presuppositional’ or related to vagueness. I will argue that such a simple solution cannot succeed, and point out a number of desiderata that any successful approach must meet. I will then present and discuss two seven-valued semantics, inspired, respectively, by the Strong Kleene semantics and by supervaluationism, which meet these desiderata.     

The use theory of meaning and semantic stipulation

According to Horwich’s use theory of meaning, the meaning of a word W is engendered by the underived acceptance of certain sentences containing W. Horwich applies this theory to provide an account of semantic stipulation: Semantic stipulation proceeds by deciding to accept sentences containing an as yet meaningless word W. Thereby one brings it about that W gets an underived acceptance property. Since a word’s meaning is constituted by its (basic) underived acceptance property, this decision endows the word with a meaning. The use-theoretic account of semantic stipulation contrasts with the standard view that semantic stipulation proceeds by assigning the meaning (reference) to W that makes a certain set of sentences express true propositions. In this paper I will argue that the use-theoretic account does not work. I take Frege to have already made the crucial point: "a definition does not assert anything but lays down something ["etwas festsetzt"]” (Frege 1899, 36). A semantic stipulation for W cannot be the decision to accept a sentence containing W or be explained in terms of such an acceptance. Semantic stipulation constitutes a problem for Horwich's use theory of meaning, especially his basic notion of acceptance.

Freges Erläuterung des Urteils

According to Frege the notion of judgement cannot be defined, but must be explicated by referring to natural language. Frege uses a subjective and an objective notion of judgement: on the one hand a judgement is an inner mental process, on the other hand judging is explained as advancing from the thought to the truth-value. The subjective notion of judgement logically depends on the objective conception of a judgement, but nevertheless remains indispensable. To clarify the objective notion of judgement, the relation of thought and truth must be explicated by using Frege's theory of sense and reference. Only an intersubjective and action-guiding knowledge of the way in which the truth-value of a sentence is determined can make it possible to advance from the thought and the understanding of a sentence to the acknowledgement of its truth. Since by this advance a sentence receives a cognitive value, Frege's theory of sense and reference makes a contribution not only to semantics but also to epistemology.     

Making sense of the lived body <Emphasis Type="Italic">and</Emphasis> the lived world: meaning and presence in Husserl,Derrida and Noë

I argue that Husserl’s transcendental account of the role of the lived body in sense-making is a precursor to Alva Noë’s recent work on the enactive, embodied mind, specifically his notion of “sensorimotor knowledge” as a form of embodied sense-making that avoids representationalism and intellectualism. Derrida’s deconstructive account of meaning—developed largely through a critique of Husserl—relies on the claim that meaning is structured through the complication of the “interiority” of consciousness by an “outside,” and thus might be thought to lend itself to theories of mind such as Noë’s that emphasize the ways in which sense-making occurs outside the head. But while Derrida’s notion of “contamination” rightly points to an indeterminateness of meaning in an outside, extended, concrete lived world, he ultimately reduces meaning to a structure of signification. This casts indeterminateness in terms of absence, ignoring the presence of non-linguistic phenomena of embodied sense-making central to both the contemporary enactivist program and to the later Husserl, who is able to account for the indeterminateness of meaning in lived experience through his distinction between sense (Sinn) and more exact linguistic meaning (Bedeutung). Husserl’s transcendental theory of meaning also allows for a substantive contribution to sense-making from the side of the perceived object—an aspect missing from Noë’s account. Thus, in contrast to Derrida and to Noë, Husserl accounts for sense-making in terms of both the lived body and the lived world.     

意义理论

Research into logical syntax provides us the knowledge of the structure of sentences, while logical semantics provides a window into uncovering the truth of sentences. Therefore, it is natural to make sentences and truth the central concern when one deals with the theory of meaning logically. Although their theories of meaning differ greatly, both Michael Dummett’s theory and Donald Davidson’s theory are concerned with sentences and truth and developed in terms of truth. Logical theories and methods first introduced by G. Frege underwent great developments during the past century and have played an important role in expanding these two scholars’ theories of meaning. Translated by Ma Minghui from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2006, (7): 53–61     

Literal meaning and psychological theory

This paper evaluates the psychological status of literal meaning. Most linguistic and philosophical theories assume that sentences have well-specified literal meanings which represent the meaning of a sentence independent of context. Recent debate on this issue has centered on whether literal meaning can be equated with context-free meaning, or whether a sentence's literal meaning is determined only given a set of background assumptions. Neither of these positions meet the demands of a psychological theory of language understanding. Sentences do not have well-defined literal meanings, regardless of whether these are determined in light of a set of background assumptions. Moreover, the putative literal meanings of sentences do not contribute in systematic ways toward the understanding of speakers' utterance meanings. These observations suggest that the distinctions between literal and metaphoric meanings, and between semantics and pragmatics, have little psychological validity.     

There is More to Negation than Modality

There is a relatively recent trend in treating negation as a modal operator. One such reason is that doing so provides a uniform semantics for the negations of a wide variety of logics and arguably speaks to a longstanding challenge of Quine put to non-classical logics. One might be tempted to draw the conclusion that negation is a modal operator, a claim Francesco Berto (Mind, 124(495), 761–793, 2015) defends at length in a recent paper. According to one such modal account, the negation of a sentence is true at a world x just in case all the worlds at which the sentence is true are incompatible with x. Incompatibility is taken to be the key notion in the account, and what minimal properties a negation has comes down to which minimal conditions incompatibility satisfies. Our aims in this paper are twofold. First, we wish to point out problems for the modal account that make us question its tenability on a fundamental level. Second, in its place we propose an alternative, non-modal, account of negation as a contradictory-forming operator that we argue is superior to, and more natural than, the modal account.     

Generalising the probabilistic semantics of conditionals

Conclusion If assertibility rules are to be important in semantic theory, hypotheses such as this one will need to beiinvestigated. And Slote's observation (see note 12) that what matters for assertibility is not belief but knowledge will turn out to have powerful consequences.Adams' rule is the first well understood assertibility rule in philosophical semantics. I think we should be led by its successes to look for more. In this paper, I have built on his assertibility rule and offered two more. But it is worth observing, finally, that their interest lies, in part, in the contrast with semantic rules stated in terms of truth conditions. Much recent discussion of assertibility conditions derives from Dummett's anti-realist claim that we should perhaps substitute assertibility conditions for truth conditions in general; see Dummett (1973), Wright (1976). This notion of assertibility is not the one I have been working with here: for the anti-realist notion of an assertibility condition is of a condition whose obtaining provides epistemic warrant for the sentence asserted. Dummett and Wright's assertibility conditions are thus to do with the justification of the belief expressed by a sentence and not directly with the justification for asserting it. ¹⁷ But realists may be interested in a more modest role for assertibility conditions — in my sense — which are not derived, by way of ASS, from truth conditions. Realism need not be the claim that all declarative sentences can be given truth conditions; it requires only the view that truth conditions account for the central class of cases. The proposals in this paper presuppose a realist treatment of the antecedents and consequents of unembedded conditionals, and a realist view of the sentences within the scope of the epistemic modality. What could be more central than that?I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal and to its editor for helpful comments on earlier drafts.