Précis of The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out "if only" something had been different. The "fault lines" of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects.     

Close to me? The influence of affective closeness on space perception

Recent data show that psychosocial factors affect visual perception. We tested this hypothesis by investigating the relationship between affective closeness and the perception of apertures between two people. People feel discomfort when they are near someone they are not affectively close to. Therefore, we predict that they will be less likely to perceive that they can pass between two people not affectively close to them. Participants had to imagine passing through the aperture between two life-size classmate pictures. We found that the closer participants felt to their classmates, the more they felt able to pass between them. This provides the first evidence of a relationship between affective closeness and the perception of aperture between two people, suggesting that psychosocial factors constrain space perception.     

Imagination and Memory

A growing body of literature shows that imagining contrary-to-truth experiences can change memory. Recent experiments are reviewed to show that when people think about or imagine a false event, entire false memories can be implanted. Imagination inflation can occur even when there is no overt social pressure, and when hypothetical events are imagined only briefly. Overall, studies of imagination inflation show that imagining a counter-factual event can make subjects more confident that it actually occurred. We discuss possible mechanisms for imagination inflation and find that, with evidence supporting the involvement of both source confusion and familiarity in creating inflation, the primary mechanism is still to be determined. We briefly review evidence on individual differences in susceptibility to inflation. Finally, the widespread use of imagination-based techniques in self-help and clinical contexts suggests that there may be practical implications when imagination is used as a therapeutic tool.     

Imagination inflation: Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred

Counterfactual imaginings are known to have far-reaching implications. In the present experiment, we ask if imagining events from one’s past can affect memory for childhood events. We draw on the social psychology literature showing that imagining a future event increases the subjective likelihood that the event will occur. The concepts of cognitive availability and the source-monitoring framework provide reasons to expect that imagination may inflate confidence that a childhood event occurred. However, people routinely produce myriad counterfactual imaginings (i.e., daydreams and fantasies) but usually do not confuse them with past experiences. To determine the effects of imagining a childhood event, we pretested subjects on how confident they were that a number of childhood events had happened, asked them to imagine some of those events, and then gathered new confidence measures. For each of the target items, imagination inflated confidence that the event had occurred in childhood. We discuss implications for situations in which imagination is used as an aid in searching for presumably lost memories.     

How people think “if only …” about reasons for actions

When people think about how a situation might have turned out differently, they tend to imagine counterfactual alternatives to their actions. We report the results of three experiments which show that people imagine alternatives to actions differently when they know about a reason for the action. The first experiment (n = 36) compared reason – action sequences to cause – effect sequences. It showed that people do not imagine alternatives to reasons in the way they imagine alternatives to causes: they imagine an alternative to an action more than an effect, and to a cause more than a reason. The second experiment (n = 214) and the third experiment (n = 190) both show that different sorts of reasons have different sorts of effects on how people imagine alternatives to actions. People imagine an alternative to an action (the protagonist went to a ball) less often when they know the reason for the action was an obligation (he had to participate in fundraising) compared to when they know about a weaker reason (he wanted to meet a famous violinist) or no reason. The second experiment shows the effect for a social obligation and the third experiment replicates and extends it to a health obligation. We interpret the results in terms of the possibilities that people keep in mind about actions and their reasons.     

A Two-Stage Model of Category Construction

The current consensus is that most natural categories are not organized around strict definitions (a list of singly necessary and jointly sufficient features) but rather according to a family resemblance (FR) principle: Objects belong to the same category because they are similar to each other and dissimilar to objects in contrast categories. A number of computational models of category construction have been developed to provide an account of how and why people create FR categories (Anderson, 1990; Fisher, 1987). Surprisingly, however, only a few experiments on category construction or free sorting have been run and they suggest that people do not sort examples by the FR principle. We report several new experiments and a two-stage model for category construction. This model is contrasted with a variety of other models with respect to their ability to account for when FR sorting will and will not occur. The experiments serve to identify one basis for FR sorting and to support the two-stage model. The distinctive property of the two-stage model is that it assumes that people impose more structure than the examples support in the first stage and that the second stage adjusts for this difference between preferred and perceived structure. We speculate that people do not simply assimilate probabilistic structures but rather organize them in terms of discrete structures plus noise.     

Individual differences in visual imagery determine how event information is remembered

Individuals differ in how they mentally imagine past events. When reminiscing about a past experience, some individuals remember the event accompanied by rich visual images, while others will remember it with few of these images. In spite of the implications that these differences in the use of imagery have to the understanding of human memory, few studies have taken them into consideration. We examined how imagery interference affecting event memory retrieval was differently modulated by spatial and object imagery ability. We presented participants with a series of video-clips depicting complex events. Participants subsequently answered true/false questions related to event, spatial, or feature details contained in the videos, while simultaneously viewing stimuli that interfered with visual imagery processes (dynamic visual noise; DVN) or a control grey screen. The impact of DVN on memory accuracy was related to individual differences in spatial imagery ability. Individuals high in spatial imagery were less accurate at recalling details from the videos when simultaneously viewing the DVN stimuli compared to those low in spatial imagery ability. This finding held for questions related to the event and spatial details but not feature details. This study advocates for the inclusion of individual differences when studying memory processes.     

Do dogs resemble their owners?

Abstract— We examined whether the frequent casual reports of people resembling their pets are accurate by having observers attempt to match dogs with their owners. We further explored whether any ability of observers to make such matches is due to people selecting dogs who resemble them, in which case the resemblance should be greater for predictable purebreds than for nonpurebreds, or is due to convergence, in which case the resemblance should grow with duration of ownership. Forty-five dogs and their owners were photographed separately, and judges were shown one owner, that owner's dog, and one other dog, with the task of picking out the true match. The results were consistent with a selection account: Observers were able to match only purebred dogs with their owners, and there was no relation between the ability to pair a person with his or her pet and the time they had cohabited. The ability to match people and pets did not seem to rely on any simple trait matching (e.g., size or hairiness). The results suggest that when people pick a pet, they seek one that, at some level, resembles them, and when they get a purebred, they get what they want.     

Individual differences in causal learning and decision making

In judgment and decision making tasks, people tend to neglect the overall frequency of base-rates when they estimate the probability of an event; this is known as the base-rate fallacy. In causal learning, despite people's accuracy at judging causal strength according to one or other normative model (i.e., Power PC, DeltaP), they tend to misperceive base-rate information (e.g., the cause density effect). The present study investigates the relationship between causal learning and decision making by asking whether people weight base-rate information in the same way when estimating causal strength and when making judgments or inferences about the likelihood of an event. The results suggest that people differ according to the weight they place on base-rate information, but the way individuals do this is consistent across causal and decision making tasks. We interpret the results as reflecting a tendency to differentially weight base-rate information which generalizes to a variety of tasks. Additionally, this study provides evidence that causal learning and decision making share some component processes.     

Imagining what might be: why children underestimate uncertainty

Children’s well-documented tendency to behave as if they know more than they do about uncertain events is reduced under two conditions: when the outcome of a chance event has yet to be determined and when one unknown outcome has occurred but is difficult to imagine. In Experiment 1, in line with published findings, 5- and 6-year-olds (N = 61) preferred to guess the unknown location of a known object when the object was in place rather than before its location had been determined. There was no such preference when the object’s identity was unknown. In Experiment 2, 29 5- and 6-year-olds were more likely to correctly mark both possible locations when an already hidden object’s identity was unknown rather than known. We conclude that children’s vivid imaginations can lead them to underestimate uncertainty in a similar way to imagination inflation or fluency effects in adults.     

Jurors' Views on the Value and Objectivity of Mental Health Experts Testifying in Sexually Violent Predator Trials

Although psychologists and psychiatrists often testify in court, we know relatively little about the extent to which jurors value the testimony they hear from these experts. We surveyed 161 jurors who rendered opinions in 14 sex offender civil commitment trials after hearing testimony from psychologists and psychiatrists serving as expert witnesses. Most jurors reported that the experts they heard testify were honest, and they tended to attribute disagreements among experts to case complexity, as opposed to adversarial allegiance or bias. Most reported that hearing from the experts helped them make better decisions and that experts using risk assessment instruments could make more accurate predictions than those who did not. Jurors were, however, more skeptical about the ability of experts to accurately predict recidivism when they heard testimony from both prosecution and defense experts. Findings suggest that jurors value risk assessment testimony from experts, but that experts must think carefully about how to best make risk assessment instrument results accessible to jurors. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The psychology of telling murder stories: do we think in scripts,exemplars, or prototypes?

According to the story model of Pennington and Hastie, jurors collect information at trial and modify it with general knowledge to create case stories. Schank and Ableson argue that human memory is organized to tell and understand stories. However, Finkel and Groscup questioned the use of manipulated, experimenter-constructed narratives to demonstrate the existence of multiple prototypical crime stories. We interviewed 76 jury eligible, death qualified citizens and asked them to imagine a first-degree murder scenario, describing the events that led to the killing. We coded the presence of dichotomous variables in the resulting stories and identified at least three shared story prototypes using cluster and profile analysis. We conclude that people do not store crime stories as simple prototypes and comment on the implications of this finding for legal decision-making.     

Counterfactual and semi-factual thoughts in moral judgements about failed attempts to harm

People judge that an individual who attempts to harm someone but fails should be blamed and punished more when they imagine how things could have turned out worse, compared to when they imagine how things could have turned out the same, or when they think only about what happened. This moral counterfactual amplification effect occurs when people believe the protagonist had no reason for the attempt to harm, and not when the protagonist had a reason, as Experiment 1 shows. It occurs for intentional failed attempts to harm and also for accidental near-misses, as Experiment 2 shows, but not for failed attempts in which the harm occurs anyway by another cause, for both general judgments about the event and specific judgments about the individual's actions, as Experiments 3 and 4 show. The implications for understanding the role of counterfactual thoughts in moral judgement are discussed.     

时间距离和自我解释对调节焦点的影响

调节焦点理论提出,自我调节过程中存在着提升焦点和预防焦点这两种不同的目标追求策略。基于以往研究,本研究提出,自我解释和时间距离会交互影响着人们的调节焦点。研究结果发现,自我解释能够显著地预测调节焦点;独立自我解释更可能激活个体的提升焦点倾向,而依赖自我解释更可能激活个体的预防焦点倾向。此外,近期时间距离启动条件下,独立和依赖自我解释使得个体的调节焦点的差异倾向性更为明显,但是对远期时间距离的知觉则使得依赖自我解释的个体更加偏离预防焦点倾向,趋向于提升性焦点,并与独立自我解释差异不大。     

Where to seat the applicant? How spatial distance influences the effect of self‐promotion on interviewer evaluations

In high‐stakes contexts such as job interviews, people seek to be evaluated favorably by others and they attempt to accomplish such favorable judgments particularly through self‐promotional behaviors. We sought to examine the persuasiveness of job candidates’ self‐promotion by examining job applicants’ subjective hireability from the perspective of construal‐level theory. Construal‐level theory states that perceptions occur from different levels of psychological distance (i.e., distal vs. proximal). This distance is created by other dimensions of distance (e.g., spatial or social distance) and affects how individuals construe incoming information. From a large distance, people more readily process abstract information, whereas from a close distance, people more readily process concrete information. Specifically, construal compatibility occurs when abstract versus concrete features of a stimulus match the psychological distance experienced by message‐recipients. Construal compatibility (vs. incompatibility) makes evaluations (e.g., of messages) more favorable. To apply this principle to self‐promotion, we created self‐promotional videos of a job interview, in which the applicant sat either far away from or close to the hiring manager (manipulating psychological distance); the applicant, then, used either direct or indirect self‐promotion (manipulating message construal level). The results showed participants reported stronger intention to hire the applicant when distance matched (vs. did not match) the type of self‐promotion the applicant used.     

Don’t hate me because I’m beautiful: Self-enhancing biases in threat appraisal

We compare people’s intuitive judgments about how the self and others respond to threat. We propose that people hold a self-enhancing belief in ”threat immunity,” i.e., they see themselves as more secure than other people in the face of threat. In Study 1, people assumed that they threatened others more than others threatened them. In Study 2, people on project teams estimated that both they and their teammates provoked roughly equal levels of threat in others, although they experienced less threat than did other people. Study 3 experimentally manipulated threat perceptions in an interactive context and revealed that when people held self-enhancing threat appraisals, those with whom they interacted experienced lower satisfaction with the outcome and relationship. Finally, Study 4 demonstrated that, as compared to people who affirmed themselves and thus focused on the self, people who affirmed another person displayed lower threat immunity. The self-enhancing nature of these threat appraisals reveals how competition and envy emerge in organizations—or at least, how people imagine they emerge.     

Thinking about Others versus Another: Three Reasons Judgments about Collectives and Individuals Differ

In this article, we review evidence that people are more positive in assessments of specific individuals than they are about collectives of others, even when people have essentially no information about the individual or collective they are judging. We offer three explanations for this difference. First, evaluative “attacks” on individuals are more aversive than similar attacks on collectives. Second, to encourage or smooth interaction, people sometimes “assume the best” about individuals until proven wrong. Social interaction occurs between specific individuals, so such optimism does not extend to people in general. Third, in making judgments of individuals versus collectives, people naturally focus on different types of information. For an individual, people spontaneously consider influences that operate inside an individual (e.g., one's will, one's moral conscience). But for collectives, people instead contemplate influences that operate at a social level (e.g., social influence, social norms). We explore how these three proposals help predict when judgments of individuals and collectives do or do not differ.     

Imagination inflation is a fact, not an artifact: A reply to Pezdek and Eddy

Pezdek and Eddy (2001) claim to prove that imagination inflation is a spurious effect caused by regression to the mean (RTM). They make four predictions about what patterns of data would demonstrate a genuine effect for imagination versus those that would be explainable by RTM. We review each of those predictions, and demonstrate significant problems with them. We conclude that imagination inflation is a genuine effect, and that Pezdek and Eddy’s work has contributed to the growing research showing that when people imagine fictitious events from long ago, they become more confident that those false events were genuine experiences.     

Specificity and Abstraction of Examples: Opposite Effects on Fixation for Creative Ideation

Fixation is one of the major obstacles that individuals face in creative idea generation contexts. Several studies have shown that individuals unintentionally tend to fixate to the examples they are shown in a creative ideation task, even when instructed to avoid them. Most of these studies used examples formulated with high level of specificity. However, no study has examined individuals’ creative performance under an instruction to diverge from given examples, when these examples are formulated with a high level of abstraction. In the present study, we show that (a) instructing participants to avoid using common examples when formulated with a high level of specificity increases fixation; whereas (b) instructing participants to avoid such examples while using a more abstract level for stating these common examples—such as a categorization of these examples—mitigates fixation and doubles the number of creative ideas generated. These findings give new insights on the key role of categorization in creative ideation contexts.