Something funny happened to reward

The human reward system has been shown to be activated by a wide range of reinforcers, including food, money, sex, drugs, and beauty. Now, a recent fMRI study has found mesolimbic reward activation associated with humorous cartoons, providing a neurobiological link between theories of humour and hedonic processes in the brain.     

Something Old, Something New: Evidence of Self-Accommodation to Gendered Social Change

Two studies examined how individuals adapt the self to social trends—in particular, when the social roles of the gender ingroup change, do people readily leave behind traditional roles in favor of nontraditional roles? We hypothesized that self-relevant cognitions and behaviors would accommodate to societal change, and we found that this accommodation took the shape of greater acceptance of nontraditional roles alongside continued acceptance of traditional roles. Experiment 1 included 112 undergraduates from the Midwestern U.S. who learned about social change or social stability by reading articles ostensibly published in a newspaper. Individuals who learned about social change for their gender ingroup, relative to those learning about social stability, projected greater personal success in careers, particularly for gender-nontraditional careers. Experiment 2 examined behavioral responses to social change in a sample of 198 female undergraduates from the Midwestern U.S. Participants learned about social change or social stability and then chose to view either a website focused on physical appearance (i.e., traditional choice) or leadership (i.e., nontraditional choice). Behavioral responses to social change reflected accommodation to the anticipated social structure: Individuals who learned about social change chose to view information about nontraditional rather than traditional roles. These studies provide initial experimental evidence investigating how individuals adapt the self to the social structure.     

The Ability to Render Something False

In this paper I try to explicate the idiom '(An agent) x is able to render (the proposition) p false', which plays a crucial role in van Inwagen's Consequence Argument and which has been extensively discussed in the literature on it. However, the explications offered so far fail to meet some intuitive desiderata which an analysis of the notion should fulfil, as for example the desiderata that (i) nobody can render necessary falsehoods false and that (ii) nobody can render historical falsities false. I propose a novel analysis which deviates from the foregoing in employing an explanatory notion, the connector 'because'.     

So We Need Something Else for Reason to Mean

In this paper I give considerable attention to Richard Rorty's attempt to make plausible a conception of non-rational semantic and cultural change - change which Rorty insists on describing as identical with progress - in order to show the extent to which this attempt is compromised from the start by an unjustifiably narrow and inconsistent view of reason. The point of this immanent critique is not just to make Rorty's view of non-rational change look bad. It is meant to do more justice to his claim that intellectual and moral progress is inseparable from speaking and acting differently by incorporating this claim into a philosophically enlarged picture of reason. So the value of taking Rorty's claims about change seriously lies less in showing the shortcomings of his conception of reason than it does in bringing a sense of urgency to the need to renew the project begun by Kant, Hegel, and German Idealism - the project of conceiving reason as an agency of change by reinterpreting reason in terms of self-determining freedom.     

The Origins of Wittgenstein's Imaginary Scenarios: Something Old, Something New

The imaginary scenarios that appear in nearly every work of the later Wittgenstein – ones involving laughing cattle, disembodied eyes that see, and the like – are decidedly absent from the Tractatus. What necessitated this change in methodology? A comparison of the Tractatus with the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein's first major work after his return to philosophy, reveals that these devices are the product of something old and something new. The rationale for these devices is already present in the notion of a “propositional variable,” but Wittgenstein had little use for them until he rejected the phenomenological language and laconic style of the Tractatus.     

Never say never

I. An argument is presented for the conclusion that the hypothesis that no one will ever decide a given proposition is intuitionistically inconsistent. II. A distinction between sentences and statements blocks a similar argument for the stronger conclusion that the hypothesis that I have not yet decided a given proposition is intuitionistically inconsistent, but does not block the original argument. III. A distinction between empirical and mathematical negation might block the original argument, and empirical negation might be modelled on Nelson's strong negation, but only on intuitionistically unacceptable assumptions. IV. Intuitionists may have to accept the original argument, and therefore be committed to a dubious view of time on which there cannot be merely inductive evidence for statements about the infinite future.     

Something Old,Something New: Revisiting Guilford's Conception of Creative Problem Solving

Over the course of his career, Guilford produced a remarkable body of research on creative thought. Today, this research is remembered primarily for its articulation of the notion that divergent thinking plays a key role in creative thought. However, a number of other capacities relevant to understanding creative thought were identified in the course of this research effort. In this article, I review this research program as a whole with special reference to those capacities that warrant more attention in current studies of creativity. Implications for current research are discussed.     

Adolescents' perceived ability to say "no" to unwanted sex

The authors examined the degree to which adolescents believe they can resist a dating partner's verbal pressure to have sex when they themselves really do not want to. 2472 10th-grade students of mean age 15.5 years from eight public high schools in Dade County, Florida, participated in the study. 49% were male, 27.8% White, 38.2% Hispanic, and 27.7% Black. 50.1% reported having ever experienced sexual intercourse. The female students were found to be more likely than males to believe that they could refuse unwanted sex. No consistent differences were found along ethnic and racial lines. The multivariate analysis identified the following as predictors of the ability to refuse sex: a less-permissive attitude toward sex, the low importance of peer influence, and, for females, a generalized sense of self-efficacy.     

What bats have to say about speech and language

Understanding the biological foundations of language is vital to gaining insight into how the capacity for language may have evolved in humans. Animal models can be exploited to learn about the biological underpinnings of shared human traits, and although no other animals display speech or language, a range of behaviors found throughout the animal kingdom are relevant to speech and spoken language. To date, such investigations have been dominated by studies of our closest primate relatives searching for shared traits, or more distantly related species that are sophisticated vocal communicators, like songbirds. Herein I make the case for turning our attention to the Chiropterans, to shed new light on the biological encoding and evolution of human language-relevant traits. Bats employ complex vocalizations to facilitate navigation as well as social interactions, and are exquisitely tuned to acoustic information. Furthermore, bats display behaviors such as vocal learning and vocal turn-taking that are directly pertinent for human spoken language. Emerging technologies are now allowing the study of bat vocal communication, from the behavioral to the neurobiological and molecular level. Although it is clear that no single animal model can reflect the complexity of human language, by comparing such findings across diverse species we can identify the shared biological mechanisms likely to have influenced the evolution of human language.     

How to Stand for Something: Toward a Genealogy of Exemplars

This paper responds to the focus issue on exemplarity that includes contributions by Kyle Lambelet, Brian Hamilton, and Gustavo Maya. The paper calls attention to ancient, medieval, and modern precedents that ought to inform our thinking about the ethical and political significance of exemplars.     

Young children use their hands to tell their mothers what to say

Children produce their first gestures before their first words, and their first gesture+word sentences before their first word+word sentences. These gestural accomplishments have been found not only to predate linguistic milestones, but also to predict them. Findings of this sort suggest that gesture itself might be playing a role in the language‐learning process. But what role does it play? Children's gestures could elicit from their mothers the kinds of words and sentences that the children need to hear in order to take their next linguistic step. We examined maternal responses to the gestures and speech that 10 children produced during the one‐word period. We found that all 10 mothers ‘translated’ their children's gestures into words, providing timely models for how one‐ and two‐word ideas can be expressed in English. Gesture thus offers a mechanism by which children can point out their thoughts to mothers, who then calibrate their speech to those thoughts, and potentially facilitate language‐learning.     

What you say and how you say it: the contribution of speech content and voice quality to judgments of others

In three studies, judgments based on separated channels (speech content, voice quality, face alone and body alone) were correlated with judgments based on combined channels (speech, face + speech, and face + body + speech). The judges observed spontaneous behavior in two different types of interview situations and rated various aspects of the behavior. Correlations between separated and combined channels varied significantly depending on the kind of behavior judged, the attribute rated, and whether other channels of information were available.