On the Possibility of Feminist Philosophy

This paper was originally presented as part of a panel entitled “Feminist Philosophy After Twenty Years” at the 1993 meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (APA). It is a discussion of the conditions that needed to be—and were—present in the United States in the 1970s in order for feminist philosophy to take root and flourish.     

Reflections on Israel Scheffler's Philosophy of Religion

The burden of this piece is to draw together into a coherent whole the somewhat diverse strands of Israel Scheffler's thought on the philosophy of religion. Extrapolating from personal discussions with Professor Scheffler, various of his books, articles, and other unpublished materials authored and kindly provided by him, I contend that he adumbrates a post-empiricist rendering of religious belief which masterfully avoids some philosophical problems, while unwittingly giving rise to others. Committed to the view that the methodology of science – in one or other of its more acceptable guises – provides the most reliable measure of the content and structure of reality. Scheffler is bound conceptually to redefine Jewish belief in such a way that the traditional conflict between religion and science never emerges. Consistent with this end, he is concerned to divest traditional Judaism of its metaphysical garb, so that what remains are simply the matters of living to which religion ought properly on his view address itself. The Bible is thus reconceptualized as a piece of rich literature, of no real difference in logical kind to any other piece of rich literature, except that it defines uniquely, along with the Torah and other relevant Jewish literature, the history of the particular community whose perception of human values and meaningfulness forms the core of what it is to be Jewish.While I have no quibble whatsoever with Scheffler that the Bible and other religious teachings provides a profound reservoir for cognitive insight into the matters of quality living and appropriate social interaction, I argue that the divorce of religious values from the metaphysics of religion is in the end misguided. My problem with Scheffler's philosophy of religion is not so much with what he has found to be central to religion, as what he has failed to find in religion. By jettisoning its metaphysical basis, he has jettisoned what is inevitably fundamental to Judaism – namely, a resolute belief in God. This being so, an atheist could more readily adopt Scheffler's version of Judaism than could the theist – an outocme which should be problematic for both the theist and the atheist.     

20世纪法国哲学的现象学之旅

大致说来,法国20世纪哲学有四个主要的发展阶段.第一阶段是布伦茨威格(L.Brunschvicg,1869～1944)的新观念论和柏格森(H.Bergson,1859～1941)的生命哲学相互竞争的时代(自20世纪初至第二次世界大战前);第二阶段是以萨特(J-P.Sartre,1905～1980)和梅洛-庞蒂(M.Merleau-Ponty,1908～1961)为代表的现象学-存在主义占据主导地位的3H时代(自第二次世界大战前至60年代初);第三阶段是以列维-斯特劳斯(C.Levi-Strauss,1908～)为代表的结构主义和以福柯(M.Foucault,1925～1984)、德里达(J.Derrida,1930～1994)等人为代表的后结构主义起支配作用的3M时代(自60年代初到70年代末);第四阶段是由后结构主义的延续(德里达、福柯等)、后现代主义的兴盛(利奥塔[J-F.Lyotard,1924～1998]、布尔迪厄[P.Bourdieu,1930～2002]等)与现象学的复兴(列维纳斯[E. Levinas,1906～1995]、利科[P.Ricouer,1913～]、亨利[M.Henry,1922～2002]、马里翁[J-L Marion,1946～]等)共同构成的多元共生的综合时代(自80年代初以来).     

On the Conditions of Possibility for Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy

In this essay, we present a theory of intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy, drawing on both hermeneutics and analytic philosophy. We advocate the approach of “de-essentialization” across the board. It is true that similarities and differences are always to be observed across languages and traditions, but there exist no immutable cores or essences. “De-essentialization” applies to all “levels” of concepts: everyday notions such as green and qing 青, philosophical concepts such as emotion(s) and qing 情, and philosophical categories such as forms of life and dao 道. We argue that interpretation is a holistic multi-directional process constrained by the principle of mutual attunement. It is necessary to assume that “the other” is a human being, who, in most cases, is consistent and stating that which is true or right. This is the condition of possibility for intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy. No more necessary conditions are needed. There is no need to presuppose concepts or categories that are universal for all humans and their languages (such as emotion(s) and qing 情).     

Gilson and Lonergan and the Possibility of A Christian Philosophy

Etienne Gilson was a strong promoter of the notion of a ‘Christian philosophy’. He viewed it as a type of historical practice whereby Christian thinkers are spurred by revelation to develop philosophical positions congruent with revelation, but which are defensible by reason alone. This paper reviews Gilson's notion of Christian philosophy and argues that the philosophical position of Bernard Lonergan is one example of such a practice.     

关于我国马克思主义哲学教学改革的思考

长期以来,人们一直在讨论我国高校马克思主义哲学教学改革的问题,并就此召开过不少的研讨会,发表过不少的文章,也作过不少实践层面上的探索。但至今并没有取得真正令人满意的效果。之所以如此,一个重要的原因就在于以往人们往往过于纠缠我国马克思主义哲学教学中存在的某些具体的、枝节性的问题,而对于一些带有全局性、根本性的重要问题     

Contesting the Will: Phenomenological Reflections on Four Structural Moments in the Concept of Willing

The starting point of this article is the undeniable experience of conscious willing despite its rejection by scientific research. The article starts a phenomenology of willing at the level of the (epi)phenomenon of willing itself, without assuming its embeddedness in a faculty of the soul, consciousness and so forth. After the introduction, a brief history of the philosophy of willing is provided, from which the paradoxical conclusion is drawn that, according to phenomenologists like Heidegger and his followers, the dominance of the will is the main characteristic of the current age, whereas scientists deny the existence of a conscious will at all. Then, four structural moments of the phenomenon of willing are explored in contrast to traditional characterizations in order to rehabilitate and appreciate the phenomenon of willing in contemporary philosophy: the interconnectedness of the one who wills and that which is willed, the transcendence and demand character of that which is willed, the self-involvement of the one who wills and the ampliative nature of the act of willing. To this end, not only sources from the phenomenological tradition but also the affordance theory of the ecological psychologist James Gibson are critically discussed.     

作为第一哲学的超越论现象学

胡塞尔将他的超越论的现象学哲学称作"第一哲学",强调它是一种由最终根源奠立的普通科学的开端和基础,它正是要研究那些最初的、自身包含一切存在与真理之起源的东西,即超越论的主观性.一切真正的科学都必须从这种科学中寻求它们的全部基本概念和原理的、它们的一切方法的、一切其他原则的最后来源.胡塞尔通过对哲学史的考察表明,这一思想也是贯穿于数千年哲学史中的统一动机,并且已在历史上取得了值得重视的成就.胡塞尔所提出的现象学还原的方法,正是要揭示这种超越论主观性的领域.他称这种方法是一种全新的反思方法,是彻底的纯粹的对自身的思考,是完全不同于自然态度的"非自然的"态度.但是胡塞尔在这里提供的不仅是现象学还原的"方法",而且同时还提供了一种有关现象学还原的"现象学",即现象学还原的"理论".     

The Importance of Philosophy: Reflections on John Rawls

This paper tackles the question whet her we should punish a remorseful offender. Traditional retributive and consequentialist theories on punishment are struggling with the question of the justification of punishment, but I think a more basic question needs to be solved first; namely, how can we interpret the practice of punishment. I state that a theory of symbolic restoration can help us to understand the meaning of this practice. A theory of symbolic restoration depends on an expressivist account of punishment, like Joel Feinberg's. Expressivism gives us an insight into the importance of the feeling of moral condemnation and it is this feeling that gives rise to the longing for punishment and remorse. Because of moral condemnation after a crime we ask for punishment and expect some kind of remorse. The question is whether punishment can be exchanged for remorse and I argue that in certain cases it cannot. The punishment of a remorseful offender is, I argue, – in certain cases – justified.     

The First Professor of Biblical Philosophy

The notion of a particular is what makes the Bible (the reference is to the Hebrew Scriptures) an original position in philosophy. (Particulars are self-contained spatio-temporal entities, and hence, though present in the system that is nature, are not essentially parts of it.) The early chapters of Genesis develop a comprehensive (anti-pagan) conceptualization of reality that gives particularity its due. Whether particularity can be secured without a fully extra-natural anchorage (i.e., without God) is a live issue. As the case may be, the philosophy of the Bible is not a footnote, not even a substantial footnote, to Plato. Plato’s metaphysical discourse cannot handle the particular. An irreducibly different, ontological, discourse is needed for that. Having conceived the new notion (the act of conception is dramatized in the theophany of Genesis 12), Abraham, the philosopher of the paper’s title, ‘called…on the name of the Lord’ (Genesis 21:33) to the men and women of the world. The particularity of God, I explain, not God’s numerical uniqueness, is the essence of monotheism.     

Reality and Philosophy: Reflections on Cora Diamond's Work

The publication of Cora Diamond's important 2002 “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy” (in Philosophy and Animal Life) stimulated the writing of this essay. “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy” attempted to show that there are experiences of reality (recounted especially in literature like John Coetzee's novels and Ted Hughes' poetry) in relation to which philosophical concepts and words encounter difficulty. The experiences resist conceptualization. By examining several of Diamond's earlier writings, I try to show that the difficulty of philosophical conceptualization of reality is due to the fact that reality does not exist external to experience. Reality being internal to experience means that reality contains an unfixed set of possibilities. Being experiential, reality is historical. The historical dimension of reality – such as the reality of animal life suffering – makes the words through we describe this reality too weak, i.e. they are not powerful enough to capture reality, hence the difficulty. Consequently, as I argue, for Diamond, the weakness of words means that words are never complete concepts. The meaning of them seems always still to come since reality seems always to have a surplus of possibilities. I suggest that because of this always still “to come” aspect of the meaning of words, we might characterise Diamond's thought as a messianism.