富民与教民之关系——以老子、荀子、韩非子的思想为例

先秦诸子生活在一个动乱的时代,他们都试图为君主提供治国的良方。思想家们普遍承认百姓在政治中的重要性,承认百姓的物质需求的合理性,主张富民,同时又对欲利之心保持警惕,希望通过教化来避免富民与逐利会带来的负面后果。老子主张君主"无为"而让百姓"自富",但富足的水平只可达到满足人的生存之需。他认为大量的财物会刺激人的欲望,主张通过君主的"不言之教"使百姓"无知无欲"。荀子认为人的欲望是生而本有的情性,主张通过富民满足人的欲望,但同时主张通过礼教来节制人的欲望以避免社会混乱。韩非子承认人的好利本性的正当性,主张通过法的规定为百姓求富提供正当的方式,而这一方式同时对国家富强有利。所以,教民并不是改变人的好利本性,而是通过"以法为教"来规范人的求富行为。     

孝道实践的情理张力及其克服——以《孟子》"怨慕"的考察为中心

面对"怨慕"这一孝道实践个案中包含的情理张力,孟子与后儒偏重于不同取向的实践进路来克服.孟子承认包括舜在内的人心中既"怨"又"慕"的情感,主张通过涵养"慕"的道德情感来转化"怨";而后世尤其是宋明儒者则偏向于"不怨",并由此转向"责己",通过道德理性的自觉与主体的反身性实践来统一理性要求与道德心理的分裂.两种进路本质上...     

评陈那新因明体系“除外命题说”——与郑伟宏先生商榷

郑伟宏认为,印度陈那新因明体系的逻辑性质是"最大类化",没有达到演绎推理的水平。其主要论据是:三支论式的同喻体是"除外命题"。首先,本文根据"除外命题"的含义反驳了同喻体是"除外命题"的论断;其次,从陈那的原文和郑伟宏的论据进行了逻辑分析,推翻了同喻体的主项要"除外"的主张;最后,通过论证得出结论:陈那新因明体系的逻辑性质是含有正负类比的演绎推理。本文不同意郑伟宏独尊"除外说"而指责"演绎推理说"为"其谬也甚",主张开展因明界的"百家争鸣"来解决争端。     

论王船山对道家治道的衍解与吸收

力辟佛老以复儒学正统虽然是船山治学要旨之一,但实际上,他对佛道有辟亦有传。不过,他对道家思想并非作纯学术的阐衍,而是站在总结、批判、弘扬、创新中华文化的高度来着力,侧重从社会历史生活中审视道家治国理念的功效及其经验教训。他称道老子清静无为、上德不德、守朴弃诈等主张;指责封建"德政""伤入尤多",认为去除僵化的道德教条则"天下自宁";主张为政者"顺物自然而无私",以柔治国;向往"自安"、"自育","胥相各得"的社会理想。以独特的方式吸收道家的治国主张并通过诸多史实验证其合理性。     

从孔孟思想的分歧探究荀子礼学

从理论承继角度看,荀子的礼学直接源于孔孟学说的分歧。孔子主张"仁礼并重",人们常用"仁内礼外"来概述二者之间的关系,而孟子则把为学的工夫化约为"求放心"、"简约",背弃了孔子依礼言仁的传统,对人文世界建构过程中的客观性维度缺少关注。荀子宗主孔子,批评和重新理解孟子的"性善论"、"法先王",提出"性恶论"、"法后王",以申张自己的礼学。     

阮元的心性论及其对汉、宋学的调和

阮元乃乾嘉汉学的殿军,为其汉学之名所累,学界对他的心性之学历来关注不够。阮元以"崇宋学之性道,而以汉儒经义实之"为宗旨,建构出哲学史上颇具特色的心性论体系。在"性"论上,消弭"天命之性",主张"血气心知即性";在"心"论上,反对以往儒学对"心"的道德性、虚灵性的诠释,而以实体化的形式论述"心",特别是反对将"心"与"仁"混而不分;在"仁"论上,主张在"以身验之"处见仁,反对将"仁"一味向玄虚高妙诠释的倾向,提倡"仁"的实践意义;在心性工夫上,提倡"居敬",反对"静坐",主张以礼节欲。阮元反对宋学"理在解语内"的诠释方式,主张"理在经文内"的解经方法,调和汉、宋,将心性之学建立在训诂之上,纠正是时宋学、汉学各执一端的弊病,吹响了清代中后期学术转向"汉宋兼采"学风的前奏。     

“应物而无累”与王弼圣人观——以王弼易释为中心

有情、无情之辨为何晏与王弼圣人观分殊之要。现有研究一般从性情关系入手,以"性其情"来把握王弼之圣人观。然就相关论说来看,王弼之关注重点似在"无累"与"应物"。王弼与何晏均主张圣人"无累",但就如何实现"无累"却有不同。何晏延续了庄子以来"弃世则无累"的道家思想,而王弼会通儒道提出了"应物而无累"的观点。王弼之所以主张圣人"应物",在于其强调"得志"之重要;王弼之圣人之所以能"应物而无累",在于其"神明茂"与"通无"。理解王弼所言"累""得志""神明""无"等概念,均需从《周易》及其易释中探寻其源。     

论儒法秩序模式差异及其现实意义——以“俗”思想为例

哈耶克在梳理自由主义秩序理论时提出了"自生自发秩序"和"组织秩序"两种模式,分别反映秩序的自主性与强制性。此差异亦蕴含于先秦思想之中,以"俗"思想为例,儒法态度与方式迥异:儒家持肯定态度,主张"美俗";法家持否定态度,主张"易俗"。首先,这体现了儒法历史意识的差异,儒家主"法古",对以"俗"为代表的传统持遵守与继承的态度;法家主"不法古",主张对传统进行变易与改革。其次,这种差异反映了不同的秩序模式,儒家因"俗"而治,重视"民"和"俗"的自发性,是由下而上的模式;法家则通过改易"俗",以实现命令的强制性和有效性,是由上至下的模式。     

中观学派对部派佛教时间学说的辩破

在东方佛教系统中,时间到底是实在的还是非实在的这样的问题值得去探究。部派佛教中的有部学派(说一切有部)主张"三世实有",认为过去、现在、未来的时间三相皆为实有。这个观点遭到了同时期的经部学派(经量部)的反对,他们主张"现在实有",过去和未来只有通过"现在"才能获得理解。而中观学派基于"缘起性空"的立场认为"三世不可得"、"时相不可得",这种"三世假有"的时间观,彻底反对任何时间的实有论,不管是三世实有还是现在实有,都在反对之列。     

老子“绝仁弃义”思想探析

老子站在大道的立场上,认为"仁义"的出现是社会"失道"后的结果,因此,提出了"绝仁弃义"的观点,主张通过绝弃"不仁不义"、绝弃"假仁假义"和绝弃"大仁大义"这三个阶段来实现"民复孝慈"的理想,最终超越"仁义",进入"无仁无义",回归到自然无为的社会形态之中。然而,在有道的社会中,"仁义"之名虽不彰显,但"仁义"之实却自然行于其中,所以从本质上讲,老子所要绝弃的只是"仁义"之名,并非"仁义"之实。     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Virtue Ethics and Being Morally Moved</Emphasis>

This essay shall discuss the moral feeling of “being morally moved” (daode gandong 道德感动) and explore its philosophical significances in understanding the nature of virtue ethics, especially that of Confucian ethics as exemplary ethics. I would like to argue that the feeling of being morally moved, similar to other feelings such as resentment or indignation, should be seen as one of the most important testimonies or manifestations of our morality or moral consciousness. It has played a very important role of moral judgment and moral cultivation in the history of Chinese moral philosophy and in its everyday moral practices. Instead of being a testimony of morality as cold laws or norms, “being morally moved” is a testimony to our moral virtues, and it should be a living motive of our moral actions as well.     

管子社会控制思想及其现实意义

齐国法家及其代表论著《管子》中包含着丰富的社会控制思想。《管子》一书在顺民心的前提下,主张运用法治制衡,培养民众礼节来进行社会的合理控制。在整个中国古代历史上,《管子》所倡导的礼法结合的社会控制手段是最为有效完善的。《管子》从治国实践的角度认为,要真正做到"以民为本",对国家和百姓进行合理的控制安排,实现百姓安居,国家长治,在治国方略上就必须礼法并用,德法并举:一方面以法来维护人民的利益,另一方面以"礼"来维护社会秩序。《管子》礼法并举的社会控制思想在构建和谐社会、减少社会道德失衡等方面具有重要的现代价值及意义。     

论健康伦理学及其基本理论架构——“九大理论”视野中的健康伦理

当代医学道德发展的走向理应是健康道德,后医学伦理学时代理应是健康伦理学。建设健康伦理学需要搭成一个基本理论架构。其组成至少应该有“九大理论”,即生命神圣论、生命质量论、生命价值论,医学人本论、医学功利论、医学公正论,医者美德论、医者义务(患者权利)论、医患和谐论。其间,按顺序由每三论构成一个“统一论”,将第一个“统一论”作为立论前提,将第二个“统一论”作为直接依据,将第三个“统一论”作为应用指南,如此,才能由三个“统一论”共同地更好地阐释全部健康伦理学问题。     

“善良意志”与道德权限

“善良意志”是康德伦理学的核心概念,他将善良意志提升到道德领域的至善地位,从而确定了道德的纯粹性。他还借助善良意志划分了善与恶的界限,指明了责任作为检验善恶的标准,将传统德性论的品质和功用主义的幸福都排除在道德领域之外。由此,康德还将伦理与道德的界限做了区分,他强调伦理与道德各自明确自身的权责,从而充分发挥各自的作用。     

Intergenerational transfer of individual differences in hereditary monarchs: genetic, role-modeling, cohort, or sociocultural effects?

Individual differences may be transferred across generations through either genetic inheritance, identification with role models, cohort effects, or sociocultural influences. Each of these four possible mechanisms makes different predictions regarding what traits display intergenerational continuities, the pattern of relationships between an individual and his or her relatives, as well as the relative impact of same-sex and cross-sex relationships. A sample of 342 hereditary monarchs was drawn from 14 European nations. These rulers, along with their parents, grandparents, and predecessors, were then assessed on the variables of intelligence, morality, eminence, leadership, life span, and reign span. Theoretically significant interaction effects were also operationalized using such moderator variables as genetic relationship, years of overlap in lives, age difference, difference in reign midpoints, and sex. The intergenerational transfer of intelligence and life span appears to be best explained by genetics, whereas the transfer of morality and eminence seems to be governed by role-modeling processes. The remaining variables were either transferred by more complex mechanisms (viz. leadership) or not transferred at all from one generation to the next (viz. reign span). The results contradict both Woods's (1906) belief that morality is genetically inherited and Galton's (1869) argument that eminence can served as a nearly equivalent proxy variable for intellectual genius.     

评中国思想家对道德与法律之关系的探索

儒家礼法合一论的真义是对“善法”的追求 ,对“恶法”的否定。因为善法体现了儒家的道德精神 ,反映了一种人道主义的价值取向 ,而恶法则是反人道的。墨家强调“法不仁不可以为法” ,其真实的意思是不道德的法律不是真正的法律 ,与儒家的礼法合一论有相似之处。法家主张“法虽不善犹善于无法” ,从而否定了法律的道德基础和价值根据。今天 ,我们在立法中贯彻道德的法律化取向需要谨慎从事 :一是注意把那些体现时代精神、合乎社会潮流的道德予以法律化 ,不能把落伍于时代的道德法律化 ;二是切忌把过高的道德义务转化为法律义务。必须认识到 ,应该法律化的道德只是“底线道德” ,而高层次的道德是不宜法律化的 ,否则就是强人所难。     

论庄子“万物一齐”的生态审美观

当先秦诸子大都以人的理解为中心去看待人与自然万物的存在方式,认为万物只是相对于人来说才具有存在的价值和意义时,庄子站在古典存在论的立场上提出了含有生态审美智慧的“万物一齐”观,即“休乎天钧”的生态和谐理念、“为是不用而寓诸庸”的生态价值观念、“万物与我为一”的生态共生气象。其“万物一齐”的生态审美观所蕴涵的万物平等共生、放弃自我中心、无用之用等观念有助于当代的生态伦理和生态实践建设。     

Why be moral: Humanist and behavioral perspectives

Students of philosophy have struggled with the question, “Why should I be moral?” Many diverse theorists have constructed elaborate logical arguments that explain why people in general should behave morally, but have had difficulty explaining why any given individual, safe from detection or retribution, should behave in a moral fashion. To avoid this problem, the notion of a supernatural deity (one who is always watching and thus removes the notion of nondetection and nonretribution) has been introduced by numerous thinkers. Philosophical systems that pride themselves on being based only on natural phenomena, however, can make no such recourse (leading to the charge, particularly from the religious, that without a god concept there can be no morality). Naturalistic humanists and behavior analysts are two groups who have found themselves unable to invoke a deity and thus face the question “Why should I behave morally?” Parallel attempts from both camps will be described and analyzed, with the conclusion being drawn that although such naturalists may not be better off than their more religious friends, they are certainly no worse off.     

Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs

Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically racist belief reflects a failure to not only attend to the epistemic risk of being wrong, but also a failure to attend to the distinctively moral risk of wronging others given what we believe.     

"明正以治国":管子行政理念初探

管子“明正以治国”的行政理念中渗透着强烈的民本意识。他相齐四十年一直坚守着“操民之命,朝不可以无政”的信条,并且将政府组织结构的同一性定位在“操民之命”所反映的民众对政府的正当要求上。倘若说管子对“顺民心”的强调是在思虑政府应当如何正当地运用权威的话,那么,管子关于“操民之命,朝不可以无政”的告诫,就是在申明政府权威的必要性。然而,需要引起注意的是,管子对于政府权威结构的设计始终无法消除其高度中央集权、强化政府管制主张的统治色彩。