The effects of control on betting: paradoxical betting on items of high confidence with low value

Traditional decision theories emphasize the probabilities and values of possible outcomes, but decisions may also be influenced by perceived control, with control defined as probability alterability. In 3 experiments, participants were offered bets on their own answers to general knowledge questions, bets that are characterized by control. The bets were fair if participants' reported confidence was well calibrated, positively valued if participants were underconfident, but unfavorable when participants were overconfident. Bet acceptance was a steep, linear, increasing function of confidence that is termed paradoxical betting. This pattern was generally contrary to the value of bets (considered either as average outcome or as subjective utility) and was steeper in slope than matched bets on apparently random events in Experiment 3. The author argues that control is a fundamental determinant of decision making that is readily incorporated in some existing models of decision weighting.     

Decision making under time pressure, modeled in a prospect theory framework

The current research examines the effects of time pressure on decision behavior based on a prospect theory framework. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants estimated certainty equivalents for binary gains-only bets in the presence or absence of time pressure. In Experiment 3, participants assessed comparable bets that were framed as losses. Data were modeled to establish psychological mechanisms underlying decision behavior. In Experiments 1 and 2, time pressure led to increased risk attractiveness, but no significant differences emerged in either probability discriminability or outcome utility. In Experiment 3, time pressure reduced probability discriminability, which was coupled with severe risk-seeking behavior for both conditions in the domain of losses. No significant effects of control over outcomes were observed. Results provide qualified support for theories that suggest increased risk-seeking for gains under time pressure.     

Information selectivity in decision making by younger and older adults

Past research has demonstrated that older adults are more likely than younger adults to exhibit information selectivity in decision making. Two alternative explanations have been proposed to account for this age difference. One explanation attributes the increase in information selectivity to older adults' reliance on prior knowledge, whereas the other explanation suggests that it reflects reduced information processing capacity. The aim of this research was to explore the latter explanation by controlling for experiential factors and varying the cognitive demands involved in decision making. Specifically, participants were faced with unfamiliar decision problems, and had to base their decisions on the available information in order to reach a desired goal. In Experiment 1 younger and older participants were required to play a game involving chance. The outcome payoff was varied between three conditions (approach, avoidance, and control). The results indicated that both the younger and the older participants based their decisions on payoff, though the older participants did so to a lesser extent. In Experiment 2 younger and older participants performed a similar decision task but with higher cognitive demands. Specifically, the decision‐making task included two dimensions of information, outcome probability and outcome payoff. The results showed that the younger participants based their decisions on probability and payoff whereas the older participants based their decisions on probability alone. In Experiment 3 younger and older participants made decisions in a sale context and received instructional cue to incorporate payoff information in their decisions. As before, the younger participants utilized probability and payoff, whereas the older participants based their decisions only on probability information. The findings are discussed in terms of age differences in information‐processing capacity, metacognition, motivation, and goal‐setting.     

Waiting When Both Certainty and Magnitude Are Increasing: Certainty Overshadows Magnitude

In everyday decision making, people often face decisions with outcomes that differ on multiple dimensions. The trade‐off in preferences between magnitude, temporal proximity, and probability of an outcome is a fundamental concern in the decision‐making literature. Yet, their joint effects on behavior in an experience‐based decision‐making task are understudied. Two experiments examined the relative influences of the magnitude and probability of an outcome when both were increasing over a 10‐second delay. A first‐person shooter video game was adapted for this purpose. Experiment 1 showed that participants waited longer to ensure a higher probability of the outcome than to ensure a greater magnitude when experienced separately and together. Experiment 2 provided a precise method of comparing their relative control on waiting by having each increase at different rates. Both experiments revealed a stronger influence of increasing probability than increasing magnitude. The results were more consistent with hyperbolic discounting of probability than with cumulative prospect theory's decision weight function. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

个体自信度对双人决策的影响

群体决策是重要的社会现象, 个体自信度在群体决策中发挥了重要作用。本文开展了不同难度和信息交流方式下的双人决策实验, 通过分析自信度和个体决策以及决策调整行为的关系, 研究了个体自信度的交流对双人决策的影响。实验结果表明, 个体的自信度与选择的正确率高度正相关; 双人决策过程是个体根据对方的自信度和选择来不断调整自己的选择最终达成一致的过程, 并通过交互过程提高双人决策的正确率; 实验中双人决策的质量明显优于“自信度分享模型”和“更自信者主导决策模型”的预期结果, 表明群体决策不是通过分享自信度进行的贝叶斯优化整合过程, 也不是由更自信的个体完全主导的过程。     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: the plurality option

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme.     

Actor-observer differences in realism in confidence and frequency judgments

Taking a social psychological approach to metacognitive judgments, this study analyzed the difference in realism (validity) in confidence and frequency judgments (i.e., estimates of overall accuracy) between one's own and another person's answers to general knowledge questions. Experiment 1 showed that when judging their own answers, compared with another's answers, the participants exhibited higher overconfidence, better ability to discriminate correct from incorrect answers, lower accuracy, and lower confidence. However, the overconfidence effect could be attributable to the lowest level of confidence. Furthermore, when heeding additional information about another's answers the participants showed higher confidence and better discrimination ability. The overconfidence effect of Experiment 1 was not found in Experiment 2. However, the results of Experiment 2 were consistent with Experiment 1 in terms of discrimination ability, confidence, and accuracy. Finally, in both experiments the participants gave lower frequency judgments of their own overall accuracy compared with their frequency judgments of another person's overall accuracy.     

Feeling happy and (over)confident: the role of positive affect in metacognitive processes

The relationship between affect and metacognitive processes has been largely overlooked in both the affect and the metacognition literatures. While at the core of many affect-cognition theories is the notion that positive affective states lead people to be more confident, few studies systematically investigated how positive affect influences confidence and strategic behaviour. In two experiments, when participants were free to control answer interval to general knowledge questions (e.g. question: “in what year”, answer: “it was between 1970 and 1985”), participants induced with positive affect outperformed participants in a neutral affect condition. However, in Experiment 1 positive affect participants showed larger overconfidence than neutral affect participants. In Experiment 2, enhanced salience of social cues eliminated this overconfidence disadvantage of positive affect relative to neutral affect participants, without compromising their enhanced performance. Notably, in both experiments, positive affect led to compromised social norms regarding the answers’ informativeness. Implications for both affect and metacognition are discussed.     

The Secrecy Heuristic: Inferring Quality from Secrecy in Foreign Policy Contexts

Three experiments demonstrate that in the context of U.S. foreign policy decision making, people infer informational quality from secrecy. In Experiment 1, people weighed secret information more heavily than public information when making recommendations about foreign political candidates. In Experiment 2, people judged information presented in documents ostensibly produced by the Department of State and the National Security Council as being of relatively higher quality when those documents were secret rather than public. Finally, in Experiment 3, people judged a National Security Council document as being of higher quality when presented as a secret document rather than a public document and evaluated others' decisions more favorably when those decisions were based on secret information. Discussion centers on the mediators, moderators, and broader implications of this secrecy heuristic in foreign policy contexts.     

The Effects of Expertise on the Hindsight Bias

We present data from three experiments examining the effects of objective and subjective expertise on the hindsight bias. In Experiment 1, participants read an essay about baseball or dogs and then answered questions about the baseball essay to the best of their ability, as if they had not read the essay, or to the best of their ability, although they read about dogs. Participants also completed a quiz about baseball rules and terminology, which was an objective measure of expertise. Results demonstrated that as participants' baseball expertise increased, their inability to act as if they never read the essay also increased; expertise exacerbated the hindsight bias. To test the effects of subjective expertise on hindsight bias and investigate factors underlying the relationship, participants in Experiment 2 ranked five topics in order of expertise and gave feeling‐of‐knowing (FOK) ratings for questions from these topics. Foresight participants then saw each question again and answered the questions; hindsight participants saw the questions and answers and gave the probability they would have known the answers had they not been provided. Hindsight bias increased with subjective expertise as did average FOK ratings. In Experiment 3, we experimentally manipulated perceived expertise but found that neither average FOK ratings nor hindsight bias was affected by experimentally induced expertise. Taken together, the results demonstrate that expertise exacerbates both objective and subjective hindsight bias but that an FOK, which likely exists only when expertise is naturally acquired, is necessary to engender the detrimental effect of expertise on the hindsight bias. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘This Is the Person You Selected’: Eyewitnesses' Blindness for Their Own Facial Recognition Decisions

The aim of the current research was to identify conditions under which choice blindness in facial recognition decisions occurs. In five experiments, participants watched four mock‐crime videos and made choices that were either evaluative (Experiment 1) or absolute in nature (Experiments 2a–c and 3). When participants were subsequently asked to motivate their choice, they were sometimes presented with choices they had not made. For evaluative decisions, concurrent (27%) and retrospective blindness rates (21%) were relatively low compared with previous studies. For absolute decisions, choice‐blindness rates varied, depending on when exposure to the manipulated outcome took place (immediate: concurrent 32–35%, retrospective 0–6% [Experiments 2a–c]; 48 hours' delay: concurrent 68%, retrospective 39% [Experiment 3]). We argue that blindness for facial recognition decisions is more likely for evaluative decisions and for longer intervals between decision and manipulation and also for conditions of increased task complexity, which we interpret in terms of ambiguity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of interviewer behavior on accuracy of children's responses

Previous research has shown that certain interviewer behaviors can evoke inaccurate answers by children. In the current study, we examined the effects of approving and disapproving statements on the accuracy of 3 children's answers to questions in an interview (Experiment 1). We then evaluated 3 questioning techniques that may be used by interviewers during a forensic interview in which a child provides eyewitness testimony (Experiment 2). All participants responded with more inaccurate answers when approving statements followed inaccurate information and disapproving statements followed accurate information in Experiment 1. During Experiment 2, 1 participant responded most inaccurately when she was requestioned after providing an initial answer, whereas the remaining 2 participants responded most inaccurately when the interviewer provided cowitness information and suggestive questions.     

The effect of question order on evaluations of test performance: Can the bias dissolve?

Question difficulty order has been shown to affect students’ global postdictions of test performance. We attempted to eliminate the bias by letting participants experience the question order manipulation multiple times. In all three experiments, participants answered general knowledge questions and self-evaluated their performance. In Experiment 1, participants studied questions and answers in easy–hard or hard–easy question order prior to taking a test in the same order. In Experiment 2, participants took the same test twice in the opposite question order (easy–hard then hard–easy, or hard–easy then easy–hard). In Experiment 3, participants took two different tests in the opposite question order (easy–hard then hard–easy, or hard–easy then easy–hard). In all three experiments, we were unable to eliminate the bias, which suggests that repeated exposure is insufficient to overcome a strong initial anchor.     

Risk attitude in small timesaving decisions

Four experiments are presented that explore situations in which a decision maker has to rely on personal experience in an attempt to minimize delays. Experiment 1 shows that risk-attitude in these timesaving decisions is similar to risk-attitude in money-related decisions from experience: A risky prospect is more attractive than a safer prospect with the same expected value only when it leads to a better outcome most of the time. Experiment 2 highlights a boundary condition: It suggests that a difficulty in ranking the relevant delays moves behavior toward random choice. Experiments 3 and 4 show that when actions must be taken during the delay (thereby helping compare delays), this increases the similarity of timesaving decisions to money-related decisions. In these settings the results reflect an increase in risk aversion with experience. The relationship of the results to the study of non-human time-related decisions, human money-related decisions and human time perception is discussed.     

No Reduction in Hindsight Bias after Complete Information and Repeated Testing

In hindsight, people often claim to have known more than they actually did. This finding has been termed hindsight bias. We report two hindsight-bias experiments which yielded converging results with different methods. All participants first estimated numerical values as answers to difficult knowledge questions, were later given the solutions, and were finally asked to recall their first estimates. In an attempt to reduce the typically found bias, the participants of one group in Experiment 1 were informed in advance about the experimental design and the bias phenomenon, while the participants of another group were not. In Experiment 2 all participants received at the end individual feedback about their recall performance and were then subjected to the same experimental procedure again, twice in succession. The amount of hindsight bias, however, remained unaffected by either of these two manipulations. These findings support automatic processes as explanation for the observed bias and dismiss motivational accounts.     

Two methods of reducing overconfidence

Prior research has suggested that most people are seriously overconfident in their answers to general knowledge questions. We attempted to reduce over-confidence in each of two separate experiments. In Experiment 1 half of the subjects answered five practice questions which appeared to be difficult. The remaining subjects answered practice problems which appeared to be easy but were actually just as difficult as the other group's practice questions. Within each of these two groups, half of the subjects received feedback on the accuracy of their answers to the practice questions, while the other half received no feedback. All four groups then answered 30 additional questions and indicated their confidence in these answers. The group which had received five apparently “easy” practice questions and then had been given feedback on the accuracy of their answers was underconfident on the final 30 questions. In Experiment 2 subjects who anticipated a group discussion of their answers to general knowledge questions took longer to answer the questions and expressed less overconfidence in their answers than did a control group.     

Sex Differences in Risk Taking: Repeated Sessions on a Computer-Simulated Task

Two experiments were conducted to investigate sex differences in risktaking behavior on a computer-generated and controlled task. Male and female subjects faced a video display of simulated mine fields with varying numbers and patterns of dots representing mines in the fields. In Experiment 1, they estimated the probability that a tank might successfully cross 100 mine fields when starting from an unknown point below each field. This was followed by the risk-taking task in which they decided whether to send a tank across each of the fields. The participants were tested on the risk-taking task once in Experiment 1 and over four separate sessions in Experiment 2. Scores, based on decision outcomes, and decision latencies were recorded. No significant sex differences were found in the participants' ability to estimate probabilities or in their total scores for decisions made on the risk-taking task. In low probability-of-success situations, women initially took greater risks than men but took longer to make their decisions; in all subsequent sessions, this pattern was reversed, with men taking greater risks and a longer time to make decisions. The findings support the growing body of evidence that men are more inclined to take risks than women in a variety of situations, indicate the importance of obtaining data over repeated sessions when investigating sex differences in risk taking, and demonstrate that computer-simulated tasks can provide a valid means for laboratory studies of sex differences in risk taking.     

Even better than the real thing: Alternative outcome bias affects decision judgements and decision regret

Three experiments demonstrated that decisions resulting in considerable amounts of profit, but missed alternative outcomes of greater profits, were rated lower in quality and produced more regret than did decisions that returned lesser (or equal) amounts of profit but either did not miss or missed only slightly better alternatives. These effects were mediated by upward counterfactuals and moderated by participants’ orientation to the decision context. That decision evaluations were affected by the availability and magnitude of alternative outcomes rather than the positivity of actual outcomes is counter to the outcome bias effect—a bias in which decisions are rated more positively when they led to more positive outcomes (despite a priori probabilities associated with the decision outcomes). Experiment 3 demonstrated that these effects represent a bias that occurs even when it is clear that the process by which decisions were made followed rational decision processes. This research suggests that when alternative worlds are even better than the desirable outcomes experienced, affect and cognition may be more strongly linked to the magnitude of alternative realities than to obtained outcomes.     

异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策的风险偏好

使用中国文化背景下修订的Beisswanger等人的异性交友决策问卷, 采用2种方法操纵自我-他人心理距离, 考察了男女大学生在后果严重性不同的异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策风险偏好的差异。实验1发现, 被试为具体和笼统他人决策时的风险偏好无显著差异, 在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。心理距离与决策者性别的交互作用显著：男性为具体他人决策更冒险, 而女性为笼统他人决策更冒险。实验2发现, 被试为不相似他人比为相似他人决策更冒险, 在后果不严重任务上比在后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。后果严重性与决策者性别交互作用显著：男性在后果严重和不严重任务上的风险偏好无显著差异, 而女性在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险。综合两个实验的结果, 可以得出以下结论：相对于具体和笼统他人的区分而言, 相似和不相似他人的区分是一种更加稳定和有效的区分自我-他人心理距离的方法。结合相关研究及理论对结果进行了讨论。     

Inference and coherence in causal-based artifact categorization

In four experiments, we tested conditions under which artifact concepts support inference and coherence in causal categorization. In all four experiments, participants categorized scenarios in which we systematically varied information about artifacts’ associated design history, physical structure, user intention, user action and functional outcome, and where each property could be specified as intact, compromised or not observed. Consistently across experiments, when participants received complete information (i.e., when all properties were observed), they categorized based on individual properties and did not show evidence of using coherence to categorize. In contrast, when the state of some property was not observed, participants gave evidence of using available information to infer the state of the unobserved property, which increased the value of the available information for categorization. Our data offers answers to longstanding questions regarding artifact categorization, such as whether there are underlying causal models for artifacts, which properties are part of them, whether design history is an artifact’s causal essence, and whether physical appearance or functional outcome is the most central artifact property.