决策的三参照点理论:从原理到应用

三参照点理论(Tri-Reference Point Theory,Wang,2008a; Wang& Johnson,2012)以底线、现状和目标为参照点,将决策结果空间划分为失败、损失、获益和成功4个功能区域.根据3个参照点的心理权重的排序:底线＞目标＞现状,该模型继而推导出跨越不同区域的以现状为分界的双S-型的价值函数,以及据此产生的对于跨越不同参照点的预期结果的偏好转换、和损失-获益及失败-成功的两种不对称性.总之,风险决策的基本任务在于,在使得达到目标的可能性最大化的同时使底线不保的可能性最小化.三参照点理论将统计学和金融学中的均值与方差(均差)分析与行为决策研究中的参照点效应有机地结合在一起;在面对不同的风险选项时,通过分析各个预期结果的均差分布与3个参照点之间的关系作出适应性的决策.本文介绍了三参照点理论的基本推论、运行原则、实证检验、以及它与期望效用理论和前景理论相比较的异同之处.同时我们也探讨了三参照点理论对实践中管理决策的指导意义和多重启示.     

Do Politicians Take Risks Like the Rest of Us? An Experimental Test of Prospect Theory Under MPs

Political psychologists have been quick to use prospect theory in their work, realizing its potential for explaining decisions under risk. Applying prospect theory to political decision‐making is not without problems, though, and here we address two of these: (1) Does prospect theory actually apply to political decision‐makers, or are politicians unlike the rest of us? (2) Which dimension do politicians use as their reference point when there are multiple dimensions (e.g., votes and policy)? We address both problems in an experiment with a unique sample of Dutch members of parliament as participants. We use well‐known (incentivized) decision situations and newly developed hypothetical political decision‐making scenarios. Our results indicate that politicians’ deviate from expected utility theory in the direction predicted by prospect theory but that these deviations are somewhat smaller than those of other people. Votes appear to be a more important determinant of politicians’ reference point than is policy.     

风险决策心理因素的理论综述

风险决策理论对于人们是否作出冒险行为的选择提出了两种比较典型的解释:一种解释把风险决策归因于人们共有的基本过程,即“较冷”的心理和认知过程。这些理论认为风险选择是由人类基本的心理和感觉机制引起的。而另一种解释则把风险决策归因于“较热”的情感和动机过程。这些理论认为,情境和人格因素会增强风险决策的动机并导致风险决策个体差异的存在。本文对这两种解释的不同理论作了较为系统的论述。     

How Affect Shapes Risky Choice: Distorted Probability Weighting Versus Probability Neglect

People's choices between prospects with relatively affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., medical side effects) can diverge markedly from their choices between prospects with relatively affect‐poor outcomes (e.g., monetary losses). We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this “affect gap” in risky choice. One possibility is that affect‐rich prospects give rise to more distortion in probability weighting. Another is that they lead to the neglect of probabilities. To pit these two possibilities against each other, we fitted cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to the choices of individual participants, separately for choices between options with affect‐rich outcomes (adverse medical side effects) and options with affect‐poor outcomes (monetary losses); additionally, we tested a simple model of probability neglect, the minimax rule. The results indicated a qualitative difference in cognitive mechanisms between the affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems. Specifically, in affect‐poor problems, the large majority of participants were best described by CPT; in affect‐rich problems, the proportion of participants best described by the minimax rule was substantially higher. The affect gap persisted even when affect‐rich outcomes were supplemented by numerical information, thus providing no support for the thesis that choices in affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems diverge because the information provided in the former is nonnumerical. Our findings suggest that the traditional expectation‐based framework for modeling risky decision making may not readily generalize to affect‐rich choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of desires in sequential impulsive choices

The present research provides evidence for a sequential mitigation effect, which is the phenomenon that participation in a prior impulsive choice task significantly reduces the decision maker’s likelihood of choosing impulsively in a subsequent task. The results of five experiments: (a) provide evidence for the Sequential Mitigation Effect using different study materials and contexts (Experiments 1–3), (b) show that prior impulsive (as opposed to non-impulsive) choice is required for the effect to occur (Experiment 4), and (c) find that the decision maker’s chronic sensitivity to positive and negative outcomes moderates the effect (Experiment 5). The results support the notion that desire for impulsive options functions as a limited motivational resource, and being consumed in the first task, is experienced to a lesser extent in the second task. The sequential mitigation effect may be characterized as a motivational contextual influence on decision making, complementing existing research showing that cognitive context effects influence sequential choices.     

睾酮对价值加工的影响——基于“累积前景”理论框架的决策行为研究

较多研究支持睾酮和决策中的风险寻求行为呈正相关,但是也有其他的研究未能发现这种关系。基于决策的累计前景理论,本研究使用动态估计参数估计任务(DEEP),结合计算模型的方法,对120名双盲给药、有安慰剂对照的被试进行睾酮对价值加工过程作用的探究。结果显示,睾酮减少了个体的概率扭曲以及增加了损失规避,但是没有引发明显的风险寻求行为,研究结果表明睾酮对个体的价值加工过程产生了影响,使个体对概率的感知更接近于客观值并且增加了对损失的敏感性。     

The Effect of Decision Strategy on Deciding to Defer Choice

Recent research has examined consumer decision making when the option of not choosing any of the alternatives is also provided. The findings from this research suggest that the decision to defer choice is sensitive to the uncertainty of choosing the most preferred option from the set of alternatives provided. Building on this research, the author tests whether the decision to defer choice is also influenced by task variables that influence decision uncertainty. In the first experiment, this proposition is tested for choice problems in which information on three relatively equally attractive alternatives is presented either sequentially or simultaneously. As predicted, the preference for the defer-choice option was greater when the three alternatives were presented simultaneously. A second study forced subjects into using one of four decision strategies in order to choose between two non-dominated alternatives. The preference for the no-choice option was found to be higher when the rule required explicit attribute tradeoffs and lower when it simplified choice. These results suggest that choice uncertainty is influenced by the decision strategy used to determine the preference among alternatives. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the results for marketers' communication strategies.     

The origins and function of the reference point in risky group decision making the case of the Cuban missile crisis

This case study explores reference level effects on group decision making during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The group is composed of American President John F. Kennedy and his advisers. The results are consistent with much experimental evidence showing that reference levels play an important role in determining preferences. The results also extend the notion of reference-dependent risky choice to the group level, where the group consists of seasoned experts who each have a different role to play within the group and who are dealing with an issue of great importance.     

风险决策中的双参照点效应

以预期理论为代表的决策理论认为, 决策者自身的损益状态对风险决策有重要作用, 因此, 将决策者的现状定义为个人参照点。它决定了决策情境是个人获益还是个人损失。个人参照点直接关乎决策者实际的得失, 具有直接性、真实性和绝对性的特征。然而, 社会比较理论认为, 与他人的比较结果同样对风险决策具有不可忽视的意义。因此, 将他人的状态定义为社会参照点。自身的现状与他人状态相比较的结果决定了决策情境是社会获益还是社会损失。社会参照点无关决策者的实际得失, 具有间接性、假设性和相对性的特征。社会参照点通过自我概念、情绪、认知等路径作用于风险决策。更为重要的是, 社会参照点和个人参照点同时存在于风险决策过程中, 决策者对两者的心理感受和行为倾向具有相似性, 因此两者将共同影响决策者的风险选择。基于此, 本文提出风险决策中的双参照点效应。有关双参照点对风险决策过程的影响机制还需进一步的探讨。     

Ear Decomposition for Pair Comparison Data

An efficient graph-theoretical decomposition technique is introduced that treats inconsistencies in behavioral data as systematic adaptations rather than random errors. This technique, which is known as ear decomposition, reduces inconsistencies in any binary data set to a basis of directed cycles. Such a basis characterizes the data set in terms of inconsistencies and its size offers an improved measure of internal consistency. In two examples it is illustrated how different implementations of the ear decomposition technique can help to identify choices that are critical for violations of transitivity.     

Now or Later? Attentional Processing and Intertemporal Choice

The tendency to discount future prospects in lieu of smaller immediate outcomes is known as temporal discounting. The current work used eye‐tracking methodology to examine attentional processing to different elements of choice during an intertemporal decision task. Our findings reveal that those who tend to prefer the immediate option demonstrate attentional biases that were predictive of choice. When losses were at stake, selective attention biases also predicted unique variance in self‐report measures of risk taking, impulsivity, and self‐control beyond what was accounted for by a discounting parameter (k), a typical method for summarizing intertemporal choice data. Overall, our findings suggest that eye‐tracking measures of selective attention may allow for a better theoretical understanding of the mechanisms and processes involved in intertemporal choice. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What a Feeling: The Role of Immediate and Anticipated Emotions in Risky Decisions

The risk‐as‐feelings hypothesis argues that many risky decisions are not only predicted by anticipated emotions, as most consequentialistic decision making theories would presume, but also by immediate emotions. Immediate emotions refer to the “hot” visceral feelings people feel as they contemplate a specific decision option at the cusp of making a decision, whereas anticipated emotions are those emotions that people forecast that they will feel once they experience possible consequences of that decision. Four studies focused on the role of both types of emotions in decisions under risk and uncertainty. Decisions were substantively predicted by immediate emotional states beyond anticipated emotions or the subjective probability attached to outcomes. Thus, risky choices may be prompted, in part, by how people feel about the “riskless” portion of the decision—specifically, the various decision options they are contemplating—rather than the potential outcomes those options may produce. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.