Basic level and superordinate level categorization by autistic, mentally retarded, and normal children

Three experiments designed to test autistic children's nonverbal and verbal categorization abilities are reported in this paper. In the first two experiments, 14 autistic children were compared to 14 retarded and 14 normal children matched on verbal mental age. Their ability to categorize pictures from basic level categories and from biological and artifactual superordinate level categories was assessed using a matching-to-sample procedure. The three groups of subjects were similar in their performance. Basic level categorization was easier than more abstract categorization, and for all three groups, prototypicality played a role in categorizing superordinate level concepts; that is, children in all three groups made more errors categorizing peripheral examples. In the third experiment, a subgroup of 7 autistic children showed evidence that their lexicons were well organized and that they appreciated the meaning relationships among words at the superordinate level. These findings suggest that autistic children do not suffer a specific cognitive deficit in the ability to categorize and form abstract concepts, as has been previously suggested in the literature.     

Self–other differences in change predictions

Individuals live in a changing world in which they predict future events based on past trends. Every event changes between two extremes (e.g., increases and decreases, successes and failures, and peaks and bottoms). People will anticipate changes if they can see the correlation between two extremes. This study investigates whether predictions about changes differ when individuals make predictions about events regarding themselves and others. Based on construal level theory, we hypothesized and found that people who made predictions for others anticipated more changes between two extremes than those who made predictions for themselves. However, self–other differences had boundary conditions. These differences were found in past trends without reversals but not in those with reversals. These results provide novel insights into change predictions.     

Linguistic negation in autistic and normal children

Young, severely maladaptive autistic children with some speech competence were compared to normally developing 3-year-old children of lower and middle class and 5-year-olds of lower class on negation tasks. All subjects were shown 12 sets of cards depicting negative contrasts designed to elicit semantic categories of nonexistence, denial, and rejection and were tested for production, imitation, and comprehension. Syntactic and semantic analysis revealed that autistic children were superior imitators and poor producers but showed skills in comprehension comparable to a 4-year-old's level of functioning. While retarded in some functions, the experimental group produced syntactic structures that were more rigid, suggesting the significantly greater use of imitation as a major strategy in linguistic coding.This work was done at the NYU-Bellevue Medical Center with partial support by NIMH Grant No. MH 07331 to R. K.     

Three‐year‐old children intervene in third‐party moral transgressions

We investigated children's moral behaviour in situations in which a third party was harmed (the test case for possession of agent‐neutral moral norms). A 3‐year‐old and two puppets each created a picture or clay sculpture, after which one puppet left the room. In the Harm condition, the remaining (actor) puppet then destroyed the absent (recipient) puppet's picture or sculpture. In a Control condition, the actor acted similarly but in a way that did not harm the recipient. Children protested during the actor's actions, and, upon the recipient's return, tattled on the actor and behaved prosocially towards the recipient more in the Harm than in the Control condition. This is the first study to show that children as young as 3 years of age actively intervene in third‐party moral transgressions.     

Priming third‐party ostracism increases affiliative imitation in children

Human beings are intensely social creatures and, as such, devote significant time and energy to creating and maintaining affiliative bonds with group members. Nevertheless, social relations sometimes collapse and individuals experience exclusion from the group. Fortunately for adults, they are able to use behavioral strategies such as mimicry to reduce their social exclusion. Here we test whether children, too, increase their imitation following an experience of ostracism. Given humans’ profound need to belong, we predicted that the mere hint of social exclusion – even third‐party social exclusion – would be sufficient to increase affiliative imitation in 5‐year‐olds. As predicted, children primed with videos in which one shape was ostracized by a group of other shapes subsequently imitated the actions of a model more closely than children in a control condition. These findings highlight just how sensitive humans are to social exclusion and demonstrate that children, like adults, modify their social behavior in response to ostracism.     

Social Identity Theory and Self‐categorization Theory: A Historical Review

The social identity approach (comprising social identity theory and self‐categorization theory) is a highly influential theory of group processes and intergroup relations, having redefined how we think about numerous group‐mediated phenomena. Since its emergence in the early 1970s, the social identity approach has been elaborated, re‐interpreted, and occasionally misinterpreted. The goal of this paper is to provide a critical, historical review of how thinking and research within the social identity approach has evolved. The core principles of the theories are reviewed and discussed, and their effect on the field assessed. Strengths and limitations of the approach are discussed, with an eye to future developments.     

Social categorization and group‐motivated interindividual–intergroup discontinuity

Research on the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect has demonstrated that intergroup relations are often less cooperative than interindividual relations. The aim of the present paper is to test whether mere social categorization suffices to create a group‐motivated discontinuity effect. In two experiments, we manipulated actors' personal versus social identity salience, whereas controlling for actors' outcome independence (1 : 1) versus interdependence (3 : 3). Making actors' social identity salient using a minimal group treatment was sufficient to increase defection in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, irrespective of whether this was in an interindividual or intergroup interaction (Experiment 1). Using a Mutual Fate Control matrix in Experiment 2, results indicate that this effect can be attributed to actors' increased motivation to maximize relative differences to outgroup opponents under social identity salience. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self–other awareness and peer relationships in toddlers: gender comparisons

Toddlers' growing self–other awareness has been linked with their ability to interact with peers, but there is reason to think that self–other awareness may relate to different aspects of peer relationships for boys and girls. We hypothesized that boys would express self–other awareness by separating self from other through claiming toys, while girls would express self–other awareness by creating similarities between self and other through use of the duplicate of a partner's toy. For 52 22–26 month olds, self–other awareness was assessed through four tasks: mirror self recognition, perceptual role taking, pronoun recognition and pronoun use. Each child subsequently interacted with a same‐sex peer for 30 min. Girls high in self–other awareness, and their partners were more likely to engage in duplicate toy use than girls low in self–other awareness. No differences in toy claiming were found. Future longitudinal research would clarify how the onset of self–other awareness relates to developments in peer interaction for girls and boys. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An analysis of observational learning in autistic and normal children

The present investigation studied observational learning in autistic children. Fifteen autistic and 15 normal children watched an adult model engage in a set of behaviors under specific verbal instructions. After observing this situation, the children were tested to determine what they had acquired through observation. The results showed that (1) the majority of the autistic and the youngest normal children acquired only some limited features of the observational situation and (2) chronological age was related to the amount of learning through observation in the normal children but not in the autistics. The deficit that the autistic children showed in observational learning may be related to a failure to discriminate or attend to the total stimulus input presented. Their failure in observational learning can be seen to contribute in a major way to the severely impoverished behavioral repertoires of these children.     

Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.     

Self‐Legislation and Self‐Command in Kant's Ethics

In his later writings, Kant distinguishes between autonomy and self‐mastery or self‐command. My article explains the relation between these two ideas, both of which are integral to his understanding of moral agency and the pursuit of virtue. I point to problems with other interpretations of this relation and offer an alternative. On my view, self‐command is a condition or state achieved by those agents who become proficient at solving problems presented by the passions. Such agents are able to stick to the results of self‐legislation over time and thereby achieve a form of temporally extended freedom.     

Prejudice in person memory: Self‐threat biases memories of stigmatized group members

The present research investigated whether self‐threat biases memory via retrieval‐induced forgetting. Results show that people under self‐threat whose goal is to restore their self‐worth by making prejudicial judgments that deprecate others are more likely to exhibit an enhanced RIF effect for positive items and a reduced RIF for negative items ascribed to a stereotyped target (i.e., homosexual). Overall, the present findings are consistent with the view that motivation can affect the magnitude of RIF effects in person memory and that, in turn, they can serve as mechanisms for justifying desired conclusions.     

Overselectivity,developmental level,and overtraining in autistic and normal children

Thirteen autistic children were compared to 13 normal children, matched to them in mental age, on performance of a visual discrimination task. Form, color, and size were relevant and redundant cues. The groups did not differ significantly in mean trials to reach criterion or in breadth of learning, and both groups increased their breadth of learning after 50 trials of overtraining. Form was preferred to color and size by both autistic and normal children. Within each group, rank on mental age was highly correlated with rank in breadth of learning. Verbal and nonverbal autistic children did not differ in breadth of learning or in dimensional preference. Even nonverbal autistics equaled the performance of their normal controls. Our results suggest that overselective attention is better understood as part of a general developmental lag in cognition in autistic children than as a specific deficit underlying psychotic behavior.This research was supported in part by NIMH Grant 11440, O. I. Lovaas, principal investigator. The authors thank Dr. Lovaas and Dennis C. Russo for their helpful criticisms of an earlier draft.     

Skill Level,Self‐Views and Self‐Theories as Sources of Error in Self‐Assessment

People's impressions of the quality of their performances are often surprisingly inaccurate. In this paper, I discuss three specific factors that contribute to error in self‐assessment. First, at a most basic level, individuals must possess a certain level of knowledge to simply distinguish weak from strong performances. Thus, a lack of skill can contribute to erroneous self‐assessments. Second, even those who possess skill might rely on the wrong information to evaluate their performances. I discuss how relying on preexisting self‐views can lead estimates of one's performance astray. Third, I discuss how motivational forces can play an indirect role in overconfidence. In particular, theories of intelligence that inspire people to think well of themselves also inspire behaviors that contribute to overconfident impressions of how well one has performed on a task. Finally, I discuss how we can draw on this research to improve accuracy in self‐assessments.     

Visualizing actions from a third‐person perspective: effects on health behavior and the moderating role of behavior difficulty

Visualizing behavior from a third‐person (vs. first‐person) perspective can produce stronger motivation to enact the behavior. However, the effects of perspective on health behaviors have been mixed. Hypothesizing that the difficulty of the visualized behavior might moderate the effect of perspective, two experiments manipulated the difficulty of the visualized behaviors (fruit/vegetable consumption; exercise) plus perspective and subsequently measured motivation (Experiments 1 and 2) and behavior (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the third‐person perspective produced stronger motivation to perform the easier, but not the more difficult, behavior. This effect extended to behavior in Experiment 2. Under certain conditions, encouraging people to visualize behavior from a third‐person perspective could represent a useful and cost‐effective means of promoting health behavior change.     

Self‐other decision‐making differences in loss aversion: A regulatory focus perspective

Drawing on a cultural perspective, we examined whether differences in self‐other decision making documented in the West can be replicated in an Eastern context. Study 1 revealed that Chinese participants showed self‐other decision‐making differences in loss aversion similar to those observed in Western participants; loss aversion differed depending on the type of decision recipient, and trait regulatory focus moderated the self‐other decision‐making difference. Study 2 found a mediating effect of situational prevention but not promotion focus on the relationship between decision makers’ roles and loss aversion. Furthermore, both studies revealed that participants did not show a preference for loss aversion, suggesting that the baseline of self‐other decision‐making differences has shifted in China compared to the West.     

Stability and Change in Domain‐specific Self‐esteem and Global Self‐esteem

A notable uptick of interest in the stability of self‐esteem has been observed over the past few years. Most researchers, however, have focused on unidimensional rather than multidimensional conceptualizations of self‐esteem. The paucity of empirical research is surprising given conflicting theoretical perspectives on the stability of self‐esteem. The goal of the present study was to thoroughly disentangle different conceptualizations of self‐esteem and test opposing classical theories on (i) the stability and (ii) the direction of mutual influence of these different forms of self‐esteem. We analysed two‐year longitudinal data from participants (N = 644 at T1, N = 241 at T2) with an average age of 47.0 years (SD = 12.4). Analyses using a latent variable approach revealed that the domains of self‐esteem were relatively stable in terms of rank order and mean levels. In fact, the size of the stability coefficients was comparable to that of other trait measures that have been reported in the literature and paralleled the stability observed for global self‐esteem. Results did not provide support for either top‐down or bottom‐up effects between domain‐specific and global self‐esteem. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications regarding the stability and development of self‐esteem in adulthood and advance the understanding of self‐esteem in personality theory. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Self‐Compassion,Self‐Esteem,and Well‐Being

This article focuses on the construct of self‐compassion and how it differs from self‐esteem. First, it discusses the fact that while self‐esteem is related to psychological well‐being, the pursuit of high self‐esteem can be problematic. Next it presents another way to feel good about oneself: self‐compassion. Self‐compassion entails treating oneself with kindness, recognizing one’s shared humanity, and being mindful when considering negative aspects of oneself. Finally, this article suggests that self‐compassion may offer similar mental health benefits as self‐esteem, but with fewer downsides. Research is presented which shows that self‐compassion provides greater emotional resilience and stability than self‐esteem, but involves less self‐evaluation, ego‐defensiveness, and self‐enhancement than self‐esteem. Whereas self‐esteem entails evaluating oneself positively and often involves the need to be special and above average, self‐compassion does not entail self‐evaluation or comparisons with others. Rather, it is a kind, connected, and clear‐sighted way of relating to ourselves even in instances of failure, perceived inadequacy, and imperfection.