Heuristic judgment of mass ratio in two-body collisions

The logic of judging relative mass from a two-body collision is developed from data presented by Runeson and Vedeler (1993). Data from two experiments are analyzed on a point-by-point basis, and strong support for the theory that mass-ratio judgments are mediated by separate speed and angle heuristics is shown. This analysis is accomplished by reducing the collision event to two elementary features: the presence of ricochet and the ratio of exit speeds. The heuristics that both ricochet and greater exit speed specify relative lightness are shown to explain the basic patterns of data presented by Runeson and Vedeler.     

Perceiving Multiple Affordances for Objects

Researchers (Gilden &; Proffitt, 1989; Runeson &; Vedeler, 1993; Todd &; Warren, 1982) have tested Runeson's (1977) claim that the relation between a collision . . event's dynamics and kinematics might support perception of the relative mass of colliding objects. Results have been inconsistent; however, these studies employed computer-generated collisions as stimuli. The present research assessed observer's ability to report relative mass in the context of physical objects involved in physical collisions. The results indicate greater sensitivity to relative mass than had been found with animations-based studies. Implications of these data for the kinematic specification of dynamics (KSD) principle of dynamics perception (Runeson &; Frykholm, 1983) and a cue-heuristics theory of dynamics perception (Gilden &; Proffitt, 1989) are discussed.     

Mode Transition and Change in Variable Use in Perceptual Learning

Runeson, Juslin, and Olsson (2000) proposed (a) that perceptual learning entails a transition from an inferential to a direct-perceptual mode of apprehension, and (b) that relative confidence—the difference between estimated and actual performance—indicates whether apprehension is inferential or direct. In 3 experiments participants received feedback on judgments of force; the results replicated Runeson et al.'s observed decrease in overconfidence but showed more overconfidence. Relative confidence depended on how performance was defined. An attempt to manipulate confidence failed, but trait confidence affected relative confidence. It was concluded that overconfidence does not necessarily signal inferential functioning and that a decrease in overconfidence might occur in a direct-perceptual mode. A theory of learning within the direct-perceptual mode, in addition to learning through a mode transition, appears necessary.     

The probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning

A probability heuristic model (PHM) for syllogistic reasoning is proposed. An informational ordering over quantified statements suggests simple probability based heuristics for syllogistic reasoning. The most important is the "min-heuristic": choose the type of the least informative premise as the type of the conclusion. The rationality of this heuristic is confirmed by an analysis of the probabilistic validity of syllogistic reasoning which treats logical inference as a limiting case of probabilistic inference. A meta-analysis of past experiments reveals close fits with PHM. PHM also compares favorably with alternative accounts, including mental logics, mental models, and deduction as verbal reasoning. Crucially, PHM extends naturally to generalized quantifiers, such as Most and Few, which have not been characterized logically and are, consequently, beyond the scope of current mental logic and mental model theories. Two experiments confirm the novel predictions of PHM when generalized quantifiers are used in syllogistic arguments. PHM suggests that syllogistic reasoning performance may be determined by simple but rational informational strategies justified by probability theory rather than by logic.     

It looks easy! Heuristics for combinatorial optimization problems

Human performance on instances of computationally intractable optimization problems, such as the travelling salesperson problem (TSP), can be excellent. We have proposed a boundary-following heuristic to account for this finding. We report three experiments with TSPs where the capacity to employ this heuristic was varied. In Experiment 1, participants free to use the heuristic produced solutions significantly closer to optimal than did those prevented from doing so. Experiments 2 and 3 together replicated this finding in larger problems and demonstrated that a potential confound had no effect. In all three experiments, performance was closely matched by a boundary-following model. The results implicate global rather than purely local processes. Humans may have access to simple, perceptually based, heuristics that are suited to some combinatorial optimization tasks.     

It looks easy! Heuristics for combinatorial optimization problems

Human performance on instances of computationally intractable optimization problems, such as the travelling salesperson problem (TSP), can be excellent. We have proposed a boundary-following heuristic to account for this finding. We report three experiments with TSPs where the capacity to employ this heuristic was varied. In Experiment 1, participants free to use the heuristic produced solutions significantly closer to optimal than did those prevented from doing so. Experiments 2 and 3 together replicated this finding in larger problems and demonstrated that a potential confound had no effect. In all three experiments, performance was closely matched by a boundary-following model. The results implicate global rather than purely local processes. Humans may have access to simple, perceptually based, heuristics that are suited to some combinatorial optimization tasks.     

字谜问题解决中顿悟的原型启发机制再探

以中国传统字谜为实验材料,采用多对多的“学习-测试”二阶段实验范式和ERP记录手段,研究了原型字谜和靶字谜之间是否含有共同字词对顿悟的原型启发的影响。结果发现,在靶字谜呈现后的700ms内,正确解决有共同字词、无共同字词和基线条件字谜所诱发的脑电活动基本一致。在800-1700ms时间窗口内,有共同字词条件和无共同字词条件比基线条件诱发了一个更正的P800-1700成分,可能反映了原型启发下原型的激活和新颖联系的形成。此外,有共同字词条件和无共同字词条件诱发的波形始终趋于一致,可能表明字面上相同的字词并没有对原型启发产生影响,而原型字谜和靶字谜之间内在的语义联系才是原型启发的关键。     

Fairness heuristic theory is an empirical framework: a reply to Arnadóttir

In this article on fairness heuristic theory, we point out some important flaws in Arnadóttir's (2002) claim that fairness heuristic theory is "not empirical," by which Arnadóttir meant that theory's predictions are knowable a priori, and are not contingent upon circumstances. To this end, we demonstrate that empirically testing effects predicted by fairness heuristic theory was and is important because this showed that the theory's propositions are not necessarily knowable a priori and are contingent upon circumstances. This implies that, according to Arnadóttir's definition, fairness heuristic theory clearly is an empirical framework. It would have been helpful if Arnadóttir had studied the fairness literature more thoroughly (as this would have easily revealed fairness heuristic theory to be not knowable a priori and to be contingent upon circumstances) and also if she had pointed out which of our studies fail to follow her line of reasoning. Our reply was written not as an attempt to defend fairness heuristic theory as we applaud, indeed are honored by, attempts to scrutinize our work in progress. Our only aim here was to point at some important flaws in the Arnadóttir article, because we think these will hamper rather than advance the science of psychology of justice.     

分类视角下认知诊断测验项目区分度指标及应用

在认知诊断中还没有指标能在无作答数据情况下直接评价项目的属性分类准确率或属性判准率。项目水平上的属性分类准确率,与项目属性向量、项目参数、先验分布和作答反应等有关。综合各个影响因素定义了项目水平上的属性期望分类准确率指标,并将其用于组卷。模拟研究显示：新指标可十分准确地评价项目的属性判准率,新指标对于项目筛选十分重要;以模式分类准确率为评价指标,基于新指标的组卷方法与经典的组卷方法表现相当。     

Implicit Affect Primes Effort: Basic Processes,Moderators, and Boundary Conditions

This article informs about the implicit‐affect‐primes‐effort (IAPE) model – a theory on the impact of implicit affect on resource mobilization – and research testing this account. Beside basic influences of implicitly processed affective stimuli on behavior, this article highlights moderators and boundary conditions of this process. The IAPE model posits that affect primes implicitly activate mental representations of affective states containing information about performance ease and difficulty. This influences subjective task demand during performance, which determines effort. A series of experiments assessing implicit affect's impact on effort‐related cardiovascular response in cognitive tasks revealed replicated support for the IAPE model. Moreover, objective task difficulty and incentive moderated the effect of implicit affect on effort, and especially controlled processing of affect primes and activated concepts turned out to be boundary conditions.     

整合模型还是占优启发式模型? 从齐当别模型视角进行的检验

实验从齐当别模型的视角,通过对决策过程反应时的考察分别对以累积预期理论(cumulative prospect theory)为代表的整合模型和启发式模型家族的重要成员--占优启发式模型(priority heuristic)--进行检验。结果表明,决策过程反应时并未随着占优启发式模型所假定的决策步骤的增加而变慢;也未随着选项之间整体值差值的变大而变快;模糊决策过程的反应时反而快于风险决策过程的反应时。无论是以累积预期理论为代表的整合模型还是占优启发式模型均不能满意地描述和解释人们的实际决策过程,而齐当别模型则能解释大部分实验结果。文章建议多角度、多指标探讨人们的决策过程,检验、修改、完善,以及建立新的启发式模型或决策过程模型(process model),以增进对人们如何进行风险决策的理解。     

Temporal delays can facilitate causal attribution: Towards a general timeframe bias in causal induction

Does reasoning occur on the Wason selection task, or are card selections determined purely on the basis of heuristic processes? To answer this question two relevance-based theories of reasoning are compared: (1) the theory of Evans (1984, 1989; Evans &; Over, 1996), which takes the heuristic viewpoint, and (2) the theory of Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995), which takes the reasoning viewpoint. In three experiments, the effect of removing matching cards from the selection task array is examined. It is argued that the Sperber et al. theory makes clearer predictions about the results of these manipulations, which are confirmed, and that the Evans theory can only accommodate them if it allows the operation of reasoning processes. The results are also discussed in relation to Roth's (1979) account of the selection task, mental models theory, and information gain theory.     

3-d interpolation in object perception: evidence from an objective performance paradigm

Object perception requires interpolation processes that connect visible regions despite spatial gaps. Some research has suggested that interpolation may be a 3-D process, but objective performance data and evidence about the conditions leading to interpolation are needed. The authors developed an objective performance paradigm for testing 3-D interpolation and tested a new theory of 3-D contour interpolation, termed 3-D relatability. The theory indicates for a given edge which orientations and positions of other edges in space may be connected to it by interpolation. Results of 5 experiments showed that processing of orientation relations in 3-D relatable displays was superior to processing in 3-D nonrelatable displays and that these effects depended on object formation. 3-D interpolation and 3-D relatabilty are discussed in terms of their implications for computational and neural models of object perception, which have typically been based on 2-D-orientation-sensitive units.     

框架效应发生机制的辨优启发加工

以亚洲疾病问题为代表的框架效应是描述性决策理论违背规范性理论的经典＂异像＂,而辨优启发式是行为决策理论的一大新进展。该研究探讨了辨优启发式对框架效应的解释过程。以经营风险决策为情境,以有管理经验的被试为样本,实验结果发现选择理由越少的情景其反应时越短、相应的优势项的选择比例也越高,这一结果有效地支持了辨优启发作为过程模型的次序规则、停规则和裁决规则存在的客观依据,也间接证实了辨优启发式对框架效应的解释力。     

A theory of learning and transfer: II

The theory of discrimination learning developed in Part I of this paper is extended to more complex learning situations such as those used for differentiating relative from absolute habits. The greater difficulty of learning an absolute discrimination than of learning a relative discrimination is predicted. The theory is also extended to cover cases of transfer. It predicts that under the ordinary training conditions transfer to new stimulus situations will be on a relative basis, and it predicts the type of transfer to be expected under other training conditions. A number of additional established facts of learning and transfer can be deduced from the theory. Methods of testing the adequacy of the theory by new and more crucial experiments are suggested.     

Time-pressure effects on performance in a base-rate task

Researchers assume that time pressure impairs performance in decision tasks by invoking heuristic processes. In the present study, the authors inquired (a) whether it was possible in some cases for time pressure to improve performance or to alter it without impairing it, and (b) whether the heuristic invoked by base-rate neglect under direct experience can be identified. They used a probability-learning design in 2 experiments, and they measured the choice proportions after each of 2 possible cues in each experiment. In 1 comparison, time pressure increased predictions of the more likely outcome, which improved performance. In 2 comparisons, time pressure changed the choice proportions without affecting performance. In a 4th comparison, time pressure hindered performance. The choice proportions were consistent with heuristic processing that is based on cue matching rather than on cue accuracy, base rates, or posterior probabilities.     

Process models deserve process data: comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006)

Comments on the article by E. Brandst?tter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig. Resolution of debates in cognition usually comes from the introduction of constraints in the form of new data about either the process or representation. Decision research, in contrast, has relied predominantly on testing models by examining their fit to choices. The authors examine a recently proposed choice strategy, the priority heuristic, which provides a novel account of how people make risky choices. The authors identify a number of properties that the priority heuristic should have as a process model and illustrate how they may be tested. The results, along with prior research, suggest that although the priority heuristic captures some variability in the attention paid to outcomes, it fails to account for major characteristics of the data, particularly the frequent transitions between outcomes and their probabilities. The article concludes with a discussion of the properties that should be captured by process models of risky choice and the role of process data in theory development.     

Perception of Sex From Complex Body Movement in Young Children

This article reports on a study of the perception of sex from complex body movement. Studies by Cutting and his associates (Barclay, Cutting, & Kozlowski, 1978; Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977) and by Runeson and Frykholm (1983) have shown that adult observers of both adult and child actors (11-12 years old) can reliably recognize the sex of the actor. In this study, prepubescent actors (4-5 years old) were employed, and the role of familiarity of observers with children of this age was also examined. Ten children (4-5 years old), 5 boys and 5 girls, performed 7 actions similar to those employed in Runeson and Frykholm's study: walking in a circle, running in a circle, throwing a ball, lifting a box, sitting on the floor, sitting on a chair, and climbing onto a chair and jumping down. Point-light displays were made of each child performing each action. Each actor was recorded performing each action once. An experimental tape was prepared in which all 70 acts from the source tape appeared in a counterbalanced order such that each child appeared once in each block of 10 trials and each action appeared once in each block of 7 trials. The effect of familiarity was explored by employing 3 different groups of observers: the parents of the child actors, a group of adults familiar with children of this age, and a student group of young adults not familiar with children of this age. The overall detection rate was only just above chance and none of the observer groups performed better than chance. Sex was reliably perceived, however, for particular actors and for particular actions. The implications of these findings for Runeson and Frykholm's kinematics specifies dynamics principle are noted.     

推理的启发式再认新模式

本文介绍了推理的启发式再认新模式,阐述了启发式再认的再认基础,介绍了“少即是多”效应,并且引用大量实验介绍了启发式再认的证据以及启发式再认的适用范围。并对启发式理论上的争议问题进行了讨论。同时也对未来的研究方向做了展望。