Reasoning about make-believe and hypothetical suppositions: Towards a theory of belief-contravening reasoning

The present study explores how suppositions which conflict with accepted beliefs are represented and reasoned about. Two studies test the predictions regarding the nature and developmental changes in children's ability to represent and reason about hypothetical or make-believe suppositions which violate their everyday knowledge and beliefs. In Study 1, 46 4th- and 5th-graders were introduced to a hand puppet, Freddy, who made claims inconsistent with generally accepted beliefs (e.g., “all dogs meow”) because he was pretending (Make-Believe Condition) or believed them (Hypothetical Condition). Participants were asked to think like Freddy and judge whether a conclusion (“There's a dog; does it meow?”) follows logically from the claim. In Study 2, 40 kindergarten (6-year-olds), 3rd–4th grade (10-year-olds), and college students were asked to represent belief contravening make-believe (pretend in a make-believe world that dogs meow) and hypothetical (imagine what the real world would be like if dogs meow) premises, evaluate conclusions of the premises (Rover is a dog, does Rover meow?) and make judgments about the attributes (growl, wag tail, purr, and eat mice) of the entity (a meowing dog) they created. The prediction that it would be easier to represent and reason from belief-contravening suppositions in the Make-Believe than Hypothetical conditions was confirmed in each study, although the two forms of reasoning were directly correlated (Study 2). The results were discussed in terms of the similarities (compartmentalization and integration) and differences (reconciliation) of processes involved in fancifully (make-believe) or seriously (hypothetical) representing and reasoning about belief-contravening suppositions.     

Reasoning about highly emotional topics: Syllogistic reasoning in a group of war veterans

Previous studies have generally found that emotion impairs logical reasoning. However, laboratory experiments have typically involved relatively mild levels of emotion where affect is not linked to personal experience. In this study we examined how army veterans reasoned about syllogisms of three types: neutral, generally emotional, and combat-related emotional. We also measured intensity of combat experience. Veterans were more likely to provide logically accurate answers when reasoning about combat-related compared to neutral problems. Participants with more intense combat experiences showed a reduced advantage in reasoning about combat-related emotional problems.     

Knowers talking about the known: Ecological realism as a philosophy of science

This Paper is Dedicated to Marjorie Grene, in Honor of her 80th Birthday     

Reasoning and concurrent timing: a study of the mechanisms underlying the effect of emotion on reasoning

Negative emotions typically have an adverse effect on reasoning, especially analytic or logical reasoning. This effect can be explained using an attentional framework in which emotion detracts limited-capacity cognitive resources which are required for reasoning. Another possibility is that the effect of emotion on reasoning is mediated by arousal, as previous research has shown that physiological arousal can be associated with decreased reasoning performance. In this research, we used a dual-task paradigm combining a syllogistic reasoning task and a time production task. Prospective timing allows to disentangle the effects of attention and arousal: time productions should lengthen if emotion takes up cognitive resources that are therefore not available for timing, whereas time productions should shorten if emotional reasoning results from increased arousal. Results from two experiments confirm the adverse impact of emotion on logical reasoning performance. Reasoning about emotional contents led to lengthened time productions, which suggests that the capture of limited cognitive resources is the main factor accounting for the adverse effect of emotion on reasoning and not arousal.     

Structural realism versus standard scientific realism: the case of phlogiston and dephlogisticated air

The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the key to formulating the appropriate form of scientific realism in response to arguments from theory change, and that the case of phlogiston theory is shown to be readily accommodated by ontic structural realism.     

Modelling the dynamics of reasoning processes: Reasoning by assumption

To model the dynamics of cognitive processes, often the dynamical systems theory (DST) is advocated. However, for higher cognitive processes such as reasoning and certain forms of natural language processing the techniques adopted within DST are not very adequate. This paper shows how an analysis of the dynamics of reasoning processes can be made using techniques different from those of DST. The approach makes use of temporal traces consisting of sequences of reasoning states over time to describe reasoning processes. It is shown for the example reasoning pattern ‘reasoning by assumption’, how relevant dynamic properties can be identified and expressed using a temporal trace language. Example traces have been acquired in two ways. Firstly, empirical traces have been generated based on think-aloud protocols of a subject solving a number of cases of a reasoning puzzle. Secondly, a simulation model has been developed and executed for the same cases of the reasoning puzzle. For all these traces, the dynamic properties can and have been analysed automatically, using a software environment that has been developed. Thus the feasibility of the approach was shown.     

Attending to the big picture: mood and global versus local processing of visual information

Two experiments employed image-based tasks to test the hypothesis that happier moods promote a greater focus on the forest and sadder moods a greater focus on the trees. The hypothesis was based on the idea that in task situations, affective cues may be experienced as task-relevant information, which then influences global versus local attention. Using a serial-reproduction paradigm, Experiment 1 showed that individuals in sad moods were less likely than those in happier moods to use an accessible global concept to guide attempts to reproduce a drawing from memory. Experiment 2 investigated the same hypothesis by assessing the use of global and local attributes to classify geometric figures. As predicted, individuals in sad moods were less likely than those in happier moods to classify figures on the basis of global features.     

The natural emergence of reasoning about the afterlife as a developmental regularity

Participants were interviewed about the biological and psychological functioning of a dead agent. In Experiment 1, even 4- to 6-year-olds stated that biological processes ceased at death, although this trend was more apparent among 6- to 8-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 4- to 12-year-olds were asked about psychological functioning. The youngest children were equally likely to state that both cognitive and psychobiological states continued at death, whereas the oldest children were more likely to state that cognitive states continued. In Experiment 3, children and adults were asked about an array of psychological states. With the exception of preschoolers, who did not differentiate most of the psychological states, older children and adults were likely to attribute epistemic, emotional, and desire states to dead agents. These findings suggest that developmental mechanisms underlie intuitive accounts of dead agents' minds.     

An empirical investigation of the visual rightness theory of picture perception

This research subjected the visual rightness theory of picture perception to experimental scrutiny. It investigated the ability of adults untrained in the visual arts to discriminate between reproductions of original abstract and representational paintings by renowned artists from two experimentally manipulated less well-organized versions of each art stimulus. Perturbed stimuli contained either minor or major disruptions in the originals' principal structural networks. It was found that participants were significantly more successful in discriminating between originals and their highly altered, but not slightly altered, perturbation than expected by chance. Accuracy of detection was found to be a function of style of painting and a viewer's way of thinking about a work as determined from their verbal reactions to it. Specifically, hit rates for originals were highest for abstract works when participants focused on their compositional style and form and highest for representational works when their content and realism were the focus of attention. Findings support the view that visually right (i.e., "good") compositions have efficient structural organizations that are visually salient to viewers who lack formal training in the visual arts.     

An auditory analog of the picture superiority effect

Previous research has found that pictures (e.g., a picture of an elephant) are remembered better than words (e.g., the word "elephant"), an empirical finding called the picture superiority effect (Paivio & Csapo. Cognitive Psychology 5(2):176-206, 1973). However, very little research has investigated such memory differences for other types of sensory stimuli (e.g. sounds or odors) and their verbal labels. Four experiments compared recall of environmental sounds (e.g., ringing) and spoken verbal labels of those sounds (e.g., "ringing"). In contrast to earlier studies that have shown no difference in recall of sounds and spoken verbal labels (Philipchalk & Rowe. Journal of Experimental Psychology 91(2):341-343, 1971; Paivio, Philipchalk, & Rowe. Memory & Cognition 3(6):586-590, 1975), the experiments reported here yielded clear evidence for an auditory analog of the picture superiority effect. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that sounds were recalled better than the verbal labels of those sounds. Experiment 2 also showed that verbal labels are recalled as well as sounds when participants imagine the sound that the word labels. Experiments 3 and 4 extended these findings to incidental-processing task paradigms and showed that the advantage of sounds over words is enhanced when participants are induced to label the sounds.     

Reasoning about conventional time as a function of conventional time systems

This study investigated how reasoning about conventional time information varied as a function of conventional time systems by using the Chinese month and Jieqi systems. Twenty Chinese students were asked to answer month-related questions and another 20 were asked to answer Jieqi-related questions. Reaction time and accuracy were the dependent measures. A cross-boundary effect was observed in processing months, and distance and direction effects were obtained when participants judged the interval of Jieqi. These results suggested that arithmetic operations were used in Chinese reasoning about months and verbal-articulatory processes were used for the Jieqi. The effects of mode of language representation on cognition and the strategies for cross-linguistic study are discussed.     

Structuralism as a form of scientific realism

Structural realism has recently re‐entered mainstream discussions in the philosophy of science. The central notion of structure, however, is contested by both advocates and critics. This paper briefly reviews currently prominent structuralist accounts en route to proposing a metaphysics of structure that is capable of supporting the epistemic aspirations of realists, and that is immune to the charge most commonly levelled against structuralism. This account provides an alternative to the existing epistemic and ontic forms of the position, incorporating elements of both. Structures are here identified with relations between first order, causal properties: properties that confer specific dispositions for relations. This form of structuralism constitutes an explicit proposal for what seem implicit structuralist tendencies in sophisticated but more traditional characterizations of realism. An outline of the proposal's response to the anti‐realist's pessimistic induction on the history of scientific theories is considered.     

Children's reasoning about spatial relational similarity: the effect of alignment and relational complexity

We investigated 4- and 5-year-old children's mapping strategies in a spatial task. Children were required to find a picture in an array of three identical cups after observing another picture being hidden in another array of three cups. The arrays were either aligned one behind the other in two rows or placed side by side forming one line. Moreover, children were rewarded for two different mapping strategies. Half of the children needed to choose a cup that held the same relative position as the rewarded cup in the other array; they needed to map left-left, middle-middle, and right-right cups together (aligned mapping), which required encoding and mapping of two relations (e.g., the cup left of the middle cup and left of the right cup). The other half needed to map together the cups that held the same relation to the table's spatial features-the cups at the edges, the middle cups, and the cups in the middle of the table (landmark mapping)-which required encoding and mapping of one relation (e.g., the cup at the table's edge). Results showed that children's success was constellation dependent; performance was higher when the arrays were aligned one behind the other in two rows than when they were placed side by side. Furthermore, children showed a preference for landmark mapping over aligned mapping.     

Vertical position as a cue to pictorial depth: Height in the picture plane versus distance to the horizon

Two often cited but frequently confused pictorial cues to perceived depth are height in the picture plane (HPP) and distance to the horizon (DH). We report two psychophysical experiments that disentangled their influence on perception of relative depth in pictures of the interior of a schematic room. Experiment 1 showed that when HPP and DH varied independently with both a ceiling and a floor plane visible in the picture, DH alone determined judgments of relative depth; HPP was irrelevant. Experiment 2 studied relative depth perception in single-plane displays (floor only or ceiling only) in which the horizon either was not visible or was always at the midpoint of the target object. When the target object was viewed against either a floor or a ceiling plane, some observers used DH, but others (erroneously) used HPP. In general, when DH is defined and unambiguous, observers use it to determine the relative distance to objects, but when DH is undefined and/or ambiguous, at least some observers use HPP.     

Depressive cognition: a test of depressive realism versus negativity using general knowledge questions

This research is an examination of whether cognition in depressed individuals incorporates a realistic view of the world or a general tendency toward negativity. Participants provided two types of probability judgments of the likelihood that they correctly answered general knowledge questions: the probability that they correctly answered each of the individual questions and an aggregate judgment, after completing the questionnaire, of the percentage of all the questions they thought they had correctly answered. These tasks generally elicit overconfidence and accuracy in nondepressives. In accord with theories of both depressive realism and general negativity, in their item-by-item assessments of their answers to the individual questions, depressed participants demonstrated less overconfidence than nondepressed participants. In accord with the theory of general negativity but not with the theory of depressive realism, however, depressed participants demonstrated underconfidence in their aggregate judgments. The implications of these findings on theories of depressive cognition are discussed.     

Representation and Reasoning about Evolutions of the World in the Context of Reasoning about Actions

The first step in reasoning about actions and change involves reasoning about how the world would evolve if a certain action is executed in a certain state. Most research on this assumes the evolution to be only a single step and focus on formulating the transition function that defines changes between states due to actions. In this paper we consider cases where the evolution is more than just a single change between one state and another. This is manifested when the execution of an action may trigger execution of other actions, or when multiple agents act on the environment following certain strategies.     

Reasoning about the future: Doom and Beauty

According to the Doomsday Argument we have to rethink the probabilities we assign to a soon or not so soon extinction of mankind when we realize that we are living now, rather early in the history of mankind. Sleeping Beauty finds herself in a similar predicament: on learning the date of her first awakening, she is asked to re-evaluate the probabilities of her two possible future scenarios. In connection with Doom, I argue that it is wrong to assume that our ordinary probability judgements do not already reflect our place in history: we justify the predictive use we make of the probabilities yielded by science (or other sources of information) by our knowledge of the fact that we live now, a certain time before the possible occurrence of the events the probabilities refer to. Our degrees of belief should change drastically when we forget the date—importantly, this follows without invoking the “Self Indication Assumption”. Subsequent conditionalization on information about which year it is cancels this probability shift again. The Doomsday Argument is about such probability shifts, but tells us nothing about the concrete values of the probabilities—for these, experience provides the only basis. Essentially the same analysis applies to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I argue that Sleeping Beauty “thirders” should be committed to thinking that the Doomsday Argument is ineffective; whereas “halfers” should agree that doom is imminent—but they are wrong.