Prospective and retrospective duration judgments: A meta-analytic review

A meta-analytic review compared prospective and retrospective judgments of duration, or duration judgment paradigm. Some theorists have concluded that the two paradigms involve similar cognitive processes, whereas others have found that they involve different processes. A review of 20 experiments revealed that prospective judgments are longer and less variable than are retrospective judgments. Several theoretically important variables moderate these effects, especially those concerned with information processing activities. Therefore, somewhat different cognitive processes subserve experienced and remembered duration. Attentional models are needed to explain prospective judgments, and memory-based models are needed to explain retrospective judgments. These findings clarify models of human duration judgment and suggest directions for future research. Evidence on duration judgments may also influence models of attention and memory.     

Relative and absolute duration judgments under prospective and retrospective paradigms

A dual-process contingency model of short duration judgment is proposed and tested. The first process, or P(t), is a timer that uses cognitive capacity to keep track of units of time. If capacity is directed toward other tasks, P(t) will record fewer units and produce lower time judgments than when capacity is not directed toward other tasks. This timing process is most likely to affect performance when people know in advance (prospective judgments) that time judgments will be required and when absolute, rather than relative, judgments are made. The second process, or P(m), which is used for retrospective and relative judgments, judges duration on the basis of the number of remembered high priority events (HPEs) occurring during the interval. When this process is used, time judgments increase with the amount of HPEs that can be retrieved at the moment of judgment. Two experiments are reported. Tactual stimuli were presented, and nontemporal information processing load (simple or complex stimuli), type of judgment (absolute or relative), and judgment paradigm (prospective or retrospective)were manipulated. The results obtained support the proposed dual-process contingency model.     

Background music as a quasi clock in retrospective duration judgments

The segmentation-change model of time perception proposes that individuals engaged in cognitive tasks during a given interval of time retrospectively estimate duration by recalling events that occurred during the interval and inferring each event's duration. Previous research suggests that individuals can recall the number of songs heard during an interval and infer the length of each song, exactly the conditions that foster estimates of duration based on the segmentation-change model. The results of a laboratory experiment indicated that subjects who solved word-search puzzles for 20 min. estimated the duration of the interval to be longer when 8 short songs (<3 min.) as opposed to 4 long songs (6+ min.) were played in the background, regardless of whether the musical format was Contemporary Dance or New Age. Assuming each song represented a distinct segment in memory, these results are consistent with the segmentation-change model. These results suggest that background music may not always reduce estimates of duration by drawing attention away from the passage of time. Instead, background music may actually expand the subjective length of an interval by creating accessible traces in memory, which are retrospectively used to infer duration.     

Effects of implied action speed on estimation of event duration

Two experiments investigated the effect of manipulating the implied speed of an individual's actions on estimation of event duration. Experiment 1 requested duration estimates from eyewitnesses to a staged event. Three groups of subjects participated, and each was provided with different postevent information, which varied the implied speed of the individual that acted out the event. Results indicated that subjects who were led to believe the actor engaged in fast actions (e.g. running) generated significantly shorter duration estimates than those led to believe the speed of the actor was slow (e.g. the actor walked). Experiment 2 manipulated implied action speed by varying the commands given by a robber during a bank robbery. The marked sound track contained phrases such as ‘hurry up’, ‘come on’, ‘now!’ which imply that the bank tellers, to whom the commands were directed, had a slow action speed. The unmarked sound track contained the same number of words as the marked tape, but they did not emphasize action speed. Both versions of the video had the same actual duration. Results indicated that subjects shown the marked video gave significantly longer duration estimates, than those shown the unmarked video. The results are discussed in terms of the reconstruction of event duration, and implications for assessing the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.     

Remembered duration: Effects of event and sequence complexity

Two experiments investigated the remembered duration of relatively long intervals. In both, subjects viewed two sequences of visual patterns. Then they unexpectedly were asked to make a comparative judgment of duration of the two intervals. In Experiment 1 there was no effect of complexity of the individual patterns on remembered duration. In Experiment 2, however, there was an effect of complexity of the entire sequence, with a complex sequence remembered as longer in duration than a simple sequence. In both experiments there was a positive time order error. Several subsequent memory tests were given in an attempt to determine what types of retrieval processes mediate remembered duration. Results were discussed in terms of several current hypotheses, and a contextual change hypothesis was proposed.     

Intervening stimulus effects on category judgments of duration

Auditory pulses (1,000 Hz) occurring between the 500-Hz bounding markers of durations being judged were varied in their position and number over three experiments which examined the effects of these factors on measures of amount of filled-duration illusion (FDI) and interduration discriminability. The results establish that the locus of the FDI is postattentive, since some of the incoming sensory information, selected on the basis of simple physical cues, can be excluded from further processing. FDI decreases both when the intervening stimuli come from a different source (earphone channel) to the marker stimuli and when they appear as part of an ongoing sequence of background pulses. Discrimination of durations containing intervening stimuli is enhanced if the filler events are placed such that repetitions of a given subinterval result. Thomas and Brown’s (1974) “chunking” model can account for the observed effects with the additional assumption that the error associated with encoding a given subinterval is sequentially modified as a function of number of recent encodings.     

The effect of actual event duration and event memory on the reconstruction of duration information

Two experiments investigated the effect of actual event duration and event memory on the retrospective estimation of public event duration. Experiment 1 provided a typicality score for each of 20 public events. The typicality score represents the degree to which the event's actual duration deviates from the typical duration of its category. Subjects in Experiment 2 estimated the duration of the events used in Experiment 1 and indicated whether they remembered the events. Typicality scores were found to be highly correlated with estimation accuracy, and to predict whether event duration was under- or over-estimated. Remembering an event slightly increased estimation accuracy. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for the assessment of eyewitness retrospective duration estimation abilities, and the reconstructive model of retrospective duration estimation proposed by Burt and Kemp (1991).     

Conditional probability judgments: Effects of imagining vs experiencing the conditioning event

Applications of Bayesian conditionalization often involve two temporal aspects: a probability judgment is based on knowledge at a point in time and is revised over time in light of added information. Let t, t′, and t″ designate three chronological points in time. E designates a target event which occurs or not at t″, and C designates a conditioning event which occurs or not at t′. Suppose that an individual judges P(EC) at t. If C occurs, Bayesian conditionalization requires that a judgment of P(E) at t′ is equal to the earlier judgment of P(EC). However, inconsistencies may result because a judgment of P(EC) at t is based on imagining C, while a judgment of P(E) at t′ is based on experiencing C. This study examines two sources of such inconsistencies. First, C normally is an abstraction of what might happen between t and t′. What actually happens may differ, such that an individual observes extraconditional information which affects a judgment of P(E) at t′. Second, experiencing C may change an individual's affective state, leading to greater optimism or pessimism about the occurrence of E. We report an experiment which documents both effects.     

Effects of attention manipulation on judgments of duration and of intensity in the visual modality

The “attentional model” of time estimation assumes that temporal judgments depend on the amount of attention allocated to the temporal processor (the timer). One of the main predictions of this model is that an interval will be judged shorter when attention is not allocated to the temporal parameters of the task. Previous studies combining temporal and nontemporal tasks (dual-task method) have suggested that the time spent processing the target duration might be a key factor: The less time devoted by the subject to the temporal task, the shorter the judged duration. In the two experiments presented here, subjects were asked to judge both the duration of a visual stimulus and an increment in intensity occurring at any time during this stimulus. In the second experiment, trials without intensity increments were added. The main result is that the judged duration was shorter when the increment occurred later in the stimulus or did not occur. In those cases, subjects had been expecting increment occurrence during most part of the stimulus and thus had focused for a shorter time on stimulus duration. We propose that attention shifts related to expectancy and to detection of the increment reduce subjective duration.     

Recursive retrospective revaluation of causal judgments

Recursive causal evaluation is an iterative process in which the evaluation of a target cause, T, is based on the outcome of the evaluation of another cause, C, the evaluation of which itself depends on the evaluation of a 3rd cause, D. Retrospective revaluation consists of backward processing of information as indicated by the fact that the evaluation of T is influenced by subsequent information that is not concerned with T directly. Two experiments demonstrate recursive retrospective revaluation with contingency information presented in list format as well as with trial-by-trial acquisition. Existing associative models are unable to predict the results. The model of recursive causal disambiguation that conceptualizes the revaluation as a recursive process of disambiguation predicts the pattern of results correctly.     

Temporal concepts and predicted duration judgments

The present research investigated whether certain conceptualizations of time influence the planning fallacy or the tendency to underestimate predicted task durations. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with one of three types of primes (video, linguistic, video + linguistic) that reflected either an ego or time motion perspective (i.e. an individual moving through time vs. time moving toward an individual). Afterwards, all participants predicted the amount of time required to sort and shelve a stack of journals before actually completing the task. The results showed that across all priming conditions, subjects in the ego motion condition underestimated to a greater extent than those in the time motion condition. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and also found that underestimations are reduced when the implied duration of the experimental session is short vs. long. As a set, these findings have relevant theoretical implications and suggest some potential de-biasing techniques.     

Relative judgments affect assessments of stimulus duration

Humans were trained on two independent temporal discriminations, with correct choice dependent on the initial stimulus duration. In Experiment 1, the durations were 1.0 and 4.0 sec, with one set of choice stimuli, and 2.0 and 8.0 sec, with a different set of choice stimuli. The 2.0- and 4.0-sec values were selected to be the geometric mean of the two values in the other discrimination. In Experiment 2, the durations were 2.0 and 5.0 sec for one discrimination and 3.5 and 6.5 sec for the other. The 3.5- and 5.0-sec values were selected to be the arithmetic mean of the two values in the other discrimination. In both experiments, participants showed evidence for relational coding of the duration pairs. That is, the test durations were selected to be at the presumed bisection point (i.e., they should have produced indifferent choice), but instead the shorter test duration from the longer duration pair produced a “short” bias (in both experiments), whereas the longer duration from the shorter duration pair produced a “long” bias (in the second experiment). Results were similar to those from Zentall, Weaver, and Clement (2004) with pigeons.     

Stimulus motion and retrospective time judgments

The effect of stimulus motion on retrospective time judgments was investigated in four experiments. Subjects reproduced the duration of a 32-s interval which was filled by either a stationary or moving visual element presented on a computer monitor. In Experiments 1 and 4, the element moved horizontally back and forth, and in Experiments 2 and 3 it traced a circular pathway. In Experiments 1 and 2, the element moved at speeds of either 5 or 20 cm/s. In Experiment 3, it moved at a constant speed, alternating direction between clockwise and anti-clockwise rotation once every 1, 4, 8 or 16 s. In Experiment 4 the element moved at linear speeds of 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16 cm/s back and forth along a 16 cm horizontal path thereby alternating between left- and rightward motion-directions once every 16, 8, 4, 2 and 1 s, respectively. Temporal reproductions were not systematically influenced by stimulus speed. Rather, the pattern of results indicated a nonmonotonic relationship between remembered duration and the frequency of motion-direction changes; whereas remembered duration was unaffected by either infrequent or very frequent rates of changes, moderate rates of motion-changes lengthens remembered duration. These findings are discussed in relation to the change models of retrospective timing, and the claim that stimulus speed, as distinct from changes in the direction of stimulus motion, is not an important determinant of retrospective timing.     

Aging and judgments of duration: Effects of task complexity and method of estimation

The effects of aging on judgments of short temporal durations were explored using the prospective paradigm and the methods of verbal estimation and production. Younger and older adults performed a perceptual judgment task at five levels of complexity for periods of 30, 60, and 120 sec. Participants either continued to perform the task for a specified interval (production) or were stopped and then verbally estimated the interval. Older adults gave shorter verbal estimates and longer productions than did younger adults. The methods of verbal estimation and production yielded approximately equal duration judgment ratios once range effects were taken into account. Task complexity had little effect. The major conclusion is that duration judgment ratios decrease from younger to older adults when the intervals are filled with a mental task.     

Children's metamemorial judgments in an event recall task

Two studies were conducted in which two different indicators of metacognitive monitoring were investigated in a complex everyday memory task. In the first phase of each experiment, 8- and 10-year-olds as well as adults were shown a short event (video) and gave judgments of learning, that is, rated their certainty that they would later be able to recall specific details correctly. In the second phase of the experiments, participants underwent a memory interview about the event and in Study 2 also gave confidence judgments, that is, rated their certainty that the provided answers to the memory questions were correct. Results revealed significant influences of memory characteristics on monitoring in that delaying judgments and monitoring judgments concerning irretrievable information affected judgments of learning. From 8 years of age onward, there were relatively appropriate metamemorial monitoring abilities in both indicators. Moderate intraindividual consistency was found across the two measures of metacognitive monitoring, with a tendency toward higher consistency in older age groups. The results are discussed in terms of the adequacy of the underlying theoretical construct.