Very rapid forgetting

Human forgetting can be much more rapid than previous experiments have indicated. Subjects who do not expect a test after a filled retention interval can rarely recall three consonants correctly after 2 sec of distraction. If there are two kinds of memory, primary and secondary, the present technique provides a purer method of studying forgetting from primary memory.     

Very rapid forgetting: Reply to Cunningham,Healy, Till,Fendrich, and Dimitry

In this comment, it is argued that the experiments by Cunningham, Healy, Till, Fendrich, and Dimitry (1993) do not constitute failures to replicate Muter’s (1980) finding of very rapid forgetting and do not undermine the conclusion of more rapid forgetting from primary memory than had previously been estimated. In Cunningham et al.’s experiments, expectancy of recall after a filled retention interval, a crucial variable in very rapid forgetting, was more than an order of magnitude higher than in Muter’s experiments, and the distracting task was substantially easier.     

Secondary memory and very rapid forgetting

Studies of recall in the absence of expectancy (e.g., Muter, 1980) have suggested that forgetting from primary memory is much more rapid than previously assumed. Two experiments examined the role of secondary memory, as reflected by encoding strategies, in determining this rate of forgetting. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the type of encoding specified by orienting tasks can influence recall in a traditional Brown-Peterson task. Experiment 2 demonstrated a similar pattern of effects of orienting task in the Muter task when recall was not expected, despite much more rapid forgetting. The type of encoding engaged by the orienting tasks did not account for Muter's results. Expectancy and orienting task appear to have separable influences on resource allocation during encoding. The presence of secondary memory influences at even the shortest retention interval indicates that forgetting from primary memory may be even more rapid than has been proposed.     

Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

Donald Davidson once suggested that a liar ‘must intend to represent himself as believing what he does not’. In this paper I argue that, while Davidson was mistaken about lying in a few important respects, his main insight yields a very attractive definition of lying. Namely, you lie if and only if you say something that you do not believe and you intend to represent yourself as believing what you say. Moreover, I show that this Davidsonian definition can handle counter-examples that undercut four prominent definitions of lying: viz., the traditional intend-to-deceive definition, Thomas Carson's definition, Don Fallis's definition, and Andreas Stokke's definition.     

Processing strategies and secondary memory in very rapid forgetting

When a memory test is unexpected, recall performance is quite poor at retention intervals as short as 2–4 seconds. Orienting tasks that change encoding conditions are known to affect forgetting in such “very rapid forgetting” paradigms where people are misled to believe that recall will not be required. We evaluated the hypothesis that differences in forgetting among orienting tasks are attributable to contributions of secondary memory during encoding in two experiments. In Experiment 1, short-term recall performance was inversely related to task demands during encoding, although long-term memory performance was not. Task demands were assessed by making the duration of stimulus presentation dependent on the time required to perform three different orienting tasks. In Experiment 2, we compared performance of that variable-length stimulus presentation to the fixed-length presentation used in most prior research. The results suggested that additional encoding or rehearsal time does not have an appreciable impact on short-term performance. Thus, differences in forgetting appeared to be a function of the contribution of secondary memory rather than a function of the time available to engage in primary memory rehearsal strategies.     

Recognition memory for briefly presented pictures: the time course of rapid forgetting

When viewing a rapid sequence of pictures, observers momentarily understand the gist of each scene but have poor recognition memory for most of them (M. C. Potter, 1976). Is forgetting immediate, or does some information persist briefly? Sequences of 5 scenes were presented for 173 ms/picture; when yes-no testing began immediately, recognition was initially high but declined markedly during the 10-item test. With testing delays of 2 or 6 s, the decline over testing was less steep. When 10 or 20 pictures were presented, there was again a marked initial decline during testing. A 2-alternative forced-choice recognition test produced similar results. Both the passage of time and test interference (but not presentation interference) led to forgetting. The brief persistence of information may assist in building a coherent representation over several fixations.     

When remembering causes forgetting: retrieval-induced forgetting as recovery failure

Retrieval practice on a subset of previously learned material can cause forgetting of the unpracticed material and make it inaccessible to consciousness. Such inaccessibility may arise because the material is no longer sampled from the set of to-be-recalled items, or, though sampled, its representation is not complete enough to be recovered into consciousness. In 2 experiments, it was examined whether retrieval-induced forgetting reflects a sampling or recovery failure by studying the time course of cued recall in this type of situation. Although retrieval practice reduced recall totals of the unpracticed items, in both experiments, the forgetting was not accompanied by an effect on the items' response latencies. This pattern of results is consistent with the view that inhibited items are successfully sampled but, because of a reduction in their activation level, do not exceed the recovery threshold.     

Divided attention facilitates intentional forgetting: evidence from item-method directed forgetting

This study examined the effects of post-cue interval and cognitive load on item-method directed forgetting. The results of Experiment 1 (free recall test) and Experiment 2 (cued recall test) showed that forget item retention increased as the post-cue interval increased. Moreover, increasing the cognitive load of participants by asking them to perform a secondary counting task did not impair, but rather facilitated, the intentional forgetting of the studied item under long post-cue interval conditions. These results and analyses of recall gains from the additional use of the independent cue suggest that the improved recall of forget items caused by an increase in the post-cue interval came from an automatic process, and that after receiving the forget cue, participants did not engage a suppression operation that was resource-demanded. The current findings suggest that forgetting is more effective when participants perform a secondary task after receiving the forget cue.     

Reply to: Roberts

In his critique of my views on supererogation, Rodney Roberts (Philosophia, 2014) claims that I treat care ethics as having a more general moral validity than other care ethicists do. He also claims that the kind of sentimentalism I espouse doesn’t sufficiently emphasize sentiment and then goes on to question what I say about supererogation. But in fact other care ethicists also think care ethics can cover the whole of morality, and my sentimentalism emphasizes sentiment just as much and as little as that paradigm sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson does. Further, the critique Roberts makes of my view on supererogation doesn’t allow for the full range of possible cases of supererogation.     

Episodic generation can cause semantic forgetting: Retrieval-induced forgetting of false memories

In two experiments, we tested whether false recognition and false recall were prone to retrieval-induced forgetting, using the retrieval practice paradigm (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). Participants encoded lists of cue-target word pairs associated with a nonpresented, critical theme word and then engaged in retrieval practice for half of the word pairs from half of the lists. As expected, unpracticed targets from practiced lists were recognized (Experiment 1) and recalled (Experiment 2) less well than those from unpracticed lists. In addition, false recognition and false recall of critical items associated with practiced lists was lower than false recognition and false recall of items associated with unpracticed lists. We argue that false memories are prone to inhibitory mechanisms engendered by the retrieval practice paradigm. The results are consistent with the claim that semantically activated critical themes interfere with the episodic retrieval of list words and that inhibition decreases the activation level of these interfering memory representations during retrieval practice.     

Subliminal backdoors to forgetting emotional memories

Weakening negative memories often requires first remembering those events. To bypass this distressing process, Zhu et al. elicited forgetting by subliminally reactivating negative memories near in time to retrieval suppression of unrelated memories. Casting an amnesic shadow over harmful, reactivated memories thereby brings new therapeutic possibilities, and questions, to light.     

Retrograde amnesia: forgetting back

Recently, the field of animal memory research has seen a resurgence of interest in the mechanisms underlying retrograde amnesia (RA) and in the use of RA as a technique for studying memory processes. A recent report from a major neuroscience lab, which demonstrated RA for an old reactivated memory, revitalized the debate regarding the widely accepted memory-consolidation theory of RA. Here, we discuss a number of the characteristics of RA and consider the findings that led to the development of the memory-consolidation hypothesis, as well as those suggesting an alternative retrieval-deficit explanation.     

Intentionally remembering or forgetting own- and other-race faces: Evidence from directed forgetting

People are better at remembering faces of their own relative to another ethnic group. This so-called own-race bias (ORB) has been explained in terms of differential perceptual expertise for own- and other-race faces or, alternatively, as resulting from socio-cognitive factors. To test predictions derived from the latter account, we examined item-method directed forgetting (DF), a paradigm sensitive to an intentional modulation of memory, for faces belonging to different ethnic and social groups. In a series of five experiments, participants during learning received cues following each face to either remember or forget the item, but at test were required to recognize all items irrespective of instruction. In Experiments 1 and 5, Caucasian participants showed DF for own-race faces only while, in Experiment 2, East Asian participants with considerable expertise for Caucasian faces demonstrated DF for own- and other-race faces. Experiments 3 and 4 found clear DF for social in- and outgroup faces. These results suggest that a modulation of face memory by motivational processes is limited to faces with which we have acquired perceptual expertise. Thus, motivation alone is not sufficient to modulate memory for other-race faces and cannot fully explain the ORB.     

When intended remembering leads to unintended forgetting

As a means of clarifying the memory dynamics that underlie retrieval-induced forgetting, we explored how instructing participants either to remember or to forget a previously presented list of items influences the susceptibility of those items to inhibition. According to the inhibitory account of retrieval-induced forgetting, it is the items that interfere most with retrieval practice that should be the most susceptible to the effects of inhibition. Consistent with this prediction, items from lists that participants were told to remember suffered from significantly more retrieval-induced forgetting than did items from lists that participants were told to forget.     

When intended remembering leads to unintended forgetting

As a means of clarifying the memory dynamics that underlie retrieval-induced forgetting, we explored how instructing participants either to remember or to forget a previously presented list of items influences the susceptibility of those items to inhibition. According to the inhibitory account of retrieval-induced forgetting, it is the items that interfere most with retrieval practice that should be the most susceptible to the effects of inhibition. Consistent with this prediction, items from lists that participants were told to remember suffered from significantly more retrieval-induced forgetting than did items from lists that participants were told to forget.