Recognition times of different views of 56 depth-rotated objects: A note concerning Verfaillie and Boutsen (1995)

The present study examines the effect of thegoodness of view on the minimal exposure time required to recognize depth-rotated objects. In a previous study, Verfaillie and Boutsen (1995) derived scales of goodness of view, using a new corpus of images of depth-rotated objects. In the present experiment, a subset of this corpus (five views of 56 objects) is used to determine the recognition exposure time for each view, by increasing exposure time across successive presentations until the object is recognized. The results indicate that, for two thirds of the objects,good views are recognized more frequently and have lower recognition exposure times thanbad views.     

Von Wright and Wittgenstein on (the Varieties of) Goodness and Family Resemblance: A Constructive Rejoinder to Klagge (2018)

James C. Klagge (2018) readings of G. H. von Wright's and Wittgenstein's views concerning goodness and family resemblance are criticised and new interpretations are provided: Pace Klagge, (i) von Wright's arguments against goodness as a family-resemblance concept do not concern cases of goodness but the interrelations between the conceptual varieties of goodness; (ii) Wittgenstein did not endorse a ‘constitutivist account of goodness’ in his 1933 lectures; and (iii) Wittgenstein did not come close to Stevenson's emotivism in his Philosophical Investigations. Rather, Wittgenstein's later remarks on goodness may be read as ‘objects of comparison’ (PI §130), implying no strong theoretical commitments.     

Multidimensional scaling by optimizing goodness of fit to a nonmetric hypothesis

Multidimensional scaling is the problem of representingn objects geometrically byn points, so that the interpoint distances correspond in some sense to experimental dissimilarities between objects. In just what sense distances and dissimilarities should correspond has been left rather vague in most approaches, thus leaving these approaches logically incomplete. Our fundamental hypothesis is that dissimilarities and distances are monotonically related. We define a quantitative, intuitively satisfying measure of goodness of fit to this hypothesis. Our technique of multidimensional scaling is to compute that configuration of points which optimizes the goodness of fit. A practical computer program for doing the calculations is described in a companion paper.     

G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons

Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.     

An examination of the effects of axis foreshortening, monocular depth cues, and visual field on object identification

Four experiments are reported on the identification of line drawings of common objects. In each experiment, performance on “unconventional” views of the objects, in which the major axis of the object was foreshortened, was compared to performance on more “conventional” views without appreciable foreshortening. In each experiment, except Experiment 2, where performance on the two views was experimentally equated, the foreshortened views were more difficult to identify than were the conventional views. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that if the foreshortened views were presented on a background with strong monocular depth cues, object identification was improved. This result suggests that part of the difficulty in identifying objects depicted from such a view stems from an improper depth interpretation of the object depictions. Experiments 3 and 4 examined visual field differences in the identification of the two types of object view. Results reported in the neuropsychological literature have shown that people with right-hemisphere damage have particular difficulty with the identification of unconventional views of objects that foreshorten major axes. Accordingly, it was expected that there would be a left visual field advantage for the foreshortened views. Neither experiment yielded any visual field effects consistent with this expectation. Possible reasons for the lack of a field effect are discussed.     

Logical structuralism and Benacerraf’s problem

There are two general questions which many views in the philosophy of mathematics can be seen as addressing: what are mathematical objects, and how do we have knowledge of them? Naturally, the answers given to these questions are linked, since whatever account we give of how we have knowledge of mathematical objects surely has to take into account what sorts of things we claim they are; conversely, whatever account we give of the nature of mathematical objects must be accompanied by a corresponding account of how it is that we acquire knowledge of those objects. The connection between these problems results in what is often called “Benacerraf’s Problem”, which is a dilemma that many philosophical views about mathematical objects face. It will be my goal here to present a view, attributed to Richard Dedekind, which approaches the initial questions in a different way than many other philosophical views do, and in doing so, avoids the dilemma given by Benacerraf’s problem.     

Parsing the rainbow

Navigating the ontology of color used to be a simple affair. There was the naive view that colors really are in objects the way they appear, and the view that they are secondary qualities to cause certain experiences in us. Today, there are myriad well-developed views but no satisfactory taxonomy of philosophical theories on color. In this article, I first examine the two newest taxonomies on offer and argue that they are inadequate. In particular, I look at Brogaard’s taxonomy and then Cohen’s. One of the reasons I am displeased with Brogaard and Cohen’s taxonomies is that I find it implausible that dispositions are relational properties. I provide an argument against this way of classifying dispositions. Having learned from the vices and virtues of Brogaard and Cohens’ taxonomies, I provide what I believe is a much-enhanced way of taxonomizing philosophical views on color. My taxonomy rules out certain views, clarifies others, and shows that there is an unnoticed view worthy of consideration.     

Cluster differences scaling with a within-clusters loss component and a fuzzy successive approximation strategy to avoid local minima

Cluster differences scaling is a method for partitioning a set of objects into classes and simultaneously finding a low-dimensional spatial representation ofK cluster points, to model a given square table of dissimilarities amongn stimuli or objects. The least squares loss function of cluster differences scaling, originally defined only on the residuals of pairs of objects that are allocated to different clusters, is extended with a loss component for pairs that are allocated to the same cluster. It is shown that this extension makes the method equivalent to multidimensional scaling with cluster constraints on the coordinates. A decomposition of the sum of squared dissimilarities into contributions from several sources of variation is described, including the appropriate degrees of freedom for each source. After developing a convergent algorithm for fitting the cluster differences model, it is argued that the individual objects and the cluster locations can be jointly displayed in a configuration obtained as a by-product of the optimization. Finally, the paper introduces a fuzzy version of the loss function, which can be used in a successive approximation strategy for avoiding local minima. A simulation study demonstrates that this strategy significantly outperforms two other well-known initialization strategies, and that it has a success rate of 92 out of 100 in attaining the global minimum.     

The role of sequence order in determining view canonicality for novel wire-frame objects

Objects are best recognized from so-called “canonical” views. The characteristics of canonical views of arbitrary objects have been qualitatively described using a variety of different criteria, but little is known regarding how these views might be acquired during object learning. We address this issue, in part, by examining the role of object motion in the selection of preferred views of novel objects. Specifically, we adopt a modeling approach to investigate whether or not the sequence of views seen during initial exposure to an object contributes to observers’ preferences for particular images in the sequence. In two experiments, we exposed observers to short sequences depicting rigidly rotating novel objects and subsequently collected subjective ratings of view canonicality (Experiment 1) and recall rates for individual views (Experiment 2). Given these two operational definitions of view canonicality, we attempted to fit both sets of behavioral data with a computational model incorporating 3-D shape information (object foreshortening), as well as information relevant to the temporal order of views presented during training (the rate of change for object foreshortening). Both sets of ratings were reasonably well predicted using only 3-D shape; the inclusion of terms that capture sequence order improved model performance significantly.     

Intimations of The Good: Iris Murdoch, Richard Swinburne and the Promise of Theism

Perhaps no one in the English speaking world has carried on a philosophical defence of theism like Richard Swinburne. Yet in all of Swinburne's work there is little use of a long-standing view in the Christian tradition that God is good, and that his goodness is interchangeable with his being. While Swinburne does little with the idea of goodness, Iris Murdoch proposes an anti-theistic view that insists on the Good without God. My argument is that both Swinburne's indifference to the notion of the good and Murdoch's 'Good without God' take away from the promise of theism. I suggest an Augustinian alternative that insists on the equation of God and the Good without falling into the problems inherent in both Swinburne and Murdoch's views.     

No symmetry advantage when object matching involves accidental viewpoints

The presupposed advantage of symmetrical objects over asymmetrical objects was investigated in an object matching task, using accidental and non-accidental viewpoints. In addition, the accidental views could be symmetric or asymmetric. When two non-accidental views were presented, symmetrical objects were matched faster than asymmetrical objects. When an accidental view was presented first (followed by a non-accidental view), the matching of symmetrical objects was equal to that of asymmetrical objects. When a non-accidental view was presented first (followed by an accidental view), matching was again equal for the symmetrical and asymmetrical objects, although much faster compared with the opposite sequence of presented views. No effects of image symmetry in the accidental viewpoints were found. Apparently, the advantage of symmetrical objects over asymmetrical objects is only present in object matching when 3-D object structures are visible.     

Explaining normative reasons

In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support-explanationism, for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ-ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism—ought-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about goodness—as well as the popular Reasons-First view, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be normatively fundamental. Support-explanationism, we argue, enjoys many of the virtues of these views while avoiding their drawbacks. We conclude by exploring several further important implications: among other things, we argue that the influential metaphor of ‘weighing’ reasons is inapt, and propose a better one; that, contrary to what Berker (2019) suggests, there's no reason for non-naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons-First view; and that, contrary to what Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist views can successfully accommodate what he calls ‘redundant reasons’.     

Imagination and insight: a new acount of the content of thought experiments

This paper motivates, explains, and defends a new account of the content of thought experiments. I begin by briefly surveying and critiquing three influential accounts of thought experiments: James Robert Brown’s Platonist account, John Norton’s deflationist account that treats them as picturesque arguments, and a cluster of views that I group together as mental model accounts. I use this analysis to motivate a set of six desiderata for a new approach. I propose that we treat thought experiments primarily as aesthetic objects, specifically fictions, and then use this analysis to characterize their content and ultimately assess their epistemic success. Taking my starting point from Kendall Walton’s account of representation (Mimesis as make-believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990), I argue that the best way to understand the content of thought experiments is to treat them as props for imagining fictional worlds. Ultimately, I maintain that, in terms of their form and content, thought experiments share more with literary fictions and pictorial representations than with either argumentation or observations of the Platonic realm. Moreover, while they inspire imaginings, thought experiments themselves are not mental kinds. My approach redirects attention towards what fixes the content of any given thought experiment and scrutinizes the assumptions, cognitive capacities and conventions that generate them. This view helps to explain what seems plausible about Brown’s, Norton’s, and the mental modelers’ views.     

Simultaneous classification and multidimensional scaling with external information

For the exploratory analysis of a matrix of proximities or (dis)similarities between objects, one often uses cluster analysis (CA) or multidimensional scaling (MDS). Solutions resulting from such analyses are sometimes interpreted using external information on the objects. Usually the procedures of CA, MDS and using external information are carried out independently and sequentially, although combinations of two of the three procedures (CA and MDS, or multidimensional scaling and using external information) have been proposed in the literature. The present paper offers a procedure that combines all three procedures in one analysis, using a model that describes a partition of objects with cluster centroids represented in a low-dimensional space, which in turn is related to the information in the external variables. A simulation study is carried out to demonstrate that the method works satisfactorily for data with a known underlying structure. Also, to illustrate the method, it is applied to two empirical data sets.     

Generalization to novel views from view combination

Four experiments examined whether or not exposure to two views (A and B) of a novel object improves generalization to a third view (C) through view combination on tasks that required symmetry or recognition memory decisions. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that exposure to either View A or View B alone produced little or no generalization to View C on either task. The results of Experiment 2 indicated that exposure to both View A and View B did improve generalization to View C, but only for symmetrical objects. Experiment 3 replicated this generalization advantage for symmetrical but not asymmetrical objects, when objects were well learned at study. The results of Experiment 4 showed that Views A and B did not have to be presented consecutively to facilitate responses to View C. Together, the pattern of results suggests that generalization to novel views does occur through view combination of temporally separated views, but it is more likely to be observed with symmetrical objects.     

Constraints on view combination: effects of self-occlusion and differences among familiar and novel views

The use of multiple familiar views of objects to facilitate recognition of novel views has been addressed in a number of behavioral studies, but the results have not been conclusive. The present study was a comprehensive examination of view combination for different types of novel views (internal or external to the studied views) and different objects (amoeboid objects and objects composed of geons; objects with and without self-occlusion across rotation). The authors found that the advantage gained from the study of 2 views was more than the generalization from each of the studied views presented alone. This facilitation occurred only for internal views but not external views. In addition, the benefits from the study of 2 views diminished when (a) the studied views did not share the same visible features and when (b) the studied views were separated by a small angular difference.     

God’s moral goodness and supererogation

What do we understand by God’s goodness? William Alston claims that by answering this question convincingly, divine command theory can be strengthened against some major objections. He rejects the idea that God’s goodness lies in the area of moral obligations. Instead, he proposes that God’s goodness is best described by the phenomenon of supererogation. Joseph Lombardi, in response, agrees with Alston that God does not have moral obligations but says that having rejected moral obligation as the content of divine goodness, Alston cannot help himself to supererogation as a solution to the content of God’s moral goodness. If God has no moral obligations and does not perform supererogatory acts, Lombardi suggests that God’s goodness may be explicated through concentrating on God’s benevolence, but he does not develop this theme. I propose that Alston’s idea of divine supererogation without obligation is sustainable, but that a reshaping of the concept of supererogation is required; one in which love, rather than benevolence, plays an important part. If the love associated with supererogation is characterised in a certain way, I suggest this adds a new angle to the understanding of divine goodness.     

A critique of Vihvelin's Three-fold Classification

In this essay, I argue for the rejection of Vihvelin's ‘Three-fold Classification’ (3-FC), a nonstandard taxonomy of free-will compatibilism, incompatibilism, and impossibilism. Vihvelin is right that the standard taxonomy of these views is inadequate, and that a new taxonomy is needed to clarify the free-will debate. Significantly, Vihvelin notes that the standard formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ does not capture the historically popular view that deterministic laws pose a threat to free will. Vihvelin's proposed solution is to redefine ‘incompatibilism.’ However, Vihvelin's formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ is flawed according to her own arguments. In addition, Vihvelin's characterization of ‘compatibilism’ is (at best) incomplete, and at least two important free-will views are missing from her proposed taxonomy. Given the problems with Vihvelin's arguments for 3-FC, her novel view of the dialectic between the major free-will views lacks support.     

The Attractions and Delights of Goodness

What makes something good for me? Most contemporary philosophers argue that something cannot count as good for me unless I am in some way attracted to it, or take delight in it. However, subjectivist theories of prudential value face difficulties, and there is no consensus about how these difficulties should be resolved. Whether one opts for a hedonist or a desire-satisfaction account of prudential value, certain fundamental assumptions about human well-being must be abandoned. I argue that we should reconsider Plato's objectivist theory of goodness as unity, or the One. This view is both consistent with and explains our most basic views both about goodness in general and human well-being in particular.     

The visual representation of three-dimensional, rotating objects.

Depth rotations can reveal new object parts and result in poor recognition of "static" objects (Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993). Recent studies have suggested that multiple object views can be associated through temporal contiguity and similarity (Edelman & Weinshall, 1991; Lawson, Humphreys & Watson, 1994; Wallis, 1996). Motion may also play an important role in object recognition since observers recognize novel views of objects rotating in the picture plane more readily than novel views of statically re-oriented objects (Kourtzi & Shiffrar, 1997). The series of experiments presented here investigated how different views of a depth-rotated object might be linked together even when these views do not share the same parts. The results suggest that depth rotated object views can be linked more readily with motion than with temporal sequence alone to yield priming of novel views of 3D objects that fall in between "known" views. Motion can also enhance path specific view linkage when visible object parts differ across views. Such results suggest that object representations depend on motion processes.