Thai Meditation Lineages Abroad: Creating Networks of Exchange

International travel is a significant component in the making of transnational Buddhism. This article argues that through even limited international travel and exchange with Buddhist teachers, networks of exchange can be created. Focusing on international meditation centres in Thailand, I delineate three mediums through which meditation teachers, in conjunction with their students, build institutional transnational links. Using case studies from various lineages and teachers within Thailand’s international meditation centres, this article reveals the stories and relationships that spread Thai Buddhist meditation abroad. In this context I also explore the effects of lineage and missionization within this process of travel and exchange.     

Cogency in Motion: Critical Contextualism and Relevance

If arguments are to generate public knowledge, as in the sciences, then they must travel, finding acceptance across a range of local contexts. But not all good arguments travel, whereas some bad arguments do. Under what conditions may we regard the capacity of an argument to travel as a sign of its cogency or public merits? This question is especially interesting for a contextualist approach that wants to remain critically robust: if standards of cogency are bound to local contexts of evaluation, then how may arguments legitimately travel at all? The key to a contextualist conception of cogent travel, I argue, lies in the way local contexts are linked to broader contexts of evaluation by relations of relevance. The burden of the article is to elaborate the different forms these relations can take in the travel of scientific arguments.     

No End in Sight: Causal Loops in Philosophy, Physics and Fiction

There have been many objections to the possibility oftime travel. But all the truly interesting ones concern the possibility of reversecausation. What is objectionable about reverse causation? I diagnose that the trulyinteresting objections are to a further possibility: that of causal loops. I raisedoubts about whether there must be causal loops if reverse causation obtains; but devote themajority of the paper to describing, and dispelling concerns about, various kinds ofcausal loop. In short, I argue that they are neither logically nor physically impossible.The only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidenceis required to explain them. Just how coincidental a loop will be varies: some arereally quite ordinary, and some are incredibly unlikely. I end by speculating thatthe tendency amongst physicists to avoid discussion of causal loops involving intentionalaction may have been unfortunate, since intentional action is an excellent way tonon-mysteriously bring about what otherwise would have been an unlikely coincidence. Hencecausal loops may be more likely in a world with beings like us, than in one without.     

Future Thinking in Young Children

ABSTRACT— The study of future thinking is gaining momentum across various domains of psychology. Mentally projecting the self forward in time (i.e., mental time travel) is argued to be uniquely human and of vital importance to the evolution of human culture. Yet it is only recently that developmentalists have begun to study when, and how, this capacity emerges. I begin by outlining the concept of mental time travel, along with newly developed methodologies to test children's ability to mentally project the self into the future. Data suggest that this ability is in place by ages 4 or 5 but also reveal conditions under which children may experience difficulty accurately predicting their future desires. I conclude by discussing how the research on children's mental time travel can be used to further our understanding of the development of future-oriented behaviors, including planning and delaying gratification.     

Self in time and language

Time has been considered a crucial factor in distinguishing between two levels of self-awareness: the “core,” or “minimal self,” and the “extended,” or “narrative self.” Herein, I focus on this last concept of the self and, in particular, on the relationship between the narrative self and language. In opposition to the claim that the narrative self is a linguistic construction, my idea is that it is created by the functioning of mental time travel, that is, the faculty of human beings to project themselves mentally backwards in time to relive, or forward to anticipate, events. Moreover, I propose that narrative language itself should be considered a product of a core brain network that includes mechanisms, such as mental time travel, mindreading, and visuo-spatial systems.     

The Principal Paradox of Time Travel

Most arguments against the possibility of time travel use the same old, familiar objection: If I could travel back in time, then I could kill my earlier (i.e. younger) self. Since I do exist such an action would result in a contradiction. Therefore time travel is impossible. This is a statement of the Principal Paradox of Time Travel. Some philosophers have argued that such actions as attempting to kill one's earlier self would always fail and that there is nothing especially strange about such failures. Despite these arguments, the problem generally is not viewed as being solved in favour of time travel. The above objection to time travel is also used to dismiss a particular class of cosmological models as being unphysical. This paper provides a solution to the Principal Paradox by exploring both the logical and causal implications of time travel.     

Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument

The most potentially powerful objection to the possibility oftime travel stems from the fact that it can, under the right conditions, give rise to closedcausal loops, and closed causal loops can be turned into self-defeating causal chains;folks killing their infant selves, setting out to destroy the world before they were born,and the like. It used to be thought that such chains present paradoxes; the receivedwisdom nowadays is that they give rise to physical anomalies in the form of inexplicably correlated events. I argue against the received wisdom. I can find nothing in them that argues against the possibility (even, the probability) of time travel.     

TIME TRAVEL WITHOUT CAUSAL LOOPS

It has sometimes been suggested that backwards time travel always incurs causal loops. I show that this is mistaken, by describing worlds where backwards time travel occurs and yet no causal loops occur. Arguments that backwards time travel can occur without causal loops have been given before in the literature, but I show that those arguments are unconvincing.     

How to Know That Time Travel Is Unlikely Without Knowing Why

What's the point of time travel? Not to change the past; no matter how carefully a time traveler plans, all of her attempts to change the past end in failure. Paul Horwich has argued that the implausibility of such failures gives us reason to doubt that there will be frequent time travel to the local past. I defend a modified version of Horwich's argument and show how we might gain evidence about the chance of there being frequent time travel in the future without having any information that explains why that chance value obtains.     

A Dilemma for Eternalists

Philosophia - In this discussion I argue that, given the possibility of travel to the past, eternalists face a dilemma. They must choose between fatalism and the denial of an intuitive claim about...     

What time travelers cannot not do (but are responsible for anyway)

The Principle of Alternative Possibilities is the intuitive idea that someone is morally responsible for an action only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt has famously presented putative counterexamples to this intuitive principle. In this paper, I formulate a simple version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities that invokes a course-grained notion of actions. After warming up with a Frankfurt-Style Counterexample to this principle, I introduce a new kind of counterexample based on the possibility of time travel. At the end of the paper, I formulate a more sophisticated version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities that invokes a certain fine grained notion of actions. I then explain how this new kind of counterexample can be augmented to show that even the more sophisticated principle is false.     

Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.     

The spiritual benefits of travel for senior tourists

This research explores the spiritual benefits of travel for older adults and illustrates how travel meets seniors' self‐actualization and spiritual growth needs. The theoretical point of departure for this research is seniors' quest for meaning and self‐actualization, which act as push factors inducing older adults to travel. Semistructured depth interviews were conducted with 16 retired senior informants who had extensive travel experience. Using an interpretive method, this research reveals four key themes that illustrate the spiritual benefits of travel, thereby extending the growing literature on the motivations of senior travelers. These themes are described as “traveling generates meaning for older adults,” “traveling reveals the self to older adults,” “traveling encourages older adults to better understand others,” and “traveling enables older adults to better understand their relationship to nature”. In sum, the themes describe how older adults may meet their unique spiritual needs through travel and thereby enhance their spiritual development. This research represents one of a few studies examining senior tourism to employ an interpretive method and provides rich insights as a result. This research also extends the emerging research on spirituality in marketing by illustrating how the tourism industry may benefit from a perspective that considers the spiritual benefits of consumption. The research findings suggest that the intangible spiritual benefits of travel, in addition to the tangible benefits, should be highlighted in travel offers and tourism communications targeted to older adults. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Autonoetic consciousness: Reconsidering the role of episodic memory in future-oriented self-projection

Following the seminal work of Ingvar (1985. “Memory for the future”: An essay on the temporal organization of conscious awareness. Human Neurobiology, 4, 127–136), Suddendorf (1994. The discovery of the fourth dimension: Mental time travel and human evolution. Master's thesis. University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand), and Tulving (1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/PsychologieCanadienne, 26, 1–12), exploration of the ability to anticipate and prepare for future contingencies that cannot be known with certainty has grown into a thriving research enterprise. A fundamental tenet of this line of inquiry is that future-oriented mental time travel, in most of its presentations, is underwritten by a property or an extension of episodic recollection. However, a careful conceptual analysis of exactly how episodic memory functions in this capacity has yet to be undertaken. In this paper I conduct such an analysis. Based on conceptual, phenomenological, and empirical considerations, I conclude that the autonoetic component of episodic memory, not episodic memory per se, is the causally determinative factor enabling an individual to project him or herself into a personal future.     

An unwelcome consequence of the Multiverse Thesis

The Multiverse Thesis is a proposed solution to the Grandfather Paradox. It is popular and well promulgated, found in fiction, philosophy and (most importantly) physics. I first offer a short explanation on behalf of its advocates as to why it qualifies as a theory of time travel (as opposed to mere ‘universe hopping’). Then I argue that the thesis nevertheless has an unwelcome consequence: that extended objects cannot travel in time. Whilst this does not demonstrate that the Multiverse Thesis is false, the consequence should give pause for concern. Even if it does not lead one to reject the thesis, I briefly detail some reasons to think it is interesting nonetheless.     

Making decisions with the future in mind: Developmental and comparative identification of mental time travel

Mechanisms that produce behavior which increase future survival chances provide an adaptive advantage. The flexibility of human behavior is at least partly the result of one such mechanism, our ability to travel mentally in time and entertain potential future scenarios. We can study mental time travel in children using language. Current results suggest that key developments occur between the ages of three to five. However, linguistic performance can be misleading as language itself is developing. We therefore advocate the use of methodologies that focus on future-oriented action. Mental time travel required profound changes in humans’ motivational system, so that current behavior could be directed to secure not just present, but individually anticipated future needs. Such behavior should be distinguishable from behavior based on current drives, or on other mechanisms. We propose an experimental paradigm that provides subjects with an opportunity to act now to satisfy a need not currently experienced. This approach may be used to assess mental time travel in nonhuman animals. We conclude by describing a preliminary study employing an adaptation of this paradigm for children.     

Choice, changeover, and travel

Since foraging in nature can be viewed as instrumental behavior, choice between sources of food, known as “patches,” can be viewed as choice between instrumental response alternatives. Whereas the travel required to change alternatives deters changeover in nature, the changeover delay (COD) usually deters changeover in the laboratory. In this experiment, pigeons were exposed to laboratory choice situations, concurrent variable-interval schedules, that were standard except for the introduction of a travel requirement for changeover. As the travel requirement increased, rate of changeover decreased and preference for a favored alternative strengthened. When the travel requirement was small, the relations between choice and relative reinforcement revealed the usual tendencies toward matching and undermatching. When the travel requirement was large, strong overmatching occurred. These results, together with those from experiments in which changeover was deterred by punishment or a fixed-ratio requirement, deviate from the matching law, even when a correction is made for cost of changeover. If one accepted an argument that the COD is analogous to travel, the results suggest that the norm in choice relations would be overmatching. This overmatching, however, might only be the sign of an underlying strategy approximating optimization.     

Mereological Explanation and Time Travel

I have previously argued in a paper with Robson that a particular time travel scenario favours perdurantism over endurantism on the grounds that endurantists must give up on the Weak Supplementation Principle. Smith has responded, arguing that the reasons we provided are insufficient to warrant this conclusion. This paper agrees with that conclusion (for slightly different reasons: that even the perdurantist has to give up on the Weak Supplementation Principle) but argues that the old argument can be supplanted with a new one.     

Queer encounters of sexuality and class: Navigating emotional landscapes of academia

In this piece I consider processes of being (or becoming) on the academic map and the emotional disjunctures across time and place felt in occupying academia, in conducting research and in moving through intersecting spaces of teaching-research. The promise of entering and achieving in Higher Education is at once seductive (CVs produced, academic stars circulated internationally) and disturbing, felt and encountered across the university environment, via administrative, teaching and research concerns. These points of arriving, departing and travelling through institutional space intersect with what I feel about occupying academia. The emotional ‘stickiness’ of these contexts contrasts with the vision of the engaged, inclusive institution that now welcomes all through its door, with this rhetoric of arrival and belonging effacing starting points, varied journeys, different labours and divided recognitions. These are emotional matters manifest in teaching and research encounters, where a ‘critical pedagogy’ may be read as a failure, mobilised by the angry, emotional feminist academic, rather than her ‘neutral’ ‘objective’ ‘rational’ un-emotional counterpart. In arguing for an emotional presence constituted in and through teaching and research, I consider the emotional landscape of class and sexuality in particular, asking what is taken with us as we travel through academia, where feminist research in particular has been critical of the travelling subject (or ‘self’), who tells only their own story.     

Travel time and concurrent-schedule choice: retrospective versus prospective control

Six pigeons were trained on concurrent variable-interval schedules in which two different travel times between alternatives, 4.5 and 0.5 s, were randomly arranged. In Part 1, the next travel time was signaled while the subjects were responding on each alternative. Generalized matching analyses of performance in the presence of the two travel-time signals showed significantly higher response and time sensitivity when the longer travel time was signaled compared to when the shorter time was signaled. When the data were analyzed as a function of the previous travel time, there were no differences in sensitivity. Dwell times on the alternatives were consistently longer in the presence of the stimulus that signaled the longer travel time than they were in the presence of the stimulus that signaled the shorter travel time. These results are in accord with a recent quantitative account of the effects of travel time. In Part 2, no signals indicating the next travel time were given. When these data were analyzed as a function of the previous travel time, time-allocation sensitivity after the 4.5-s travel time was significantly greater than that after the 0.5-s travel time, but no such difference was found for response allocation. Dwell times were also longer when the previous travel time had been longer.