Court populations in need of services: defining the court's role

Court populations frequently include individuals in need of educational, employment, health, housing, mental health, social, and other types of services that are not commonly provided by the judicial system. Courts vary in the ways they address the service needs of these individuals based on a variety of factors specific to their respective jurisdiction. Following a discussion of some of these approaches, the article offers a framework, based on Bronfenbrenner's human development paradigm and its focus on environmental contexts, to help courts more systematically and comprehensively define their role in service issues within the legal and service parameters of their own jurisdiction. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

绝对的公平和相对的公平

效率和公平是经济伦理的两大原则 ,也是制定和衡量经济政策的价值依据 ,但大部分经济学家都认为 ,效率和公平存在着不可调和的矛盾 ,使得人们在指导经济行为和制定经济政策时处于两难境地。本文通过对自由主义、平等主义和功利主义公平观的批判 ,试图说明 ,从历史唯物主义的立场出发 ,抛弃绝对的公平观 ,主张相对的公平观 ,便能够解决这个难题。     

The role of closure in defining the "objects" of object-based attention

Many recent studies have concluded that the underlying units of visual attention are often discrete objects whose boundaries constrain the allocation of attention. However, relatively few studies have explored the particular stimulus cues that determine what counts as an "object" of attention. We explore this issue in the context of the two-rectangles stimuli previously used by many investigators. We first show, using both spatial-cuing and divided-attention paradigms, that same-object advantages occur even when the ends of the two rectangles are not drawn. This is consistent with previous reports that have emphasized the importance of individual contours in guiding attention, and our study shows that such effects can occur in displays that also contain grouping cues. In our divided-attention experiment, however, this contour-driven same-object advantage was significantly weaker than that obtained with the standard stimulus, with the added cue of closure--demonstrating that contour-based processes are not the whole story. These results confirm and extend the observation that same-object advantages can be observed even without full-fledged objects. At the same time, however, these studies show that boundary closure-one of the most important cues to objecthood per se-can directly influence attention. We conclude that object-based attention is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon; object-based effects can be independently strengthened or weakened by multiple cues to objecthood.     

The role of thought-content and mood in the preparative benefits of upward counterfactual thinking

Upward counterfactual thoughts identify how a prior outcome could have been better and have been shown to improve subsequent performance. Both the identification of corrective actions (content-specific effects) and the more general mobilization of effort as a result of negative affect (content-neutral effects) have been suggested to underlie performance benefits. The results of three experiments presented here indicate that counterfactual thoughts have broad benefits for performance, independent of their content and beyond the effects of planning. These benefits were consistently dependent upon the experience of negative affect, but were eliminated when negative affect could be (mis)attributed to an intervening task. This misattribution effect is consistent with the operation of a mood-as-input process in which affect informs judgments of goal progress. Overall, the findings suggest that the benefits of upward counterfactual thinking reflect more broad attempts to improve following a subjectively unsatisfactory performance.     

Fairness and futility

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - William Lane Craig argues that both God and immortality are required for life to have meaning; life is futile without either of the two. I argue...     

Fairness and preference

Two equity models were evaluated by fitting them to subjects' judgments of the fairness of payment distributions to “self” and “other” under hypothetical work situations. Neither the E. Walster, G. W. Walster, and E. Berscheid (Equity: Theory and Research, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1978) equity formulation nor Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear model adequately accounted for the fairness judgments regardless of whether self worked more or less than other. Subjects also were asked to indicate their most preferred payment distributions and these preferences were significantly different from the fairness judgments. Results suggested that fairness judgments were influenced by a bias in the direction of overpayment to self.     

Well-Being and Fairness

The article explores the interaction of two, potentially clashing, considerations, each reflecting a different conception of fairness concerning the resolution of interpersonal conflicts. According to the Equal Chance Principle, the harm for each person should be minimized in a significant and (roughly) equal degree; when this is impossible, each person should be accorded the highest possible equal chance to avoid the harm. According to the Importance Principle, the danger to the person who would otherwise suffer the more serious harm should be prevented. An erratum to this article is available at .     

The benefits of being present: mindfulness and its role in psychological well-being

Mindfulness is an attribute of consciousness long believed to promote well-being. This research provides a theoretical and empirical examination of the role of mindfulness in psychological well-being. The development and psychometric properties of the dispositional Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) are described. Correlational, quasi-experimental, and laboratory studies then show that the MAAS measures a unique quality of consciousness that is related to a variety of well-being constructs, that differentiates mindfulness practitioners from others, and that is associated with enhanced self-awareness. An experience-sampling study shows that both dispositional and state mindfulness predict self-regulated behavior and positive emotional states. Finally, a clinical intervention study with cancer patients demonstrates that increases in mindfulness over time relate to declines in mood disturbance and stress.     

Fairness in life and Death Cases

John Taurek famously argued that, in ‘conflict cases’, where we are confronted with a smaller and a larger group of individuals, and can choose which group to save from harm, we should toss a coin, rather than saving the larger group. This is primarily because coin-tossing is fairer: it ensures that each individual, regardless of the group to which he or she belongs, has an equal chance of being saved. This article provides a new response to Taurek’s argument. It proposes that there are two possible types of unfairness that have to be avoided in conflict cases, as far as possible: ‘selection unfairness’, which is the unfairness of not giving individuals an equal chance of being saved; and ‘outcome unfairness’, which is the unfairness of not actually saving them, when others are saved. Since saving the greater number generates less outcome unfa-irness than coin-tossing, it is argued that, in many conflict cases, fairness demands that we save the greater number.     

Fairness in Financial Reporting

ABSTRACT Public companies in most countries are legally required to publish annual accounts, and these are widely used for making financial decisions. To prevent users of accounts being misled into making disastrous decisions, all major Western countries have introduced controls on the ways accounts are presented. By British and EEC law a company's accounts must give a 'true and fair view' of its financial state.
It has become widely accepted that if accounts are prepared according to standards drawn up by the accounting profession itself, then they can be considered as being 'true and fair'. In this paper it is argued that such an interpretation of 'true and fair' gives inadequate protection to users. How users' interests might be better protected is discussed. Finally, it is suggested that Rawls' notion of a 'veil of ignorance' could be used to ensure that in the preparation of accounts equal regard is paid to the interests of different types of user.     

Fairness in Technological Design

This paper addresses an important multi-disciplinary issue of current interest, that is, the implications of technological design for fairness. A visual, graphical methodology centered on the Taylor-Russell diagram is proposed to address this issue. The Taylor-Russell diagram helps to identify and explore ways in which predictions built into designs can pit the interests of different constituencies against one another. The configuration of the design represents a trade-off between the interests of the communities involved. Whether or not the trade-off is appropriate constitutes a problem of fairness or distributive justice. The breadth of this methodology is supported by a diversity of examples analyzed. These include a surveillance system, an automotive safety system, a civic information system, and the international food distribution system. These examples provide models for application of the methodology to the analysis of designs in further areas of concern. Limitations of the methodology are also discussed. While it helps to identify and clarify issues of fairness in technology design, the methodology does not provide a general theory of fairness, nor can it provide fair solutions to such issues without appeal to further principles or concepts.     

Fairness and political obligation

Abstract

In this paper I offer a limited defence of “fairness” or “fair play” arguments for political obligation by focussing on one important critique of such arguments, that offered by A. John Simmons. I isolate Simmons’s concentration on the idea of “accepting” benefits and argue that, among other difficulties, his criteria for when we can be said to accept a benefit from our political communities are too restrictive. While the scope of the discussion is narrow, I try to sketch ways in which the failings of Simmons’s critique are symptomatic of deeper problems with his libertarian approach.     

A three city comparison of the public's knowledge and attitudes about AIDS

A survey of knowledge, beliefs and attitudes about AIDS was administered simultaneously in San Francisco, New York and London to a total of 399 persons. The aim was to investigate how such knowledge and attitudes may he influenced by social and cultural contexts, as well as by disease epidemiology. Across all samples of the general public (excluding risk group members) in the three cities, general fear of AIDS and anti-gay attitudes were significantly negatively correlated with knowledge about AIDS. In the London sample, general fear of AIDS and anti-gay attitudes were significantly and positively associated with both sexual and general health behavior change. Only sexual behavior change, however, was significantly correlated with general fear of AIDS and anti-gay variables for the New York sample. Neither of these variables was significantly associated with behavior change of any kind in the San Francisco sample. We accounted for these inter-city differences by proposing a four-stage model of public response to an epidemic over time. Our data support the need for specific programs aimed at the general public that take into account sociocultural and AIDS epidemiologic differences across different sociocultural contexts.     

Fair equality of opportunity and decent minimums: a reply to Buchanan

Responding to criticism by Allen Buchanan in a Winter 1984 Philosophy and Public Affairs article on "The right to a decent minimum of health care," Daniels defends his thesis that if justice requires protecting equality of opportunity, then health care institutions should be governed by the principle of fair equality of opportunity because impairments of normal functioning, seen as impediments to opportunity, are obviated by good health care. He defines his concept of normal opportunity range, which is relative to certain social considerations, and shows that health care services affect the distribution of opportunity, but not the normal opportunity range, among individuals. He agrees with the criticism that his argument does not guarantee minimum health care or solve problems of resource allocation.