Identifying unreliable informants: do children excuse past inaccuracy?

In three experiments (N = 123; 148; 28), children observed a video in which two speakers offered alternative labels for unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds endorsed the label given by a speaker who had previously labeled familiar objects accurately, rather than that given by a speaker with a history of inaccurate labeling, even when the inaccurate speaker erred only while blindfolded. In Experiments 2 and 3, 3‐ to 7‐year‐olds showed no preference for the label given by a previously inaccurate but blindfolded speaker, over that given by a second inaccurate speaker with no obvious excuse for erring. Children based their endorsements on speakers’ history of accuracy or inaccuracy irrespective of the speakers’ information access at the time, raising doubts that children made mentalistic interpretations of speakers’ inaccuracy.     

What’s the point? Domestic dogs’ sensitivity to the accuracy of human informants

Animal Cognition - Dogs excel at understanding human social-communicative gestures like points and can distinguish between human informants who vary in characteristics such as knowledge or...     

Domestic dogs’ (Canis familiaris) choices in reference to agreement among human informants on location of food

When interacting with others, informants may offer conflicting information or information of varying accuracy. Recent research suggests that young children do not trust all informants equally and are selective in both whom they solicit for information and whose claims they support. We explored whether domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) are similarly sensitive to agreement among informants. To this end, we utilized a common human gesture, pointing, to which recent research suggests dogs are sensitive. We conducted two experiments in which an experimenter secretly hid food in one of two clear containers while the dog was distracted. Next, a small group moved to indicate the food's location using stationary points positioned above the containers. In Experiment 1, two experimenters moved to stand behind the non-baited container, while a third experimenter moved to stand behind the baited container. Then, all directed one static point at the container in front of them. Experiment 2 exactly resembled Experiment 1 with the exception that the single experimenter standing behind the baited container directed two static points at the container (one with each hand). Dogs chose the container indicated by the majority in Experiment 1 significantly more often than chance, but chose the container indicated by the minority in Experiment 2 significantly more often than chance. This suggests that the number of points, not the number of people, more strongly influenced dogs' choices.